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This thesis examines the growth and significance of private security 
in the United Kingdom. It details the broad commercial functions and 
lack of public accountability of the private security sector and draws 
out the implications for civil liberties and public policy. 
This is a subject which has been seriously neglected in criminology, 
sociology and related disciplines in Britain. This thesis is the 
first (publicly available) criminological study of private security in 
Britain to bring together such a range of material and concerns. It 
draws upon original 'case-study' observational field-work and on 
interviews with a wide range of respondents, in private security, the 
police, Parliament, journalism,, trade unions, civil liberties groups 
and academia. Extensive literature review and collaborative work with 
various involved parties also support the research. 
An Introductory chapter provides background to the research and 
outlines the structure of the thesis. The second chapter presents two 
Icase studies' based upon the observational field-work, discusses 
aspects of methodology and draws out those points which broadened the 
nature of the research project and those which have particular 
relevance for subsequent chapters. The next chapter discusses the 
range and activities of the private security sector. 
The chapter on the issue of licensing examines 'causes for concern', 
present arrangements for self-regulation, the role of the professional 
Associations and of the Home Office, considers the experience of other 
jurisdictions and generally presents the case for public regulation 
and accountability. 
A theoretical chapter charts the conditions conducive to the post-war 
growth of private security, takes issue with previous theoretical 
accounts and develops an analysis in which political relations with 
and within the state are forefronted. A concluding chapter offers 
cautionary comments on the limits and desirability of some possible 
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Focusing and Blurring: An Introduction to a Study of Private Security 
as an Agency of Social Control, its Commercial Functions, Public 
Accountability and Relationship to the State 
1 
"One need only pause for a minute to see that although in 
areas I ike mental illness the private sector might genuinely 
displace the state, this would be an impossible outcome in 
crime control. For the state to give up here would be to 
undercut its very claim to legitimacy. " 
(Cohen,, 1983: 117) 
This thesis started out as a straightforward observational study of 
private security 'at work'. It ended up as a somewhat more ambitious 
examination of the range of activities within what I came to call the 
Private Security Sector. 1 an exploration of issues of accountability 
and an attempt to develop a new theoretical account of the phenomenal 
growth of private security and of how it is accorded legitimacy within 
the state without detracting from the legitimacy of the state itself. 
I came to this study with a criminological interest in what is broadly 
termed social control (c. f. Cohen, 1985). From an original interest 
in industrial sociology I had moved through under-graduate and 
graduate work on the 'underside' of industrial relations, looking at 
the ' under-workings of the work-place' (South, 1978 (a)), to a 
recognition that there was another little-noted side to this area 
apart from workers' involvement in the Hidden Economy, industrial 
sabotage, work-place resistance and so on - this was the dimension of 
control. 
Initially, the area of 'social control at work in the work-place seemed 
not merely under-developed but virtually barren. ' However, at the same 
time as my own interest developed some of the original hidden economy 
writers began to indicate the significance of areas of commercial 
justice (Ditton, 1977) and of private security (Henry, 1978). In a 
co-authored critique of some of this early work (Scraton and South, 
1978/79) 1 began to explore one arena of what we ref erred to as 
private justice. By this time I had already embarked on what had been 
conceived as an ethnographic study of private security workers. 
Informed by a continuing interest in the traditions of the sociology 
of deviance, influenced and stimulated by the tension between 
Interactionism and the New Criminology and with supervisory guidance 
from an anthropologist keen to apply the theory and methods of that 
discipline to industrial societies, the subject of private security, 
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(after a brief flirtation with the idea of prison guards), seemed 
ideal for some form of observational study. 
As I indicate in Chapter 2, this proved a good starting point for what 
turned into a different kind of study. The observational work began 
to raise questions - as field-work should - about broader features of 
the private security enterprise. It also confirmed the value of the 
field-work per-se. 
As a system of social control with strong similarities to the police, 
private security nonetheless remains unique by virtue of its private 
status and many other characteristics. For example, despite the 
heterogeneity of functions across the private security sector there is 
a strong homogeneity in terms of occupational values shared from low- 
grade operational staff to the most senior members of the board. 
These values are reinforced by a variety of factors which I shall 
identify in Chapters 2 and 5 particularly. But most striking from 
fieldwork was that this is a business with confidence and optimism. 
Uniquely, when other enterprises are sorely beset, even in the service 
sector to which the present government pins such hopes, the private 
security business is expanding rapidly and significantly (cf. Chapter 
3). Sociologically this has a strong significance. Workers' 
attachment to the values of their occupations and goals of their 
organisations may be undermined where they see their industry as in 
decline or stagnating. In private security, workers can not only feel 
that they are doing a 'good and useful' job, supporting the police and 
the status quo, but also that the evident demand for their services 
and success of the industry indicates public approval and demand. 
At the same time, these reinforced occupational values and the sense 
of worth, common from guard room to board room, bolsters the sense of 
a strong boundary between the occupation and the rest of society that 
requires the private security service. This affirmation of boundary, 
contributed to by a host of features of private security such as the 
uniform., the secrecy of undercover work, the accountability to 
clients, and so on, was made clear throughout the field work. Thus 
although the description of the breadth of the private security sector 
in Chapter 3 and the broader analysis of Chapter 5 are essential 
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complements to the fieldwork of Chapter 2, the analysis of the former 
required the framework of ideas and directions of enquiry derived from 
the latter. The fieldwork, for example, stressed the importance of 
'boundaries', both within private security and between it and society. 
This theme is now taken up empirically and theoretically throughout 
the thesis. 
Simi 1a rly , the recognition that certain features i dent if ied were 
occupationally specific, for example, long hours, low pay, little 
training, lack of impact of unionisation, etc., suggested, among other 
things, that these would also be found in private security in other 
countries and that legislative responses in other jurisdictions would 
have had to deal with parallel problems. 
Hence, although a survey of private security in practice in other 
countries could not be attempted, fieldwork conclusions strongly 
suggested that there are enough features of private security that are 
occupationally specific to make reference to other models of licensing 
and regulation abroad., a sound exercise. In otherwords, examining 
other models of licensing in other countries would be of relatively 
little value if we could not take it that they shared at least some 
strong common ground in their coverage. 
As field-work continued, a literature search progressed, slowly 
picking up the sparse and disparate studies available in this subject 
area. By the time that an opportunity arose to work with other 
researchers developing a policy related interest in this area, (cf. 
O. C. P. U., 1978), and to subsequently assist and gain access to the 
files of Bruce George M. P. who was attempting to introduce a 
Parliamentary Bill to provide for the licensing and regulation of 
private security, my aspirations for the research project had grown 
considerab1y. Although two books, one by a lawyer and one by a 
political scientist (cf. Draper, 1978; Bowden, 1978) added 
substantially at this point to the little that had been written about 
private security in the United Kingdom_, (cf. Wiles and McLintock, 
1972; Bunyan, 1976; Henry, 1978), a full and detailed treatment frCm a 
sociological and criminological perspective was still unavailable and 
seemed to validate the re-orientation of the thesis. 
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The significance of the expansion of private security had been evident 
to various representatives of the police service and the Police 
Federation for some years, and periodically various media reports had, 
and continued to focus on either 'heroic' or 'sinister' aspects of 
private security in operation. In other countries policy debates had 
flourished for decades, or at least a few years, resulting in various 
schemes for licensing and regulation of certain aspects of the private 
security sector. Meanwhile, the fruits of pioneering work by 
Shearing, Stenning et al. in Canada and Spitzer and Scull in the 
U. S. A., were just beginning to receive attention, (cf. Shearing, 
Farnell and Stenning, 1980; Shearing and Stenning, 1981; Freedman and 
Stenning, 1977; Stenning and Cornish, 1975; etc.; Spitzer and Scull, 
1977 (a), (b)). 
As I began to reorganise the thesis, the observational field-work 
which had generated questions about legitimacy, 'hidden' services such 
as undercover work, and 'where did private security come fromV became 
the pivot for the broader study. It was to be framed by an historical 
investigation of the lineage of private initiatives in policing and 
social control from medieval times, through the 19th Century 
development of the 'new' police to the post-World War II period. This 
would bring the history up-to-date and the description of the range of 
activities and breadth of services within the private security sector 
would naturally follow. Continued engagement with policy relevance 
and theoretical explanations would be reflected in chapters on 
accountability and regulation and on critique of other theoretical 
positions and development of a new account., one which, in particular, 
moved away from the North American bias of the most sophisticated 
offerings available and took into account the specificity of the U. K. 
situation. 
In the event, the sheer length of the various drafts of 
project necessitated yet another reorganisation. Yet 
has clearly been for the best, for the thesis as it is 
is a rather more 'honest' presentation, unfolding, as 
way that the research developed - albeit now with the h 
omitted. 
this ambitious 
in a sense this 
presented here 
it does, in the 
istory sections 
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One final point needs to be made about how the thesis progressed 
(however slowly). Although elements of the theoretical analysis were 
proposed at an early stage (cf. South., 1978 (b)), the development both 
of theoretical propositions and of the arguments for a system of 
regulation has been sustained through a lengthy period of literature 
review, dialogue with other researchers and interested parties, and 
personal involvement in raising issues around accountability. 
regulation, low pay., civil liberties, unionisation and lessons to be 
learned from comparative studies. 
Whilst a study of this area which began now would have far less 
difficulty in conducting and presenting a 'literature review' of some 
worth and validity, nonetheless, relative to the body of work on other 
agencies of social control (such as the police, institutions of 
incarceration, mechanisms of decarceration and diversion and so on), 
there remains a general paucity of material with the thematic 
coherence which would make a conventional literature review worthwhile 
and useful. It has therefore seemed more appropriate to refer to that 
literature which has an informative or incidental bearing on the 
subject at those points where its relevance is most evident. Debate 
with the literature that is more sustained and substantial in its 
treatment of the various issues taken up in this thesis, is 
principally found in Chapters 4 and 5. 
However., in what follows I can initially 'set some of the scene' about 
ideas which helped to shape the thesis by outlining some of the 
general debates and reference points to which the thesis relates. I 
shall then briefly review the chapter structure of the thesis; what 
the thesis is not about; and, finally, its intention to locate the 
private security sector within the social control continuum and relate 
it to broader relevant developments. 
Some General Debates and Reference Points 
What would be an adequate definition of private security? Perhaps at 
one level simply a good description of it, covering how and where it 
operates, how big it is and so on. But a rather more sophisticated 
enquiry might ask about its relationship to other social institutions, 
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for example the police, the state and so on. Exploring these avenues 
might raise questions about underlying features of the phenomenon - 
its legitimacy, its 'Weltanschauung', its deeper mechanisms and 
functions (in the senses developed by Foucault, 1977) and even, beyond 
the face value of the terms, what can be said about the privatisation 
of that security which all members of the commonweal quite naturally 
desire for themselves, their families, friends and communities. In 
the following chapters I shall attempt to present empirical and 
theoretical accounts exploring such diverse questions. Here I can 
only offer some initial reference points. 
Defining private security might start by asking how it defines itself. 
One of the most articulate, vocal - and relatively liberal - 
spokespersons of the private security guard, alarm and transport 
industries,, is J. Phil lip-Sorenson of Group 4 Security. Speaking at a 
Cambridge University, Institute of Criminology Cropwood Conference in 
1971, (cf. Wiles and McLintock, 1972), Sorenson defined private 
security services as operating: 
"almost always in private industrial and commercial premises, 
behind the traditional and legal boundary of the factory 
fence, which the police cannot lawfully cross unless by 
invitation or in other special circumstances. Our principal 
task is to prevent loss and minimise risk to people and 
property in private places and we have no function in the 
preservation of law and order in the public sector. " 
Building upon Sorenson's statement, Garner (1978) offers a "workable 
definition of the private security industry" as: 
"firms offering services or products designed as protection 
against fire and/or theft primarily in the private sector of 
property where the police have limited access. " 
72) 
Having offered her compromise definition,, Garner then goes on to note 
several very pertinent problems with it. First, the commercial term 
'firms' may exclude 'in-house' security which constitutes a separate 
department within larger organisations, servicing the organisation 
with private security services but not offering them for hire to 
others. A focus on private security firms or the 'industry' is then, 
too narrow. Secondly, Garner suggests, the range of 'products' to be 
included poses a problem. The example of curved mirror manufacturers 
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is offered at what may seem a mundane level, but which in fact 
represents a highly profitable industry in itself. Is this part of 
the private security industry because their product is often used for 
security purposes? Similarly, Garner asks, although lock and key 
manufacturers are obvious inclusions in any definition, where does one 
place the services of the 'heel bar' key cutting counters which have 
prol if erated? (Garner, ibid). Thirdly, even the term 'services' must 
come under scrutiny for its vagueness. Thi s poses a prob I em f or 
Garner in the distinction between protecting property and guarding 
people. Perceptively, she hints at one solution to this dilemma at 
the levels of theory and dehumanising practice, when she observes 
that: 
"the guarding of illegal immigrants at airports, undertaken by Securicor, does equate people with property and treats 
them as commodities not persons. " 
(ibid. ) 
A fourth confusion arises over determining where public and private 
territorial limits are drawn. For example, in the Prevention of Crime 
Act, 1953, a public place is defined as: 
any place to which, at the material time, the public have or 
are permitted access, whether on payment or otherwise. " 
(ibid: 73) 
Thus private security guards working in shopping precincts find 
themselves working in a privately-owned building and space but in a 
public place (ibid. ), an anomaly which is a source of some legal 
confusion and which has implications for the role of private security 
in those functions which Sorenson refers to, regarding "the 
preservation of law and order in the public sector, " (cf. Stenning and 
Shearing, 1980, (b): Shearing and Stenning, 1981,1983). 
If the task of def i ni ng what pri vate securi ty does and wh ere, is 
difficu1t, open to debate and in need of c1 ari fi cati on , then the 
related question of how big 'it' is - logically - becomes even more of 
an obdurate problem. Bowden (1978), for example, concedes that it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the size of the private security 
'industry' (let alone the make-up of what I refer to as the rather 
broader private security sector). However, one can at least, he 
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suggests, be "a good deal more precise about the logistical capability 
of the larger commercialised companies, " (ibid: 255). Where such 
precision is actually to be found remains unclear unfortunately, for 
Bowden then resorts to the estimates of capability provided by Bunyan 
(1976) - which were certainly open to some question as accurate for 
the mid-1970s. This is not to be critical of Bowden,, rather to take 
the first opportunity (which I shall repeat! ) to emphasize the dearth 
of information available in this area. 
In 1978, a report on The Private Security Industry was prepared by a 
working group of the Outer Circle Policy Unit and submitted to the 
Home Office as it considered a Green Paper 'Discussion Document' on 
the subject. The report discussed a wide variety of issues related to 
private security but observed that "the problems are created not by 
the existence of the industry", since it is no affront to any formal 
constitutional understanding., and indeed obligations remain on the 
public to help to 'maintain the peace'. Rather, problems stem from: 
"its size and pervasiveness, and the gradual assumption of 
quasi-public duties and the claim to authority implicit in 
the wearing of uniforms. The security industry has become 
in effect an auxiliary of the police in crime prevention and 
an important exception to the general trend of regarding the 
police as exclusively responsible for the prevention of 
crime. " 
(O. C. P. U., 1978: 9) 
I shall take up several of these issues later (particularly in Chapter 
4), but here, considering the latter points, perhaps private security 
could be construed as an affront to certain informal 'constitutional 
understandings'. Could then the nature of "general" expectations 
about policing, provision of security and crime- prevention, provide 
clarificatory and conceptual leverage? 
In an essay on private policing in the USA as a suitable case for 
research. Becker (1974) asked if we could use the idea of 
'sponsorship' as a basis for distinguishing between private and public 
forms of policing? This proposal excludes vigilantes and voluntary 
deputies who are unpaid, although the distinction between the two is 
still clearly between private and public spheres. But convergence and 
overlap render "such a simple distinction (as) not possible" Becker 
finds. 
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Examining the nature of services performed, Becker concludes that: 
"at best private and public functions seemed to be turned 
around from traditional images. Thus we find private police 
performing the more aggressive crime control and 
apprehension functions, while public police perform more 
prevention, order and maintenance and community service 
functions ... The area in which private police seem to be taking over is that of theft prevention,, protection of 
private premises and the types of more minor crimes that 
used to be curtailed by the presence of policemen on the 
beat. " 
Thus shifting bases of role and responsibil ity, whil st analytical ly 
very useful in addressing the changing division of policing labour, 
(cf. Chapter 5), do not really provide a clear definition of the two 
policing/security forms or one which helps us to better understand 
their development and practice. 
To move beyond the narrowly didactic approach to the elusive research 
subject - e. g. private security can be defined in this way because it 
differs from the police in that way, it performs these services for 
these interests, it is such and such a size with so many employees and 
so many armoured vehicles, and so on, -I must briefly refer to some 
broader sources of theoretical influence and relevance. 
A New Criminology with an Old Focus? 
The mythical., but often assumed, unil i near march of theory in 
criminology and the sociology of deviance (Young, 1981: 250), has only 
relatively recently moved on from the situation where, as Spitzer 
(1975: 638) writes: 
"prior to the 1960s, the subject matter of deviancy theory 
was taken for granted and few were disturbed by its 
preoccupation with 'dramatic' and 'predatory' forms of 
social behaviour. " 
After the 1 abel Ii ng and conf 1 ict theori sts of the 1960s (and early 
1970s) had reappropriated the rationality and humanity of thE deviant, 
occasionally to the point of panegyric, the 'materialist romanticism' 
of many writing in the wake of the New Criminologists (cf. Taylor, 
Walton and Young, 1973; 1975), reawakened a corpus (or corpse? ) of 
interest in the control agencies engaged in what Spitzer refers to 
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(without so much as a nod towards Lemert, 1971) as "deviancy 
production". As Spitzer contends: 
"The changing character of 'problem populations' is related to 'deviance production' in much the same way that 
variations in material resources affect manufacturing. 
Changes in the quantity and quality of raw materials influence the scope and priorities of production, but the 
characteristics of the final product depend as much on the 
methods of production as the source material. " 
After the defining and etiological descriptions of deviance- 
"Th e se meth ods c ompr i se the th i rd el emen tin devi ance 
production- the development and operation of the control 
system. [our] theory must explain why a system of control 
emerges under specific conditions and account for its size, 
focus and working assumptions. " 
(ibid.: 640-1) 
The emphasis upon locating systems of control, and their discernible 
features under specific conditions is one prescription for broadening 
the enterprise. Yet still, as Edwards and Scullion (1982: 322) have 
noted., "systematic attention to the controllers of deviance has been 
rare. " Plummer, (1979: 110) has persuasively argued that it is not the 
province of the sociologist of deviance to be overly concerned with 
the agents of control, for the subject of the deviancy tradition is 
properly the study of the devalued groups who are controlled. More 
surprising, argue Edwards and Scullion, is the claim that can be made 
that the 'New Criminology' "has ignored agents of control, " 
especially, 
"given its central concern with locating deviance in a social 
and political context in which power is crucial. Yet 
detailed attention to the activities of controllers is 
ra re ... a new criminology is still a criminology. 
" 
(1982: 321-3) 
Foucault: A New Vision of Social Control? 
In recent years the work of Michel Foucault, arriving from outside the 
boundaries of new or conventional criminology (or sociology, history 
and philosophy, for that matter), has provided a major and significant 
stimulus to the study of systems of social control. But importantly, 
Foucault's work offers several key themes which resonate stronqly with 
some of the concerns which emerged out of the New Criminology debates. 
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For Foucault (1977) contemporary 'complex' societies are best 
characterised not in terms of their economic system their political 
structure or their social composition, but in terms of the 'mode of 
power' which pervades and thereby dominates them. Hussein (1978) 
captures part of the thrust of Foucault's thesis with both clarity and 
brevity: 
0-* the mode of action of power in disciplinary societies takes the form of the creation of a norm and the institution 
of procedures to rectify deviations from the norm. 
Therefore, 'At the heart of all disciplinary systems 
functions a small penal mechanism' (Foucault, 1977: 177). 
However, there are important differences between judicial 
penalty and disciplinary penalty. The former operates by 
referring to laws and judicial texts, the latter by 
referring to observable behaviour. " 
(Hussein, 1978: 937) 
The private security sector works precisely within a regime of, and 
with the raison d'etre of applying a code of, 'disciplinary penalty'. 
Revolving around 'protection' and 'surveillance' - and thereby also 
and crucially, protection from surveillance and intrusion in numerous 
forms, - its own mode of action must continually refer to "observable 
behaviour" and, by extension and necessity, the detection and/or 
anticipation of the unobservable. Given this, this thesis is informed 
by, and draws, not only upon developments in the broadening of 
criminological studies and concerns but also upon the suggestive work 
of Foucault and debates it has generated and coincided with; (see for 
example the essays in Fine et. al... 1979; Cohen, 1979). 
One key question for Foucault has obvious centrality here. Again 
Hussein (op. cit. ) summarises neatly: "what means"., Foucault asks, "do 
disciplinary institutions employ to secure discipline? " It is not 
necessary to detail here Foucault's exposition of the three principal 
means - (1) hierarchical observation, (2) normalising judgement, 
(3) 
examination: insofar as they are central to the practice of the 
private security sector their significance should shortly be apparent. 
It should suffice to emphasize here, my shared conviction that the 
power of organised observation is crucial , by noting Foucault's 
contention that: "The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism 
that coerces by means of observation" (1977: 170). 
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The Private and the Public: A Blurrinq of Boundaries? 
The distinction between the 'Private' and the 
the implications of 'privatisation' of arenas of 
and governance,, e. g. health, justice, policing, 
becoming increasingly complex in modern 
Understanding where the public/private divide 
is being blurred is of considerable relevance 
control, (cf. Cohen, 1979; 1983; Bottoms, 1983). 
, public' spheres, (and 
production, exchange 
wi thi n the 1 atter) ,is 
Nestern societies. 
is clearly in focus or 
to studies of social 
As one starting point, Williams (1976: 204) offers the following 
definition of 'the private' : 
"Private,, that is, in its positive senses, is a record of the 
1 egi timati on of a bourgeois view of 1 ife; the ultimate 
general ised privilege, however abstract in practice, of 
seclusion and protection from others (the public); of lack 
of accountabil ity to ' them' ; and in rel ated gai ns in 
closeness and comfort of these general kinds. As such, and 
especially in the senses of the rights of the individual (to 
his private life, or from a quite different tradition, to 
his civil liberties) and of the valued intimacy of family 
and friends, it has been widely adopted outside the strict 
bourgeois viewpoint. This is the real reason for its 
current complexity. " 
In the chapters that follow, it is worth bearing in mind the equation 
of ' the pri vate' wi th 'I ack of accountabi Ii ty' However, of more 
specific concern here is the nature of the private and the public in 
relation to systems of justice and security. 
In a slightly weary tone, the American political scientist, Hanna 
Pitkin (1981) has observed that: 
"The prevailing disillusionment with established leadership 
and institutions produces not protest but withdrawal into 
privacy, yet privatisation manifestly is not providing 
the 
comfort and security we seek. And all that anyone seems 
able to muster for calling people back ... is the 
familiar 
and incompatible pair of devices: the exhortation to civic 
duty, and the appeal to self-interest. Neither seems to 
be 
doing much good" 
(p. 327). 
Pri va ti s ati on (in both c omme rc i al and psychol ogi cal senses) promotes 
insularity and isolation, paranoia and prejudice, subverting any sense 
of 'social comfort' or 'comfort with society. 
The policing 
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ins ti tuti on s decl a re th ei rIi mi ta ti on s( and thei r own i nsecuri ti es) 
and appeal to a shared civic responsibility for the management of the 
contemporary social malaise. At the same time governments have been 
elected on the strength of comforting promises and strongly populist 
platforms,, self-interest is taken seriously and the privatisation of 
services is embraced, resonating with criticisms of the public sEctor. 
Within, and reflecting, such changes, the police and their role are 
changing. As the French legal theorist, Gleizal (1981: 362) remarks: 
"The police are being transformed. Their aim is no longer 
solely the maintenance of law and order ..., but also now to assure citizens' security. The police not only should 
exist but should also be liked. " 
Both the police and private security sector are increasingly 'image' 
conscious; they present themselves not simply as 'doing the job' but 
they also demand that they should be acknowledged for it - for their 
contribution; they "care" and should be given some credit for it. 
Furthermore,, the public should acknowledge their own responsibilities 
and contribute more to the policing and servicing of their 
communities. This is a further source of confusion around the 
boundaries of public and private arrangements for policing and 
security. 
Approaching the concepts of the private and the publ ic is evidently 
not straightforward. Sennett (1977: 16) has presented a conception of 
the "geography" of the public and the private. According to this view 
the private is "in here", personal, intimate, protected from intrusion 
by others -a space in which we are "free to be ourselves", (cf. 
Pitkin, 1981: 328). The public is "out there", "impersonal, distant, 
formal" - ready or liable for "publication", for openness and 
exposure, (cf. Sennett, 1977; Pitkin, 1981). This sort of distinction 
certainly meshes with much that is common-sense, yet, as Pitkin 
responds, what then is to be made of that expansive, intrusive 
phenomenon at the heart of the capitalist economy - the 'private 
enterprise'? Within the equally common-sense frame of economic 
imagery, the "'public sector' is divided from [the] private on the 
basis of ownership, and public means, roughly, government, the state" 
(Pitkin, 1981: 328). In terms of social interaction (and withdrawal 
from it), economic behaviour, and the ordering of society through 
means of government and so on, there are ample sources of confusion 
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about the boundaries and permeations between the private and the 
publ ic. 
Pitkin's erudite opening-out of the private/publ ic distinction also 
considers Hannah Arendt's (1958) conception of 'the public' as 
synonymous with 'political' public life in the sense of partaking in 
actions in a community of peers. While, here, 'the private' exhibits 
a tension between its historical connotation of the status of the 
'deprived' (think for example of low 'rank') and its additional 
association with 'privilege', and the "advantages of withdrawal". The 
distinction drawn by C. Wright Mills (1959) between "personal troubles 
of milieu" and "public issues of social structure" offers a further 
valid and suggestive dichotomy. 
The dil emma of approachi ng what is now obvi ously a di ff icul t 
distinction, cannot be resolved here by the offer of a 'correct' 
definition -a subject in itself for a different kind of thesis. For 
present purposes, this broadening of conception, and its corresponding 
blurring of lines of distinction, is intended to forewarn and fore-arm 
in anticipation of the following discussions of the tensions, 
symbiotic relations and compromise between 'private' and 'public' 
institutions, actions and philosophies. I return to this issue in 
Chapter 5, but the focusing and blurring of the private/public spheres 
is central to the general account of private security presented here. 
Outline of Chapter Structure 
As I have noted,, (with the omission, for reasons of space, of several 
chapters on the history of private policing initiatives), the thesis 
structure as presented broadly follows the way that the research 
developed. Two phases of fieldwork, (reported in Chapter 2), provided 
me with both covert and overt experience of working in private 
security companies. This sensitising period (coupled with background 
reading and discussions with 'significant others' ) raised questions 
(which I note in Chapter 2) , broadening the nature of what I was 
aiming to investigate. Most profoundly I realised that medium-sized 
guard and patrol security firms were but one aspect of a much wider, 
though I ess vi sibl e range of security services. This in turn 
15 
suggested that. if the undercover activi ties of the ' ordinary' , 
'respectable' firms raised questions about civil liberties issues, 
then the activities of the less visible agencies might well raise even 
more. Thus questions about the accountability and legitimacy of the 
private security agencies (or sector) coincided and resonated with the 
recurrent public issues of licensing and regulating private security. 
In Chapter 31 attempt to chart, on a broader and more detailed scale 
than has been available before, the activities and breadth of the 
private security sector. This account is unique in the very wide 
range of sources that it has been able to draw upon and its attempt to 
relate to other bodies of work in criminology and the sociology of law 
on policing and private justice. Chapter 4 takes up the matter of the 
accountability of the private security sector, again drawing upon 
diverse sources, engaging with past and current relevant debates, and 
attempting to consistently argue for a system of safeguards ensuring 
the regulation and accountability of the private security sector. 
During the time that Ih av e been d oi ng th is re search , pr esenti ng 
papers and writing up this thesis, the significance of private 
security has been noted by a widening number of other academic (and 
media) researchers and commentators. 2 Much of the resulting work has 
been illuminating, some rather less so. But in particular, the 
development of theoretical accounts of the growth, expansion and 
significance of private security has produced a number of 
sophisticated analyses. Notably the various works of Shearing and 
Stenning, Spitzer and Scull , and Weiss 
(see bibliography) have 
contributed much - not just to our understanding of private security 
per se, but also through relating to and engaging with other work on 
various dimensions of social control. In Chapter 5.1 review some of 
the key contributions of these authors, engaging in critical debate 
with their positions, in an attempt to develop a theoretical account 
of the private security sector which has some specificity with regard 
to the U. K. but which still relates to consanguine developments in 
other western societies. The Conclusion, Chapter 6, reiterates some 
points and adds cautionary warnings about others. 
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What the Thesis Does Not Cover 
I woul d claim that this thesis presents a more Comprehensive and 
critically researched picture of the breadth and significance of the 
private security sector than has been available heretofore - at least 
for the U. K. It still does not, however, definitively answer some of 
those ' basic' questions that I referred to earlier such as 'How big is 
it? ' Thi s question coul d have been answered with cynical and 
po I emi Cal ' guesstimates '. but such a resort woul d be both 
sociologically and politically dishonest and dangerous. Statistical 
information on private security in the U. K. is virtually non-existent, 
(cf. Chapters 3 and 4), and even in other countries, where licensing 
and/or other registration procedures have existed for some years, 
information of this order is very sparse. Even with the resources of 
a major ten-year project on private security in Canada,, Shearing and 
Stenning (1981) must observe that: 
"In presenting the following brief survey of international 
data., we should caution the reader against drawing any but 
the most tentative conclusions comparatively. Despite 
serious efforts to improve matters in a number of 
jurisdictions (notably the United States) current 
statistical information on the size and growth of private 
security remains very crude. Estimates of expenditures on 
private security, for instance, vary wildly and standard 
categories for determining the number of persons involved 
have not been developed sufficiently to support comparative 
analysis across national borders" 
(P. 198) . 
Like Shearing and Stenning (et. al. ), I had originally felt that it 
would be necessary to attempt some degree of international comparison. 
However, it quickly became clear that, unlike the comparison of 
legislation, the information required for comparative analysis of 
trends in employment, labour turnover, expansion of companies, foreign 
ownership of companies and so on, was simply unavailable. In the 
event such an exercise would have been precluded by space (and time) 
considerations and by the likely contribution of the end-result to the 
overall project. Hence., in discussing legislation, licensing and 
controls for private security (Chapter 4) 1 have found it worthwhile 
to briefly refer to some international models (partly on the basis of 
conclusions derived from the fieldwork reported in Chapter 2); 
but for 
the rest the study principally confines itself to the U. K. experience. 
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I have already noted that this thesis does not cover the history of 
private initiatives for protection and security that have generally 
thrived in place of, or even alongside more clearly 'public' 
initiatives. Nor does it address those private statutory forces which 
exist somewhere between the private sector and the police, although 
usually bearing some clear mandate from some form of public authority 
or body. It is, however, important to briefly refer to these private 
statutory forces for several reasons. Partly because they represent 
another apparent anomaly in the division of policing labour; partly 
because they are a frequently forgotten but nonetheless important part 
of our apparatus of 'everyday' ordering of life and protection of 
public and private property. But, in addition, it has been suggested 
that these forces are: 
"an alternative model at least for the manned security 
services ..., organised along the lines of the ordinary 
police forces, but employed and financed by a private or 
governmental body other than the local police authorities. " 
(O. C. P. U., 1978: 11) 
Usually oriented in their training toward local functions (e. g. 
docks/harbour police), these forces have a policing responsibility for 
private property which nevertheless, anomalously, sees a lot of public 
traf fic. In certain cases ordinary public or council employees, such 
as park employees, have been incorporated into official constable 
status forces,, such as the Royal Parks Pol ice. Their powers are 
legally constituted within specific Acts of Parliament, which can 
bestow minimal responsibilities or powers as extreme as those of the 
Atomic Energy Authority Police with the right to carry guns. 
Cooperation between such private forces, created by legal statute, and 
the ordinary police is clearly eased in that they "share a common 
legal status, similar procedures and have no constraints on the 
exchange of information"(O. C. P. U., 1978: 13). 
Such forces are generally controlled under their empowering 
legislation by local authorities or else ultimately,, at least 
in 
theory., by section 7 of the Pol ice Act, 1976, which 
imposes the 
relevant intent of the Act or allows 
for the regulatory intervention 
of the Home Secretary. Their duties may often 
be less of a 'police' 
status and more, apparently, similar to private security 
but they are 
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distinguished from the latter by a legal status (however mundane their 
responsibilities), a formal legally constituted system of 
accountability and a contractual responsibility to more readily 
answerable 'private' employers than non-accountable private interest. 
They are hence considered, for present purposes, to be phenomenal 
forms of the system of public Policing, whilst I shall concentrate 
here on private forms of policing, security and surveillance whose 
function and accountability are wholly privatised. 
Conclusion: Focusing and Blurring 
There are difficulties in delineating the divide between the private 
and public spheres of modern life - and indeed this has certainly been 
no less true historically. These difficulties carry over into the 
study of inter-locking systems of social control. The highly 
suggestive work of Foucault (1977) and Cohen (1979) clearly influences 
my perspective here and in what follows. But whilst some aspects of 
social control in practice may seem self-evidently 'in focus' - for 
example, the work of the police - increasing the magnification with a 
view to seeing what else may be happening can frequently produce an 
illuminating 'blurring effect'. 
Topically, for example, there is currently much talk of inter or 
multi-agency strategies to respond to a variety of social problems. 
Commentary on these trends has almost exclusively focused upon the 
participation of public sector agencies; on aspects of their 
enthusiasm or resistance, and so on. This is a consequence of one 
particular sort of focus. But with a different perspective, a search 
for some blurring of the boundaries between various agencies across 
the private/public divide would expect to find it in this kind of 
development, if nowhere else. 
The present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is a man who knows 
more than a little about strategies and deployment of resources. In a 
speech given at the opening of the International Fire, Security and 
Safety Exhibition at Olympia on 15th April, 1985, the Commissioner, 
Sir Kenneth Newman said that he was engaged "in a long-term effort to 
promote police/public cooperation - cooperation that will be 
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continuous, structured and effective. " This required "a multi-agency 
approach. The security industry was one of the most important of 
these agencies" (Metropolitan Police, 1985: 2). 
I do not believe that Commissioner Newman intends to turn over the 
files of Scotland Yard to agencies working within the private security 
sector. I do believe that whatever their differences in the past, as 
Newman intimates, police, private security - and other agencies - have 
to learn to live together. That is a reality here and now. What 
developments might follow can only be influenced if we keep them in 
sight. 
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Chapter 1- Notes 
Although I first used the term 'private security sector' in a 
paper delivered to the National Deviancy Conference in 1978 
(South, 1978 (b) ), and at the time thought it a possibly 
original , though obvious, neat and accurate term, I subsequently found that it had been used in passing and without fanfare by 
Joseph Thurston, President of Community Guardians Assoc. Limited 
in an address to a Canadian Security Conference in 1973, 
(Thurston,, in Jeffries, 1974: 40). At the same time as I was 
writing , O'Toole 
(1978) published a book with the title: The 
Private Sector: Private Spies, Rent-a-Cops and the Police T- 
Industrial CompTEex , which I only discovered a few years later. No doubt many others have seen the heuristic potential of this 
term and I make no claim to its originality only to its utility. 
(2) Nonetheless the field remains small and my dialogue with others 
interested in the area has often had to rely on transatlantic 
correspondence and travel. On one occasion I was in Toronto to 
present a paper on youth culture and on arrival was told that my 
only free morning had been eagerly hijacked by researchers at the 
Toronto Centre for Criminology keen to share ideas. On another 
occasion, in the hallowed cloisters of an Oxford college, a 
visiting American, presenting a paper to a colloquium on the 
history of 'private policing' , left his pontificating 
hosts 
slightly taken aback that he should be searching for some Ph. D. 
student from Middlesex ("where? ") that he had been corresponding 
with. 
My own f eel i ngs of i sol ati on in carryi ng out research in this 
area were considerably mitigated by various contacts and friends 
that I made through 'snowballing' from the initial suggestions 
and introductions offered by my supervisors. I am very grateful 
to them and to all the others who have helped in the preparation 
of this thesis. They are, as the saying goes 'too numerous to 
mention' . but 
if the result ever sees publication then I shall be 




'Private Security at Work; Statics, Mobiles and Control' : 
Two Case Studies 
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The Observational Research: Its Role in the Development of the Research Project and Some Brief Notes on MethoJo ogy 
"A continued caveat, or warning, prefacing virtually cvery f ield-study [of police agencies, is the claim] that the 
study is only exploratory,, the conclusions are only tentative and are based on one case, and so forth. " 
(Manning, 1972; 243) 
I can at least claim to have looked - very briefly - at two case 
studies, but the rest of the continued caveat must stand ... 
The essential starting point of the research project reported in this 
thesis was the intention to carry out a period of observational 
fi el dwork. Th e1 imi ted aim , unti II wa s ju st at the threshol d of 
entering the field, was to present an account of the workings of 
private security organisations, their growth and lack of 
accountability. In the period of setting up the fieldwork, entering 
into a short initial period of observation, following up further 
reading and making new contacts, the 'limited aim' sprang apart. 
From a sociological and anthropological point of view the field-work 
was seeking to explore a variety of areas. Perhaps most centrally it 
was concerned with aspects of the occupational culture. This was a 
concern refl ecting several interests: in the sociology of work and 
occupations, (cf. Hughes, 1958) - how people 'do' and 'get through' 
their jobs, relatedly, the sociology of deviance - particularly in 
occupations and industrial roles, (cf. Bryant,, 1974; Taylor and 
Walton, 1971)- and in the debates about 'working class images of 
society' which Lockwood's seminal article had generated,, (cf. 
Lockwood,, 1966; Bulmer, 1975). 1 sought therefore to explore the 
nature and consequences of shift-work; relations with families and 
friends- the relationship of the occupation and its values to the 
broader 'Weltanschauung' of the workers; the negotiation of formal 
understandings about wage/effort commitment and the informal 
manipulation of the timed routine of work; and also the impact of low 
pay, poor conditions and low unionisation, all of which preliminary 
reading suggested would be important variables. A key conclusion 
drawn from examination of the latter three features, for example. is 
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that without strong, established and pervasive channels for the 
expression of dissatisfaction through unions or other representative 
bodies, the manifestation of discontent with the job for many of what 
I refer to as 'peripheral' workers (cf. Mars and Mitchell , 1976) is 
demonstrated in an unusually high labour turnover. This occurs 
despite the confidence of the industry and security of job prospects. 
This chapter therefore reports the exploration of these interests, 
ideas and themes. However, as it unfolded, the observational research 
became, initially intuitively, and later formally, an exercise in 
providing a backdrop to, and second a context for the development of, 
more intriguing questions about the wider dimensions of the private 
security phenomenon. As I shall indicate initial findings were 
rapidly able to raise such questions about history, wider operations, 
relationship to the police and (fashionably at the time) to law and 
the state. 
The research project therefore developed to investigate some of the 
hidden history and continuum of development of the private security 
sector; (limited by space, the early pre-twentieth century history is 
now reported in South forthcoming). Subsequent chapters explore the 
private security sector and aspects of its development, especially in 
relation to what I describe (in Chapter 5) as the commercial 
compromise of the state. In this chapter I present a 'take-off' point 
reporting the initial phase of research which prompted the broadening 
out of the very subject matter - and hence analysis - of the thesis. 
This chapter therefore reports not a true ethnography in any sense, 
but perhaps what could be claimed to be ethnographic vignettes of 
various occupational roles, activities and aspects of the sub-culture 
of private security workers in two medium-sized companies. 
1 
Th efi rst ca se- s tudy i nvol ved covert partici pant observati on 
f or i ust 
over thre e and a half weeks, which was actually a 
fairly intense 
immersion because the shifts were 12 hours long and I had few days off 
because I was new and therefore had to 'learn the ropes'. 
Thi s was 
followed up with two return visits, one on leaving and one to socially 
'drop in , and a 
follow-up interview - of interest but no great 
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success - with one friendly co-worker. During this period, cycles of 
12 hour day and night shifts were passed through, and a more advanced 
and intensive 'on the job' traininq Drocess than i-c iiziA1 
experienced because I was placed as an assistant controller at the 
I centre of operations'. The second case-study involved open 
observation and 'hanging around' with workers in another organisation 
spread over nearly four months. 
The purpose of the case studies as presented here are four-fold. 
Firstly to give a flavour of working in the most visible areas of 
private security. Secondly. to thereby provide an account 
complementary to the macro-analysis of the division of policing labour 
in western industrial societies offered in Chapter 5. Thirdly, there 
is the hope that the case-studies and the points that they raise will 
be seen in relation to the issues of low pay, unionisation, the 
structure of the work-force and the domination of the business by 
powerful, large firms at one end with small firms at the other, and a 
division of functions across the spectrum - which the discussions of 
the development of private security and proposals for licensing and 
accountability address in Chapters 3 and 4. And finally., hopefully, 
Ii ke me, th e reader wi 11 begi n to wonder about the geneal ogy of these 
pseudo-police; in short, 'Where are they coming fromV 
Orientations and the Choice of Method 
Early on., In attempti ng emp i ri ca 1 res earch on bu i1 di ng a nd ki tchen 
workers (South, 1978 (a) ), I had been struck by Lockwood's observation 
on the dubious validity of investigating 'class consciousness' (and 
such matters) through the responses to questionnaires, and political 
attitudes "from the point of view of the statistical correlations 
between [a respondent's] graphically recorded replies to nine 
questions .. ." 
(Lockwood, 1975; 248). 
More closely related to the subject matter considered here, Reiner 
(1978),, commenting on his own methodology in a study of the police and 
attitudes to unionism, notes that: 
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"There are two major pitfalls that attempts to understand and 
explain attitudes through interview or questionnaire can f al 1i nto. The fi rst is excessive ideal ism The 
opposing danger is that of excessive materialism. " 
( 17) 
The first is the result of ' ideal typif ication' and the second probl em 
results from interpreting 'correlation as causation'. Thus, "ideas 
are correlated with structural positions - say attitudes to unionism 
with rank 
"In either case, " notes Reiner, "the complex process of social 
interaction in which ideas develop is reduced to a simpler 
relationship, either one of logic or a simple reflection of material 
circumstances" (P. 17). 
Such problems follow from the limited track that this particular 
methodological approach can run, produced by its formality and its 
structured nature. It limits and forecloses the development of a 
picture which attempts to relate action to consciousness outside of 
the frozen interview moment. As Reiner observes: 
"The problem is that interviews (even in a longitudinal 
study) cannot trace the process of social interaction in 
which ideas develop, as men with various initial 
orientations to a situation encounter circumstances and 
other actors that have the power to frustrate or satisfy 
these expectations. All that can be done is to reconstruct 
a plausible account of how present ideas, and their 
relationship to other ideas and to material factors, could 
have developed. This account can be supported, but never 
conclusively tested, by statistical relationships and 
insight gained from the statements made by the actors. Thus 
no account can be considered final. " 
( ibid. ) 
Concurring with Reiner's concluding statement, I believe that the 
pursuit of the 'final account' is, sociologically, a fruitless quest. 
Instead, I have sought in this thesis to present a 'rounded' account 
of the private security sector based on a broad, if imperfect, 
'cross- 
gridding' of evidence and method of investigation. From the 
beginning, as this intention began to find form, it has had 
implications for the methodological starting point of the project. 
Thus., the pursuit of approaches to the subject from beneath in terTns 
of its hidden history (now excised from this thesis), 
from the policy 
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front in terms of its accountability and from above in terms of trying 
to develop a theoretical understanding of the division of policing 
labour, meant that there was little time left for as rigorous a use of 
observational methods as I would have liked. 
Although I engaged in both open and covert observational research I 
shall here just briefly discuss the issue of covert participant 
observation - partly because it is sociologically contentious in terms 
of its ethics, and partly to try to explain why it, and the 
observational approach broadly, seemed more appropriate in this 
research than other methods such as survey or structured interviews. 
The Choice of Method 
The very limited use of covert participant observation reported here 
cannot really warrant a long-winded justification of the method. 
However, reference to established debates might help to clarify my own 
position, both in adopting it and in defending its place in the 
repertoire of sociological methods. 
The collection on Social Research Ethics edited by Bulmer (1981) must 
surely cover most of th e maj or vi ewpoi nts on th isis sue and 
comprehensive coverage and references are best sought there. But 
Bulmer's introductory essay to this volume essentially hinges on a 
contrast between an attack on covert observation by Kai T. Erikson and 
a defence from Jack Douglas. I would like to draw out a few points 
from both of these positions which I considered, (albeit then in a 
less informed manner), in deciding to embark upon some period of 
covert research for this particular project. These considerations, it 
will be evident, were less matters of weighty ethical reflection and 
more concerns of immediate pragmatism. 
One of Erikson's objections is that: "Covert observation is liable to 
damage the general reputation of sociology and close off further 
avenues for research. " (This and succeeding quotes from Erikson and 
Douglas are found in Bulmer, 1981: 3-12). 
It seems to me that there always have been and always will be certain 
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avenues of research where it is made clear that the sociologist has no 
right-of-way and is unwelcome. Of course, even in the most forbidding 
territory the open- observation approach may get the researcher a 
guided tour and pleasant lunch, but the 'l ocal s' wi 11 tal k to you as 
the visitor you evidently are. Indeed, I was warmly entertained at 
the training centres of both Securicor, on a private floor atop a 
hotel in Richmond, and Group 4, at their private country house and 
hotel. But there is, of course, no such thing as a free lunch and 
public relations is the pleasant name of this pleasant way of spending 
a day. On the other hand, a covert approach might bring the threshold 
problems of being a 'newcomer' . but at the same time, there is a great 
difference between being an outsider passing through and an insider 
settling in. 
It wa s prec i sely b ec au se initi al readi ng an d prel imi na ry c on tacts 
indicated that private security was generally disdainful of 
sociologists, journalists and most enquirers that I was persuaded that 
the recommended strategy of my anthropological ly-trained supervisor 
was at I east a good means of getting some general sense of the 
insider's perspective - rather than the simple public relations 
position. 
Ironically,, though I did not know it at the time, this decision also 
reflects other issues which Erikson raises in support of not doing 
covert research: 
11, .. Most of those who get 
involved in covert observation 
are graduate students. Since covert research poses serious 
ethical problems and often results in personal stress for 
the observer,, it is unreasonable to use a method, the burden 
of which will fall upon those still dependent on their 
academic elders. " 
I certainly experienced some stress, both ethically and arising from 
the social and physical context in which I worked (on which more 
below). But the drift of Erikson's argument here seems unrealistic 
and somewhat patronising. It is comforting that supervisors should 
be 
urged to reject some methods in order to protect the mental health of 
their students. On the other hand, many students might find 
it 
galling to have an alternative methodology dictated where s/he 
(and 
the supervisor) felt another method to be more appropriate and 
valuable in the particular circumstances. 
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More cl oselY in tune with my instinctive feelings at the time were the 
(subsequently 'discovered') arguments developed by Jack Douglas in his 
Investigative Social Research (1976) 
, and these also relate, not 
incidentally, to the rationale behind the research project as a whole. 
As Bulmer summarises: 
"Douglas explicitly disavows ethical judgements upon the 
methods he uses,, and does not discuss 'the tortured moral 
arguments' over covert methods. His reason for doing so is 
that '[aIny one who really knows what goes on in American 
society, and who has any sense of fairness and practicality, 
will immediately recognise that all of our [research] 
methods are by comparison still genteel and relatively 
harml ess' ." 
(Bulmer, 1981: 10,, quoting Douglas, 1976). 
In approaching this research project and the initial method I 
considered my own crude perspective, (running along these lines in 
relation to western societies generally), to be especially pertinent 
in the case of a subject that inevitably prompted reflection on the 
ethics of the private security enterprise and what I already knew of 
some of its more dubious practices, (cf. Bunyan, 1976; Kakalik and 
Wildhorn,, 1972; Task Force Report, 1976). Contemplating research on 
the world of private police (as the available U. S. literature 
consistently called them) and private detectives (as I fancifully 
began to th i nk) ,it had al ready occurred to me that at 
1 eas t on e 
useful: 
"model for investigative social research is provided by 
1 spi es , counter-spies, pol 
ice, detectives, prosecutors, 
judges, psychiatrists, tax-collectors, probation officers 
0.., investigative 
journalists' and others, who all seek 
to uncover, for various purposes, different aspects of the 
workings of modern society. " 
(Bulmer, 1981: 10-11, quoting Douglas, 1976) 
I stand by this 'model' and most especially its utility in 
investigating these other investigators and other cases where the name 
of the game is not op-. ýnness but privilege, surveillance and secrecy. 
While the debate will doubtless continue I have little space to pursue 
it here. I must conclude therefore by citing support - both general 
and specific for the ethical perspective that I have held to through 
the research reported here. In Galliher's (1973) important essay on 
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'The Protection of Human Subjects: A Re-Examination of the 
Professional Code of Ethics' , he draws attention to the eloquently put 
position of Rainwater and Pittman (1967): 
"Sociologists have the right (and perhaps also the 
obligation) to study publicly accountable behaviour. By 
publicly accountable behaviour we do not simply mean the 
behaviour of public officials (though there the case is 
clearest) but also the behaviour of any individual as he 
goes about performing public or secondary roles for which he 
is socially accountable - this would include businessmen, 
college teachers, physicians, etc.; in short, all people as 
they carry out i obs f or wh ich th ey are in some sen se 
publ icly accountable. One of the functions of our 
discipline, along with those of political science, history, 
economics, journalism and intellectual pursuits generally, 
is to further public accountability in a society whose 
complexity makes it easier for people to avoid their 
responsibilities. " 
(My efnphasis) 
Focusing more specifically on agencies and occupations within the 
division of policing labour, Holdaway' s account of his own covert 
research within the British police argues that: 
"Research and my previous experience of the police 
demonstrated the power of the lower ranks, not least their 
resistance to external control of their work. Any effective 
research strategy would have to pierce that protective 
shield if it was to be successful. This much is true of 
research on many organisations; however, the necessity of 
covert research is strengthened by the central and powerful 
situation of the police within our social structure. The 
police are said to be accountable to the rule of law, a 
constitutional feature which restricts their right of 
privacy, but which they ni: ýutralisa by the maintenance of a 
protective occupational culture. " 
(Holdaway, 1981: 64) 
Private security are also, of course, accountable to the rule of law. 
But they too have an occupational culture and image-making machinery 
which erect protective shields; these also 'neutralise' - or at 
least 
reduce - the effective accountability of private security. 
But it is 
the final point of this part of Holdaway's argument with which I shall 
conclude this section. It does not justify all covert research, or 
even I open' research where all the aims are not made absolutely 
expl icit,, - not even where the subjects are powerful or secret groups. 
Nor it is directly translatable from the case of the police to priva e 
security, for the latter has a more heterogeneous work-force and, 
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hence, occupational cultures. But in essence it is a valid guideline 
for research on certain institutions in modern society: 




Securi Services: In Control - "the centre of things", 
%J %w 1 %4 IU Ut II%, 
Trusty Security Services are a medium-sized but expanding company 
based in London, with main offices in parts of West London and a depot 
in North London. One of the West London offices is the operational 
headquarters while the other is principally used for recruitment, 
interviews and some public relations administration. Th is1 atter 
office was my first point of contact with the company -a lack-lustre 
suite of offices above a shop just off a main road. 
Initial Recruitment 
First impressions count, and those of the prospective employee are 
guided by being urged to 'browse through' some introductory publicity 
about the company. Like myself,, hoping to find the right things to 
say, many are probably drawn to reading the brief introduction written 
by the Managing Director: 
"The police are slowly gaining ground against the law- 
b reak e rs but the cost of crime is sti 11 too hi gh to say 
nothing of nearly 1650,000 lost daily to industry through 
fire and other hazards. 40% of firms hit by a serious blaze 
are forced permanently out of business. With a smaller 
force than he had 50 years ago the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner reports forceful entries in non-residential 
buildings to be increasing, with f100,000 in cash from 
properties stolen in London every day. Good citizens take 
sensible precautions to protect their homes and families. 
Good corporate citizens, business firms, public bodies and 
the like are increasingly helping police and emergency 
services by avoiding preventable ri s ks 9 Hence continued 
growth of commercial security companies. By their presence 
they deter trespassers and help to reduce accidents. If 
danger from either threatens they take immediate action and 
ensure too that the proper authorities are summoned without 
delay. A good security guard is not an imitation policeman, 
still less an amateur soldier, he is a vigilant and 
effective lookout. " 
(My emphasis) 
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Although this was the first security job that I had gone after, I was 
at the time and f or a short time after., an avid reader of the 
publicity materials put out by private security companies. As my 
notes from the time indicate., Trusty trod a well-worn path in what 
they referred to and what they did not: 
"Much is made in all the publicity of the fact that the 
economic situation means industry cannot afford these 
losses. The insurance is much more expensive just for 
starters. They manage to suggest indirectly that they are 
an effective adjunct to the police who desperately need help 
due to shortage of manpower and the growth of crime,, growth 
in population, ... in violence and general decline in 
public order. All these fearsome talismans are used by P/S 
to explain their continued growth in terms of the rhetoric 
of prevention. There is no suggestion here of detection or 
intrusion - it is rather more a matter of being an effective lookout service to prevent things 'getting out of controll, l' 
(TSS fieldwork notes) 
Of course, first impressions can also be misleading. 
At f irst contact Trusty emphasized their concern for the good of the 
security industry and the publ ic, and hence thei r publ ic image. 
Within this they make much of the necessity of screening and vetting 
applicants. This company is also involved in recruitment services for 
'temp' workers and this they suggested, not only allows them to 
recruit more reliably from a wide range of potential employees, with 
'access to specialisations (- unspecified -) unavailable to other 
firms', but also gives them a deeper, more credible experience of 
following up character references and histories. Here the brochure is 
cited: 
"We require employer and personal references covering up to 
15 years and a senior executive checks these in writing and 
by telephone reject-ing all applicants in all cases of 
doubt. " 
The I abouring of this point seems largely for effect. It may 
hopefully deter some with an 'undesirable' past from proceeding with 
their application rather than having that past raked over. For 
others, impressionable in other ways, it may induce some respect and 
regard for the professionalism of the company. The efficiency of the 
actual vetting process may., however, serve to diminish some of that 
respect and regard. In my own case it took the company just over 
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three weeks before they took up my references. I have learned that 
this is far from uncommon in the private security business, yet by the 
time that my references could actually have been properly checked I 
had left the firm having worked for nearly one month in their control 
room. By that time I could have had access to a variety of files and 
routines - and disappeared. 
Pay and Conditions - the Consequences of the Promises of Security 
There are two conflicting promises of security which contribute to the 
determination of wage levels in the industry. One is made at the 
level of selling the service, the other at the level of trying to keep 
the work force. 
Given the nature of security work - principally guarding other 
people's property and money - it is obviously helpful to the 
psychological selling of the service if clients are convinced that the 
security staff employed are scrupulously honest and of the 
(relatively) highest integrity. Most reputable firms, including 
Trusty, say that they will look into the 'personal circumstances' of 
their employees on a regular basis as a security check. In practice 
however, it seems that few companies do, although some of the major 
firms, (notably Securicor) will seriously compile information about 
the family home, hire purchase or other financial commitments which 
might lead employees into temptation. Therefore, at the same time as 
having to sell their services at competitive rates (and therefore 
having to keep costs down)., Trusty and others must also be reassuring 
to their clients about the high standards of pay and conditions of 
their staff: 
11. o. staff costs, our 
biggest single outgoing, are rising, 
as sizeable operators we shall continue to offer competitive 
rewards. " 
In fact, at Trusty and throughout the private security industry 
(Chapter 3). workers remain poorly paid,, (Williams et al., 1984). The 
hours are consistently long and arduous, usually twelve hour shifts, 
with some of the smaller firms routinely operating 18 and 
24-hour 
shifts. Given that in most basic security jobs comforts are 
limited 
to a kettl e and a radio (both of which the guard may have to supply),, 
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itis rather di ff icul t to say that condi ti ons are strikingly good. 
Holiday entitlements and pension schemes are hardly universal. This 
is wh ere the other promi se of securi tY is frequently advanced by 
companies, suggesting perhaps an occasional underlying contempt for 
workers that put up with such poor conditions. Static site work 
(basic guarding on one site), is commonly described by security 
management,, and even by some workers, as an easy and a secure job. It 
is on these grounds that it can be more appealing to some, and excused 
by others, when compared to other service sector occupations where 
better pay and conditions might be found. Of course, increasingly, as 
unemployment rises but private security continues its recession- 
resistant expansion, the attraction of security as a secure job will 
genuinely increase, and prospects for the improvement of pay and 
conditions in non-unionised firms diminish accordingly. 
Delivering the Goods. .. 
Most security companies make some claims about providing formal 
i nstructi on and ' on the job trai ni ng tail ored to the needs of the 
assignment under the supervision of an experienced officer', (Trusty 
brochure). Now it can be said that everyone does receive some form of 
training insofar as they are told, however briefly, what they are 
expected to do, when and where. What seems extremely rare is any 
fixed period of formal instruction. I went straight into a fairly 
responsible job as an Assistant Controller, working on the 
communications panel, and was expected to pick it up as I went along,, 
with Robin showing me the ropes as things came up. I learned that the 
static site guards spend most of one night with one inspector or 
supervisor who is supposed to know the site. This covers where the 
key points are - the points in the building where keys are fixed and 
which are part of the system of checks that a guard is completing the 
assigned patrol. I shall explain some of this routine later. The 
experienced supervisor will also point out all the significant nooks 
and crannies of a building, the location of fire doors, the various 
routes for patrolling and so on. Perhaps this does constitute a 
'fixed period' of formal instruction, but it hardly corresponds to the 
public image that companies seek to convey. 
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From the point of view of efficiency, many companies and their clients 
are mutually dubious about the value of any in-depth training. What 
unites them is an interest in business-like questions about whether 
the job gets done well or not. Embraced within this consideration, 
and beyond the importance of training, are matters like staff 
discipline, backgrounds, capability of the company and expertise 
avail abl e. 
One popular image of the private security industry, based upon the 
visibility of the contract guard companies discussed here., is that it 
is rigid, regimental and para-military in its discipline. Like many 
other firms sensitive to such portrayals, Trusty is insistent that it 
operates on industrial not military lines. "We offer sound 
administration and high commercial standards - quite simply we deliver 
the goods, " (Trusty brochure). Indeed this particular company was 
managed very efficiently, and like all security firms of its type, its 
staff would be turning over at a much higher rate if any seriously 
regimental discipline was forced upon them. Nonetheless,, the company 
does operate with a quasi-police hierarchy of ranks and, in this 
regard the backgrounds of the senior staff are of interest. Nearly 
all of these, including those at executive level, have some kind of 
military background. The majority of the supervisory staff (around 
eight) had been members of the police or armed forces, and most of the 
older personnel working on a stable basis with Trusty had also done 
their National Service and talked reminiscently of its camaraderie. 
This said,, it is true that Trusty does not see itself as operating in 
aI quasi-military' style in the way that some companies, such as 
Securicor may have been seen in the past. It is less clear however, 
in what way it sees its hierarchical ranking as reflecting a more 
familiar or less threatening industrial- model of workforce management 
and discipline! 
It is at this level of the perception of appropriate 'ordinary' 
workplace discipline and expectations of workforce behaviour 
(however 
often these are confounded),, that the connection is made between the 
employment of a supervised and disciplined workforce in the security 
field in order to be an active force in the supervision and 
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disciplining of workforces and workplaces in other fields. As 
Trusty's brochure puts it: 
e*. we maintain a continuing routine liaison with 
customers so that all occurrences are automatically brought 
to their attention. Besides noting cases of trespass, fire 
and so on, these observations cover such items as faulty 
keys, broken window catches, unlocked doors., frayed power 
cables, overflowing cisterns, insecure fences, appliances 
wrongly left running over night and unextinguished lights. 
Such information is of continuing help in improving 
management disciplines. As part of our service we can 
install television photo-scanners which are increasingly 
used in crime and accident detection and prevention. 
Finally, the prominent display of our signs on customers' 
premises is enough to deter many vandals and trespassers. " 
(My emphasis) 
Th us , as a pri nc i pal aspect of the service of private securi ty , 
alongside the crime and accident prevention/detection functions, there 
is a great emphasis placed upon the familiar elements of the 
incremental tightening of workplace discipline; (I shall broaden the 
discussion and analysis of private security's employment in monitoring 
and regulating the workplace and workforce in Chapter 3, cf. the use 
of 'snowflake' notes, Chapter 3. pp. M-20). 
Clearly in this commitment to improving the conditions under which 
management discipline can be made more effective, companies like 
Trusty share the same operational rationale and ideology as those 
major or small specialised firms which also offer services screening 
employees, planting undercover agents in the workplace, and all of 
whom seek to elevate the minor infringement of rules to the height of 
the real problem - the subversion of efficiency and discipline and 
the 
need to counter this everyday laxity and the personnel and conditions 
which contribute to it. 
It is, of course, unrealistic not to emphasize that some of the basic 
pay-offs of security guards' work are a wholly commendable social 
good. The prevention of fire, crime, accident and potentially 
expensive damage for which consumers, insurers, members of 
the 
workforce and others must ultimately pay, are all valuable 
contributions. It is also commercially understandable that clients 
should be urged to consider "the costs and consequences of undetected 
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electrical faults, of leaving fire doors open., windows unfastened or 
water leaking .- ." (Trusty brochure). But equally, it is only 
realistic to also emphasize where, within the security mentality, 
these practices necessarily lead, how they are carried out and the 
remedies thereby 'logically' following. 
Getting into the Job 
The backgrounds of senior staff at Trusty (which are fairly typical 
for private security), and the assumptions and world-view of the 
pervasive security mentality, are a necessary backdrop to my account 
of how I could get into a fairly central and key position in a 
security firm, in a covert participant observer role. Whilst trying 
to minimise fabrication and outright lies to the very minimum, I had 
to be able to present myself at any interview capable of first, 
explaining my past which was recently dominated by being a sociology 
student at university. Second, why I shoul d be wanting to work in 
private security and why they should believe that I did. Third, I had 
to set a date for leaving after my covert research, without the 
personal and professional problems which the ethical and 
methodological literature warns about. 
I picked out the advertisement for a job as an ordinary security guard 
(with scope for promotion etc. ) from the local job centre. Nervous 
and apprehensive about trying to 'infiltrate' a private security 
organisation, I spent time preparing for the interview, working out 
and rejecting a variety of approaches that I might take. I finally 
formulated what my field-notes refer to as a 'cover story' (the 
subject matter is conducive to encouraging the researcher to 
occasionally think like a character out of the Private-Eye genre). 
After four years of university and with only casual labouring jobs 
through summer and winter holidays, my sources of appropriate 
references were limited. The solution was to 'confess' that I had 
been at university and had a degree but that, as this was evidently an 
over-qualification for the job that I was applying for, I could be 
clear that I only wanted the position for a short time because I was 
intending on a career which would use my degree. This career path had 
to explain why there was a certain point of departure, explain an 
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interest in security type work and, hopefully, commend me to the 
interviewers, without going over the top. 
I therefore suggested that I was thinking of applying to join the 
Prison Service at Assistant Governor grade in the Autumn when their 
recruitment and examination scheme would re-commence. Getting used to 
shifts, discipline, uniforms and acquiring a sense of the working of 
security made working as a security officer look like a good 
apprenticeship. 
The interview room was a largish office with two desks, one for the 
interviewer and one for an absent secretary. Dominating one wall was 
a large map of London with coloured pins stuck to it. Although this 
office was not an 'operational one, the map gave it a clear 
connection with the 'real work' of the organisation. On it the 
interviewer could later outline the types of services offered and in 
what geographical areas of Greater London. The map looked 'business- 
like' and professional and being guided over it, however briefly, was 
obviously a part of the recruitment 'rite de passage'. Whether one 
was bored or interested by it did not matter, the point was that one's 
attention woul d be drawn to it and made to take note of it, and the 
service and professionalism that it represented. Indeed, a 
significant element of this process of 'rite de passage' was being 
offered the chance to take up the notion of performing a "public 
service". This was explained in the sense of the organisation 
'working in a supportive capacity to civil police and other services, 
working in the cause of prevention and detection of hazards and on 
behalf of the Crown (i. e. government premises) and business'. 
The public image of the company was impressed upon me immediately. 
"We don't use dogs and we don't handle money transit, " said my 
interviewer. "We have a low-intensity approach to our jobs" but he 
also emphasized that the company was by no means "low-key in 
[its] 
approach to the sophistication of [its] operations, " which seemed to 
be principally a reassurance that their communications equipment was 
not antiquated. 
I was perhaps rather brightly dressed for this kind of interview not 
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possessing a suit in London. I therefore appreciated the tact of the 
interviewer, who probably thought that I had never owned a suit in my 
life, when he broke off from asking me some vague questions to tell me 
that the uniform had to be dry-cleaned regularly, but at the company's 
expense. They also, he continued, provided a free shirt and tie. 
The interview went well and my prospective entry into the prison 
service was viewed highly favourably., although a joke on the telephone 
to a colleague at a different office brought the comment that 
Assistant Governors are glorified office-boys. Out of this regard for 
my 'intentions' and following a couple of telephone calls, it was 
suggested that I might like to take a job in the company's control 
room - "the centre of operations". 
After the telephone calls and once past the stage where it was decided 
that I could be "just right for their vacancy", then the interview 
naturally became more informal. Being 'welcomed in' I was immediately 
b ei ng given tips on how to ' ease' the job that I was going to be 
doi ng. "The big problem", I was told., "is that you get a massive 
inflow of calls from guards going on duty at the same time as 
receiving all the calls of those going off duty ... you just mark 
down and time those going on and then assume that those who have been 
on their assignment for the past twelve hours would definitely have 
gone off. The only ones to check are where somebody hasn't checked 
on. " This in fact turned out to be useful advice - my first piece of 
knowledge of the occupational culture. It induced considerable guilt! 
I left the office realising that I had been very lucky. Although I 
had anticipated getting an ordinary static guard's job and therefore 
much of my 'approach' to the project was organised around the idea of 
that role, I could see that the control room would offer a good 
opportunity to observe private security at work more broadly and from 
its heart - at the point where patrols and management met. 
2 At the 
same time, I had quite liked my interviewer who, for whatever motive, 
seemed to have gone out of his way for me. It was true that they 
obviously had an unfilled vacancy in the control room that they were 
keen to find someone suitable for, but my 'suitability' was largely a 
fabrication. It had worked, it had been believed and had got me my 
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i ob. But relief and elation were definitely tempered by a bad case of 
participant observer's quilt. 
Doing the Job. .. 
The Control Centre of Trusty is in an old building close to 
Westminster and the river. I arrived at 9 o'clock on the appointed 
day of what was termed my "induction". The entrance door is 
electronically controlled with cameras surveying the pavement, 
nonetheless I spent ten minutes pressing a door buzzer that did not 
work. I was eventually admitted and met by the Personnel Director and 
a secretary. There were several forms to fill in and one was handed 
over with the advice that the Personnel Director was required to give 
me this by law. Subsequently studying it I could find no clear 
evidence of how it related to the law, its clearer purpose was to 
impress employees with the confidentiality of the firm's work. Thi s 
is suitably stressed in the contract which is signed (an ethical and 
legal problem that I am now more keenly aware of). Signed up and 
photographed, I was then fitted with my uniform -a cap, jacket, a 
pair of trousers, a tie, three shirts (police-uniform style; blue with 
epaulettes), a torch and a whistle. 
The control centre struck me at f irst sight as f ai rly unorgani sed, 
this impression perhaps being underlined by the contrast between the 
administration staff wearing ordinary 'civil' clothes and the 
uniformed staff of the control room. The uniform/non-uniform divide 
was also accentuated by the lay-out of the premises, with the 
administration downstairs and the control room and its facilities 
upstairs. Very quickly staff from one territory began to look out of 
place in the other, although with greater familiarity this division 
would probably have blurred a little. 
My introduction to the administrative staff was in humorous 
circumstances. There were only five staff in these offices and most 
were crowded into one office when I met them. Someone 
had been 
messing about and had turned various pieces of furniture upside 
down - 
a chair, an ornament, a clothes stand and so on. As things were 
righted I noticed that one of the pictures on the wall was upside 
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down. 'Obviously' 
, the joke inevitably ran, 'I would go far in this 
business'. All of this was quite a contrast to the impression that 
the staff in the control room made. Presumably intending to impress, 
the atmosphere here was of sober purpose. The individuals and their 
job demanded respect, and if I was to work well with them in the same 
job I should understand this from the start. 'Atmosphere' is the 
right word - whilst I was there for my first few introductory hours, 
movement and speech were rigid and clipped. The air was still heavy 
with the night shift's cigarette smoke, not yet cleared by old and 
inefficient filters and the more frequent opening and closing of the 
electronically operated door as management and others made their 
respective checks and enquiries. 
The work of control , as it was explained to me, seemed to basically 
revolve around filling in several different types of report form to 
facilitate cross-checking on the patrols, particularly the static 
guards. The use of ticker-tape clocks that the guards carry was 
briefly explained, how these are checked on by random visits of 
inspectors, and how patrols are also cross-checked by telephone calls 
from the static guards themselves. These are noted and entered into 
'the books' so that the inspectors can then subsequently check back 
against the control room books the timings that they have on the 
ticker-tapes from the guards clocks. But it was the business of radio 
communications that was stressed as the "really fascinating" and major 
purpose of the control room. I was told that I would have to learn 
the NATO radio alphabet (Alpha, Bravo, etc. ) as this was mandatory 
under British radio-communications licensing law. I was quite ready 
to be impressed by this unforeseen requirement of specialist 
knowledge, and, to be honest, in nearly a month I never did become 
100% proficient in radio procedure! 
The shift system initially appeared quite complicated. Theoretically, 
it works on a 21-day rota of 7 nights working and 2 days off, then 8 
days working (including 1 as stand-by) and 4 days off. In fact with a 
shortage of control staff we all worked extra overtime shifts. The 
length of the working 'days' and 'nights' was 12 hours; "a good alarm 
clock", I noted, "is a good investment in the security business - at 
several levels. " 
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The following day was my first actively in uniform and I immediately 
experienced the feeling of being 'set apart' that wearing a uniform 
bri ngs. Sociological reading apart, I also quite swiftly felt rather 
than simply understood, how the shared uniform contributes to feelings 
of solidarity and camaraderie among the work group. Whether riven by 
personal antagonisms or criss-crossed by friendship alliances, the 
fact of the shared uniform gives that group the basis for a common 
front and common identity. This is clear from studies of the police 
and armed forces but I would also suggest is strong in more mundane 
occupations such as security, commissionaires, trafic wardens and 
their like. According to my field notes I felt a definite personal 
embarassment travelling to work on the tube in my uniform which only 
passed after a week or so. Joining others in the control room, 
entering into the working-home of the uniform, brought some strange 
sense of relief. Such feelings can reinforce at an individual level 
the general pervasive respect for seniority which the company seeks to 
cultivate. The members of the rank structure at different levels 
above basic grades contribute to this, for they too, whilst 
occasionally mocking the farce, also seek the entitlement they are 
brought by seniority. 
The question of ' entitlements' - both formal and informal - was 
repeatedly linked to a notion of one's 'responsibility'. This was a 
quality which, it was tacitly made clear, would be noted and rewarded 
- or in its absence, reprimanded, although Robin often stressed that 
rank was not really "pulled" so long as "everyone keeps to the team. " 
Team analogies, I realise now, bring a prompt smile to the face of any 
sociologist (or psychologist) of work. My notes written that night 
have the ring of stone-faced discovery: "This sort of analogy is 
commonly employed to encourage commitment and a sense of belonging. " 
Some serious reading in industrial sociology followed. But with some 
previous background knowledge of the divisive world of building sites 
and 'workplace crime/deviance' I was not slow to pick up on the nature 
of commonly expected entitlements in private security. These were 
kept very much on the quiet, hidden behind references to 
responsibility and seniority, but basically dependent upon fitting in 
and being trusted. They amount to nothing sensational., but as part of 
the very relationships of the work culture people valued them, and 
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were correspondingly cautious and secretive about them. The most 
obvi ous enti tl ement ( thei r word) , or more col 1 oquial ly perk, that I 
quickly picked up on was free transport for senior staff using company 
cars (and some of its petrol) when these were supposedly 'in the 
garage'. 
Age was an immediate barrier to negotiate, especially as it was only 
slowly made clear to other staff why this total novitiate had been 
placed in the control room immediately. A vacancy was a vacancy, and 
a pain in the neck, but surely it should have been filled by someone 
with some experience? Robin asked almost immediately how old I was (I 
was 23 at this time). Later on in the morning, Ben, one of the 
schedulers who worked out shifts and patrols commented: "You are too 
eager boy. " The 'boy' b it was to put me in my pl ace, but the 
reference was at least part of a joke. I was guilty of a little eager 
initiative, I had opened the electronically controlled door 
prematurely before a senior staff member who was on good bantering 
terms with the control staff actually wanted to leave. I had hardly 
noticed how my action had slowly fixed attention to me until Ben made 
hi s comment and then Robi n added., "... th ey sa idhe wa s cl ever. " 
Th is hardly induced paranoia, but I decided that being a bit sl ower on 
the uptake was probably a good idea. 
I had been anxious to appear competent as soon as possible and capable 
of handling all the ongoing activities - answering the telephones and 
the radio, monitoring the door, filling in the variety of forms and so 
on. Howeve r, I was quickly assigned to, and now happily embraced, a 
role which was designed to disabuse me of over-confidence and yet 
which allow ed me to be consistently, if peripherally, involved in the 
social and work-related to-ing and fro-ing. As the most junior member 
of the cont rol room staff I was to make most of the tea! Taking on 
this kind of vague servicing role in an all-male work group does not 
emasculate because its potential 'feminisation' would simultaneously 
produce an intruder and outsider. This would be fine if the work 
group were seeking a scapegoat, but fortunately in this case they were 
n ot. The service then has to be cajoled and asked for in good 
(masculine) humour which necessarily reinforces inclusion within the 
very 'work ing together' of the work group. I began to day-dream on 
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the tube of 'South's sociological theory of the tea boy as unremarked 
but powerful cog in the machinery of the mascul i ne work-pl ace' . Remembering the building sites I soon abandoned the 'theory' but 
assignment to the role at Trusty was a nice piece of methodological 
serendipity. 
Negotiating slow adaptation to new jobs versus showing eager aptitude 
is, of course, a familiar problem to note. The instance referred to 
above was by no means a unique experience for me. On other occasions 
with Trusty, (despite my newly-resolved caution), and in observation 
of training periods and work-group socialisation with other firms, I 
observed many similar examples of such light-hearted,, and more heavy- 
handed, braking of eagerness. Cain (1971) in her study of the work 
socialisation of police constables describes a comparable situation. 
There she noted that., "the experienced constable can show the recruit 
how to write a report and other technical aspects of his job" (p. 93). 
It is accepted that developing the set of "craft skills" rather than 
"universally applicable principles" necessary for dealing with the 
public for example, can most successfully be accomplished by picking 
up tips from experienced men (cf. Cain, ibid). During such tentative 
learning, "instances of light-hearted ridicule of over zealous 
recruits" are frequent. 
At the same time, the promise of 'good material ' can bring with it 
some praise and special attention from management. On this score one 
factor can intrude that clearly differentiates private security 
companies from the police. In relatively new, expanding and medium- 
sized firms the higher ranks and management may be 'first generation' 
or stretched thin. In these circumstances it is natural that firms 
should be seeking to establish the continuity of career mobility for 
some suitable staff from 'the ranks' up to higher management. 
This point was brought out by an enquiry by one of the senior managers 
as to whether I had "the aptitude". as he put it, to pick up the 
control room work straight away. This he did by addressing almost 
everybody else in the control room without directly looking at me. My 
university background and prison service intention was explained to 
him and suddenly he was sitting half on the desk next to me, talking 
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to me and wishing me "the best of luck". Subsequently, he and another 
manager mentioned the good career prospects offered "for a bright lad" 
(etc. ) in security. "Think about it .. ."I was told. Perhaps 
caution was not enough, a demonstration of relative incompetence might 
yet be required. As it turned out this would not require much 
fabrication. Juggling all the calls, report sheets and other bits and 
pieces when they all came together - as they tended to - proved a 
pretty demanding job. 
The breakdown of the day had most impact, in the first few days. From 
7 a. m. to 10 a. m. 'juggling' is an appropriate metaphor for working on 
the control desk. Picking up telephones that ring as soon as they 
have been put down, handling radio reports at the same time if the 
other controller is simultaneously more busy. I began to wonder why 
there were only two controllers doing all this. Surely there would be 
less room for mistakes, greater efficiency and so on, if we simply had 
one more person working the desk? Of course, not only did cost 
militate against this proposition but, as I soon found out, this early 
morning hectic ride through all the sites with calls from guards 
clocking on and off, and making other reports, slowed from mid-morning 
onwards. After lunch-time, and especially between 3.00 p. m. and 5.00 
p. m. many sites began to telephone in with different shifts checking 
on to new and odd schedules. Whilst some site guards may have to make 
periodic 'reports-in' during the day, depending upon the assignment, 
many were not expected to call in at all during daylight jobs, unless 
there was a specific incident to report for 'the books'. But between 
5.00 P. M. and 7.00 p. m. more and more sites were signing off whilst 
the evening and night shifts were signing on. The frantic activity by 
this time brought a mellower tension - less that of the start of the 
day and more a gratef ul ness that it had al I to be done wi th quickly 
because it would soon be time to go home and the control room had to 
be cleared before the night shift came on at 7.00 p. m. 
This kind of diurnal round - long days and nights governed 
by routine 
- is founded upon and generates its own codes and regulations. 
I 
shall have more to say about the informalities of the work routine 
later, but will first mention the formal codes of the work routine, 
pertaining both to its broad outlines and its minutiae. 
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The General Instructions for duty control staff are more complicated 
than f or ordi nary un if ormed personnel , but the 1 atter are 1 ef tin no 
doubt - at Trusty and all similar 'respectable' firms - that they are 
11 on duty" and will "follow regulations" which have a ring of authority 
to them designed to convey a "sense" of authority to the guards. The 
sought-after ethos is one pervaded by efficiency, sound image, 
responsibility. Static site guards are required to be actually on- 
site five minutes before starting time. They should always let 
control know if they cannot make it to the assignment; book on duty as 
soon as arriving at the site; carry their identity card; always be 
wearing their uniform and do so neatly, and so on. Whether they are 
taken seriously or not, regulations about the wearing of the uniform 
include the occasional instruction reminiscent of police and military 
rules. The most obvious example is the instruction that the uniform 
jacket must be kept fully buttoned except when "the dress of the day 
is shirt-sleeve order". 
The duties of the Controllers are set out in an appendix to the 
Operating Manual . The Senior Controller (Robin) and his Assistant 
Controller (Me) are the essential key links between the static guards, 
the mobile patrols and the shift inspector and supervisors., and in the 
event of any really serious incidents with senior management. 
Everything that happens, reports and the absence of reports, is 
supposed to be recorded in the appropriate place: the Occurrence Book, 
the Radio Log., the Duty Sheet or on one of the additional different 
forms provided. Messages from customers, the police or elsewhere are 
also supposed to be noted in the Daily Occurrence Book. This 
literally covers all daily occurrences related to operational and 
connected activities on a 24-hour day-to-day basis. 
Guidelines direct that the following should be recorded: 
(a) All incidents occurring on static sites and where reported to the 
controller by the security officer on site. The incident is to 
be recorded fully, including detail of action taken in dealing 
with the incident and an additional cross-reference will be made 
to the relevant incident report form. 
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(b) All incidents which occur on mobile patrols and customers' 
premises are to be reported and recorded as above. 
(c) All incidents which occur as in (a) and (b) and which are 
reported by the customer to the controller. 
(d) Messages from controllers to members of management, either of 
some matter of fact or happening, or a request for advice 
concerning a problem. 
(e) Messages concerning operational procedure from security officers 
to members of supervision staff or management. 
Any other matter. 
"It is imperative that every incident, every telephone call that is 
received from customers, police or other sources is recorded in the 
Occurrence Book. " The advice given is that the recorded message 
"should create a word picture of what has happened in the mind of the 
reader, " and "failing to do this could lead to a breach of operational 
commi tments. " On this basis I suspect that Trusty are asking for a 
rather higher degree of articulation than most of their staff were 
either inclined to or even able to give. 
Disparagement of the security staff is not intended here, for Trusty 
were paying average rates for what seemed a very capable work-force. 
They were not however paying for people who were particularly 
enthusiastic about writing a multitude of reports. At the same time 
whil e some staff may have been reassured by the presentation of 
I report writing' as presenting a "word picture". others were clearly 
less happy about "the kiddies eye-view bit". Pompous and patronising 
language became a familiar hallmark of the literature that I came 
across in Trusty and other companies. 
For several reasons the most important piece of paper to be filled out 
is the Duty Sheet. This is a combination document used to detennine 
who was actually on duty during particular shifts, what check calls 
were made, by whom, what they reported and so on. It is also from 
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these sheets that the numbers of hours worked by staff is taken so 
that pay can be calculated. Guidance to the controllers stresses that 
the names of officers should not be recorded until they actually 
arrive on site and check in and not be recorded as assumed to have 
arrived by the time that the job is scheduled to start. However,, 
instructions regarding the procedure for recording static site check 
calls were rarely carried out to their bureaucratic letter: an easing 
of work routine found common in other companies and noted in various 
studies of civil policing forces. On the other hand, the occupational 
culture of the control room at least was one which took its 
professionalism seriously and where it resorted to modification of 
formal procedures it was with the assurance that the essentials were 
dealt with and that only the unnecessary was given short shrift. 
For example, static site check calls are always to be recorded no 
matter how empty of content or perfunctory the action. Here rul es and 
practice coincided because Controllers do recognize that it is their 
job to know the status of each site, to be alert to the timing of 
calls and not to miss any. This psychological investment in the job 
is more than 'professionalism' , it helps keep concentration alive 
through the long twelve hour shift. At one level the emphasis that a 
missed call could mean a lost life, is taken seriously. But the 
regulations lose adherence where they demand that: 
"where a call is not made on time, the officer concerned 
should be telephoned immediately and if ten minutes after 
his check call time no contact has been made, then the shift 
inspector, shift supervisor, or mobile patrolman, whoever is 
most available, should be requested to visit the site 
involved 
If this procedure were followed then there would be constant demands 
upon the senior and mobile staff to visit 'late' sites. There are 
many good reasons why a call might be late, and less acceptable but 
accepted ones to do with laxity or forgetfulness (meaning falling 
asleep). Usual ly therefore, unless it was a case of a guard who was 
always punctual in calling in,, a check call could be up to an hour 
late before the required action was taken. That this is accepted 
informal practice, contrary to regulations, is confirmed in that 
Inspectors and Supervisors also view it as an acceptable practical 
negotiation of what actually happens on the job. 
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Mobile patrols report their arrival at and departure from sites by 
radio or else contact control at thirty minute intervals, but they, 
far more than the static guards, can be elusive, especially on night 
patrol s. Their relatively higher pl ace in the formal and informal 
hierarchy and closer and more frequent contact with Controllers and 
Supervisors helps them to exploit their relative freedom, so long as 
they do not go over unwritten limits of periods of unavailability and 
not being quite where they are supposed to be. Negotiating the latter 
point is helped by a recognized and informally sanctioned manner of 
carrying out patrol assignments directly contrary to the procedure 
that most security companies say they adopt. I shall explain the 
technique of 'jumping' calls shortly. 
Effectively, the principal checks on the work of the Controllers are 
made by other Controllers. Sergeants (Supervisors), Inspectors and 
management naturally check on what is relevant to them and what is 
happening overall , but the basics of how the job is being done by one 
shift are most readily apparent to the next shift of Controllers. 
When one senior Controller hands over to the next, they have to 
discuss the "ongoing situations" at various sites to see if there are 
any problems, go through the Daily Occurrence Book for major items and 
to check for management instructions. Everyone is of course eager to 
complete this business as fast as possible so that the outgoing shift 
can get away home. However, the image of how management throughout 
the industry would like to imagine such procedures are followed is 
conjured by the language used in standing instructions. These are 
couched in quasi-police/military terminology, so that, for example, 
where a security officer has not arrived on site at the right time 
then Controllers are advised that ". .. effective immediately, the 
following procedure will be actioned as notated .. ." It is almost 
as if a stereotype drawn from media images of high-powered 
intelligence agencies competes with a more mundane everyday practice. 
A fascination for television police and spies suggests that such 
imagery does have its impact, but it is negotiated, drawn upon and 
used as a resource in making sense of the job and giving the passage 
of long hours extra value and frisson. At the points where people are 
tired and want to go home or sit down with their first cup of coffee, 
or where the same old thing is happening again ("Oh Charlie's late 
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again ... ") , then the managerial imposition of such action- 
orientation is ignored; it is recognized as absurd. 
For the static guards the end of shift is supposed to be completed by 
the preparation of a Shift Report. The company, like others, assures 
clients that they will receive "complete reports" where appropriate 
suggesting remedial action to be taken where any "incident" has 
occurred. The guards do prepare their own short reports and 
throughout the shift the Controller will have recorded the events of 
the past twelve hours. But collation of 'complete' reports is, in 
practice unlikely unless something fairly significant has happened. 
What is more likely to be passed on is the short memo or notice of 
some relatively minor problem or infraction ( 'snow-flake' style, 
Chapter 3: 12d) . At one and the same time, this provides convenient 
feedback and delivers the security service of monitoring and reporting 
on the workplace and workforce of the customer. 
Clearly this sort of account of how routine procedures are followed 
through is to some extent generalised. It must be remembered that, as 
in any working organisation, there are a variety of working practices; 
I can report here only the dominant impressions and generally followed 
practices, but my notes on the writing-up of the Daily Occurrence Book 
do confirm the measure of different, individual approaches to formal 
procedures. Explicit organisational rules directed control staff to 
record every event in the D. O. B. in order to subsequently allow the 
duty Sergeant/Supervisor to familiarise himself (there were no women 
supervisors) with developments and to allow the managers to keep 'up- 
to-date'. An informal disinclination to record everything is 
unsurpri si ng. As my field notes record however: 
"this could not be categorised as an 'organisational' system 
of negotiation of such rules for it is basically a matter of 
differing discretionary practices and degrees of laxity on 
the part of the individual controllers and supervisors. " 
One Supervisor, who had previously been a Controller was renowned for 
being meticulous in noting all details of all 'occurrences' , whilst 
the Senior Controller on my night shift would be more likely to say, 
"Oh, don't bother with that one - it won't come back .9 *11, if the 
incident did not seem likely to be one which would recur. Such 
decisions, I noted, could easily look fairly arbitrary from the 
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outside but were, I learned, based on long experience of the business 
and the present job. 3 
It seems a common feature of occupational cultures that routine is 
both respected and derided. It provides 'rules of thumb', ways of 
I getting through' and still 'doing the job well'. Yet it can be 
extremely boring, is based on predictability and in order to make 
continued sense to the old hands and be assimilable by new recruits it 
cannot be modified too much. But for all that, the occupational 
culture leaves psychological and social space which its own consensus 
and conditions of routine guarantee will be fi lled by the non-routine, 
by the unpredictable and by the humorous. As the graffiti high up on 
the toilet door attested, the seriousness of the security mentality 
was as open to token subversion as any other professional sense of 
self importance. In large letters of alarm, followed by small and 
neater lettering, a long-standing legend read: BE ALERM the 
world needs more lerts ... 
Having outlined some of the basic routines and procedures of the job, 
in their formal respects, I shall next discuss some of the more 
informal aspects and understandings of the occupational culture, 
continuing to refer to the 'formal' as and where this is negotiated 
and modified by the 'informal'. 
In a way, the control room and the staff who are generally there (not 
just Controllers but also Supervisors) represent the 'centre' not just 
organisationally but also psychologically. For various reasons, to do 
with their time sheets, new assignments, periods of stand-by duty and 
so on, some of the static guards will return to the control centre 
after their shift or filling-in. If not a return to 'home' this is at 
1 east a return to base, marked by a cup of coffee, a biscuit and a bit 
of gossip. Not incidentally, time sheets are also haggled over and 
occasionally 'amended'. But most of all it is the mobile drivers who 
return to control to put their feet up and work their accepted petty 
time-fidd1es. There is much manipulating of the system of triple 
checking which is coordinated from control. Here the Senior 
Controller and liaising Supervisor, in this case Robin and Ron, had 
more or less complete control over the time and pay sheets, including 
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who could get off a bit early among the drivers whilst still being 
timed as on patrol. 
The novelties of the little additions to routine and the little 
fiddles that subtract work time are among the principal highlights in 
the management of this particular job's monotony. In general, neither 
by night nor day does anything happen that is sensational or wildly 
exciting. But if something does happen it is swiftly jumped onto. As 
much as anything else it is the occasional 'incident' that reinforces 
the seriousness and importance of the 'policing' image that the 
security staff can conjure up of themselves and their organisation. 
On one night for example there was a report of fairly serious 
vandalism at a school patrolled by the company. The mobile patrol 
there reported-in that he was chasing a gang of youths around the 
school grounds. Whilst in this instance the Senior Controller and 
present senior staff were at first slightly sceptical about the report 
- apparently the guard was known for calling in false alarms - 
nevertheless the tenor of the reaction in general was that the lazy 
guard should not have contented himself with merely scaring the youths 
off but should have actually got out of his van and apprehended them, 
turning them over to the police. The report turned out to be genuine 
and the subsequent conversation about it, while remaining general and 
in the main directed at the 'laziness of the guard' nonetheless 
retained within it the explicit idea that it had been the guard's duty 
to act in a real policing role and arrest the youths, despite company 
guidelines advising against such potentially dangerous actions. From 
management down to some of the guards with familiarity with the armed 
forces or police service, there was some discomfort with their legal 
position as empowered only to the same extent as the ordinary citizen. 
Thus, informally at least and without too much seriousness being 
attached to it, this particular security guard was nonetheless not 
really fulfilling his duty. He was doing something else, he was 
merely being what the company's brochures suggested that he ought to 
be, a deterrent, a scaring watchdog making the appropriate report. 
Implicitly and informally, what the backgrounds and/or aspirations of 
many key security staff suggest is the duty to go beyond that role and 
actually play a more determined interventionist role in the potential 
policing aspects of their job. 
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I am not alone in having detected this sentiment. The enthusiasm for 
the rol e of the security patrol as part of the fight to keep the 
streets safe has also been noted in an insightful paper by Flavel 
(1973: 11). This reports on research conducted in the early 1970s on 
two private security companies in the Bristol area: 
apart from the impact of burglar alarms ... on the perational priorities of the civil police there were some 
areas in which the operational circumstances of contract 
security directly influenced its selective impact. For 
instance, some mobile security guards (patrolling beats in 
radio equipped vans) believed that, apart from the 
protection they provided for the premises they visited, they 
also had an increasingly important role in policing the 
streets during the night. Some believed that the police 
actively took into account their presence in certain parts 
of the city when organising their own patrols. Particul ar 
patrolmen would report to the company's control room any 'suspicious circumstances' they noticed in the streets and 
such messages would invariably be passed on to the police 
control roan for their attention. " 
The Uniform and Uniformity 
The uniform in particular seemed to symbolise so much of this world- 
vi ew. Wearing it initially., I felt an intense shyness about its 
visibility. This soon passed but I remember hiding it beneath an 
enveloping great-coat on the tube journey to and from work. Once in 
its right setting though the uniform was indeed a source of uniformity 
and consequently of identification. I began to feel how the very 
nature of the uniform can be an incredibly powerful mechanism for 
inducing solidarity. In this sense, the uniform helps to set up the 
parameters for both internal and external identification of the role 
with colleagues, which excludes even sympathisers. 
This significance of the uniform has, of course, been well-noted in 
other studies of policing agencies. Indeed such an understanding 
guided the very formulation and unfolding of the public policing role. 
It is no deep insight to recognize the capacity of the uniform to 
change character. And just as for the public policing establishment 
it can be viewed as a symbol of the strength of institutional resolve, 
so in the private sector it is a symbol of representation of 
fundamentals - of the authority of ownership, the custodianship of 
property. It devolves a status of being 'in the right' whilst on duty 
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or patrol. This, for the police or private security,, is the formal 
public front behind which lies of course, the hidden occupational 
culture, the relaxation and the informal. Silver (1967) notes an 
early remarking of these two faces from a journalistic account of 'The 
Police and the Thieves' of London in 1856: 
"Amid the bustle of Piccadilly or the roar of Oxford Street, 
P. C. X59 stalks along, an institution rather than a man. We 
seem to have no more hold of his personal i ty than we c oul d 
possibly get of his coat buttoned up to the throttling 
point. Go, however to the section house ... and you no longer see policemen, but men ... They are positively laughing with each other! " 
(London Quarterly,, 1856: 93) 
If this was the impression of a contemporary observer of the 'new' 
police still in relative youth then it is testimony to the shrewd 
vision of the early conceivers of the public image of uniformed 
policing forces. Thus, Mannings' (1979: 46) comments regarding the 
original thinking of Peel and Mayne when considering the design and 
function of the Metropolitan constabulary's uniform remain apposite 
with regard to both police and private security today. 
"Concern for the collective appearance, and for appearance as 
seen in written rules detailing dress, is indicative of the 
considered administrative attempt to use appearance as a 
general sign of moral conduct, or a short-hand or synecdoche 
for character. " 
This short-hand is of course somebody elses' script and the uniform as 
symbol is still an artificial one, constructed and amenable to 
deconstruction. Wearing a uniform does not necessarily impose 
appropriate character. Subversion of standardisation and resistance 
to uniformity are fairly ubiquitous human characteristics. As Joseph 
and Alex note in their classic article on 'The Uniform': 
"variation from uniform standards stems in part from the 
ludenic element in man which finds expression through many 
media,, not the least of which is personal adornment or self- 
enhancing modes of dress. " 
(1972: P. 724) 
Deviation from standard uniform style, or simple discomfort in it as 
in my case, is wholly unsurprising. But individual feelings about, 
and adjustment to, the uniform are only a half (and perhaps the lesser 
half) of its impact. For the designed purpose of the uniform is not 
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just to represent an ideal character, but to construct the foundations 
of a group or organisation of such characters., identifiable no longer 
as individuals but as bearers of the uniform and all it symbolises. 
"Because of its identification with a group, the uniform 
assumes the properties of a totemic emblem and embodies the 
attributes of a group. In a sense the uniform becomes the 
group, and it, rather than the group, is often the focus of thought and affect. Thus, an individual's behaviour may 
reflect favourably or unfavourably upon his uniform rather 
than upon his group and, in extreme instances, one may 'disgrace the uniform'. Reciprocally, the uniform may 
enhance or denigrate the honour of its wearer. " 
(Ibid: 720) 
Cl early then, there can be a tension between i ndi vi dual and group 
member's senses of self. Regardless of enthusiasm or discomfort, 
being the wearer of a uniform and bearer of what it symbolises is up 
for individual negotiation - if only in the extent to which it can be 
held to express the individual's commitment to, and as a part of, the 
group. Functionally, the uniform may serve "to bind the wearer to his 
(or her) peers and to separate him (or her) from outsiders" 
(ibid: 721), yet still one may feel acutely conscious of the very 
imposition of the uniform and the regulations that surround it. For 
example., at Trusty the whistle chain has to hang from the shirt pocket 
over the tie so that it is visible and then clipped behind. The chain 
hangs there as a gleaming symbol of a claim to authority. The 
necessity for overall smartness is repeatedly stressed and the key- 
words 'public image' invoked as if synonymous with the similarly 
embraced and espoused notion of 'public service to the community'. 
Uniforms and ranking structures are surface 1 evel phenomena, beneath 
and beh i nd them 1ie other work-group dynamics. There are other means 
by which cohesion is maintained, formal and informal standards 
regulated and dividing lines drawn between co-workers. For example, 
to some extent (and as found in numerous other work settings), co- 
workers controlled and disciplined each other over certain matters. 
Rank was not really pulled but was ever apparent and formally and 
informally recognised. At the same time, this was not necessarily the 
expected source of 'being pulled up' for something. The lateness of 
colleagues might well be reported upon by co-workers of equal rank. 
Sometimes there seemed to be in such behaviour a degree of hypocrisy 
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which in the right conditions might spill over into self-righteous 
denunciation, but this was probably largely attributable to the 
particular ways in which some people got on together - whilst others 
clearly did not. But certainly the seriousness of this 'I am 
reporting you for your own good' morality and its attendant 
subscription to a petty bureaucratic mentality could seem jarringly at 
odds with those deviations into light banter about television and 
pornography which engaged all, including those with an allegiance to 
higher virtues. 
Obviously, in these - and consistently in more general circumstances - 
I had to consider my relative position in the 'team' . For., despite 
the formal and informal recognition of the rank hierarchy, it was the 
team analogy that continued to be stressed as the real measure of 
effective working relationships. As newest member of the team I was 
also potentially the most marginal. Mars (1972: 7: 21) points out that 
limited period of service is a significant factor in contributing to 
marginality whilst status in the group is influenced by "the relative 
seniority in the team vis-a-vis new inductees. " Thus: 
"the newest members in a team always remain marginal until 
their mantle of marginality can be in effect taken on in 
their turn by even newer arrivals. " 
( Ibid. ) 
In a variety of ways 1 ong-establ i shed workers emphasized their 
familiarity with the dynamics and responsibilities of the team,, thus 
declaring the autonomy and exclusivity of the teams collectivity. The 
acceptance and authentif i cation of this state of affairs by more 
marginal and junior members of the team - (although the latest, I was 
not the only relatively new person) - affirmed the prestige of 
climbing the levels of team stratification. And, if the benefits of 
prestige were somewhat nebulous, there was at least some significance 
attached to the slight but real material 'pay-offs' arising out of the 
system of obligations in which (moral high-mindedness apart) one 
entered as an equal upon passage from newcomer apprenticeship to 
accepted status. 
While I do not have the space to devel op such an analysis here, the 
tensions and contradictions of negotiating full acceptance into the 
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group might be illuminated by reference to the ideas of status 
passage, (Glaser and Strauss, 1971) and Van Gennep's (1960) 
description of Rites de Passage. Such 'rites' mark the development of 
status changes and significant time passages. Roughly three stages of 
these rites of passage could be delineated: those which mark the 
superceding of one status, those wh ich cover the period between past 
status and that which is aspired to, and those which mark adoption of 
and absorption into a new status. In a work setting this process is 
partly measured by all concerned by the demonstration of increasing 
proficiency in tasks undertaken and the progressive taking on of 
further tasks. Higher status and its recognition means of course that 
some tasks can be delegate d to others still in the ir 
1 apprentic eshi ps' . But getting i nto the job entails learning what is 
routine practice and, to be 'part of the team'., understanding what 
this 'means'. 
'Working the Night' 
The meaning of the job, its routine and the occasional deviation which 
smoothed its reproduction, seemed most open to exploration during the 
night shifts. There is something about night work, its atmosphere and 
the occupational culture of night-workers, which lays the world 
slightly bare. 
The twelve-hour night shifts can often seem intolerably long; 
perversely, just occasionally, they can seem to pass with comfortable 
speed and ease. AtTrusty the control room managed the night hours 
with a skeleton staff, two controllers., one or two supervisor 
sergeants, mobile patrol staff passing in and out and, of course, the 
static guards spread across parts of London. There are no senior 
management present, although they are 'on call', and the supervisors 
are supposed to be constantly moving in and out to visit groups of 
sites to check on the guards and the 'status' of things. There is 
then a fair amount of movement and activity against a background of 
well-established and familiar routine. While it is never forgotten 
that staff are on night-duty, somehow the lawlessness of the night 
still corrupts in little ways and the small fiddles of the job come 
out. 
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Early on, the practice of 'bouncing' the check-calls just before and 
after midnight, was partly explained to me (see also the Sparrow Case 
Study below). The mobile units were supposed to drive their routes in 
spirals so that they would spiral into a call site at the heart of 
their operational circle and then, supposedly, spiral right out again 
to call at a site quite some distance away from the centre of the 
circle. This should be repeated continually so that the patrols would 
be spanning the operational circle but working on an unpredictable 
time schedule and ensuring that they would never be out of one area 
within the circle for too long a period. In other words, if they did 
three calls in one area together just because they were close together 
and then moved out to do two or three calls closer to the periphery of 
the operational circle, then they would not be back into the centre 
again for some considerable length of time. This procedure was 
intended to prevent anybody intent on a break-in into one of the 
patrolled premises from being able to work out a safe and predictable 
period of time in which the premises would not be visited. A 
secondary purpose was to keep the mobile patrols busy and 'on their 
toes' . So much for the theory. In practice, cal ls that are close 
together are often 'bounced' and visited one after another. This 
comes about for several reasons. First, it makes life easier, 
everyone knows it does and, so long as the right people are involved, 
this is something that it is difficult to begrudge. Second, there are 
times when it is an organisational necessity. When the company has 
over-sold and thereby over-stretched its services, there can simply be 
too many visits to fulfil according to strict procedure. In order to 
get them a 11 done at 1 east once., 1 et al one twi ce or whatever is 
contracted for5 and still allow the patrols a1 ittl ef ree time, 
bounci ng becomes an i nf ormal organisati onal adaptation to 
organisational demands. Third, bouncing can occur because there are 
three ways of checking up on it,, and all are fiddleable and are 
fiddled. There are time checks when patrols report in; there are the 
drivers time sheets which the drivers themselves fill in and there is 
the radio call sheet. Over time, cooperation has developed to bring 
these into line as and where necessary. 
The fiddling of clocks and routes to ' make time' is widespread 
throughout the industry - an irony that struck me more and more as I 
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came to discover the link between security and the imposition of 
workplace discipline and regulation through history (cf. Southl 
forthcoming). Similarly, the life-line and heart of the enterprise - 
the radio link - was used to arrange rendezvous between mobile patrols 
for coffee and a chat, and to exchange pornographic magazines, to 
discuss personal favours and to remind about arrangements made. 
Despite contravening licensing laws about the use of the airwaves, 
quite a lot of banter crosses them through the night, in particular 
using a strong West Indian accent which seemed a strong and persistent 
theme for jokes despite the popularity of several Afro-Caribbean 
guards and the disavowal of racist intent by several of the key team 
members. 
The fatiguing length of night shifts over twelve hours, heightened 
across the shift-cycle by also trying to fit in family and social 
life,, and combined with other points of shared identification, 
contributed - at least for those regularly around the control room - 
to the beginnings of some sense of 'occupational community' (cf. 
Salaman, 1974; Banton, 1964). Quite a few social activities were 
shared by those operatives who shared shifts. A few of course,, had 
been friends before the job, but others had developed close 
friendships within the company since joining it. One week much talk 
centred around Paul, who was one of the mobile drivers and others on 
the same shift who were all going up to St. Albans for a family party 
being given by Paul's in-laws. It seemed that most of the key people 
on this shift had met Paul 's family several times and would therefore 
be very welcome to stay for a day or so up in St. Albans. On another 
occasion, Robin (my Senior Controller) and Jack (one of the 
Supervisors) agreed to do some cash-in-hand work for Trusty, painting 
the hallways on their Friday night off. With some of the cash paid 
I up front' . they got the job done and had the opportunity to then go 
out on the town for a free night without their wives, meeting up with 
some of the other lads at a Soho pub (I was semi-seriously invited but 
declined). 
I shall take up the theme of the over-spill of work-relations into 
social life in the 'Sparrow Case Study' reported later on in this 
chapter. I shall also discuss night work in that context, but before 
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leaving the subject would just refer to a few other observations about 
its particularity. 
When comparing it with other studies of ni ght- sh ift work , the 
marginality of private security as an occupation is emphasized by the 
preponderance of studies of eight-hour shifts and absence of attention 
paid to the strange significance of doing the extra four hours of the 
routine private security shift. The chemical workers in Nichols and 
Beynon's (1977) Living with Capitalism, for example, complained of 
being out of phase with public transport, 'making a car a virtual 
necessity'. Now while finishing a security shift in a town or city at 
7.00 a. m. means that you generally cannot complain about the absence 
of public transport, having worked a twelve-hour shift for less pay 
than chemical and other night workers makes that little comfort. 
Private security workers usually do not get special rates for night- 
work, and certainly not the high salaries that Gall ie' s (1978) 
resentf ul ref i nery workers f eel cynical about as a 'pay-of V. 
Of course, the fact that there is an increase in shift- and night- 
working across the manufacturing and service sectors generally (Wrench 
and Stanley, 1983), means increased demand for 'support' services, 
such as security, to correspondingly expand to cover such shifts. 
This may result in some moderation of the (perceived) unusual nature 
of the hours worked. Alternatively. it may serve to sharpen 
sensitivity about the poorly paid, labour-intensive characteristics of 
private security guarding which demand twelve-hour - and longer - 
shifts. 
Whatever the longer term trends, night-work will retain its peculiar 
distinctiveness. As Wrench and Stanley (1983) note: 
"Some authorities stress the qualitatively different world of 
night-work, describing it as more democratic and comradely 
and less stressful than day work. " 
Both junior and supervisory staff that I talked with and accompanied, 
remarked in semi-serious ways, how they all got on better on nights 
than on days. This surprised me as I anticipated (and at first 
personally felt) some stress relating to being virtually completely 
out of synchronisation with the rest of the world. The shared context 
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means that there is some degree of suspension of day time 'standards' . But this democracy of the night is founded not only upon "comradeship" 
in an abstract sense, but al so upon the material impact of the work 
c ondi ti ons. The col d if you are doing an outside patrol , the noi se if 
you are guarding a 24-hour working-factory, the tiredness that 
disruption of regular sleep patterns brings - all contribute to this 
feeling of people being a bit more equal. At Trusty it was very 
noticeable that the mobile patrol guards returning periodically to 
Control or talking over the radio made cheeky (and mildly abusive) 
comments to Supervisors at night that were simply not heard by day. 
But this, of course, is not unrelated to the organisational context, 
for fundamentally we are still talking of an organisational hierarchy 
and the night-time absence of senior management also plays its part in 
contributing to the democracy of the night. 
To conclude this short case study I wish to emphasize both some 
aspects of specificity and also refer to some points of a more 
generalisable nature which will find resonance with points to be made 
in subsequent chapters. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the observations that can be made on 
the basis of the Trusty case study are largely related to it being 
based on a short but intensive period of covert participant 
observation in one enclosed setting. Whilst contact with others in 
the company was limited almost exclusively to those who regularly 
passed through the control room, the sacrifice of breadth at least 
gave some sense of depth. Working at the heart of the company,, within 
the organisational space designed to impress customers and staff alike 
with the purpose of the organisation, placed me in a far more 
'concentrated' atmosphere than I could ever have experienced as a 
static or mobile patrol guard. Not only was the experience of working 
with a variety of people usefully sensitising,, but the experience of 
working in a physical and social space designed for, and to symbolise, 
security work was acutely felt. 
The security of the entrances, the 1 ayout of the control room 
directing attention to the technology of communications, by which 
means the operations map, and all it represented, centrally placed 
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across the wall , might be protected - all contributed to the symbol ic 
signature of sober purpose in the control room. Subtly, the physical 
dimensions of the work environment have their impact upon those who 
work within them. As Edelman (1978: 6) astutely observes: 
"Such arrangements typically represent themselves as 
technological aids, and their focus upon technique blurs 
awareness of the constrictive assumptions about values that 
they promote. " 
For staff in the control room, the social space in which they work can 
promote a sense of difference in their feelings about their job, its 
pace and urgency, seriousness and responsibility, in relation to 'the 
world out there'. 
Pace and Urgency 
Whatever the realistic understanding about the general monotony of the 
job, there remains in the control room - and in the occupational 
culture of security more broadly - an undercurrent of feeling that the 
pace might (and should) 'hot up' at any minute. Staff need to be 
ready to take urgent action! Yet this semi-serious wishful thinking 
usually only comes close to realisation when the check-in calls are 
made and more rarely when 'an incident' is reported. For much of the 
rest of the time., after the appropriate entries have been made in the 
duty books, action books and so on, casual conversation, humourous 
badinage, the exchange of newspapers and pornographic magazines and 
the making and drinking of tea and coffee predominate. But still, to 
emphasize the point, there is a slight tension in the room; what I can 
best describe as a practised alertness which kills or at least mutes 
conversation when an unscheduled report crackles over the radio. Such 
a reception contrasts bizarrely with the not infrequent cavalier 
treatment of the report made. Perhaps such an attitude reflects, in 
part, the release of some of the tensions within the small enclosed 
room. Perhaps too, it is a measure of relief that once again nothing 
really serious has happened. 
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Seriousness and Responsibility 
On the surface, serious attention is usually paid to the bureaucratic 
requirements made by time and paper. The clock demands a routinised 
schedule to be followed as it is worked through and whenever., for 
whatever reason, it is interrupted., then it must be recorded in the 
appropriate place. The seriousness of conforming to this operational 
code of practice is strongly impressed upon the trainee control staff. 
However, just as it does not take long to get the hang of the basic 
procedures, nor does it take long to realise that their meticulous 
pursuit is, at least, not total. Laziness, forgetfulness, or 
suspicion about the dubious nature of a report may leave incidents 
partially or wholly unrecorded, and of course, late check-ins (and 
even completely missed check-ins which have been 'checked out' by 
sympathetic supervisory staff) may go unrecorded with a nod from the 
senior controller and/or inspector. Further, the responsibility and 
integrity of authority which senior staff emphasize as theirs by right 
of service can be paternalistically negotiated and even compromised in 
return for junior staff being less than scrupulous in recording the 
movements of the Inspectors, Supervisors and others with 'long 
service'. This is not to say that everyone connives at petty 
corruption in this way., rather that, realistically, it is not 
uncommon. 
The 'Work-Space' and its Relationship to the 'World Out There' 
As I have noted, the wearing of a uniform and its accoutrements 
immediately produces a feeling of being set apart by virtue of the 
ascription of an authoritative role (be it real or imagined, or partly 
both) . But in addition to this, the spaces in which one does a job 
also bestow a sense of self and relationship to the rest of the world. 
For the lone security officer patrolling an empty building at night, 
anybody else that he/she encounters is an intruder - in essence a 
criminal having broken the law by entering onto private property with 
deliberate intent. The attitude of the guard is likely to be 
apprehensive but hostile rather than gently enquiring (even if he/she 
takes no personal direct action without police support). The mobile 
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security patrol in a car experiences a fairly unique version ( shared 
with police car patrols and other radio-controlled vehicles such as 
taxis) of the syndrome which Edelman (1978) suggests may influence 
motorists generally, a feeling of alienation as "psychological 
isolation" from one's immediate surroundings "occurs in spite of total 
visibility" (p. 7). Such af eel i ng , coupl ed with thc- restive 
watchfulness of the bored patrol staff , does not, from observational 
and other gathered evidence, contribute significantly to 'chasing' or 
'making' incidents out of innocent misunderstandings (e. g. by lost 
'trespassers' 
. drunks, playful children, etc. ) or even lies (though 
this is rather more difficult to pin down); it does however seem to 
promote and compound the already established sense of distance from 
the same mundane plane of general activity as 'the public'. 
It woul d be di ffi cul t not to devel op some sensitivity to the space in 
which one works after several twelve hour shifts in the small control 
room. Even to the extent that it is something that comes to be taken 
for granted, it is never truly experientially forgotten because 
leaving the control room just to go to the toilet is viewed as a break 
from the four walls as much as anything else. But the feeling of 
enclosure and removal from 'the outside' is difficult to convey about 
a job which can sound not dissimilar to "just sitting in an office for 
twelve hours" or indeed "doing a shift on a telephone exchange. " In 
fact the unforms, the nature of the job, the ethos of the security 
business and the mock-pretence of police-work importance which can be 
played up, all contributed to some sense of difference with respect to 
other 'ordinary' occupations. In addition,, in the control room, the 
physical space itself played a defining role. 
Hopefully, it is not too fanciful to attempt to convey some sense of 
this by quoting Edelman's (1978: 6) suggestion that one particularly 
alienating modern phenomenon, taking its form: 
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"both as the use of space to constrict perception and as alienation of people from others, occurs in the 'war rooms' and operations planning rooms of military bureaucracies. If 
others are dots on a map in a context that hi ghl i ghts thei r aggressive potentialities, they become these aggressive 
characteristics, and it is easy to plot preemptive strikes 
or chemical warfare against them, even while, in a setting a few blocks away in which people discuss common cultural i nterests , it is just as easy to pl an the exchange of artists, ballet companies, and symphony orchestras with the 
potential bombing targets. " 
(pp. 6-7) 
This is not of course to suggest that security staff in the control 
room feel so remote from everyday life or normality that they spend 
their time planning World War III on the pin-board map of London. 
However, the atmosphere and layout of the control room (indeed its 
very name), are conducive to talking with conviction,, contempt and 
moral righteousness about criminals, fiddlers, scroungers and trouble- 
makers, whilst working in an industry which harbours and exploits a 
high percentage of tax-dodging moonlighters, for a company which 
happily paid two senior staff cash-in-hand to paint part of the 
building, and elsewhere finds examples of dishonesty, cut-throat 
competition, 'sharp practice' and 'short-service' (cf. South, 1983; 
Chapter 4 below). 
In the next section I report on a period of open observation which 
also marks the broadening of my perceptions of private security as an 
occupation and which, in confirming some ideas, discrediting others 
and raising new questions, helped to broaden the nature of the 
research project overall. 
3. Sparrow Security Limited: Statics and Mobiles - "Out There FT-rusty Sergeant) 
Sparrow, being a smaller outfit than Trusty. was a1 ittl e more 
informal and parochial in its habits. The converted house, which 
housed ground-floor shop premises and in the upper storeys the offices 
of Sparrow, nonetheless retained the vague layout and atmosphere of a 
house. It was much more common at Sparrow to find guards crowding 
into the kitchen/recreation area or sitting around the control room or 
one of the offices waiting to be directed to changes of assignment for 
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the day, night or week. New and changing contracts,, and the need to 
cover for staff who were ill or who had left, often necessitated this 
beginning of shift (usually nights) changing around. 
In this period., during summer early evenings, the guards viewed this 
time as paid but 'free'. Be it ten minutes or a couple of hours of 
waiting around, it gave time to read the paper, have a chat and joke, 
a cup of tea and a moan. B ut i nterest in' the j ob' and the c ompa ny 
was al so strong in such discussions,, noting new contracts and sites to 
be started, as well as anticipating a new expan sion of the building 
with extra offi ces, a large room for training and meetings, and more 
space generally. 
Like Trusty, and most reputable companies, Sparrow operates twelve 
hour shifts. Arriving just before 6 p. m. I would hear with some 
consistency, the by-now familiar night-shift workers' lament. Whether 
on balmy summer evenings, or on frosty winter nights, they were always 
"just going" to work, as "everybody else is just coming" home. While 
this arrangement undoubtedly suits some people who choose private 
security work and prefer the night-shift, the majority were less 
enthusiastic. Some were simply resigned, some slightly resentful and 
feeling 'hard done by' but understandably on those warm summer 
evenings nearly all would rather have been doing something with their 
kids, walking in the park with their girlfriends orwives, playing 
football or cricket, or sitting outside one of the pubs by the river 
having a drink. Evidently, there were a number of openings for the 
establishment of rapport between the observer and the workers. 
Introduced to Sparrow as an open., interested observer actively doing 
research on the workings of the industry., I felt that I was once again 
'lucky' in finding a company that was genuinely interesting. Overal 1 
there was nothing remarkable about it in the way that it operated: it 
was and is just like other small, relatively localised (in this case 
South-West London) companies, at least in its actual operations. But 
it also had a clear individuality about it, a parochialism and 
paternalism which allowed an unusual forthrightness from management, 
supervisory staff and guards. It would be misleading to suggest that 
there appeared to be anything sensational to be forthright about, and 
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perhaps this is why the 'openness' was tolerated. But the closed 
i nsul ari ty of many security companies, contrived as it is. seemed far 
more 1 ow-key at Sparrow. 
The company was formed in the late 1960s, has employed at various 
times between 100-150 staff and was the kind of company that is 
confident of its ability to enjoy safe and sure,, but unspectacular, 
growth. Of the two founders and directors, George had worked in 
middle management for a large national security company, but like his 
co-director Arthur, had a background of working for most of his life 
in the plain-clothes side of police work. Both had risen to the lower 
middle ranks., Arthur coming straight from C. I. D. to starting up 
Sparrow. As a pair they had a good double-act going, 'naturals' in 
public relations and strong on the skills of impression management as 
might be expected from their training. Not unrelated to this was a 
fairly strong degree of cynicism about certain other companies in the 
industry. These they characterised as being 'top heavy' , with upper 
management who were simply interested in profits. Without too much 
prompting this was readily (and fairly regularly) turned into a 
critical analogy of what was wrong with the Government (any 
government) and its reliance on a largely unnecessary bureaucracy. 
The almost maverick-like quality of Sparrow's "straight-tal king" 
approach came across clearly in an early, introductory interview. No 
dogs"., the directors said, "they're trouble and they're not 
necessary end of issue! But the strength of the implied 
criticism of companies that do use dogs was loud and clear. I raised 
another matter. The company operated just one mobile patrol, and this 
was in an unmarked car. Leaving the car unmarked left it free for 
other work, they explained. I did not pursue this point at the time 
but discovered later that the company undertook some under-cover work 
for which staff might have need of a vehicle. The advertising of the 
presence and services of the company would be undesirable in such 
work. Apparently dismissing this issue as secondary, George and 
Arthur were more keen to explain that Sparrow did not yet feel able to 
expand the mobile patrol side of its service and that they did not 
want "to be dishonest to their clients" about their capabilities. 
Willingly expanding on the edge in this comment they cited the well- 
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known fiddle of 'bouncing' calls made at sites, but described a 
version of the practice which I thought few firms would try so 
c rudely: 
"Wel 1, when you're supposed to be doing two cal Is per ni ght, 
one before twelve and one after, you might fulfil them - at five-to and ten-past (twelve o'clock). " 
This sort of practice they told me, with this still unfamiliar (though 
sel f-interested) candour, is known to be common throughout the 
industry. Coming down to the bottom-line of pragmatism, Sparrow "try 
to keep clear of that side of the business - too many problems. " 
Racism and 'Joking Relationships' 
Having become sensitive to a fair degree of racism at Trusty, however 
'playfully' expressed, and by this time having encountered racist 
sentiments elsewhere in the private security world,, Sparrow again 
seemed, at least initially at odds in its aspirations and practice. 
For good, no-nonsense, pragmatic reasons, the senior management at 
Sparrow declared that it encouraged a 'non-racist' policy of 
recruitment and promotion. It had indeed placed some young and bright 
ethnic minority staff in middle-to-senior supervisory grades. At the 
time of this observational research,, two out of five senior 
supervisory personnel were from second-generation ethnic minority 
backgrounds, one Asian and one Jamaican. The firm had just 1 ost 
another "extremely able" and highly praised Asian junior supervisor, 
at sergeant rank, who was described as being "excellent Inspector 
material". Both the remaining officers were extremely keen and 
serious about the job - and grateful for its opportunities and 
"security". Moreover they specifically addressed the question of 
discrimination in conversation and in their work, asserting that they 
themselves tried to be as impartial as possible in supervisory 
matters. Caught however in a somewhat invidious position,, they could 
sometimes seem to 'over-compensate' producing an inverted racism 
where, in particular., Asian workers are picked on as "sometimes" the 
"stupidest people we have to employ" as the Asian supervisor himself 
actually said! 
On closer examination, whatever the espoused policy of Sparrow, thE 
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prejudices of the white-dominated security mentality with its 
insularity and xenophobic conservatism, conspire to condition working 
life in private security. Two examples may be offered here. The 
company refused to employ anyone who for religious reasons wore a 
turban. This, it was argued, was not a matter of prejudice, it was 
simply the case that "you cannot wear a uniform cap over a turban. " 
It was impossible, from this point of view, to conceive of the metal 
badges which distinguished the caps being fitted to dark coloured 
turbans! Here blinkered obstinacy hinged on the detectable underlying 
sentiment that 'if they won't conform, there's no place for them here 
- sorry! ' The company management genuinely believed that they were in 
no way being discriminatory, after all -' one of their best 
supervisors was Indian' I More familiar from the Trusty case study was 
the place of racism in joking relationships (Bradney, 1957). As I 
became accepted by the work culture I was increasingly privy to the 
informalities surrounding the formal procedures. 
Like al 1 other security companies, Sparrow suffers frarn a high degree 
of absenteeism, both regular and occasional "cry-offs" and, of course,, 
a regular turnover of staff. The control room maintains an Excuse 
Book with an ambiguous semi- formal /semi- i nf ormal status, recording 
most reasons offered for not being able to turn up for an assignment - 
'cry-offs' or 'blow-outs'. Excuses with either a degree of 
familiarity or novelty,, formed the basis of some fairly harmless and 
organisationally useful running joke routines. However, the end 
result of what amounted to consistent re-definition of some people's 
excuses could be profoundly negative for their credibility. The basis 
of much of this excuse re-definition was in translating the account 
offered into the pseudo-accent and pidgin-English of mock-Indian to 
create a dialogue with other 'joking' partners who played the roles of 
the sceptical security controllers presenting a world-weary 'heard-it- 
all-before' perspicacity which could clearly see through such 
transparency. The playing out of such 'humourous' re-definition 
effectively devalued accounts and excuses., no matter how valid, until 
the accountee was prone to be labelled unreliable. 
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'Core Workers',, Rel iabil ity, Paternalism and the Integration of Social Life 
gain similar to the Trusty case-study, was this reduction of an 
employees' worth to vague standards of reliability and service. This 
clearly followed at Sparrow from the inter-play between management and 
the irreproachable reliability and commitment of the control staff. 
George for example, was frequently offering homilies to those in the 
control room about the desirability of a strong service ethic, the 
importance of quality, high standards, loyalty and reliability. His 
approach was highly paternalistic but sincere in its appreciation of 
the sacrifices made by control staff who often demonstrated their 
loyalty, reliability and so on, by working extended shifts or taking 
on the assignments of absent staff. 
Not surprisingly, where any evident sense of occupational community 
spilling over into the social exists, it is found (as at Trusty) 
revolving around the control room. The control staff, some of the 
senior and longer serving guards and the two directors, all mixed 
socially to varying degrees. George drew this to my attention after a 
few days of getting to know people. Arthur,, his co-director and 
Gerry., one of the controllers, were both keen water-skiers and pursued 
their hobby together on free days, taking their respective families 
with them to the coast: "Af ter al 1, " sa id George, " th ey' re the only 
people they see, " implying that the work-demands were such that it was 
difficult to build a substantial social life outside the company. 
Another facet of social bonding within the company came to light as I 
got to know Sam, informally the most senior supervisor in the company, 
the one who had undertaken most of their undercover work assignments 
and a key figure in the social network of the company from the top to 
the 'middle' levels of those who had been with the firm long enough to 
identify with it. Visiting a series of factories early one Monday 
morning, Sam breathed deeply and said he was still waiting for his 
head to clear. He. Arthur and a few others in the company, were 
'Antelopes' he explained. He expanded in response to the expected 
look of slight bewilderment on my face. This was a Fellowship, not 
like the Freemasons he insisted, more a social club. They had all 
just returned in the late hours of Sunday night from a long weekend of 
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heavy drinking and "singing the old songs" in Brighton. "It's only a 
Butlins hotel" commented Sam, "but we've been there before and we know 
it - they know us - and it's a really good weekend 
On another occasion, a discussion with Sam about the future role of 
women in the expanding security business also highlighted the 
commonpl ace practice of security staff undertaking plain-clothes work 
at social functions and how wives may not only be 'married to their 
husband's job' but also expected to actively participate in it, both 
socially and in providing some occasionally necessary work-related 
back-up. Sam had, he said, no objection to women working in the 
security industry: 
"After all , they're certainly ideal for some jobs. Where it's a matter of just sitting around, checking bags and 
being polite - in the entrance to a building say ... But we don't get or take a lot of that kind of work and men can 
do that job as well as others .. 0 But guardettes (sic) 
will grow! We use our wives and girlfriends when we need 
them - like if we're doing conferences or dinner-dances for 
business - wives go along to deal with the ladies. " 
Such social affairs are also, Sam pointed out, "a good night out" for 
the security staff; "you can grab fifteen minutes here and there for a 
da nce ... if you're not doi ng itin un if orm of course! " Such 
occasions are frequently provided with security in both uniform and 
plain-clothes and obviously, while uniformed guards are supposed to 
stand out, those in plain clothes are supposed to be less conspicuous. 
Here the presence of "our good ladies" connects in working practice 
both the social and the occupational dimensions of the job and 
perpetuates the traditional sexism inherent in relationships where 
women are 'married to their husbands jobs' (Finch; 1983). 
This kind of cross-over of the occupational and the social , even 
drawing family life into the job, served in turn to draw closer 
together the key 'core' workers (cf. Mars and Mitchell, 1976). These 
core workers were not simply the higher echelons but the key, 
11 reliable" figures throughout the hierarchy, barring only ad-hoc 
groupings of casual workers, newcomers and the disinterested ordinary 
guards who simply "did their job.,, 4 "Where can you get reliability 
these days - name one place! " Arthur was fond of saying as 
he 
literally and metaphorically patted his loyal core workers on the 
back. 
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The notions of reliability and loyalty, at Sparrow as at Trusty, 
really stood for a whole series of values based on the demands the job 
could make; readiness to be 'on call' for irregular hours and 
willingness to sacrifice leisure, family and consistency for example. 
Stanley, one of the Controllers, asserted that working for the company 
had changed him. He used to be a welder but got "really fed up" 
9*0 it didn't mean a thing to me anymore. " So he joined a security 
firm as a guard, "for a complete change, " but admitted that he joined 
with the idea that "probably a lot of these others do ... that you 
go on, you have a sl eep through the night and do what you want to do 
through the day. " Stan obviously had some ideas about a cushy job by 
night and some moonlighting (sunlighting? ) by day as a welder. "But 
it's not as simple as that. " Henow really enjoyed hisjob as a 
controller, feeling he fitted in and was part of the team. Far from 
having a lot of spare time he was now quite willing to sacrifice the 
limited time-off that he did get when necessary, despite having a 
young family. Using an idiom in a way that it took me a while to work 
out he declared, "We're all wankers here ... where would you get 
wankers like that anywhere else, eh. " The expression, echoed by 
others, referred in this context to the idea that it was a good team 
of people who knew they were daft to work such long hours for the 
company but they liked it and felt good about being loyal. The 
classic features of paternalism are alive and well and entrenched in 
the security industry (cf. Newby et al. 1978). 
Reliability and the Scheduling of Assignments 
Wh i1 st rel i ab i1i ty h as a conceptual signi f icance as the f ounda ti on of 
a body of values, it also of course has a very practical significance. 
The planning of assignments, in advance wherever possible, and the 
payment of an attendance allowance are designed to avoid 'blow-outs'. 
Weekly time-sheets are prepared on Wednesdays for the week ahead, "So 
a guard knows what he is doing well in advance and can ask for a 
change in advance. " However, if the guard has accepted the timesheet 
and 'blows out' of one slot then he loses his attendance allowance for 
all his days of that week. Friday is notoriously the worst day and 
night for blow-outs, which can mean supervisory staff and controllers 
working through weekends even when their own shift cycles should have 
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finished Thursday evening. One weekend that I was there for example, 
the control shift were working until 1.00 a. m. on the Thursday, back 
at 9.00 a. m. and working on and off throughout the weekend covering 
for blow-outs. Not surprisingly frustration does surface around this 
i ssue, al though it is di spl aced away f rom the company and the 
conditions in the industry and onto the unreliable guards who do not 
turn up. The company response has been to get into the Services 
Resettlement Programme, seeking a higher quality of staff from ex- 
armed forces personnel; people in short who are used to the "necessary 
discipline and reliability. " Currently serving forces personnel were 
already being used on a part-time basis, working during their leave, 
though I was never able to find out if this was strictly on or off the 
books. The practice was only mentioned to me because although these 
staff were reliable! - should they be suddenly recalled to duty, as 
occasionally happened, the company was left without cover at very 
short notice. 
To their credit, part of Sparrow's inculcation of the ethic of duty 
and responsible behaviour was a serious attempt to provide some 
elementary training in basic law (as relating to security duties, 
powers of arrest, search etc. ) and first-aid and by giving various 
'pep talks'. Additionally, the company maintained a training index, 
essentially a cross-index of guards who had previously trained and 
worked on certain sites. So that when one site is "unfilled" and none 
of the available stand-by guards have knowledge of the site the 
schedulers and controllers can start to juggle round the assignments 
to fit people into sites that they have knowledge of. This, it was 
explained, can be very important for customer relations. For example, 
one large U. S. company apparently had the habit of telephoning through 
at odd hours to leave messages for various executives in their south- 
London based subsidiary. Humour and pride were attached to the idea 
of the U. S. executives developing personal telephone relationships 
with the regular guards on the site., and to the fact that it was 
picked up on very quickly if there was a new site guard on duty who 
was unfamiliar with the procedure. 
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Images of Guarding and Gua iy Image 
Regard for procedure and routine, for protocol and the image of the 
company, are essential complements to the qualities of reliability and 
1 oyal ty. In general 
group member from the 
they distinguish the 'good 
more common casual worker 
, potentially 'core' 
in security. But 
throughout security, at Trusty and at Sparrow, r outine and procedure 
have both their formal and their informal sides. 
My notes from one night accompanying a supervisor 'training' and 
showing a new guard over a large office site, emphasize that the main 
recurrent point of conversation was not about fire risks or the 
possibility of break-ins, but that walking miles and miles of 
corridors repeatedly through the night is very tiring. Perhaps the 
supervisor stressed this so that the new guard could find no excuse 
for skipping parts of the building after having made this discovery 
for himself. 
On another night visit, attention was drawn to the overwhelming 
proliferation of "office porn", commercial calendars advertising the 
services of various firms by contriving to associate them with 
pictures of naked women. "Pictures of naked men probably couldn't do 
the same job, " I suggested, but irony can easily be lost at 4.00 a. m. 
Enthusiasm for knowing the location of every calendar on the patrol - 
and probably those not on the official route - was however, related 
not just to crude sexism but also to the breaking up of monotony. The 
discovery of a new pin-up calendar or magazine was a real treasure 
find, and the permutations on looking at only January to March on the 
fi rs t patrol , April to June on the second and so on,, or not 
1 ooki ng at 
other months at all until they came around, seemed well developed. 
Concern for the image of the company also straddles the formal and the 
informal, both in action taken to remedy problems and in potential, 
but hopefully unrealised and undiscovered, consequences. On one 
night-shift when Winston, one of the sergeants, had started off a new 
guard on an office and chemical laboratory site we were called away to 
take another new guard to a hotel site just north of the river. The 
intention was to come back to check on the guard at the chemical 
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laboratory later, during Winston's round of check-out calls on other 
sites. The hotel was being renovated and refurbished and the initial 
furniture and fittings removal job was a large task. The removal firm 
was therefore working through the night and Sparrow had been hired to 
provide a guard to watch over the rear entrance that they were using 
to ensure that nobody else came along and started removing things. 
Winston however was clearly struck from the start by the 
inappropriateness, as he saw it, of the man to be put on this new 
contract. The job could potentially lead to further lucrative 
contracts with the hotel and others in its chain, so the first 
impressions presented to any management supervising the removal were 
considered paramount. In short, Winston's opinion was that the new 
guard simply was not bright enough to do the job. 
In the car, driving up, we stopped at a set of traffic I ights behind a 
Securicor van and Winston remarked pointedly, "They're a difficult lot 
to get into .. ." Driving on and arriving at the hotel it did indeed 
become clear that the new guard would hardly generate confidence in 
the company. It was extremely unlikely, I noted later,, that he would 
have gained employment as a security guard under any half-way adequate 
system of licensing, examination and training requirements. Winston 
was genuinely agitated as the man mumbled to the removal men and then 
the hotel's management representative, whittling away the company's 
credibility. After seeing how big the job was, the number of people 
coming and going, how many rear exits there were and how bared wires 
left hanging from removed 1 ight sockets constituted a fire and 
electrocution risk to just about everybody., he decided that this was 
definitely not the man for the job. Reporting to Control he suggested 
that he send the man home in a taxi and take over the job himsel f. 
The management of the hotel were evidently relieved, but this piece of 
I good' management also had negative management implications for the 
rest of Sparrow's operations for that night. A fault not of Winston 
but of the company and its structure,, these themselves being 
reflections of the shortcomings of the industry overall. 
With Winston staying on at the hotel this meant that spot-checks could 
not be made on other sites that night. Further he was unable to 
return to continue the briefing and training of the new guard started 
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off at the chemical laboratory. The inability to cover for the hotel 
guard or for Wi nston 1 ef ta new guard in the position of being 
responsible for a laboratory complex that he did not know, aware - as had been emphasized to him - that he was surrounded by highly 
inflammable chemicals. As it turned out, one other supervisor, in a 
private car, was able to fit in one visit to this site, but 
supervisory coverage of the depth that the company itself feels 
necessary and which it advertises, was just not possible. 
Despite Sparrow's eventual ability to provide some slight back-up 
supervisory coverage, the events of this night pushed me yet further 
into querying why private security services seemed to be accepted at 
face-value. There was no statutory requirement or system for 
regulation, training or accountability. Clients, public and 
government seemed to regard them as legitimate adjuncts to, or 
replacements for, other 'public' services. Questions naturally formed 
about the development of this situation, and the nature of private 
security's accountability and legitimacy. For, as I noted at the 
time: 
"If the security industry continue to be entrusted with the 
care of fire-risks in areas of high residential 
concentration or where volatile chemicals are involved, then 
there should be concern about their competence, training and 
over-s jel `ng '. 
Accompanying Sam on his route of check-call sa few days later we 
discussed the hotel incident, which he had already heard about, and I 
mentioned some of my concerns about the judgements that the company 
could afford to make in taking on new staff and asked what he thought 
training could contribute to improving the workforce and the image of 
the industry. At a time when unemployment was not so high and the 
security companies had fewer applicants and a high staff turnover, Sam 
was pragmatic in his response. "You have to take nearly everyone you 
can get, " he said "and you don't really know how they'll work out 
until they're in thejob and doing it - or not, as the case may 
be .. ." More importantly, 
for a man with a shrewd insight into the 
workings of his own company and the industry generally, I was struck 
by his minimalist attitude to training. "You can' t train a man 
straight-off on all aspects of a site - at first there's only two 
basics - the route (to patrol), and always re-lock everything you 
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open! " Later in the morning he raised the subject again making a 
distinction between what "you can be told and what you have to pick-up 
yourself. " This was especially true, he argued, in the case of 
getting to know a site which becomes "your own". 
Indeed, the underside of being formally shown the lay-out of a site, 
the route, I ocks, risks and so on, i nvol ves getting to know it as an 
environment. So eloquently did Sam begin to describe this 'feel' for 
the patrolled environment that he was flattered as I rushed to take 
notes as we drove along. 
"There's the feel of the pile of carpetting under your feet, 
even if you are wearing boots. The noises of the night: the 
banging of rope against flag poles, of wires inside a gate- 
arm, the feel of air from ventilation shafts, the one odd 
door that opens the wrong way .* ell 
All these, and more, if consciously thought about and mentally noted, 
create, he suggested, a "sense" of the patrol,, which makes you "aware 
that you've missed something if the 'sense' is disturbed. " 
Driving on to visit several factories near the airport most physical 
senses became dominated by the noise and smell of aircraft! Al 1 
guards on duty on these sites took great interest in the aeroplanes. 
Even though, unsurprisingly, they complained of the noise, some became 
quite expert on the types of pl anes and the i denti fi cation of 
international airlines - and all knew the times when Concord took off 
and looked out for it, using it as a regular marker for a joke or cup 
of coffee -a technological update of Donald Roy's 'Banana Time' (Roy, 
1958). 
At the 1 ight engineering factories that we visited Sam put a lot of 
work into maintaining a good rapport with the members of the work- 
forces that we came across as we went round. Sam's role was to check 
on what the Sparrow guards were doing, look over their reports and 
i nspect the securi ty and f ire precautions that they had a 
responsibility for. "At the same time, " said Sam, "it doesn't hurt to 
keep your eyes open. " Sam, who also did some undercover work for 
Sparrow, and who "could tell you a tale or two about fiddles on the 
Underground" for whom he used to work., saw himself as the scourge of 
syndicated fiddling and pilferage. "Keep you eyes and ears open and 
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you'll see who's in with who" he said. Given that his approach had 
frequently "paid off".. resulting in 'random' searches which had 
uncovered pilferage, I was surprised that the unionised work-forces at 
the factories were not more evidently hostile to the security staff. 
Yet to the contrary,, it was the white collar workforce of a computer 
company that we visited after lunch that were most obviously 
antipathetic to the intrusion of security, resenting their checking of 
names in and out of the building and their attempts to enforce minor 
rules. The mutual nature of understanding about workplace fiddles and 
infractions was much clearer between the blue-collar work-forces and 
security staff than with white collar professionals who, asserted Sam, 
had their own "tricks" and perks. 
The regulation and incorporation of perks and so on, is too large a 
subject to go into (cf. Ditton, 1977; Henry, 1978; Mars,, 1982; Scraton 
and South, 1984; South, 1982) but the subject cannot be passed without 
mentioning how researchers can themselves see phenomena displaced even 
when looking for examples. It took me a few days after going through 
my initial notes of the various visits with Sam to realise how perks 
were so neatly integrated into his and the routine of other security 
guards and supervisors. Subsidised lunches in factory canteens were 
nice but, further, some factory canteens and their meals were nicer 
than others., so the factory that was visited just before lunch was not 
a random choice. It had a good paternalistic American management that 
had overhauled the canteen and the menu. Many factories run company 
shops selling their own product at discount, wholesale or even below, 
and security staff are as welcome as company employees. Such 
initiatives are partly (if not largely) attempts to make pilferage an 
unattractive alternative. Relatedly some firms have sought to avoid 
the institutional isation of informal systems of giving away scrap and 
waste as a perk or of allowing it to be taken as an entitlement. One 
alternative is to formalise its status as a service or benefit from 
the company, selling the items at a token price and giving a receipt. 
Sam bought a few pallettes from one firm for two pence each and duly 
got his receipt. They were put on one side for him to pick up later. 
The control of the 'perks' had become an easily administrated but 
formal process, yet reminiscent of the exchange networks in Henry's 
study of the Hidden Economy (1978), the pallettes were nonetheless 
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destined to continue to have exchange value in non-accountable terms. 
Sam intended to "let a mate have them for the price of a few 
pints .*9 It 
That all of this was taken for granted and regarded as unproblematic 
was clear. Sam knew that I was doing a research project on private 
security and he was certainly nobody's fool. He was thoughtful and 
reflective, yet there was no hint of irony in the justifications he 
put forward in a discussion that we had about the need for private 
security to be given more official powers to enable them to arrest on 
suspicion as the police could. We both agreed that pol ice use of 
'Sus' could be wrong at times and talked of its use against black 
youth in Brick Lane. Sam, however, argued that "mistakes" were 
"inevitable in one-off situations" whereas security staff "who work in 
one place" with one workforce "get to know them and pick out where the 
dodgy business is going on. " On this basis, he contended,, security 
staff were far more likely to be right in their 'sus arrest' than 
police in one-off situations. 
Part of Sam' s belief in good security personnel being able to 'pick 
out the dodgy business' sustained, and was sustained by, his 
willingness to take on short-term undercover work. This I never got 
to fully explore with Sam - and never really understood about him as a 
person. He was not zealously moral about petty crime as contributory 
to the decline and fall of civilisation as some security staff and 
commentators are. Rather he was the epitome of the pragmatic side of 
the security mentality. Neither a zealot, nor possessed by an equally 
familiar unimaginative doggedness, it was simply his job to take on 
the assignments that came his way. They were obviously more exciting 
and better rewarded than the normal routine of checking on contracted 
arrangements, but they were neither romanticized nor up for 
consideration alongside the perks, fiddles and pilferage which he and 
other security staff throughout the industry engage in to varying 
degrees (cf. South, 1983). As Arthur and Sam agreed after I had sat 
through listening to them finalising an undercover job, without union 
liaison, over the telephone: "It's the only way, if a lot's going 
missing. " 
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However much Sam is committed to the company and embraces and is 
embraced by ideas of professional pragmatism, he is nonetheless a 
rather more individualistic and autonomous actor than most security 
staff. For those who Sam makes his mobile round to check on, and for 
the majority of security employees, responsibility and worth is 
measured less by their inclusion in the core group of staff and more 
by The Clock. 
The Clock 
"So the clock is a tell-tale ticker-tape machine, " I said. The 
working of the sealed, leather-cased clock that guards usually carry 
around their assignments was being explained to me by Winston and Joe, 
an old hand with nearly twenty years in private security. My little 
alliterative joke passed into common use for a week or so. But it was 
an essentially correct description and, as I subsequently discovered 
in developing the historical aspect of the research, it was a 
mechanism which had been around, relatively unchanged, since the early 
days of factory development (cf. South,, forthcoming). 
The clock has a significance - real and symbolic - belied by its 
humbl e appearance. The clock face is visible through an opening in a 
thick leather case, sealed by a small padlock or built-in lock,, and 
with a shoulder strap attached. Inside the clock an ink-marking 
mechanism can be operated by inserting and turning the keys placed at 
fixed points throughout the building to be patrolled. This results in 
a ma rk b ei ng 1 ef t on a paper tape rol 1 ed wi thi n the cl ock and attuned 
to the clock-work mechanism. According to the pre-planned and laid- 
out timing for the patrols, the keys must be reached at specific times 
and a record of the time made by inserting the key, thereby 
leaving a 
distinctive mark on the paper tape. Supervisors and managers then 
have a timed record of the guards' progress on his/her assignment. 
Most guards accept this peripatetic and constant form of 
'clocking on' 
without complaint. It is,, after all, standard and routine practice 
and, as I found (though I suspect few guards 
know) a few hundred years 
0 ld in principle. But being the human part of 
the mechanism for the 
monitoring of one's own progress necessarily promotes some 
reflection 
- albeit occasionally with 
humour: 
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Winston: "They did this to lorry drivers, with tachometers. The ' spy 
in the cab' they call them. To stop the fiddling! " 
Joe: "It's like clocking on every quarter of an hour. They've got you 
I clocked' see ... (laughs). " 
Rather more deeply, 'the Nightwatchman' in Fraser's book of accounts 
of Work, (Fraser,, 1968: 34-53), draws out the levels of self-discipline 
and self-surveillance (best understood in the senses developed by 
Foucault, 1977) which this procedure promotes: 
it, e. one carried time with one on this task, from beginning t0 end. Not the time of a wrist-watch, a diminutive meter 
for consulting at one's own convenience, registering the 
f1 ow of a process f rom which one normally turned away. Not 
even the time of work-cl ocks on af actory or of fi ce wal I. 
Domi nant but at a di stance, these are the sentinel s of the 
work environment, parts of the whole external field of force 
one is pitted against. As such, one could fight against 
them. This watch-man's clock machine represented a deeper, 
more intimate penetration into one's being. As inaccessible 
as time itself behind its case and padlock, it embodied 
time's enstrangement none the less, and in the most 
immediate and compulsive way imaginable, resting against 
one's thigh like a companion, almost alive, demanding 
attention every few minutes of the working night. Every 
principal work action - that is every transference of 
oneself to the next point on the patrol route - was dictated 
and registered by it. So whoever opened the case and 
unwound the tape would see a complete and measured record of 
one's labour, the continous night-long skeleton of one's 
experience. A better work instrument would have to be 
actually embedded in the skull, and seize the workings of 
one's brain. " 
(Nairn, 1968: 38) 
Again., it is evident that the imperatives of discipline and 
surveillance permeate private security in its theory and 
its practice. 
And they do so in their most effective forms - in a reflexive manner,, 
directed not only at external threats but also back upon the 
bearers 
of security practice. 
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'Cl ocki ng Out' : Concl usi on 
It was undoubtedly useful to accompany two of the people that I got on 
well with on their routine shifts. Both Sam and Winston were popular 
and fitted in well with the rest of the staff of all ranks, but as a 
boon to the researcher they were also reflective and articulate in 
their ideas and in explaining things to me. 
Bearing in mind standard advice on participant observation, whether in 
an overt or covert role, I had high hopes of gathering insightful gems 
from these two during the day and night shifts on which I accompanied 
th em. For as Becker (1958: 655) has written: 
"On the one hand, an informant may say and do things when 
alone with the observer that accurately reflect his 
perspective but which would be inhibited by the presence of the group. On the other hand, the presence of others may 
call forth behaviour which reveals more accurately the 
person's perspective but would not be enacted in the 
presence of the observer alone. " 
During the Sparrow stage of the research I was stil If ai rly intent on 
undertaking a study with more reliance on observational field-work, 
and therefore seeking to tap both the contexts that Becker describes. 
In the end it is evident that this is not how the research progressed 
- or rather it is not how it turned out, for nonetheless this initial 
intention afforded a most valuable base for progress - an insight into 
working in private security, understanding its values, encountering 
aspects of the 'security mentality', the permeation of discipline and 
surveillance in practice and symbol . and familiarity with the 
occupational and social dimensions of at least a part of the security 
wor1d. So, although this is not a report of a full participant 
observation study, initial use of the technique, as I first entered 
the world of private security, did what it should do. It sensitised, 
gave perspective and, importantly, it raised questions, gave 
directions and generally helped to make me aware that there was a 
great deal more to find out about. Only really in this sense, but 
positively nonetheless, is the limited account offered here truly in 
tune with some of the precepts and pay-offs of sustained use of the 
participant observation method, as described, for example, by Becker 
and Geer (1957: 32). 
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"The participant observer is both more aware of 00. problems of inference and more equipped to deal with them because he (sic) operates, when gathering data, in a social context rich in cues and information of all kinds. Because he sees and hears the people he studies in many situations 
of the kind that normally occur for them, rather than just in an isolated and formal interview, he builds an 
evergrowing fund of impressions, many of them at the 
subliminal level, which give him an extensive base for the interpretation and analytic use of any particular datum. " 
Impressions,, both immediate and subliminal, were gained from having 
c of f ee wi th a grou p of guards or wal ki ng around af actory by n ight or 
day with just one or two. The 'questions raised' - about history, the 
clock . the uniform, about undercover work and other 'specialist' 
services, about civil liberties, accountability and so on, led me to 
explore the broader contemporary (and historical) significance of 
private security. But to first of all know something about working in 
it, was invaluable. 
Working within private security and having access to the daily real ity 
of its participants from senior management to ordinary guards, gave me 
at least something of an insiders' sense of what goes on, how and 
why, and - importantly how and why certain things might and should 
be changed. Working with and under senior security management helps 
to make sense of the positions that they adopt on public platforms 
(cf. chapters 3,4,5). Working alongside and accompanying various 
operational grades of security staff gives a sense of the ordinary and 
likeable humanity behind the 'front' of 'the job'. 
Management in a highly competitive industry is rarely enthusiastic 
about cooperation but grudgingly will go along with it. In private 
security managements share a perception of the status quo, stability 
and order and see their role as managing consistency and regularity, 
both for their clients and within their own organisations. Private 
security workers share a range of values, cultural viewpoints and 
occupational routines and accoutrements, such as uniforms. 
Private 
security as a whole is permeated by shared backgrounds, strongly 
influenced by ex-police and ex-military occupational cultures and a 
shared world-view which strengthens a boundary drawn against outside 
ideas and threats from alternative views of society. 
The field-work 
has therefore sought to draw out differences in, but also 
to highlight 
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shared features of, the occupational culture of the private security 
business. 
Of course, shared values are not sufficient to induce self-sacri f icing 
loyalty among all employees, even where the features of paternalistic 
embrace are strong, if pay, hours, conditions and so on are 
unattractive. Coupled with low unionisation across most companies the 
unsurprising manifestation of job-dissatisfaction is not merely 
fiddling time and goods but a high degree of labour turnover. These 
features of the contract security business could be remedied by the 
kind of licensing, regulations and accountability discussed in Chapter 
4. However, the shared values and conservatism that permeates the 
business, as noted above, should not be under-estimated as a barrier 
to policy intervention and the implementation of change in practice. 
This is undoubtedly so throughout the breadth of the private security 
sector and should be borne in mind in considering the chapters that 
f ol 1 ow. 
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Chapter 2- Notes 
It was clearly impossible to look at even just the major security companies in equal detail. So initially five firms were taken as I case studies', each with a diff-e-rentand particular purpose in mind. Three of the major firms and two medium-sized firms were chosen. Group 4 was approached primarily with an interest in their training procedures. Securicor and Security Express kindly 
provided some information on their Trade Union agreements, and other aspects of their operations. Pressures of space however have dictated that only a limited amount of this information has been reported in Chapters . 3 and 4. 
The two medium-sized firms - Trusty and Sparrow (both pseudonyms 
of course) - were the subjects of short but intensive periods of 
observational fieldwork. The first in a covert, working, 
participant observer capacity, the second as an open observer. 
The constraints of time and a desire not to overstretch the 
indulgence and cooperation of harassed and generally suspicious 
respondents meant that the same questions could not be asked of 
each firm. It was decided therefore to focus on a common core of 
basic questions with 'tailored' different questions for different 
firms, depending upon the 'angle' I was pursuing with them. In 
this manner I hoped to gather responses and material relevant to 
other concerns as wel 1. I th ink th is approach was 1 argely 
successful although it did of course produce material which was 
essentially impressionistic - being the impressions and opinions 
of those interviewed filtered through my framework of questions 
and how I subsequently interpreted the responses. However, such 
problems would also have applied to a more formal questionnaire 
format. In the event far more useful material was generated than 
could be presented here. 
These semi-formal interviews with representatives of Group 4, 
Securicor and Security Express, and the observational fieldwork 
were supplemented by more casual 'open-ended' interviews with 
other security managers and staff, with representatives of the 
industry's professional associations (cf. Chapter 4) with trades 
union officers and negotiators in MATSA and ASTMS, with members 
of civil liberties groups, with several members of the police 
force (Metropolitan and Yorkshire) with ordinary workers in 
factories where private security firms were employed and with two 
Home office researchers who in fact were seeking information 
about private security from Mr. Bruce George, M. P. and his staff. 
In its early phases the research had extensive help and feedback 
from Mr. George who has been the most consistent Parliamentary 
advocate of licensing and regulation of private security. 
The fieldwork was carried out in London for several reasons. 
First and most obviously it was where I was based. But 
additionally, the Metropolitan area has the highest concentration 
of crime and of commercial activity and hence 
it seemed 
reasonable to assume that private security would 
be flourishing 
particularly strongly there. Whilst the Metropolitan case was 
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also likely to produce demand for more special ised services this would not, I felt, necessarily detract from the general representativeness of the average private security firms offering the standard range of services. Obviously, there might be differences in standards and employees across the country and some factors, such as high levels of tourism for example are an important stimulant to the demand for private security in London. But on this I evel ,I reasoned at the time, that the London case may also offer some general isabil ity to consideration of the 
employment of private security in other major cosmopolitan 
cities. As I have noted in Chapter 1 both the ambitions for thorough ethnography and for the comparative exercise were 
overtaken by the other directions in which the thesis developed. 
(2) A further post-hoc justification or awareness of good fortune, 
occurred as familiarity with the policing literature was extended 
for there are few studies which have based their observational 
work in this context of the 'hub' of communications. A notable 
exception is Shearing (1984) in an observational study of police 
work., conducted in the communications centre of a large urban 
police department in Canada. Among others, the continuing work 
of Peter Manning is examining this communications nexus. 
In what is reported here I refer to nothing that is highly 
confidential or that is particularly specific to this company. 
Names and some other points of identification have naturally been 
changed. The purpose of this and the following 'case study' is, 
I reiterate, simply to give some flavour of everyday working in 
the majority of ordinary, medium-sized companies. 
(3) For a related, informative and detailed discussion of 'paperwork 
negotiation' among the police, from a phenomenological 
perspective see Manning, 1979 (54-6). 
(4) Of course a very high, but unknown, proportion (I might estimate 
30-40% or more) , of the private security guarding work-force are 'casual' , marginal workers with a 
high turnover rate. That is to 
say,, these workers are unlikely to have a great deal of interest 
in the central values of the job, or the rewards - official or 
unofficial - which it can bring; they are not 
"core" but 
"peripheral" workers (Mars and Mitchell, 1976)). But whatever my 
original intentions, this can no longer be a study contrasting 
the marginal workers with little interest in their private 
security occupations with those workers who embrace their jobs 
with more commitment, aspiration and enthusiasm. 
The 
observations that I am able to report in these case-studies must 
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Public Interest and Private Interests: The Police and Private Securi from the 190Us to the Pos -W-arYears: A Brief Introduction 
One key 1 egacy of the history of the arrangements that society has 
made for public order and social control is the enduring distinction 
between private and public policing as found in the institution of 
1 aw. Considering the roots of this distinction Stenning and Shearing 
(1980) have emphasized that: 
"Police and law-enforcement powers, because they developed 
originally from the peace-keeping powers of ordinary 
citizens have also evolved closely constrained by the legal 
recognition of the rights of private ownership. The legal 
concept through which this evolution was accomplished was 
the concept of 'the peace'. Essentially the 'King's peace' 
extended to the King's highway and other common lands not 
the subject of private ownership. In places which were the 
subject of private ownership, it was originally not the 
King's peace which prevailed but the 'private peace' of the 
owner/occupier. These concepts ... 1 ie at the very foundations of our modern day distinctions between public 
criminal law and private civil law. " 
(Stenning and Shearing, 1980: 233). 
Throughout the 20th century the 'private peace' of the owner/occupier 
has been a central point around which the developing relations between 
the police, the public and private security have revolved. Early 
problems in the establishment of the police and conflicts - overt and 
covert - over their control, as well as the activities and powers 
of 
private detectives and private guards, emerged out of the strength of 
this concept of 'private peace'. By the turn of the century 
the new 
national policing system had still not settled 
down (Radzinowicz, 1956 
(a)) on the other hand private guarding associations and agencies seem 
to have been h avi ng a1 eaner time of i t. The private 
detective 
bureaux which had emerged were also having to cast around 
for a new 
approach and style of work as they faced a popular cynicism 
towards 
them born of their frequent malpractices in matrimonial cases. 
At the 
same time however, the early decades of 
the century also saw the 
beginnings of the technical side of private security establish 
itself 
commercially in the United Kingdom with 
the installation of alarm 
systems whilst in the USA the clearly recognizable 
foundations of the 
modern private security organisation were 
being laid (cf. Draper, 
1978: 16). 
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Private Interest and the Police 
In the early years of organised policing of the new industrial cities 
much power had accrued to the members of the overseeing watch 
committees. The commercial interests of these members not 
infrequently enjoyed special protection and service and., where they 
involved dubious or illegal practices., occasionally enjoyed 
discretionary immunity from prosecution. Brogden (1978) for example, 
offers the case of the Liverpool Watch Committee of 1914, where the 
chairman was the attorney for major dealers in alcohol. After the 
introduction of beer house licensing in the 1870s, small unlicensed 
premises not owned by the major interests were often hounded out of 
existence by the police. Another member of the committee was the 
physician to many of the brothels. Elsewhere, as in Romsey for 
example, opposition to outside inspection of the police as a body 
often came strongly from the brewers and publicans who had a near 
monopoly over the provision of the negligible town police (Critchley, 
1967, p. 121). In the case of Liverpool, as Fosdick (1969) remarks 
"needless to say, the activities of the police, in respect to liquor 
and prostitution were negligible" (p. 53). The private direction of 
the new police in certain matters of commercial interest had clearly 
not disappeared by the First World War. 
Private Enquiry Agents and Private Detectives 
Equally unsettled as the Victorian era faded were the private enquiry 
agents who had flourished in fact and fiction with the flamboyance of 
the former on occasion nearing the flights of fancy of the latter. 
But such flamboyance and the occasionally boastful claims of even more 
sedate operatives had encouraged dubious practices which the courts 
were increasingly inclined to view with disfavour. As Draper 
observes: 
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"the courts began to reject the evidence of private detectives in relation to matrimonial affairs, in situations where it had previously been accepted, when it appeared too coincidental or contrived. The scope for the use of lies and false evidence in the divorce market was disappearing. In 19019 Garnier's detective agency was founded and became one of the first multi-purpose firms, offering all kinds of i nvestigation services. Others followed suit, and this became the pattern of the 20th century agency; the Victorian e nqu i ry agent had matured i nto the modern pri vate detective. " 
(Draper, 1978, p. 16) 
This is not to say of course that these early "practices of blackmail 
and deception" (ibid. p. 16) disappeared - but that is a point to 
which I shall return later in this chapter. 
Cl early as the watershed of the turn of the century passed, neither 
public police nor private alternatives could claim to have occupied a 
wholly stable and unambiguous position in the history of the moment. 
However, as my concern here is principally with those private 
alternatives we should pause to consider their persistence, for 
persist they did despite their low profile (compared to the 
consolidation of the public police) and their varied manifestations. 
Crime Rates and the Decline and Rise of Private Police and Security 
A cursory look at the historical visibility of forms of private police 
or security might see them as common in the absence of public policing 
up to around the mid-19th century,, thereafter disappearing, and only 
re-emerging as a 'boom' industry in the decades following World War 
II. Such a reasonable first-sight view would probably rest on one of 
the two hypotheses (or possibly both). First, that with the 
institutional isation of the public police and the widespread provision 
of their service,, recourse to private agencies was simply no longer 
necessary (and possibly more expensive if price were to rise as demand 
fell). Then, in the more complex and sophisticated society of the 
post-war era, private security re-emerged as part of the generally 
booming service sector (parallels may be made in such a hypothesis 
between the establishment of the National Health Service co-existent 
with a, lately, flourishing system of private medicine and health 
insurance plans). The general propositions and implications cf this 
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hy poth es isa re el ab o rated in the 'f iscal cri si s' expl anati ons of the 
growth of private security and I offer a critique of this analysis in 
Chapter 5. 
An alternative hypothesis however might equally reasonably focus upon 
and seek some correlation between publ ic and private policing 
arrangements and the statistical incidence of crime and civil 
disorder. Fortunately (whil st by no means concerned with the 
phenomena of forms of private security) a major study by Gurr (1977) 
is explicitly aimed at investigating the hypothesis that both crime 
and civil disorder declined significantly in several major western 
cities (he takes London, Stockholm, Sydney and also Calcutta as a 
Icolonial' city) between the mid-19th Century and the mid-1920s/1930s 
and then underwent a massive increase after World War II. Cl early 
then an examination of Gurr's study, albeit brief, is appropriate 
given the above hypothesis. 
Gurr is concerned with these trends in the decline of crime and civil 
disorder, with changes in their patterns of incidence and with their 
relationship to elite, institutional and political perceptions and 
actions regarding social stability and public order. He is well aware 
of the methodological problems of using crime statistics, especially 
across historical spans, - the influence of elite power, institutional 
procedures, popular pressures and political ideologies. But if 
criminal statistics cannot reveal the real 'rates' of crime, they can 
at least indicate a lot about trends in crime. Despite sources of 
distortion, he argues, they must reveal or reflect real changes in 
criminalised behaviour. As Storch (1979) observes: 
"where the best data are available (crimes known to the 
police) they usually form patterns similar to committal or 
conviction data alone. This might mean for example that 
18th century committal or conviction statistics can perhaps 
provide us with fair assessments of general trends in crime, 
though not of its actual incidence. " 
118) 
What Gurr's analysis of the data for his three major cities finds is 
that between 1850 and 1930 there is a long-term decline in incidences 
of common crime: a finding which, as Storch (1979: 118) notes, is 
confirmed for England as a whole by the work of Gatrell and Hadden 
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(1972: 364). A somewhat bemusing finding however., and one born out by 
other studies cited by Storch (p. 119),, is that "all studies of the 
west thus far show no correlation between rapid urbanisation and 
vastly increased urban crime rates" (Storch, 1979: 119) . Now, if this 
is the case, then perhaps the evident 'success' of the new police, 
called upon to stem the tide of feared and expected increases in urban 
crime, reflects rather a simple and basic absence of any such 
overwhelming or spectacular increase. Alternatively: 
"The notion has been advanced that modern policing had 
uncertain effects on violent crime, but significant effects 
on property crime. The first proposition is probably true. 
Murder and serious assault are probably not much affected by 
the technique most used by modern police - pressure of 
surveillance and active patrol - but perhaps the statistical 
incidence of some kinds of minor violence ... was 
affected ... (B)ut can this be ascribed to the deterrent 
effects of active patrol or to other social and cultura-T 
factors at work within the working class? " 
(Storch, 1979: 120 - emphasis added) 
With regard to the second proposition however, (effects on property 
crime), while this is "possibly true", there are problems and Storch 
concl udes that: 
"In London during the two decades after the introduction of 
the police, crime indicators seem to more readily reflect 
the swings of the economy and of the political and social 
tension than the effects of a new institutional factor. " 
(1979: 121) 
It therefore seems difficult to substantiate the case for making some 
causal correlation between the 'decline' of crime between 1850-1930 
(and its resurgence after 1940), the birth of the new police (and 
their various reorganisations for efficiency after 1940) and the 
apparent fading of private arrangements between 1850 and 1930 (and 
boom after the late 1940s). Gurr himself recognises the breadth of 
sources and influences on any 'causality' that may be found, asking: 
"whether the improvements that occurred, especially between 
1850-1930 were due to the policies of publ ic order 
themselves or to their coincidence with more fundamental 
cultural, economic and political changes. The disquieting 
general conclusion ... is that the effects of these 
policies depend upon other circumstances, only dimly 
understood. " 
(Gurr, 1977: 183) 
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Certainly, to take one manifestation of such changes not explainable 
solely by reference to the policies of public order: by the inter-war 
years a major discernible development in relations between the police 
and the public was the acceptance of the former into and by the 
community which was most heavily policed, that of the working class. 
Popular feeling towards the police had slowly adjusted to seeing them 
as being important in potentially offering protection to all against 
crime and providing a mechanism of discipline (Scraton, 1982: 34), 
(despite the historical memories of recent use of the police in 
violent clashes with members of those same working class communities, 
cf. Scraton and South, 1981: 29). 
With regard to privatised arrangements for policing, their persistence 
certainly seems to have at least a significant degree more to do with 
cultural . economic and political changes than simply the effects of 
public order policies. But all these factors were nonetheless 
contributory to the development and growth of private security - from 
Victorian principles of self-help, through the stimulus of commercial 
demand to inter-war changes in the organisation of the public police 
system. It is with these 'contributions' that the rest of this 
section on the period 1900 to post World War II is concerned. 
The Persistence of Voluntary Policing 
The concept of voluntary policing or, perhaps more appropriately at 
times, 'self-policing' has an interesting extension beyond the 19th 
century with the growth of the women police associations. Though not 
strictly privatised policing or policing on a commercial basis, their 
organisation and status as voluntary associations deserves mention 
here. 
Their intentions were those of practical 'self-help' for women and the 
preservation of Victorian morality. A strange mix of assertion and 
denial of 'independence' . Thus they were to protect women from 
aggressors and from their own occasionally unsound judgements. The 
1 egacy of the 'evangel ical police' and the societies for the 
suppression of vice (Radzinowicz, 1956 (b) ; Hall and McLennan, 
1980: 64) is discernible as are contemporary fears over the white slave 
93 
traffic at the turn of the century (Garner, 1978: 43). The 
Associations also owed much to the inspiration of the Suffragette 
Movement, encouraging women to assert their competence in traditional 
male occupations (Garner., 1978: 43). 
Whatever their commitment and motivation, from the turn of the 20th 
century to the 1920s: 
"there were a variety of modes of service, some served the 
government while others were financed privately; some had 
specific duties, others had wide-ranging powers; most groups 
were shortlived but a few became permanent officers within 
the Metropolitan police. All the associations began as 
privately funded organisations trying to pressure the 
government into adopting the principle of women police 
whilst at the same time attempting to show why this was 
necessary by practical demonstration, such as setting up 
women patrols to guard the public spaces and parks. " 
(Garner, 1978: 44) 
The vigilance committees and similar private associations already 
relied on women as well as men to report unlawful and immoral acts to 
the police for prosecution (Garner, 1978: 45; Owings, 1925: 4). The use 
of the police against the suffragettes led many women to believe that 
the presence of women within the police force might result in a more 
sympathetic reaction to their cause from a masculine establishment, 
both politically and physically. World War I, brought a further 
rationale - patriotism and significantly with men away at war, it also 
brought opportunities. Whilst many in the Womens Movement were 
strongly ambivalent about 'the war effort' and others highly critical 
(Rowbotham., 1973., Chapter 17) still others were eager to prove that 
women could do men's jobs. A large number of voluntary, uniformed 
associations sprang up, often organised by society ladies and, as 
Marwick describes them, performing their roles as a "not necessarily 
ineffective mixture of Girl Guides, County Charity and Territorial 
Army" (Marwick, 1977: 40). 
By the 1920s the Women' s Police Service operated in several major 
cities and while their work was generally for the police or government 
departments, they also worked in commercial factories (e. g. Nestle and 
Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk at Bromley) (Al len, 1925: 71; Garner, 
1978: 51) and for private organisations such as the British Empire 
League Country Club: 
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"where they ' removed the loose women of Richmond' and at the 
request of Vicar William Q. Amer of Holloway, N7 they 
cleaned the neighbourhood of undesirable females in less 
than two months, no doubt being paid by the Church. " 
(Garner, 1978: 51) 
At the same time members of the W. P. S. were also employed on a 
permanent basis by the makers of Maypole Margarine as factory police 
women (Garner, 1978: 51; Allen, 1925: 150). The W. P. S. was shortly re- 
constituted as the Women's Auxiliary Service after conflicts with the 
new Metropolitan Commissioner, Sir Nevil Macready, in 1918, who whilst 
forming the Metropolitan Women's Police remained highly suspicious of 
the Suffragette cause. Voluntary work, supported by donation and 
subscription continued,, as did commercial commissions for private 
security type work, as for example at the 1924 Wembley Imperial 
Exposition. 
A further example of the initiative of organised women is represented 
by the 'moral policing' provided for by a convention organised in 1914 
by the National Union of Women Workers. With the widespread movement 
of soldiers and male workers around the country necessitated by the 
war effort,, concern arose over the "dangers arising from the 
uncontrolled excitement which possessed much of the girlhood and 
womanhood of the country" (Owings, 1925: 23; Garner, 1978: 54). 
Initially paid for from voluntary funds these moral police were 
subsidised by the Home Office after 1916 at about 1400 per annum to 
train other women to aid police work in London. Police funds were 
then used to employ a private, secondary force of moral guardians who, 
for example, reported on the behaviour of the members of the audience 
in London cinemas (Garner, 1978: 55). At the same time, other sponsors 
and employers, such as vigilance committees, church organisations and 
the London Council for the Promotion of Public Morality, maintained an 
interest in the private employment of women patrols to encourage moral 
rectitude. 
The fascinating histories of these women's 'self-help' groups, 
generally funded by private commissions, voluntary contributions and 
subscriptions or government grants., cannot be adequately or 
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appropriately dealt with in a study of privately paid policing and 
security (Garner's, (1978, Chapter 3) excellent thesis offers a 
thorough treatment of the subject). Suffice it to comment that for 
the purpose of this study the proliferation of women' s 
private/voluntary police associations, now largely forgotten, 
highlights one irregularity among many in the conventional uni-linear 
picture of police history (cf. South forthcoming). It also shows how 
quickly and effectively, private, trained, uniformed and equipped 
personnel can be brought together - and,, in some cases, be absorbed 
within the public policing arrangements of the state. 
Private Security and the Police in the Inter-War Years 
Periods of conflict, oppression and victimisation invariably throw up 
examples of organised resistance and opposition. The General Strike 
of 1926 and the aggressive reaction, more particularly of the middle 
and upper class special constables than the regular police, led to the 
formation of defence corps by the workers. In some cases relations 
with the police were simply bloody. In others, (whatever the truth of 
stories of friendly football matches), as at Willesden with the 200 
strong 'Maintenance of Order Corps' and at Selby, apparently 
harmonious cooperation was established in a mixture of community self- 
policing and state policing (Garner, 1978: 62). But the response of 
employers in the General Strike actually highlights another facet of 
the privatisation of policing - the direct use of ordinary employees 
in a security capacity. The Times newspaper for example, directed its 
employees to act as guards to protect the loading and delivery of 
newspapers (Garner, 1978: 63). 
Most factories and warehouse complexes employed 'works police' for 
gate security work and to patrol for fire and intrusion. The outbreak 
of World War II in 1939 made such provision a more pressing problem, 
most acutely so where products, services and safe storage were 
essential to the war effort. Unsurprisingly the state saw the need 
for the incorporation of such security responsibilities into its own 
general home defence strategy and these early in-house security 
arrangements were amalgamated into the Home Guard (Calder, 1969: 143; 
379; Garner, 1978: 64). 
96 
After the war many large companies retained, and even expanded these 
basic in-house security forces. Other firms felt the labour intensive 
costs of such staffing (prior to the development of sophisticated 
security technology in the 1950s and 1960s) to be too prohibitive and 
instead opted for the provision of security by 'rental'. 
Some sophistication in the sense of a 'technical ' approach to security 
had already entered the commercial market place as early as 1926, 
though this was neither for the provision of factory guards or 
technological alarm systems. In that year an entrepreneur called 
Arnold Kunzler had formed a company called Machinery and Technical 
Transport. As Draper (1978: 19) notes, "the word 'technical' in 
reality stood for 'security' but t he company believed then (as it 
believes to this day) that one of the secrets of security is 
anonymity. " Machinery and Technical Transport provided couriers to 
accompany and safe-guard the passage of various goods, including cash,, 
valuables and bullion by road, rail or air. Specifically designed 
security vehicles were a later innovation but M. A. T. transport 
developed with the times and is still operating as Brinks-MAT in the 
United Kingdom, a part of the i nternational Brinks security 
organisation. 
In 1935 a Night Watch Patrol was offered as part of a limited range of 
guard patrol services run by Night Watch Services Limited on a 
commercial , rental basis. Night Watch Services was established by the 
Marquis of Willingdon and Henry Tiarks, a merchant banker, to protect 
the penthouse propertied set against East-End undesirables and 
Moseley's fascists who were drawing violence to their meetings 
wherever they were in London (Bowden, 1978: 253; Clayton, 1967: 12; 
Garner, 1978: 65). The pre-war complement of 15 guards on bicycles was 
reduced to two by 1945, but thereafter the firm grew, changing its 
name first to 'Security Corps' in 1947 and then later, in response to 
Home Office concern that this sounded too military, to Securicor 
(Bunyan, 1976: 231). While the history of Securicor thus seems more 
lengthy than commonly thought, elsewhere private policing and security 
is even older. Apart from the USA, Sweden offers a good example. The 
Group 4 Total Security Company today operates one of the major U. K. 
security organisations, and may be the largest across Europe. 
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Unsurprisingly, it is a grouped amalgamation of four companies, 'Cash 
in Transit', 'Securitas Alarms'. 'Store Detectives' and 'Factory 
Guards Limited'. Factory Guards was the fore-runner, established in 
the United Kingdom in 1952 as a subsidiary of the Swedish parent 
company Securitas International, which has an even longer history than 
Securicor being founded in 1913. 
If the years immediately prior to World War II were formative for the 
organisation of the post-war private security sector and the type of 
firms that would emerge, so too was it a period in which the 
operational style and priorities of the police significantly changed 
in response to an apparently changing style of criminal activity. 
These 1 atter two related changes also had implications for the 
development of post-war private security. As Scraton (1982: 35) points 
out: 
"wel 1 over a hundred years after Col quhoun' s vi si on of a 
scientific form of policing there was little to recommend 
the service on this level. Classification systems were 
disparate and incompatible and communication between forces 
was sparse. " 
1933 saw the appointment of the Dixon Committee to assess the state of 
detective work within British policing. Critchley (1978) summarises 
the conclusions and recommendations of the committee,, important as the 
blue-print of the organisation and practice of subsequent and modern 
police detection work, and the system and standard against which so- 
called private detection should be measured. (Though it should also 
be remembered that the negative appraisal of the achievements of the 
British police was the result of comparison with overseas pol ice 
systems., where one exemplar, the United States, had derived much of 
its original and imaginative approach to criminal investigation from 
private security agencies such as the Pinkertons). Reporting in 1934, 
the Dixon Committee concluded that: 
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"England lagged behind other countries in the use of 
scientific aids in the detection of crime., and the outcome 
of its work was the introduction of systematic training 
courses for detectives; the establishment of regional crime- 
clearing houses to assist in identifying convicted persons, 
particularly mobile criminals; the issue by the Home Officc- 
of instructions of scientific aids, drawing detectives 
attention to the ways in which laboratory work could help 
them; the consolidation of a system of forensic science 
laboratories; and the provision of rapid, reliable and 
systematic means of collecting and communicating information 
about criminals between all police forces in the country. " 
(Critchley., 1978: 210) 
Far from resenting such criticism, senior police officers seemed to 
welcome it. The modernisation of policing technology and need for 
sophistication in its approach to detective work was a paramount 
necessity in their eyes as they identified signs of the growth of 
lorganised crime' with another image imported from the USA, that of 
1 gang-l and' The growth of inner-city gangs, born of the loyalties 
and fears of resistant community networks, depressed areas and 
depressing housing, provided, as they established themselves beyond 
street corner meetings and local prostitution and protection,, the 
basis for more profitable forms of criminality such as robbery, 
burglary and the move from what McIntosh (1975) refers to as 'craft' 
to 'project' crime. The latter, in its turn, being a significant 
contributor to the growth of the private security sector, stimulating, 
in a relationship of assault and defence symbiosis, the development of 
alarm systems, armoured cars, guard services, camera monitoring and 
recording, personnel and investigation, and perpetually more and more 
elaborate cash protection and dispensing systems. 
Of course, these developments were not the only major contributor to 
the dramatic post-war expansion of the private security sector. 
Whilst here I have only had the space to note the early 20th Century 
history of some forms of private security in a very cursory and 
selective manner, this sacrifice at least allows me the space to 
detail the nature of that post-war expansion. In the rest of this 
chapter I shall discuss the range and diversity of the modern private 
security sector. Understanding its evident significance then leads in 
Chapter 4. to discussion of its lack of accountability. In Chapter 5, 
I return to consideration of broader social, economic and political 
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factors which have contributed to the growth and importance of the 
private security sector. 
The Private Security Sector Today 
Contract Private Security 
The only consistent and reliable statement that is continually made 
about the size and scope of the private security industry today is 
that it is hard to get consistent and reliable information about it. 
The most recent survey of the contract security field, produced by its 
principal trade union., MATSA (October, 1983) notes: 
"There are no reliable figures on the size of the security 
industry. It is rapidly changing, partly seasonal and, of 
course, there are a number of very small companies about 
whom it is hard to get any information at all. " 
( 
It is worth pointing out at this early stage that if this last 
observation is true of the most visible and familiar aspects of the 
private security sector then it is even more true of the less 
conspicuous and more specialised aspects. And it is not simply that 
such information is unavailable to interested parties such as the 
trade unions. Until the Home Office produced its Green Paper on The 
Private Security Industry in 1979, it seems to have been particularly 
under-informed about or just particularly disinterested in, the 
subject. In reply to a letter from Bruce George, MP, to the Home 
Office Crime Prevention Centre., Lord Harris., Under-Secretary at the 
Home Office, wrote in March 1977: 
"As you know, the Home Office does not keep a record of such 
organisations. In 1971,, however, it did ask chief officers 
of police in England and Wales how many organisations were 
known to them which provided services for the protection of 
persons and property., including the installation of security 
equipment. The replies showed that 741 such organisations 
were known. This is the most recent information we have. " 
For some time this 1971 figure was the only vaguely official one to go 
on and yet many who knew the industry felt it a woefully inadequate 
estimate. 
Prior to 1950, sales in the private security business i. e., contract 
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security dealing in guards, armoured cars, alarms and so on, amounted 
to less than f5 million per year. By 1970 turnover had risen to 
around X55 million, employing, according to one estimate, around 
40,000 men and women (Wiles and McClintock, 1972: 67-68). An estimate 
for 1976 suggested a much more sizeable set of figures: 7,000 firms; 
250,000 uniformed staff and 10,000 armoured vehicles (Bunyan, 
1976: 230). Though now certainly something less of the over-estimate 
that it probably represented in 1976, Bunyan's figure still stands as 
a staggering estimate of the size of the visible dimensions of private 
security. No less so when considered alongside the police 
establishment in the 1970s which according to the Report of the 
Inspector of Constabulary for the end of 1979 had a total strength 
which had "grown to a new peak of over 113,300" officers, with an 
additional 43,000 civilian employees. The Chief Inspector for 
Scotland reported that in 1979 there were 31,214 officers in the eight 
Scottish forces. In these terms, private security employment far 
outnumbered total police force strength. (As a matter of interest, 
the relative strengths of the armed forces in 1979 were: Royal Navy, 
71,053; Royal Airforce, 86,649; Army, 156,415). 
Such academic and journalistic estimates were no better or worse 
informed than those which could be made by the police. Speaking in 
19795 P. D. Knights, Chief Constable of the West Midlands police 
addressed the Association of Chief Police Officers/Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities joint summer conference on the theme of 
'Policing - Public or Private? ' and had to return to the 1971 figure, 
offering the following breakdown: 
11* *. no reliable up-to-date statistics are available. One 
writer has put the figure at 128,000 (in excess of our total 
police force). The 1971 census would show about 80,000 
people recorded at that time as being occupied as security 
guards, patrolmen, watchmen, gate-keepers and in similar 
employment. Pol ice forces in 1971 knew of 74, private 
security organisations in England and Wales. About a dozen 
operated nationally and 80% of the total operated in only 
one force area. 47% of the organisations installed intruder 
alarms, 39% guard dogs, 38% mobile guards and 32% static 
guards. A majority of firms (60%) offered only one service. 
529 of these companies employed an estimated 26,000 persons 
(which might give a total of 30,000 all told), and of the 
26,000, over 20,000 (or 84%) were employed by only nine 
firms. More recent estimates put the total at 40,000 
employees. Their turnover, outside of manufacturing, is put 
at about X130 million annually. " (pp. 5-6) 
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More recently available information has not been exceptionally 
helpful . Sales turnover remains an indicator of growth which many 
refer to. Randal I and Hami I ton (1972 ) reported to the Camb rid ge 
conference on private security that annual sales turnover had risen 
from 15 million to f55 million in the period 1950-1970. By 1976 this 
had increased to an estimated 1135 million according to the 1979 Home 
Office Green Paper (Chapter 1; cf. Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 207). 
And again the 1971 figure recurs, as if it had been the product of 
some sound survey of the field originally, when in fact senior police 
officers had simply been asked to put together their locally available 
information,, and had done just this. Thus, Shearing and Stenning 
(echoing Knight) note that: 
"The Home Office also found that of the 741 private security 
organisations known to the police in 1971, some 80% of the 
firms operated in only one police force area, and only about 
a dozen operated nationally. On the basis of a more 
detailed analysis of a sub-sample of 529 security 
organisations, they report that 84% of the employees work 
for 2% of the security organisations. " 
(United Kingdom, Home Office, 1979: 3) (Shearing and 
Stenning, 1981: 207) 
With a commitment to unionisation in the security industry, MATSA (the 
Managerial, Administrative., Technical and Supervisory Association, 
part of the GMBATU), have made as consistent and thorough effort as 
anyone to chart the growth and size of the private security companies. 
In their latest 1983 report, The Security Industry, they note the 
"best official estimates" starting with the Cambridge conference and 
the 1971 police figures. They also note that in 1978 the BSIA,, (the 
British Security Industry Association) claimed to have 63 member 
companies employing 32,063 contract security workers. 1 
Agreeing with the BSIA's claim that it represents the security 
industry because its member companies account for most of its 
activities by volume,, the MATSA report continues: 
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"As the top ten companies are al 1 BSIA members and cover 
a rou nd8 0% of th ei ndustry, total di rect empl oyment in 
contract security companies in 1978 may have been around 40,000. By Autumn 1983,, the BSIA estimated that membership 
covered 26,500 contract security guarding jobs with a further 2,000 in ancillary occupations. Alarm maintenance 
and installation employment had reached 4,, 000 making an 
approximate total of 32,500 employment in member companies. Obviously, the vast majority of security companies are not 
m embers. " 
(p. 3) 
The report also makes the critically important observation that 
contract security is only one dimension of the private security 
'industry' which in wider terms includes specialised constabularies 
such as the Ports police, parks police, transport police, the Atomic 
Energy Authority police etc.; in-house security, security equipment 
design, manufacture and installation; private detectives; store 
detectives; security consultants, advisors and trainers; and so on. 
With the exception of the specialised constabularies (referred to in 
Chapter 1) all these and other dimensions of private security will be 
discussed in the following sections of this chapter. Taking account 
of those mentioned and "other smaller sectors". the MATSA report 
suggests that "from 80,000 in 1971, this wider definition of the 
industry puts total employment at just under 400,000 in 1980" (p. 3). 
This latter figure is close to the 386,000 persons employed in all 
'security occupations' in 1980 as estimated in the 1983 Economic 
Review produced by the Institute for Employment Research at Warwick 
University. On this basis the Review estimates that by 1990 'security 
occupations' will employ 483,000 people or "two out of every hundred 
workers" (ibid., p. 3). 
It should by now be clear, if it has not been all along, that it is 
extremely difficult (if not currently impossible) to give any accurate 
estimate or assessment of the 'size' of the contract security industry 
specifically or the private security sector more generally. I have 
presented all the available major, reputable estimates and have been 
unable to gather any data which could generate any estimates which I 
could argue as more accurate than those recently proposed. The latter 
offerings from the MATSA report and the Warwick Economic Review seem 
to be based on sound estimates, and if my feeling was that Bunyan's 
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1976 estimate of 250,000 staff in private security was an over- 
estimate for the mid-1970s I have far fewer reservations about its 
accuracy in the mid-1980s. 
I have so far tried to indicate the size of the phenomenon of contract 
private security and now move on to describe examples of contract 
security companies in the upper and middle ranges of the market; 
common aspects of, and problems with, the labour force that they 
employ (principally in the labour intensive areas of guard and mobile 
work, cf. Chapter 2); and then broaden out to describe the range and 
nature of services which this contract security industry provides. I 
do not describe the very small companies operating in this sphere, 
partly because if the information were there this could go on 
indefinitely, but largely because the information about small 
companies is very hard to come by, unless one were to go through the 
telephone books of every town. (Looking at the Yellow Pages might 
give one the reputable sample - relatively speaking! )2 I can also 
only cursorily deal with the common characteristics and problems of 
the employed (often marginal, casual) labour force found in private 
security guard and patrol-type work (though related issues are raised 
in Chapters 2 and 4). 
Although the number of companies operating in the contract security 
field is unknown (though MATSA suggest it is at least over 1,000) what 
is striking about this particular area is that it is so heavily 
dominated by just five companies. These five now take up around 75%- 
80% of the market. In terms of size they rank downward from 
Securicor, Group 4, Chubb, Security Express to Pritchards. But 
Securicor is the really dominant force in the market, employing as 
MATSA observes., "14,, 000 workers, almost as many as the remainder put 
together" (MATSA, 1983: 4). There is little point or value here in 
giving what would essentially be company histories. However, af ew 
points about how certain companies are diversifying their activities 
are important. 
Ref erence has al ready been made to th e pre-wa r estab 1is hment of th e 
fore-runner of Securicor and its post-war re-naming and subsequent 
growth, expanding rapidly throughout the 1960s up to the present. 
104 
However, within that expansion it has not merely sought the extension 
of established services but has consistently moved into newly 
developed areas. Thus., today it is clearly placing less of its growth 
emphasis on 'traditional' security services such as the provision of 
static and armoured van guards etc. and is moving into the booming 
area of communications: for example the development and application of 
cellular technology used in mobile communications systems. In a major 
project in this area Securicor has entered into a partnership with 
British Telecom - known as Sectel. This venture has a 25-year 
operating license, one of only two so-far issued, to build up a 
national cellular radio network which will: 
"enable business people to use a cordless telephone to make 
and receive calls while on the move. Major cities and their 
connecting motorways will be divided into small areas, or 
cells, each with its own radio transmitter and receiver 
operating on a unique frequency. As subscribers travel from 
one cell to another a computerised exchange switches 
frequencies automatically to provide a continuous link. " 
(Golding and Murdock, 1983: 33) 
Golding and Murdock's comment on this particular kind of enterprise 
which, in this case takes radio frequencies out of public access and 
privatises them, refl ects an unsurpri si ng f eature of al I the 
commercial activities of the private security sector -a "tendency to 
put the demands and needs of business before the broader publ ic 
interest" (ibid. ). 
Securicor is al so involved in Cash in Transit operations (CIT) , which 
are reported to be "doing reasonably" (MATSA, 1983) and al so has 
interests in alarms, cleaning services, hotels, vehicle dealerships 
and insurance and travel. Its parcels and courier services "are 
expanding" (ibid. ) including its data service delivery organisation. 
This latter venture was reported in the Securicor Guardian, Spring 
1981, as providing "one third of the company's turnover, employing a 
staff of 3,500 and utilising 1,700 vehicles" (p. 15). The development 
and success of the parcels and data delivery services of Securicor 
provides one indication of the assistance which senior directors 
joining Securicor after service in the public sector, can give. In 
this case the Securicor Guardian describes the contribution of Sir 
Ronald German, the last Director General of the Post Office, who 
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"brough ta weal th of knowl edge to the board and gave inval uabl e hel p 
in setting up our radio network which has grown to become the most 
comprehensive coverage of any private company in the United 
Ki n9dam ... (and) ... he was able to advise on setting up the Data 
Service .. ." In common with most of its major competitors Securicor 
is diversifying from a position of financial good health in an 
economic climate when most businesses are simply consolidating or are 
contracting. As the MATSA report puts it: 
"Even in the depths of the recession with competition at its 
fiercest, the company is doing far better than the average 
U. K. business. " 
(MATSA, 1983: 4) 
There is little point in noting similar details for other companies 
such as Group 4, (which alongside Chubb is the next largest security 
company in the U. K. ) except to observe that it is also diversifying 
from early concentration on property guarding, CIT and store detective 
work into other areas. Securicor and Group 4 do however raise one 
further point which has, in general , been more of an issue for 
American and Canadian commentators. This is the question of foreign 
ownership of security companies (cf. Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 207). 
There are undoubtedly now a number of foreign owned, almost 
exclusively US-based companies in Britain. But Group 4 is actual lY a 
Swedish company, and while Securicor is a British company it has 
sizeable overseas operations, with around 30% of its total staff 
working abroad. As Shearing and Stenning have remarked: 
"this suggests that foreign ownership is probably a 
significant factor in the European private security industry 
as well as in the industry in Britain and Canada. " 
(1981: 207) 
Chubb and Security Express are the next two really sizeable companies. 
Chubb (the larger by far) is a1 ong-establi shed lock and safe-making 
firm based in Wolverhampton, which expanded into guard services (Chubb 
Wardens) and logically, into domestic and industrial lock and alarm 
systems and other electronics. In recent years demand for locks and 
alarms, particularly from the Middle East has been high and the 
company has prospered, though exports are now falling off. In common 
with the general trend the company has successfully diversified abroad 
and into other areas, though remaining principally tied to its locks 
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and alarms manufacturing and sales activities (cf. MATSA report). 
Security Express pri nci pal ly operate in the Cash in Transit field, 
which is unsurprising as they are a subsidiary of the De La Rue Group 
which specialises in the printing of bank-notes for a variety of 
countries. As the MATSA report observes, it is from this base that 
"the group has moved to high quality colour printing and storage and 
carrying of valuables" (p. 5). There is perhaps less scope for 
Security Express to diversify its activities, and a "recent 
spectacular robbery from one of their vaults ... dented their image 
and forced them to drop prices to retain business" (MATSA report,, 
1983: 5). But this set-back should not be over-rated and the company 
and group are doing very well. 
Finally,, other indicators of growth are noted by the MATSA report: 
examples of small companies 'fighting their way into the market' and 
undergoing rapid expansion; the continued growth of firms specialising 
in security system and alarm installation; and the expansion of 
companies like Security Centres Limited which "buys up smaller, weaker 
companies turning them into local branches for hiring out burglar 
alarms" (ibid. p. 5). All these areas of growth become evident from a 
focus on the contract private security industry, but it should also be 
noted that other security functions come to be taken on and 
commercially developed by firms apparently coming from a different 
di recti on. A clear example in the past few years has been provided by 
the growth of OCS (Office Cleaning Services) which now offers among 
its cleaning and maintenance services a complete package incorporating 
expertise in security and alarm systems. 
On a continuum of a whole range of commercial services it is 
increasingly difficult to say where the private security sector begins 
or ends. The MATSA report summarises the current trend in the 
contract security business: 
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"The trend is therefore towards a multitude of small and 
medium-sized companies fighting for the patrol, guarding and 
cash-carrying contracts, with the very much larger companies 
tightening their hold on the technologically advanced end of 
the market. There may be a steady decline in CIT and pay- 
packeting as more companies move to cashless pay and plastic 
money becomes more widely used, but this may take a lot 
longer than is widely thought. " 
(p. 6) 
Employee Recruitment, Turnover and Training 
One very significant consequence of this multitude of companies,, of 
all sizes, is that., as Garner (1978: 96) has remarked., 
"the multiplicity of sizes, resources and expertise in the 
industry makes it very difficult to generalise about 
recruitment and training and working conditions 
From my own interviews with managers in manned security and alarm and 
lock-fitting companies it was clear that issues of recruitment and 
training were fairly sensitive subjects and something that few people 
were totally happy with in the industry. For example, although the 
actual incidence of infiltration by persons with criminal intent or 
simply with a record of past offences is probably relatively slight, 
this is nonetheless an issue which security companies rightly feel is 
a public and police worry, and is hence a worry to them. The fact 
that there have been cases of people employed with convictions for 
violence, possession of stolen property,, corruption and so on, means 
some considerable focus on and concern about the initial problem of 
selection of emplqyees. 
For many c ompani es thi s becomes the key argument f or greater 
recognition of private security's willingness to police itself if it 
were granted exclusion from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act (1974) and the means to vet prospective employees more 
thoroughly (cf. Chapter 4). There is also obvious awareness in manned 
security that given the low levels of pay (an issue which the Low Pay 
Unit has campaigned about cf. Williams et al, 1984) and the anti- 
social and long hours of the shift system (usually twelve hours or 
longer, cf. Chapter 2) then this level of private security is unlikely 
to attract high calibre employees. On the other hand,, the companies 
argue, these conditions are forced upon them by the competitive nature 
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of the security market. Rates of pay are kept low by the vicious 
circle of competition which exists in this highly labour-intensive 
industry where the major costs are the wage bills. The companies 
argue that if they paid more then they would have to charge more; they 
would then be under cut by competitors. Similarly, in a business 
which offers a twenty-four hour service, then three shifts of eight 
hours might attract some better staff but cost-considerations mean 
that two twelve hour shifts are more desirable. All these factors, 
coupled with the generally boring nature of the job3 contribute to a 
massive turnover of staff., which in turn, of course, reduces the 
possibilitiy of the services achieving the levels of efficiency that 
security companies claim (or would like to claim). 
The 1972 Cambridge Cropwood Conference on private security (Wiles and 
McLintock, 1972) estimated that 25% of the labour force changed four 
to five times per year. Ten years on, with the massive growth that 
the industry has maintained but with little commensurate improvement 
in conditions or pay this estimate should at least hold and the figure 
is probably somewhat higher. In one 'medium to small-sized' South 
London company that tried to offer good pay and conditions, and was 
generally well thought of, one of the principals told me that the 
average stay for guards was still only two months, though a number, of 
course, stayed rather longer (interview in 1979). 4 This company at 
least tries to make employees feel that they would like them to stay 
on, partly by offering a weeks training and induction course. Most 
medium to small firms simply cynically accept that they are employing 
a large percentage of casual , floating and part-time 
labour who will 
move on regardless, hence it is a waste of time and money to try to 
offer any (or more than a morning or day's) training and orientation. 
There are serious criticisms to be made of such disregard for the 
sensitive positions that guards will occupy and the information and 
skills they will need (see Chapters 2 and 4). The level of 
preparation that is currently seen as better than most companies 
provide need not be a sophisticated matter. The South London company 
referred to above for example, after some lengthy experience, will try 
to cover points of relevant law and safety matters but insists that in 
this business they really have to start with basics, ensuring that 
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employees have the ability to read, write and speak English in order 
that they may write reports, read safety signs and instructions and 
communicate with anyone in or near the property or the police or 
owners. 
In the field of manufacturing and installing security devices and 
locks, one manager suggested that the standard procedure for taking on 
employees would be very simple. Receiving the job application, 
checking the references and then undergoing 'on-the-job' training. 
Although work in this particular industry often calls for some 
qualifications, probably at least the three year City and Guilds 
certificate in Electronics (or equivalent), it was also acknowledged 
that anyone could set themselves up in business with no qualifications 
at all . Movement into the more 'craft-traditions' orientated world of 
the locksmith might more typically mean joining a specialist firm as a 
trainee, or in the old days as an apprentice, at sixteen and then 
being trained. Membership of the Master Locksmiths Association only 
follows after a series of examinations. 
Growth, Expansion., Employment and Prospects 
Having noted the instability and high turnover of the labour force in 
the contract security field, it is nonetheless extremely important to 
consider this area in terms of it being a major employer. As a major 
growth industry it is also a major provider of jobs. This is 
obviously a key issue for the trade unions as well as the industry 
itself. The MATSA report (1983) mentioned earlier., has distilled the 
implications and prospects for security professions generally from the 
most recent and important extrapolating survey and review which covers 
this field., (among others). It notes that the 1983 Economic Review 
from the University of Warwick, Institute for Employment Research., has 
predicted: 
-That contingent upon the growth of trade, retail activity, 
di stri buti on and so on , the security 
i ndustry general ly wi 11 
experience continued overall growth across all regions of the 
country. (Predicted growth is not directly linked to any predicted 
rise in crime). 
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- That the increase of 10,000 jobs in contract security companies 
which occurred between 1975 and 1982 is part of a continuing growth 
trend, which may even accelerate. 
- That the broad range of security occupations is the only area of 
manual employment which is not predicted to decline. By 1990 an 
overall gain of 100,000 jobs should take total employment in this 
area to just under half a million. This figure includes 'public 
administration' i. e. the police, but clearly non-public security 
occupations are a major percentage of the total. Within this sector 
both contracted security services and other security-type jobs in 
other industries are included. 
On the basis of these projections both the public and the private 
security sectors are going to be of increasing significance on a range 
of criteria - not least size - in the next two decades. 
The probl em with such projections however is their vagueness and 
generality. On the scale on which they are calculated a variety of 
trends and indicators can be put together to produce a forecast figure 
for this or that. It is difficult however, if not impossible, to 
break down the components of the projected future picture. This is 
partly because one can assume that general trends will have the 
impetus to carry the composite whole to its forecasted growth, but it 
is less easy to predict how individual components of the whole will 
fare. Where some may decline (e. g. in this case manned security) 
others may flourish to take up slack and overtake in growth (e. g. 
electronic security systems). As indicated, the major companies in 
the contract security field are already seeking to diversify and make 
themselves less focused and dependent upon business which is as 
labour-intensive and hence competitive and costly, as guarding and 
cash-in-transit services. Hence, despite the sustained business 
activity and likely growth of smaller companies already in, and moving 
into, this area there is unlikely to be major or rapid increase in the 
labour force here. As the MATSA report notes: 
"The 'new' sectors like telecommunications, electronics, 
alarm systems and maintenance are less labour-intensive in 
themselves. However, a large organisation is needed to 
support such high technology, complex operations. It is 
these 'indirect' jobs which are likely to continue growing. 
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Meanwhile, of course, jobs will continue to grow in parcels 
and courier services as trade rises ... Cash in Transit is likely to fall somewhere between "... the latter 'new' 
areas and the old guarding and patrol services. " The large, 
heavily armoured vans are a big investment and need 
expensive back-up. Small amounts of cash and valuables can 
be taken by smaller vans in reinforced boxes, this area of 
CIT is more easily accessible to smaller companies. Thus 
the overall picture is of more jobs in virtually all main 
sectors: 
High technology craft and technician employment 
White collar administrative 
Parcels and security freighting 
Guarding - slight growth but only in small companies. 
"The only exceptions are likely to be pay-pak, " (i. e. the 
service offered by a number of companies which makes up pay 
packets for clients firms and then transports them on pay- 
day to the clients premises) "where a gradual decline is 
probable and CIT where the level of jobs may remain stable 
in the short-term and fall slowly in the medium to long- 
term. " 
(MATSA, 1983: 7-8) 
In 1976 the USA Federal Task Force on Private Security Standards and 
Goals forecast that "with the 'encroachment by electronic technology' 
growth rates for guard, armoured car and courier services will be 
modest compared to the ... annual growth of the past few years" (US 
Department of Justice, 1976: 34). Even given that the Task Force was 
considering growth in comparative and relative terms, it does seem 
now, for the USA and elsewhere that they may themselves have been too 
"modest" in their assessment of growth. However, it is true that it 
is these three areas particularly (within the contract security 
industry) which will be overtaken and, over time, see relative 
decline. Certainly,, the 'encroachment of electronic technology' is 
the significant factor in this crucial re-orientation of the contract 
security industry and its activities and services. 
"The classic nightwatchman is a thing of the past, " observes the MATSA 
report. Closed circuit television and electronic warning and sensor 
systems now work out cheaper and can certainly be more efficient. The 
pace of development of electronics, the competitive nature of the 
market and the rising labour costs of guard and patrol services,, mean 
that it is no longer the sophisticated and up-market option of major 
corporations to survey premises by camera and monitoring screen, 
112 
staffed by a single guard. This is now an option open to an ever- 
increasing number of companies with physical plant or stock to guard. 
More disturbingly perhaps such technology lends itself on a twenty- 
four hour basis, not only to the overseeing of property by night, but 
also to the surveillance of workers and that property, by day. Of 
course, there is a further set of factors which make electronic 
surveil lance-guarding attractive to customer companies and security 
firms as well. As I have noted elsewhere (South, 1983) and as MATSA 
despite its sympathy and interests lying with security staff concurs: 
"guards can become frustrated or bored or suffer temptation 
as their employers make no effort to train or pay them 
adequately. " 
(MATSA, 1983: 8) 
Fooling around, fiddling time or pilfering the protected goods can add 
interest to the job and the wage-packet. Electronic surveillance 
technology, especially that which can record and can be subject to 
checking involves a higher degree of professionalism and interest than 
traditional guarding roles for the security staff, can be cheaper and 
more efficient for the employing customer and reduces the problems of 
rising labour costs for security companies. Interestingly, despite 
the fact that this looks like a lucrative trend for the private 
security sector generally the structuring of the UK market in this 
area means that the bubble already has limits set upon its expansion 
before it bursts. 
"In the UK a high price is charged for installation of 
alarms, closed circuit television etc., a relatively low 
hiring charge thereafter to cover maintenance (in the USA it 
is the other way round). This means big profits while the 
industry is expanding and selling new systems but the 
balloon will burst once the market becomes saturated. At 
t he same t ime ,si nc e th ere 
is no money in servi ce and 
ma i ntenance, al a rms h ave a poor reputat i on f or rel i ab iIi ty , 
to the great annoyance of passers-by , neighbours and 
police. " 
(MATSA, 1983: 8) 
Policy intervention to reverse this market trend and its consequences 
would make good sense for all concerned. However, in present and 
forseeable circumstances this is unlikely. 
Nonetheless, as a recent survey of the industry by Jordan and Sons of 
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London (1983) observes., intruder alarms in total market terms are "the 
most important sector by some distance (accounting for 35.2% of total 
sales in 1982) ... Growth in intruder alarms from 1978-1982 was 
69.5% but this was to a large extent attributable to a 21.8% increase 
in 1982 " (p. 5) .I shall discuss the problems of performance of 
alarms and the stimulus to the market for them prompted by the 
requirements of the insurance business in a section on the alarm 
industry below. 
Finally in this survey of prospects I turn to cash-in-transit (CIT) 
and Pay Pak services. As the MATSA report astutely notes,, "Cash-in- 
Transit is a response to whether people think crime is rising as much 
as whether it actually does. Hence the greater public presence of 
security companies itself generates trade" (MATSA, 1983: 9). The 
visible presence and conspicuous movement of private security guards 
and armoured vans is commonplace on the streets and in operation on 
public and private property. Such presence very basically advertises 
the 'obvious need' for such services and needs little more to strongly 
resonate with public perceptions of the growing 'crime problem'. 
Continued demand for such services is hence encouraged. 
Of course there is genuine commercial need for protection of the 
increasing amount of cash and valuables in circulation. Despite the 
electronic transfer of funds., some decline in the number of workers 
who insist upon cash in their weekly wage packets, the rise of credit 
cards and so on, the move to the cashless society is making little 
real headway. Over half of all manual employees are still paid in 
cash and over a third. of all staff grades (MATSA, 1983: 9) . The 
transport of cash for pay makes up about half of CIT trade and the 
rest is accounted for by bank business and shop takings. The latter 
are actually generating a greater volume of circulating cash and 
valuables than ever before. This is partly the result of the decline 
of the corner shop and small chain stores and the growth of larger 
superstores, multiple chain stores and shopping complexes which 
concentrate and multiply the generation of cash. Such developments 
have meant more business for CIT companies (cf. MATSA, 1983: 9). 
Finally, the cash-only nature of transactions in the informal economy 
and the large and growing service sector encouraged by the attraction 
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of avoiding high VAT, National Insurance and Income Tax rates means 
that as the MATSA report concludes "however much 'plastic money' grows 
or bank opening hours become more convenient, there will always be a 
substantial demand for cash" (MATSA, 1983: 9). 
The major security companies have been preparing for the moves to the 
cashless society for years but their far-sightedness has generally 
been tempered by keeping an eye on how fast trends are really 
developing. Some of the security technology which companies like 
Securicor were beginning to develop nearly ten years ago has still not 
seen the light of day,, at least partly because the computerised card 
systems of monetary transaction which they are posited upon have not 
arrived. 5 Whilst property guarding and CIT services and other labour- 
intensive areas of operation still have so much commercial stability 
and some growth potential in them, then despite diversification and 
expansion into other areas, the major companies and their small 
competitors will remain in them. 
The Nature and Range of Services in the Contract Private Security 
Industry 
Having outlined some of the basics of the 'foundations' of the 
contract security business and aspects of its potential for continued 
growth and diversification, I turn now to a fuller account of the 
nature and range of services offered. 
The provision of contract security is the most visible private 
security activity. It covers a wide range of services and functions, 
including the provision of static guards and mobile patrols to guard 
and secure property and for the the protection of persons; the 
transport of cash and making-up, picking-up and delivery of wages; 
other specialised delivery services; back-up communications networks,, 
such as the 'Haulage Emergency Link Protection' (HELP) system to 
assist and protect long-distance lorry drivers and their loads; 
tailored guard services for anything from race-horses to oil paintings 
and other special assignments; consultative work on maximising the 
efficiency and security potential of the work/business/home 
environment; and various forms of investigative work from store 
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detectives to shop-fl oor spies working under-cover. Less reputable 
firms will also happily offer services which constitute the strong arm 
of private protection, providing 'guards' for use in evictions or the 
repossession of property. 
For many years, and in the eyes of many still today, the private 
security static or foot-patrol guard represented what the employment 
of security services actually meant (or seemed to mean). Some 
description of the role and functions of security patrol staff is 
therefore necessary. 
The essence of the private security guard patrol has remained 
unchanged through history. The Pinkerton's bureau may have taken up 
the phrase 'The eye that rever sleeps' to describe its private 
detective agents., but at least ideally the phrase describes the 
function of the security guard more accurately. The security guard is 
supposed "to keep an eye out for potential security problems" 
(Shearing et al; 1980: 168). This involves the performance of tasks 
related to the safety and securing of property and the surveillance of 
persons within it. Checking on locks, doors, windows and gates, 
checking alarm and security systems, checking for fire risks and 
checking personnel, visitors and intruders are the basic routines. 
And such work is 
-highly 
routinised, especially the core of tasks which 
fall into the 'housekeeping' category of duties such as turning off 
lights and taps, shutting windows, switching off machinery,, bits of 
maintenance and checking for fire hazards. Similarly the checking of 
security guards themselves as they do their rounds is routinised, 
often utilising 'clock stations' located especially at vulnerable 
points where the guard must clock-in, inserting a key to have a 
ticker-tape marked at a specific time by the clock mechanism and 
telephoning into the control room as a back-up not only to confirm 
adherence to schedule but also as a check that the guard is alright 
(Chapter 2). Although in the past most patrolling was done on foot, 
and this is still generally the case, many firms employ mobile patrols 
not just to move between sites at unpredictable, irregular intervals 
(for obvious reasons) but also for the mobility of supervisory staff 
who can then personal ly check on guards and premises. As many 
commentators and security staff have observed, the patrol function of 
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the security guard can be seen as "very much 1 ike that of the 
traditional 'cop on the beat' ." (Shearing et al; 1980: 169) 
Private 'beat' patrols pre-dated public police patrols by centuries 
(Radzinowicz, 1956; South, forthcoming), so it remains pertinent to 
keep in mind the question 'which is the most traditional? ' Shearing 
et al (ibid. ) elaborate on the 'traditional' role which private 
security seems to have taken over from the public police: 
"The modern public police have increasingly turned to the 
automobile as a means of transport, and have accordingly 
evolved into an emergency force which prides itself on its 
quick response time. While the public police continue to 
patrol our streets the traditional foot patrol function, 
historically regarded as the mainstay of the police role, is 
now almost the exclusive preserve of private security. " 
( Ibid. ) 
Perhaps a more 'dynamic' account of the continuing development of 
private security should be more cautious about the kind of 'static' 
pronouncement quoted above from Shearing et al. Certainly there has 
been some bifurcation of services - public and private - especially in 
the post-war period. However, this has occurred within a continuum of 
policing services and functions which does not readily offer static 
and fixed positions or neat divisions. As at other times 
historically, there are familiar signs of overlap as well as of 
bifurcation. This has occurred in recent Years as private security 
have offered mobile patrols of industrial and residential estates and 
the police have moved to put more officers back onto foot patrols in 
the community. Equally traditional but perhaps less routinised and 
certainly 1 ess emphasized are security duties involving the searching 
of employees and in some cases visitors, to commercial concerns and 
industrial plant, including their vehicles and those involved in 
delivery and distribution. These latter duties relate to occasional 
mundane tasks taken on by private security such as the receiving and 
shipping of goods usually after ordinary working hours (cf. Shearing 
et al ; 1980: 170). In the USA and Canada private security are now also 
involved in the process of 'receiving and shipping' of people as 
passengers. In their long-term study Shearing et al found: 
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"yet another form of access control mentioned., which because 
of its visibility has become associated with private 
security work ... air craft pre-boarding checks. " 
(I bid: 170) 
Although a "relatively rare activity", at least in Canada, and despite 
the fact that there is no precisely similar private security activity 
in the U. K. nonetheless given the use of private security to detain 
and guard people at the London area airports (see Chapter 4), such 
developments in the UK are not remote possibilities. 
Remembering earlier comments about contract security companies' 
(occasional) concerns about training, it might have seemed patronising 
to those unfamiliar with the industry to find such concerns starting 
at basic levels like literacy and communication skills. However, 
there are some essential professional components of the security 
guards' work which in reputable firms perform several functions. The 
most obvious example is the writing of reports. These are important 
in terms of efficiency, communication and as an additional resource in 
checking up on the work of employees, at the organisational level of 
the private security company. They can also be important as an 
I advertisement' and guarantee of good and conscientious service for 
the company in dealings with customers, police and others (e. g. the 
media). Additionally at the occupational level, they can offer a 
psychological boost to 'job satisfaction' . Al though, almost 
inevitably regarded as an arduous task, staff can nonetheless see 
report writing (whether a 'duty' or a 'pain' ), as a prof essi onal 
commitment and further, one which gives them a respectability and 
professional sub-cultural affinity to the broader law enforcement 
enterprise. Such feelings are naturally heightened and emphasized 
when a security guard is required to give evidence in court. This may 
not be a frequent call of duty, but given the nature of the job it is 
not surprising that it is an occasional one. 
While not wishing to sensational ise by veering close to military 
metaphors (although there is a strong validating historical lineage) 
the guard's functions can be seen as the securing of the internal 
security and safety of an area or areas, or of premises and persons on 
a route that they are commissioned to patrol and protect. Within the 
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perimeters of their patrolled site or parameters of their mobile 
patrol they must be alert for internal problems but, equally 
importantly must also secure against, deter and detect unauthorised 
(and indeed. 
., 
note authorised) entrance and intrusion. 
Whilst security is actually employed to provide a wide range of 
services, it should nonetheless be re-emphasized that the primary 
concern emphasized by private security in selling its services and by 
employers (see particularly the surveys of the Toronto studies., and 
for the UK any random sampling of the professional security journals), 
is the concern to ensure the concept of 'loss prevention'. This 
includes everything from discovering the results of the negligence,, 
carelessness and incompetence of employees to detecting and protecting 
against minor and major theft. Here, as part of a system of 
surveillance and discipline of property and persons (in the sense 
developed by Foucault., 1977) a primary aspect of what Shearing et al 
(1980: 172) call "remedial loss prevention work" is., as they observe, 
"its supervisory and educative component. " In this respect written 
reports passed to the employing contractor are expected to indicate 
'breaches of security' which Shearing et al found in their Canadian 
study "were often used by clients as a means of increasing the 
I security consciousness' of their employees and as a basis for 
improving the security measures in force" (ibid). The same 
expectations are held by UK corporate and government employers of 
private security. 
The private security tasks of patrolling, checking, housekeeping and 
itemising breaches of security are essentially the operation of a 
system of surveillance. Whilst police surveillance is directed to 
cover what Spitzer (1975) has termed "problem populations", this is 
generally focused around actual or potential breaches of the law and 
public order. However., as Shearing and Stenning (1981: 214-215) 
suggestively argue, the emphasis of private security on 'prevention' 
means that the focus of its surveillance falls not so much upon 
"breaches of the law" or even of organisational rules, but rather more 
upon the "opportunities for such breaches": 
"As a consequence., the objects of private security 
surveillance tend to be not just potential troublemakers but 
also those who are in a position to create such 
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. 
opportunities for breaches. Thus, the target population is 
. 
greatly enlarged (my emphasis). For example, within a business setting the focus of surveillance is not simply 
potential rule-breaches but any person who might contribute 
to the creation of an opportunity for a breach of a rule. 
This feature of private surveillance is nicely illustrated 
by a surveillance strategy commonly used by private security 
and described in an article on corporate headquarters 
security by Jack Luzon, under the revealing heading "Further 
Loss Prevention Refinements": 
"In support of the project drive for theft reduction, 
Atlantic Richfield security instituted an evening patrol 
still in effect. For each risk found, the patrolling 
officer fills out and leaves a courteous form called a 
11 snowflake", which gives the particular insecure condition 
found, such as personal valuable property left out, unlocked 
doors and valuable portable calculators on desks. A 
duplicate of each snowflake is filed by floor and location, 
and habitual violators are interviewed. As a last resort, 
compliance is sought through the violator's department 
manager. " 
(19783, p. 41) (Shearing and Stenning's emphasis) 
As this example illustrates, when the surveillance spotlight is turned 
from those who commit breaches of rul es to those who create 
opportunities for such breaches a new class of "delinquent" is 
created; the category "offender" is expanded to include those who 
violate security procedures as well as those who commit traditional 
criminal and other offences ... 
As the "snowflake" strategy implies, the loss preventative role of 
private security., in creating a new category of delinquents also 
creates a new category of person requiring information. 'ý5 
As shoul d by now be clear the invocation of Foucault's (1977) analysis 
of disciplinary surveillance is not simply a theoretical appropriation 
to offer theoretical perspective to this account of private security. 
The strategy of disciplinary surveillance makes sense in everyday 
empirical terms to the practice and practitioners of private security. 
It forms part of the programme of the private security enterprise 
which offers services to ensure the security of the conditions of 
production, exchange and reproduction (e. g. maintenance). 
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Mobile Services 
Cl osely related to the service of static and patrol guards is the 
provision of mobile patrols. These offer irregular checks, to 
confound predictability, to be made on the external, and sometimes 
internal, security of premises, usually where a static or patrol guard 
is not felt necessary or is considered too expensive. Such a service 
is held to be particularly useful and important when covering property 
to which entry is forbidden under any circumstances, as for example 
where Customs and Excise forbid entry to bonded warehouses. Dog 
handling services are provided by some companies at an extra cost if 
requested. From the interviews conducted with guards in the industry, 
it was evident that from the point of view of those who had worked 
with dogs, they can be of enormous psychological support when 
patrolling a large, dark, rambling - and occasionally rumbling- 
bui1ding. Companies stress that the provision to offer mobile 
services and support is extremely valuable, if not absolutely 
necessary, as it enables random supervision to encourage efficiency, 
allows for the immediate replacement and transportation of sick or 
called-away guards and also enables the running of an efficient key- 
holding service to premises so that clients do not need to rush to 
allow police or other services access to property when an emergency 
occurs. 
The other major 'mobile' services are cash transportation (CIT) and 
the special delivery services. Before the arrival and expansion of 
CIT services., cash in transit was carried in public on the street by 
employees or taken by taxi or else, as in the case of banks, conveyed 
by special British Road Services vehicles with bank staff travelling 
with it (Garner, 1975: 91). In 1971 the Post Office changed its 'high 
value packet' delivery system, effectively making the banks search for 
an alternative to this method. Many banks and commercial concerns had 
of course already sought the services of CIT specialists and 
conditions for a boost to such services had received favourable 
indications for future growth prospects when, in the wake of the 1962 
Royal Commission on policing, the police service had withdrawn much of 
their back-up escort support for cash transport. The signs were right 
for investment in armoured van services and Securicor saw the 
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opportunities early, buying out a fleet of vans owned by an 
entrepreneur named Winkelman and modelled on the American armoured car 
companies. 
Until the advent of the relatively successful raids on vans in the 
past few years,, losses from CIT vehicles had been slight and 
considerable confidence was generated about them!, (in 1975 less than 
13 million was lost compared to total theft losses of 1600 million). 
Certainly this confidence expressed itself in at least one way 
somewhat unexpected in a male-dominated and orientated industry. As 
Garner (1978) reports, Securicor apparently use (or used) many women 
for the job of staying inside the van, operating the radio and pushing 
out the money, saying that they "have clearer voices than men on the 
radio" and that it is not dangerous - "it's like sitting in a safe" 
(p. 92). It is unclear whether this practice has changed at all in 
response to the impact of more violent and successful attacks on CIT 
vehicles. 
Undoubtedly, whatever the prospects for growth or simple consolidation 
in the CIT business, it has been a development that matched its times 
and will not see contraction whilst ever we are a cash-based society. 
Wage packeting and distribution services ensure that a firm's wages 
office is not an attractive target on pay-day and the money is 
vulnerable for the shortest length of time. The employment of 
specialist services rather than deployment of a firm's own personnel 
took some time to be accepted by British managements but is now a well 
entrenched orthodoxy which, as with special delivery services using 
quick delivery vans and courier staff working nationally and 
internationally, now justifies itself in terms of efficiency and 
competitive rates. 
Related to the development of road transport services and awareness of 
the threat of criminal attack on them, as well as the occurrence of 
other emergencies, Securicor particularly has been engaged in 
expanding its Radio Telephone Service. It now operates HELP - its 
Highway-Link radio telephone service., which provides links between 
commercial transport vehicles on the road and Securicor's Control 
Centres spread across the country and which enables drivers to summon 
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h el pin ca ses of acc id ent .i 11 ness or attack. Using the radio link, 
employers can al so change pl an s. routes. schedul es and so on in a 
s ecure manner. The service is not simple astute commercial 
opportuni sm. Though hardly a 'sensational ' common crime, and hence 
not heavily publicised, highway robbery as a modern phenomenon is not 
infrequent. In June 1962 the Vehicle Observer Corps was established 
as a voluntary organisation with around 700 firms involved in road 
transport and haulage. The aim of the Corps was to alert drivers on 
the road to common and frequent dangers and to the modus operandi of 
recent attacks on drivers and their loads. It al so paid out rewards 
to dri v ers wh o spotted stol en high val ue cargos (Bel 1. n. d. : 22) . As 
Garner wryly observes of this scheme, it is "rather like the rewards 
offered in the 18th century for information leading to prosecutions" 
(1978: 94). As I have indicated elsewhere (South, forthcoming), there 
should be little surprise in finding such continuities. 
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Security Equipment and Systems 
High prof its, 1 ow ri sks and a wide range of products and markets 
characterise the business of selling (and to a lesser extent, 
manufacturing), security equipment and systems. As noted above, 
patrol firms have diversified into this area traditionally dominated 
by expanded locksmith manufacturers such as Chubb and Brocks because 
it is a logical extension and adjunct to their services. In technical 
and service terms there are clear advantages in having alarms linked 
to the supplying security companies control centre in conjunction with 
their provision of a key-holding service. In recent years it has 
certainly become apparent that aggressive entrants to this market, 
such as the rapidly growing Security Centres Limited chain, do not 
bel ieve that it is only the rich who can be encouraged to 'invest' in 
security equipment, alarms and safes. Such companies have not been 
neglecting their sales efforts in depressed social areas particularly 
inner city areas. This is partly attributable to strong 
recommendations made by insurers of small businesses and shops but it 
might be hypothesized that deeper insecurities and fears are also 
being refl ected. Plate glass, strong locks and alarms are of little 
real value against street riots, nor do insurers seriously believe 
that their clients in depressed areas are significantly better risks 
for taking such precautions. 
Other Services 
I shall fill out some aspects of histories and practices relating to 
these various services below but to anticipate the breadth to be 
covered I will just mention four more specialised areas of service 
provided. These further services range from the provision of 
security-vetted cleaning services through retail security and an 
intriguing side-line in security printing to industrial espionage 
services (usually advertised as counter-espionage services - though so 
few companies will admit to initiating industrial espionage on behalf 
of clients that one wonders where all the espionage to be countered 
ori gi nates) . 
Securicor and Pritchards are the principal firms offering screened 
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staff for cleaning 'sensitive', 'risk' areas and premises and for 
special ised cleaning services such as are required by computer 
facilities. Part of the rationale for this diversification is that 
the coordination of cleaning and guarding services is obviously made 
more effective and efficient if the two are hired from the same firm. 
Briefly (though I shall expand below), retail security principally 
impl ies the use of store detecti ves to watch out f or shop- Iif ters, 
make test purchases to check the honesty of staff and spot-checks on 
deliveries, stock and on staff when leaving the premises. 0ne 
particular organisation, Lodge Services, which has specialised in 
supplying store detectives has offered significant and oft-quoted 
contributions to the estimates surrounding the size of hidden economy 
crime in the workplace as committed by employees not outsiders. For, 
significantly for a firm supplying store detectives which are commonly 
supposed to be directing their attentions towards shoppers, Lodge 
contends that most theft or fiddling is accounted for by staff. As 
Bunyan (1977: 251) notes in referring to Lodge: 
"it is estimated that 11 million a day is lost by retail 
firms - but only a small proportion, about 20-25% is through 
shoplifting by customers. Fiddling or theft by staff 
account for the rest (including shops' own security officers 
or hired detectives). " 
(cf. South, 1983; p. 130 below). 
This impl ies that over 70% of 1 osses are down to ' insiders' (in a 
Sunday Telegraph report. of 8th December, 1973, Lodge was apparently 
estimating that it was 60% of losses that could be attributed to 
internal dishonesty). This is clearly a remarkably high figure and 
explains why, despite common assumptions about who store detectives 
are supposed to be watching, agencies like Lodge are happy to 
emphasize that they offer a service to plant 'undercover' detectives 
to check on employees. According to the Telegraph report, they also 
maintain what was a 12,, 000 name file of dishonest staff for employers 
to check during recruitment (although Bunyan notes such a file in 
1977, reporting it as containing between 12,000 and 20,000 names). 
There are evident and common sense reasons why security printers of 
bank notes etc. like De La Rue can find it logical to have connections 
with security transport companies, in their case their subsidiary, 
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Security Express. However, whilst not earth- shattering news, it is 
nonetheless interesting to also note that the demand for security 
printing services is neatly and ironically stimulated by the growth of 
the commercial hidden economy of perks just as other security services 
are stimulated by the hidden economy of pilferage and fiddles. And, 
as with so many facets of the hidden economy, it should come as no 
great shock to discern the operation of a familiar 'dual morality' 
(Ditton; n. d. ). It is of course not unnatural that security printing 
has enjoyed demand for more sophisticated design and printing of 
documents., negotiable securities and!, of course., banknotes, to help 
guard against fraud and forgery and to help tracing. However, 
inflation and the Inland Revenue have generally and recently most 
vociferously, conspired against the ability of commercial enterprise 
to reward employees or 'sweeten' buying orders, and so on., with 
Igifts', perks and the odd fiddle. One adaptation, which is not new 
but in such circumstances is certainly attractive is 'private' paper 
money. This takes the form of 'gift vouchers' or 'bonds' redeemable 
for goods only at a range of national retail outlets. Such bonds are 
legally liable for declaration by the company and recipient but are 
remarkably easy to 'lose' in accountancy and forget about as personal 
income - they are not transferable, not bankable and cannot be 
exchanged for cash. The major bonus scheme in the U. K. is 
appropriately called Bonusbonds; its security printers are De La Rue,, 
owners of Security Express. Such schemes do not lend themselves to 
the fiddles of the shop-floor hidden economy but are, rather, 
'legitimate perks' in the hidden economy of the commercial business 
world. 
The provision of initiating and countering espionage services will be 
dealt with in some detail later, suffice it to say here that there is 
a highly reputable part of the market, openly and candidly advertising 
its services, including companies like Securiplan and Walsh, many of 
whom emphasize that their specialist expertise is directed to the 
protection of information rather than property. There are other 
services on offer from other quarters which would entail breaking into 
property in order to get access to information. 
I have al ready discussed the nature of contract guard and patrol 
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services in some detail .I now offer more detail about the range of 
other services found in what is commonly described and seen as the 
I contract private security industry',, as outlined above. 
Armoured Cars and Cash in Transit Services 
Although Allan Pinkerton had established his private detective agency 
in the USA in 1830 and moved into the provision of Protective Patrol 
guard services in 1850, 'secure', 'express' delivery services were 
developed by other entrepreneurs entering the 19th century private 
security market. In the same year of 1850, Henry Wells established 
the American Express Company, which indeed "did nicelY". Though not 
strictly the first (cf. Draper, 1978: 16), Wells' operation, joined in 
1852 by William G. Fargo, was a pioneer in its time and over a hundred 
years later was familiar to television viewers around the world 
(although how much connection they made between stage coaches and the 
armoured vans on their city streets would be interesting to know). 
Wells Fargo remains a major security vehicle operator in the USA. 
As in the security market of the 20th century, rivals were quick to 
see that there was scope for competition. The Adams Express Company 
was established in 1854 and todays Brinks Incorporated (which operates 
in the USA and the UK) started life in 1859 when Perry Brinks 
established a company to provide secure transportation of valuable 
goods (Draper, 1978: 16). A huge market had opened up, even in the era 
of the stage coach. 
The security transport business did not get underway in Britain for 
nearly another hundred years, in large part because, as Draper (ibid. ) 
observes, while the United States was a 19th century continent of 
'migrating population and spreading towns', "in England and the rest 
of Europe, a community existence remained., " as did poor communications 
and it might be added, other traditional notions about transport and 
security. Even the promise of the railways was not exploited to any 
far-reaching innovative degree but found its significance and impact 
within a traditional perspective of what transport systems should 
achieve. In turn therefore the railways were seen as swift and secure 
and all that could be needed for security transport. Hence 
it was not 
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until the middle of the next century that the 'armoured car' idea 
found its moment in the UK. 
In 1955, Roy Winkelman made the sort of classic entrepreneurial move 
which seems to have contributed so much to the growth of the private 
security sector in the post-war period. Having gained experience of 
the Brinks Inc. armoured car operation in the USA, Winkelman 
established his own Armoured Car Company in the UK offering the 
security of a "motorised bank vault" for transporting increasingly 
large pay packets and other large sums of cash in a society then 
particularly (as it is still), suspicious about moving money by 
pushing paper between banks. Securicor established its own armoured 
car division in 1959 and eventually bought out Winkelman in 1964. 
Around the same time, Security Express was established in 1960 by De 
La Rue and Wells Fargo., with the former buying out the latter in 1965. 
Such 'entrepreneurial moves' could, of course, only be successful 
where and when the market demand was influenced by conditions which 
encouraged the purchase of the services. In the case of armoured car 
services, other bank protection services and the related aggressive 
development and marketing of security hardware designed to protect 
cash and valuables, it is to the changes in patterns of post-war crime 
that we must refer. 
John Mack (1975: 59) argues that the organisation of crime changed 
significantly in the late 1950s with the development of 'commando- 
type' robberies. A graphic picture of some of the methods used in a 
bank raid for example, can be summarised from the evidence of a bank- 
robber turned informer: 
"bank ceilings blasted with gunshot as an effective form of 
'frightener' , till-drawers shot open, commando assaults 
by 
ladder over grilles, counter-doors sledge-hammered down., 
raids over in a minute or two,, mounting hauls, people 
injured. A decade that had begun with the craftsman bank- 
burglar working delicately at the vault with a thermal lance 
had ended with the primitive sledge hammer. " 
(Mack 
. 1975: 60) 
Such evidence of 'crimi nal organ i sati on' f ound pol i ce organ i sati on 
unprepared or at 1 east inadequate to deal with such 'serious, 
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specialist crime' - As Scraton (1982: 44) notes, the sense of outrage 
which such examples of the: 
post war crime wave stimulated throughout Britain placed the 
police under immense pressure. The development of new 
technologies in response to the range of crimes was not 
sufficient to gain real ground in containing project crime. " 
While the police increasingly turned to the development of networks of 
informers to establish some system of surveillance over the potential 
and real sources of major criminal enterprises, those on the 
'receiving end' of project crime were, unsurprisingly,, also in a mood 
to seriously cast their eyes about. Their commercial inclination 
however encouraged them to perceive that in response to 'new' forms of 
criminal enterprise, there was much to recommend new entrepreneurial 
forms of security-protection and crime prevention. 
Shoplifting and Retail Security Services 
Shoplifting and dealing with it are emotive issues. It is an area of 
ambivalence - something about which in some respects, too little is 
made and in others too much. Kenneth Robinson writing in Punch in 
1977 observed that "whoever the shoplifters might be, they are 
doing ... well" before swiftly caricaturing the private security 
response (Robinson, 1977: 377): 
"The job of catching shoplifters is becoming a lucrative 
industry. AI ot of peopl e are havi ng a very good time 
because of the growth of petty crime. Men wearing steel 
helmets, dark glasses and striped pullovers can be seen 
hovering in the back rooms of large stores, playing 
sinister-looking roles they never thought a respectable 
community would give them. They don' t have weapons - not 
yet - but it surely won't be long before they are given not 
only truncheon-vouchers but also their own television 
seri es. " 
Ambivalence (to some degree) and dissonance, is even evident among the 
interest groups where one might expect to find unity. But as Henry 
(1983) has argued, the administration and exercise of private justice 
for the control of private loss problems can tend to the accommodation 
of plural perspectives. Since 1977, and alongside 'traditional 
interested parties' such as the Home Office, retail stores and private 
security companies, the Association for the Prevention of Theft in 
Shops (APTS) has become a vocal pressure - and coordinating - group 
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representing various retail interests. The nature of this 
representation may have been a contributary factor in an interesting 
divergence of views between APTS and private security and the Home 
Office over 'who' is principally responsible for the majority of 
losses (theft, pilferage) from retail stores. As the APTS Director, 
Baroness Phillips has written: 
the Association is not merely a prevention exercise on behalf of traders but another agency to support authority in 
the fight against crime. " 
(Phillips, 1982: 5) 
However, there seems to be some sl ight disagreement about the 
perpetrators of the crime in question. Such disagreement may not 
appear earth- shattering but it is indicative of uncertainty about the 
nature of the problem and hence about the certainty surrounding 
1 appropriate' responses. Indeed it is suggestive about the extent to 
which the ' probl em' real ly is such a maj or probl em f or i nterested 
parties and society (a query which I shal 1 go on to elaborate with 
reference to the work of May (1978)) - except as a problematic bit of 
social behaviour which interested parties have imbued with a 
significance that is a corollary of their interest. 
The significance of the problem and the need for serious response 
starts, for most commentators, with the size of the probl em and the 
subsequent breakdown indicating those responsible and against whome 
the response should be directed. According to the APTS: 
"The f igures of I oss, "shrinkage" as it is cal I ed in the 
retail trade, are given as a possible X1 billion in 1982 and 
although this covers bad stock control, back-door theft and 
employees' dishonesty, the major loss comes from customer 
theft, despite the declaration of various security firms who 
prefer to suggest that 60% of goods stolen from stores are 
taken by staff. " 
(Phillips, 1982: 5; my emphasis) 
It may be that it is a touching loyalty to shop staff on the part of 
APTS that leads them to assert that the major proportion of shrinkage 
is the result of customer theft. While security firms may have their 
own interests reflected in their emphasis on shrinkage as the result 
of theft by employees. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that the 
Home Office comes down somewhere in between the two positions, though 
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I eaning sl ightly inf avour of the pri vate securi ty vi ew. Thus the 
Home Office and Police Guide, The Disappearing Profits; Pilferage from 
Smaller Shops (1973) suggests that shrinkage is made up of three 
elements: 
"National averages show that of every 11.00 that is lost 
about 30 pence can be put down to error and genuine wastage, 
while of the remaining 70 pence that dishonest people are 
stealing from you, about 30 pence are accounted for by 
shoplifters taking your goods. This leaves about 40 pence 
which is stolen (in the form of goods or cash) by some 
members of your staff. " 
(p. 1) 
I shall return to more sophisticated estimates and arguments about the 
size and significance of the shoplifting problem below. It is 
important to set the scene with the appropriate backdrop of 
uncertainty because despite disagreement about numbers, private 
crusades like APTS and private entrepreneurs 1 ike security companies 
can in tandem, cooperation or competition, develop a very disturbing 
scenario around the appropriate responses to 'the problem'. 
To take a swift look at what could happen in the UK by looking at what 
has already happened in the USA we could note the availability of a 
handy 452 page book called Where's What (O'Toole, 1978: 152-154). 
Where's What is a "guidebook for a tour through 6,723 different record 
systems maintained by the federal government .. (and) .. personal 
data depots operated by the private sector" (O'Toole, 1978: 152). The 
handbook directs those interested in the past of any given individual 
not only to governmental sources of information but also beyond to the 
record systems kept on those who have passed through, or by, the 
private justice processing system - whether they know it or not. 
Shoplifting and store theft incidents - real, suspected or imagined - 
are grist to the mill of a system which can only thrive confidently if 
it feels it is working efficiently i. e. even when in doubt recording 
everything and everyone. 
Obviously there are specific conditions surrounding the response of US 
retail organisations to shop-theft, a particular history and cultural 
set of commercial values surrounding the nature and seriousness of the 
problem, and hence legitimacy of response. The current organisation 
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of security and response to shop theft in the UK seems far more 
ambivalent, inconsistent and, at times apparently disorganised. But 
it is of course, precisely these circumstances which private security 
services and pressure groups like APTS would like to see replaced by 
the more serious 'positive' and organised response common in the USA. 
Ambivalence about shoplifting in the UK, about why it occurs and about 
what coul d be done about itis ref 1 ected inafai rly c on si sten t 
attitude which has been amenable to incorporating it as a side-effect 
of the attractive and accessible display of goods, bringing with it, 
as a necessary evil , the need to employ security staff. For example, 
a writer in Readers Digest in the early 1960s noted the 'dangling of 
the carrot' psychology employed in sales techniques and display 
presentation: 
"Display techniques (are) psychologically devised to increase 
'impulse buying' - bright lights, soft music, the tumbled 
p rof usi on of stock nea r th e door. Four months after 
opening, the proprietors of an Essex discount store were 
able to diagnose the disappointing volume of business from 
the amount of shoplifting: the pilferage rate was, in fact, 
too low. "That meant the goods were not accessible enough, " 
explains the manager without cynicism. "We had to rethink 
the whole system so that people could get at things. And 
engage two floor detectives. " 
(Quoted in South,, 1978a: 3.20) 
Whatever the manager quoted may feel, such thinking inevitably invites 
some cynicism and prompted Kenneth Robinson to write in his Punch 
article that "a society that sells easy-to-grab sausages next to help- 
yourself panti-hose has reached such a point of decadence that it must 
expect fairly unstable behaviour from its victims" (1977: 377). In a 
more serious vein., though similarly touched by incredulity other 
researchers, official and academic, have observed that commercial 
considerations and costs, not any sense of compassion, tend to govern 
responses to discovered shop theft and also to commercially motivated 
psychological enticement. 
Thus the 1973 Home Of f ice Worki ng Party on Shopl if ti ng and Thef ts by 
Sho reported that: 
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"Most of the retailers' representatives with which we 
discussed the matter agreed that lay-out could make a 
substantial contribution to the prevention of losses. It 
was agreed that those high displays and blind corners which 
impeded observation by staff, those unattended low counters 
and shelves which facilitated shoplifting, the stacking of 
displays close to, or in entrances and at exits were all to 
be avoided. It was also agreed that offices overlooking the 
shopping area and (in supermarkets) the check-out points 
were aids to security. Yet in every case we were told that 
management took little, if any, account of these points when 
planning the lay-out of shops and display areas. The sole 
criterion was the effect it would have upon sales. " 
(Emphasis added - Home Office, 1973 (b): para. 3.13) 
Ha ving outlined the 'problem' and noted the ambiguities contained in 
understanding its causality,, control and component parts, I turn now 
to consider the application and practice of store security in this 
context. 
According to the Home Office Working Party on store security (ibid., 
para. 4.14) there are two identifiable types of security staff who may 
work in shops and stores. Security officers who deal principally with 
theft and rule-breaking by internal staff and related to delivery of 
goods by other firms, and so on. The second category is that of store 
detectives who are employed to deal with shoplifters. In practice 
however for all except quite large stores, such a distinction is 
unlikely to be precise or at all evident. There is in any case, 
inevitable boundary-blurring where both categories are concerned about 
'undesirable-looking' individuals or groups in or hanging around 
outside the store. 
I have found no available figures relating to the gender breakdown of 
employees in these categories, but from interviews and the literature 
it seems safe to suggest that 'security officers' tend to be male 
(e. g. "retired policemen supplementing their pensions in a time- 
honoured manner" (May,, 1978: 139)), whilst 'store detectives' tend to 
be female and often part-time, whether working for security firms 
which train them and offer a vague semblance of career structure, or 
for the retail organisation itsel f. Such workers can 
be 
sociologically described as marginal but nonetheless 
(or perhaps 
because of this) they assert strong group and occupational norms, 
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claims for informal.. if not formal. autonomy and negotiate their 
peripherality within the immediate work- environment by suggesting some 
higher loyalty or deference to higher authority in the form of the 
security company they 'really' work for., or else the Chief Security 
Officer or Director of the retail organisation, remotely (and 
facelessly) based at head office (on the latter., cf. May., 1978: 141). 
The issue of the assertion of autonomy by store security staff has 
received attention from a number of researchers, most evidently 
because it is part of the discretionary basis of private justice so 
strongly identified with the decision to prosecute or not prosecute 
those apprehended (or simply observed but ignored) while shop-lifting. 
In the UK, May's (1978) study of juvenile shoplifters and the 
organisation of store security in Scotland found that: 
"In the organisation of their work security officers, both 
part-time and full-time, enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. 
Shared perceptions of what constitutes 'high risk' periods 
determine their presence on the sales floor. " 
(p. 140) 
In the USA, Rojek's (1979) study of 'Private Justice Systems and Crime 
Reporting' in a mid-western city found that: 
"Discount stores had entrusted all security decision-making 
power to thei r pri vate pol i ce empl oyees to s uch an extent 
that the organizational structure of these stores had been 
redefined, thereby giving the security staff complete 
autonomy. The threat of employee theft had prompted major 
organizational changes, resulting in the security staff 
being held answerable not to the local retail store manager, 
but to a special security component within the overall 
organization ... However, in all stores a pervasive sense 
of concealment and specialization tends to shield security 
personnel from company rules and regulations thereby 
ensuring them of a significant degree of autonomy. " 
(Rojek, 1979: 109) (Emphasis added) 
Thi s autonomy work s at the I evel of sh op- f1 oor practi c e; it can at 
this 1 evel guide and., to some extent control . decisions about 
apprehension and movement onto the next stage of the construction of 
the statistics about shop-lifting and impressions about security's 
efficacy. For the next stage is generally notification of senior 
security staff or some level of management. This then opens up 
another arena of discretionary decision-making about whether to notify 
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the police and whether or not to actually prosecute. As should be 
evident in this particular sphere, there is much similarity between 
the processes involved in the practice of security work and the 
eventual construction of criminal statistics, and the work of the 
police. Having noted this however, I do not propose (or have the 
space) to follow the implications much further down the 
ethnomethodological cul-de-sac (for a critical excursion see Hindess, 
1973). 
However, the nature and patterns of policies (such as are 
distinguishable) which stores have are clearly significant in terms of 
public perception of 'the shoplifting problem', commercial perception 
of the utility of security and the actual practice of security in this 
area. Interestingly there are at least two consistencies identified 
by studies of 'policy' in this area in the UK, USA and Canada. These 
are first that there are a variety of 'policies' , suggesting a 
circumstantial flexibility based on little real policy applicable to 
practice, whatever head office or deterrent signs may say. And, 
secondly that the fundamental consideration of cost not ccmpassion 
governs decisions and procedures. 
In the UK a recent (1983) report of a Home Office study of 'Dealing 
with Shoplifters'. (Murphy and Iles) found that as had been expected, 
"the shops included in the study demonstrated a wide range of 
policies for dealing with suspected shoplifters. In some 
cases all those apprehended were referred to the police, in 
others as few as one-third (contrary to the recommendation 
of the Home Office Working Party that all those apprehended 
should be referred to the police). 
"Even these figures, however, obscure the extent to which the 
shops varied in their use of discretion. As is known from 
previous studies, age was an important factor in decisions 
to apprehend - the very young or old being less likely to be 
stopped, and less likely if stopped to be reported to the 
police. Similarly, physical and mental condition such as 
pregnancy or depression were often taken into account in 
decisions to prosecute. In addition many stores operated 
within cash limits: they would not contact the police if the 
offender had taken only one inexpensive item, when there was 
some possibility that it was a mistake, and where the costs 
to the store in terms of the lost service of the detective 
while at the police station or in court outweighed the value 
of the goods involved. 
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"What this study was abl e to demonstrate, however, was how 
much the pol i ci es of stores and shops in relation to 
shoplifting differed not only between shops but between 
stated store policy and actual practice. " 
(p. 25) 
As this same study notes, the variety of policies - and practices - 
has a number of significant implications. 
"Fi rst there exi sts a1 arge number of peopl e who are 
apprehended and recorded by stores as shoplifters but not 
ref erred to the pol ice. Secondly, the figures already 
quoted for referral rates need to be interpreted within the 
concept of preventative action - the point being that there 
were known to be far more shoplifters than those 
apprehended. Thirdly, it appears that store detectives do 
more than apprehend suspects and refer them to police; they 
also operate in many situations where prosecution is not the 
aim and the strategies and techniques they employ require a 
degree of tact and skill. Further, there does not appear to 
be any standard method of preventing shoplifting; the 
tactics used differ from store to store., and vary according 
to the time of day or year and the number of suspects. 114 
(p. 27) 
I have already emphasized the contradictions surrounding the position 
occupied by private security. The specific context of retail security 
provides a microcosm of some of the ambiguities which the private 
security function and private security employee must negotiate. This 
largely hinges on the paradox that private security is supposed to 
detect offences and hence deter by detecting., but is not necessarily 
supposed to deter by apprehending those detected. As May puts it,, 
"apprehension is inherently problematic" (p. 156). This assertion 
rests on three factors: 
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"Firstly, the security officer can never be certain of the 
suspect's response to intervention. For the first time she finds herself having to react to events rather than dictating them. Secondly,, the limits to her authority 
remain unclear. While a security officer may regard her 
actions as morally justified, she cannot know that they are legally justifiable. Intervention must always proceed with the fear that one day this ignorance will be exposed. Thirdly, even if the security officer can show that her 
actions were both morally and legally justified she may find 
that the Company for whom she works does not regard them as 
commercially justified. That is, in the final analysis she 
must take care not only to avoid violating the law that 
remains unknown (and, until too late, unknowable) but also a Company "policy" that is, as I have argued., essentially 
ambiguous. " 
(p. 156) 
But beyond these problems in the practice of private security., the 
case of shoplifting (as opposed to the more difficult issue of 
shrinkage as a whole) also highlights two other issues central to 
examination of the private security world. First, their contribution 
to the construction of official statistics and second, the prevalence 
of what I call the 'security mentality' and its tendency to typologise 
and stereotype. 
The official recording of the crime of shoplifting is suggestive about 
the contribution of the security industry to popular perceptions of 
the incidence of crime in society, insofar as, in filtered and 
digested forms, such popular perceptions are informed by reports of 
trends in criminal statistics. Scepticism towards such statistics is 
not of course the monopoly of academic criminologists. James 
Anderton., Chief Constable of Greater Manchester police referred to the 
problems with shoplifting statistics in an address to an international 
security conference in 1978. Discussing thefts from shops and stores 
he remarked that: 
"in the light of all the uncertainty surrounding this matter 
and the i rrel evance of most stati sti cs, I am reluctant to 
mention the number of crimes of shoplifting recorded by the 
pol ice. It is nonetheless significant that the number of 
recorded crimes of theft from shops and stores in England 
and Wales rose from 25,756 in 1956 to 180,993 in 1976; an 
increase of 603%. Such a growth must lead one to conclude 
that the true incidence - as much as the better detection of 
shoplifting offences - has increased. " 
(Anderton, 1978: 17) 
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Shoplifting may have indeed increased in its incidence, it is likely 
in inflationary times, but still we cannot be certain by how much. We 
can however be certain that the private security industry has 
'inflated' the statistics by increasing detection rates, and in many 
cases pushing for prosecution. The growth of private security and 
'crime prevention' advice has meant widespread employment of store 
detecti ves the instal 1 ati on of cl osed ci rcui t tel evi sion, 
surveillance devices, electronic 'tagging' etc. The resulting 
likelihood of increased rates of detection of offence (not necessarily 
of commission of offences) does indeed show up in the statistics for 
these boom years of private security growth. 
Tabl e 3.1: Offences of Shoplifting Known to the Police 
Year Shoplifting Offences Total of all Shoplifting Offences 
Indictable as % of All Offences 
1966 68,288 1,999,859 5.3% 
1969 91,169 1,488,638 6.1% 
1973 130,161 1,657,669 7.8% 
1976 180,993 2,135,713 8.5% 
Source: Compiled from Home Office Statistics 
The fact that retail managements have unknowable and ambiguous 
'policies' about apprehension and prosecution of shop-lifters should 
not be confused with the inclinations of security staff. Simi1ar1y, 
identifying a system of private justice which employs security staff 
to detect and apprehend on occasion but which leaves the next stage of 
disposition of offenders to employing managements (to which security 
staff naturally ultimately defer) , does not mean that there are not 
inclinations and structural pressures found in the position of 
security staff which disincline them to whole-heartedly go along with 
decisions not to apprehend or prosecute. Senior security staff at 
retail companies head offices and security companies advising 
retailers will generally try to encourage a policy of apprehension and 
prosecution. Security staff on the shop floor must mediate between 
the reasons for such an inclination and the store management practices 
which will often seek to discourage apprehension or at least 
prosecution. 
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May notes some of the factors which produce this dilemma, starting 
from the point of how the efficiency of store managements versus the 
efficiency of store security staff, might be evaluated: 
although management retains ultimate responsibility for store security, its efficiency., in that respect is 
measured essentially in terms of profitability, not 
shopl if ti ng apprehensions. Security staff, however, occupy 
a different position. Given that neither the level nor the 
source of "shrinkage" is known with any degree of accuracy the number of apprehensions becomes the one objective test 
of the security officer's efficiency. Evidence given to the Home Office Working Party suggests that some companies do in fact employ this method of evaluation. (1973, b) 
"Like all security organizations (e. g. police, army) security 
staff in stores find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. 
While on the one hand the elimination of the problem might 
be regarded as a measure of their effectiveness,, at the same 
time this would remove their raison d'etre. The ideal 
situation calls for an expanding crime problem which 
security staff can show they are on top of, and this is most 
readily demonstrated through the volume of apprehensions. 
"These situational pressures are reinforced by ideological 
factors. Security staff for the most part possess what I 
can best describe as a "police mentality"; that is, they 
tend to see shoplifters as constituting a limited and 
readily identifiable group who sooner or later will find 
opportunities to steal. " 
(May, 1978: 148-149) 
Such stereotyping was evident in my own research on security staff who 
also held a world-view, cosmology or ideology like that which May 
refers to as a "police mentality" although I have called it the 
"security mentality" in order to distinguish it from the ideology and 
occupational culture of the police (see Chapter 2; cf. also South,, 
1983). 1 conclude this review of the issues relating to retail 
security (which could form the basis of a whole separate study) by 
elaborating on the nature of security mentality stereotyping as 
illustrated by a quote from a popular Handbook for Detectives (Meek, 
1967) and noting the important but neglected (here, as elsewhere) 
consequences of over-zealous certainty about some people feasibly 
looking like and therefore probably being shoplifters - the case of 
wrongful apprehension and allegation. 
The occupati onal cul tures of pri vate securi ty and the pol i ce ty pica 11 y 
assert that they seek to avoid prejudice and stereotyping, acting only 
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on what they have reason to suspect, have observed, have evidence of 
and so on. Evidently however, occupational practice (and its urging 
of short-hand and expediency) , occupational experience and 
occupational folk-wisdom, all combine to provide pointers, hints and 
warning signs. Up to a point this is understandable, 'common sense' . 
even logically desirable in terms of capitalising on the value of 
experience. What is required at this point however is good judgement 
not a good imagination. The place of stereotyping, and its 
ideological significance, in the operational security mentality is a 
cause for concern. It is disturbing in its tendency to dichotomise 
the ' them' who are deviant, criminal , weird, etc. and 'us' who are 
upright, honest, clean-living etc. No matter how liberally coated, 
the underlying assumptions can be strongly discriminatory towards many 
social groups and, in particular xenophobic towards those regarded as 
'foreigners' . 
Meek's Handbook for Detectives offers a good example. An experienced 
commentator he adopts a technique familiar in private security texts 
the adoption of a 'liberal' pseudo- psyc hol ogy to cover his prejudices. 
"It is frequently found that arrested hoisters suffer from 
the loss of a1 imb deformity, or from some facial 
disfigurement such as a birth-mark; or they are hump-backed 
or have a cleft palate, or an uncontrollable nervous twitch, 
or extremely offensive breath, or some permanent complaint 
of which they are only too conscious though it may not be 
apparent to others. Such misfortunes can develop in their 
victims a mood of resentment against the world in general 
which they try to assuage by vengeful actions such as 
writing anonymous letters and stealing from shops. A 
cripple can always anticipate merciful treatment so has no 
need to put forward a complicated defence. Customers with 
ailments or disfigurements sad though it may be must 
therefore be watched. 
"Foreigners, particularly hard-up au pair girls from 
countries where attractive goods are not so generously 
displayed fall easily for the temptation of shoplifting. 
Being a long way from home makes them reckless. " 
(Meek, 1967: 50-51) 
Not surprisingly, if this kind of advice influences or resonates with 
the opinions and attitudes of security staff then in their practice 
they will inevitably not only apprehend people 'caught in the act' 
(who may or may not conform to stereotypes), but will also be 
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encouraged in their belief that they 'know what to look for' and 
apprehend a number of perfectly innocent parties. In some cases, 
where security staff have not detected any shoplifting at periods when 
they might expect to., it might be hypothesized that they will 
increasingly turn their attention to customers who 'fit' the 
stereotypes and perhaps wishing to deter by indicating their interest 
and making their surveillance apparent, could encourage 'suspicious' 
behaviour on the part of the worried and embarassed shoppers. The 
consequences could be wrongful accusation. In response to an 
apparently rising number of cases of wrongful accusation, (though this 
is truly an area of statistical quicksand), an organisation now offers 
a help and advisory service - CCAS - Crisis Counselling for Alleged 
Shoplifters. Regina Dollar, Coordinator of CCAS, describes what the 
organisation does: 
"CCAS aims to offer sympathy and advice to genuine cases of 
forgetfulness or error on the part of the shopper. If 
necessary,, we can refer those wrongly accused to expert help 
in their area. Other commitments we have are to make the 
consumer much more aware of their rights should they every 
find themselves in this awful situation. We are also waging 
a continuous campaign against certain stores whose names we 
feel keep cropping up with alarming regularity. " 
(King, 1983: 17) (Emphasis added) 
A counsellor with CCAS explains a further element of the process of 
intimidation which can take the stages of wrongful apprehension 
further than the initial challenge, a development which in itself 
might confirm the security officer's beliefs about the suspicious 
nature of the person apprehended: 
"It is a dreadful experience to be stopped by security staff 
when you have done nothing wrong, " says Harry Kauffer, 
Deputy Executive Counsellor. "People start staring and very 
soon a crowd gathers. It is hardly suprising therefore that 
rather than cause a fuss, many entirely innocent shoppers 
accompany the security officer to the manager's office. " 
(King., 1983: 17) 
Retail security is clearly an area of ambiguity, it is also indicative 
of the power and of the contradictions of discretionary private 
justice. Having sought to emphasize such points throughout, it is 
only f itting to end on a note of paradox and irony. CCAS would 
undoubtedly be among the first to condemn the basis and nature of 
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stereotyping found in the security mentality, to deny the validity of 
I occupational knowledge' which says that you can 'sense the guilty 
type' and to emphasize that being accused of shoplifting and then 
being asked questions about it is a harrowing experience and needs to 
be handled with sensitivity. It is then an interesting testament to 
the power of the mythology of stereotyping to find the coordinator of 
CCAS invoking the concepts of 'occupational knowledge' and 'gut 
feelings'. 
"How though can one distinguish between a shopper who has 
taken something by mistake and an habitual shoplifter who 
also happens to be a convincing liar? "Trained security 
staff and the police should be able to tell the difference 
easily, " Regina Dollar insists. "Only a very small 
percentage of people contacting us are guilty of deliberate 
thef t. After a while we have a gut feel ing about them when 
they ring. " 
(King, 1983: 17)6 
After such a diverse survey of private security services any attempt 
at a summary would be difficult and probably pointless. What should 
be remembered, and I shall now go on to emphasize, is that these are 
services for hire from what is seen as the 'open and above board', 
highly visible, contract security companies. 
I next turn to the less vi si bl e but nonethel ess major area of 
employment of security staff and practices, the in-house security 
staffs and departments of business and industry. I shall then move 
progressively through specialised security industries, such as alarms, 
locks and safes etc. toward more clandestine and less reputable 
aspects of the private security sector. 
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In-House Security 
I shall devote less attention to In-House security for several 
reasons. First, although it appears to employ more personnel than the 
statistically enumerated staff of private security companies, this 
fi gure isi nf 1 ated by staf f who do a vari ety of duti es which are not 
necessarily of a security nature. Secondly, the range of actual 
security functions performed by in-house staff while wide is 
necessarily not as wide as the range performed throughout the private 
security sector as a whole. Thus most in-house security is of the 
mundane nature of patrol and gate-keeping duties etc., already well- 
covered. There is however a relatively new specialism which has 
developed with particular regard to in-house security arrangements 
whether provided by in-house security managers or by contracted 
security consultants. This is the concept of risk-management and 
evaluation, and I shall discuss some of its principles at the end of 
this section. 
From the point of view of purely cost considerations, then the wide- 
spread persistence of large scale employment of in-house security 
staffs is odd. The commercial argument of those who proclaim the 
virtues of contract security usually emphasizes that the attraction of 
hiring an outside agency as against retaining in-house staff is 
probably most significantly the added labour costs of in-house 
security staff. An argument increasingly heard in relation to the 
privatisation of public services, this argument has long been around 
in selling the privatisation of security in the private sector. As 
Garner summarises., 
"for round-the-clock, all year round protection, one needs at 
least seven men on the payroll depending upon the size of 
the pl ant, as each eight hour shi ft has to be covered and 
holidays or emergencies like illness need to be taken into 
account. National insurance, pensions, uniform, holiday pay 
and sometimes transport home after late shifts, all need to 
be included for the full cost to be ascertained. (This is 
of course before training costs are added). " 
(1978: 68) 
Such requirements which in-house employers usually have to meet to 
bring their security staff into line with all other employees' 
benefits, hours and so on, are not, of course, problems which the 
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contract security employers tend to be overly- concerned with. 
(Although in interviews with representatives of MATSA the principal 
trade union in contract security - conducted in 1983, it was suggested 
that often, or at least occasionally, security staff may be in a 
different union to the rest of the work-force which weakens their 
position whilst allowing management to suggest that this is best for 
industrial harmony. The major trade union on site will then be 
unconcerned about the conditions of service of the security staff and 
more interested in what they do. The security staff, if indeed 
unionised at all - something else which management can discourage on 
grounds of 'conflicts of loyalty' - will in any case be in the very 
weak position of the minority without allies). 
Nonetheless, in terms of strict numbers, in-house security (on 
available statistics, and consonant with trends in the USA and Canada) 
seems to employ more staff than contract security, at a ratio by the 
late 1970s of 3: 2 (cf. Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 202-203) (see Table 
3.2). 
Table 3.2: Private Security Personnel: United Kingdom,, 1971-78 
(000s) Change M 
Yearly 
1971 1978 1971-78 Average 
Public Police* 97.3 109 12 1.6 
Private Security** 80 100 25 3.2 
In-House 50 60 20 2.6 
Contract 30 40 33 4.2 
Ratio Police/ 
Private Security 6: 5 1.09: 1 
Ration In-House/Contract 5: 3 3: 2 
Source Reports of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary for 
the years 1971 and 1978 (app. 1, "Total Police Strength not 
including Civilians, Special Constables and Staff") (London 
H. M. S. O., 1972 and 1979). 
** Source: United Kingdom, Home Office 1979, p. 3. 
(n. b. Although this is not officially stated or broken down in 
available statistics, on the basis of the current research I 
would suggest that the category of in-house security is often a 
'convenience' category for many companies', covering staff with 
multiple roles - the term 'security' adding a touch of company 
efficiency and employee status. Such additional roles would 
include responsibility for out-of-hours shipping and freighting, 
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delivery, checks on health and safety regulations, maintenance 
of some items and areas, including for example cleaning duties 
and so on. ) 
As a general and standard definition of the expected activities of in- 
house security staff I derive the following from a wide variety of 
literature originating from respondents in the research, from advice 
given by various business associations and government departments and 
from the writings of specialists on industrial security. The first 
two sources tend to emphasize the basic, the routine and the mundane 
whilst the latter, principally USA writers,, tend to add an over- 
emphasis on readiness and capability for dealing with the exceptional 
like industrial espionage and terrorism. Hence this 'definition of 
activities' is something of an averaging-out exercise. Perhaps as a 
result of this (although I think not) at this basic, standardised 
level of the functions of in-house security they come out in fonnal 
terms as little different from the formal functions of contract 
security staff (patrol/static guard). 
- Control and direct and indirect supervision and surveillance of the 
work-force. Checking for example on clocking on and off procedures 
and maintaining criteria for suspicion of personnel who may be 
absenting themselves from shifts or involved in pilferage etc. 
- Control of access to site premises, both entry and exit, 
involving 
the recording of arrival and departure of vehicles, as well as 
ensuring that visitors are helpfully guided to their destinations (a 
function of diplomacy and company representation), whilst ensuring 
that intruders are discouraged (a function of security and company 
solicitude). 
-Finally, general responsibility to ensure the security, securing, 
surveillance and recording of the state of site premises. 
I do not have the space to go into the more rare and exceptional 
(and 
hence interesting) aspects of in-house security services and 
functions. However, having outlined the basic levels of in-house 
operations, it would be misleading not to stress that - corresponding 
to trends in the private security sector generally - in-house security 
engages in both specialist operations and in certain industries can 
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also, necessarily take on specialist forms of oroanisation. To offer 
three exampl es theref ore .I take fi rst the case of su rve i1a nce asan 
elaborate in-house security operation in an industrial concern, and 
secondly the development of ai rl i ne security, as reported by one of 
its insiders in the 1950s and early 1960s. Fi nal ly , and brief ly I 
of f er the exampl e of how maj or econ omi c devel opments -in th is case 
the exploitation of North Sea Oil, can open up new circumstances and 
responsibility for companies in their provision of in-house (and 
contract) security. 
The surveillance of trade union representatives, their offices and 
meetings within companies is probably, in ge 
, 
neral , not a lot more 
sinister than actions that union representatives will take to keep an 
eye on what managements are up to, differences reside in matters of 
power and resources. As Bunyan (1976) observes: 
"while bugging and tapping of union offices and 'phones is 
not unknown_, the practice does not seem widespread. But 
surveillance could be carried out in other ways. " 
(p. 252) 
Bunyan reports that in 1973, equipment was installed in the office of 
the Chief Security Officer of Guest., Keen and Nettlefolds Birmingham 
plant which enabled him to eavesdrop on all calls made on the plant's 
internal telephone system and interrupt should he so desire! The 
equipment was removed when the workers at the plant found out about it 
and made protests. The explanation offered by GKN's Administrative 
Director was less than wholly convincing. The machine, he said, had 
been installed to allow the Security Officer to contact his staff: 
"His men are trained in First Aid for instance. They might 
have been needed for that purpose. The fact that the ' phone 
enabled the security chief to listen in on all our 'phones 
was coincidental ." 
(Bunyan, 1976: 253; Sunday People, 7th January, 1973) 
In the context of in-house security directly operating across 
international boundaries,, Fish (1962) provides an 'insiders' , if 
exceptional, account of the overlap between private security (in this 
case airline security departments) , and international civil police 
agencies. 
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Such overlap and collaboration most commonly occurs in relation to 
terrorism (though this is a recent development) and smuggling. For 
example, in the case of drugs: 
although Customs and police at Hong Kong were kept on their toes in an attempt to keep up with the increasing ingenuity of the smugglers, we all knew the grim facts. The 
seizures were no more than a minute part of what was getting 
through. Heroin had been discovered in a shipment of small 
pictures, neatly pasted in between the picture and the 
cardboard backing; also in a hidden compartment in the back 
of a wooden doll. On another occasion, the stuff had merely 
been mixed with a shipment of rice. Buchanan's (B. O. A. C) 
private intelligence system went into action between Hong 
Kong and Bangkok. Security officers, in co-operation with 
the Hong Kong police began a discrete watch on passengers 
and regular freight shipments in and out of the colony. " 
(Fish, 1962: 162) 
Although airports have at various times been 'policed' by the public 
pol ice and at other times by 1 ocal ly based 'private' statutory pol ice 
forces (usually run by the local authority transport, docks or port 
'authority'), private security companies have also been widely 
employed in various capacities, both generally throughout airports as 
well as in the employment of particular companies, for example for the 
guarding of goods in transit. But the operating airline companies 
also maintain their own security staff. The first airline to 
seriously utilise its own private security department was BOAC,, 
establishing it in 1945 under the direction of an ex-detective 
inspector from Scotland Yard - Donald Fish - who just prior to taking 
up the appointment, was also on secondment 'for special duties' with 
MI5 as well as being a captain in the Intelligence Corps (Fish, 
1962: 52). Fish, writing of his career in 1962, recognised that 
international law was not then (nor is it now), prepared to deal with 
the sort of crime, liabilities and other problems which the post-war 
expansion of the air-routes and capability of air technology would 
bring. 
His forecast of the recognised necessity for an international air- 
security police has however (not yet) been realised: 
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"Today, everyone in air security knows that once the real ly big trouble hits the airlines, there will be precious little help forthcoming and little the law will be able to do about it. It is this weakness that long ago convinced me of the 
over-riding need for a code of international criminal air 1 aw. This on its own will not be enough,, for the national 
police forces are not the people to enforce it effectively, 
even with the help of Interpol. Instead, if the airlines 
are to meet the very real threat of highly organised air 
crime hanging over them at the moment, it is their own 
security forces who will have to do the work. Sooner or 
later, they will have to combine under some central 
authority to form the nucleus of a really international Air 
Police Force, with full legal powers to attack air crime 
wherever it occurs., irrespective of local laws and national 
boundaries. There seems no other way. " 
(Fish, 1962: 26) 
The cooperative vision that Fish tendered may be a little 
melodramatic; it was offered at a time when Interpol seemed a 
genuinely successful international force for the cooperative exchange 
of information about crime and the contemporary feeling was that such 
an auspicious start could only be improved upon. Further, Fish had 
himself seen the growth of intimate cooperation between the security 
staff of various airlines, not only among themselves, but also with 
specialised police agencies of various countries - from CID to 
drug/currency/fraud/forgery squads etc. to intelligence agencies. 
However, it remains now, as realistically it probably did then 
extremely unlikely that any nation would give up the sort of 
sovereignty or legal monopoly which the establishment of an 'Air 
Police' would imply. 
Nevertheless., although Fish suggests that "there seems no other way, " 
we might reasonably anticipate an alternative system of coordination 
of airline security. And indeed professional security associations, 
liaison between security staff and encouragement from bodies such as 
the United Nations has led to greater coordination in air security, 
most obviously and explicitly as a response to air terrorism but in 
other areas also. Essentially, de facto extension and coordination of 
airline security 'authority', responsibilities - and legally granted 
powers - has occurred without recourse to the creation of a cumbersome 
and accountable bureaucracy.,, or the divesting of any legal powers by 
any state to an external authority. 
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A third example of specialised in-house security is an example of 
changes in law and policing resulting from extensions of property 
rights and the redefinition of private versus state jurisdiction 
afforded by the relationship between commerce and state after the 
discovery of North Sea Oil. At a time when the energy crisis was 
underlining the true seriousness of deepening recession and rising 
inflation, the exploitation of North Sea Oil was greeted as a saviour. 
However,, the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s was also 
characterised by the growing tactical capability of international and 
indigenous terrorist groups. This development generated considerable 
concern about the security of North Sea Oil and Gas. There are now 
over forty major companies involved in off-shore production and 
development operations and probably well over 150 operational rigs. 
To provide constant security against capture or sabotage a series of 
secret contingency plans were drawn up by the UK government and the 
Offshore Operators Association. 
Offshore rigs are, of course, rather uniquely difficult to get access 
to and this means that the first level of security is provided by 
nature. However, it also means that the provision of a permanent 
civil police or armed forces presence would be stretching the limits 
of the conventional 'brief' of these forces as well as stretching 
their establishment numbers in terms of other cammitments. Typically 
then, the commercial compromise leaves the owners of the rigs 
responsible for "structural and operational security measures on their 
installations" (Smart and Hodgson, 1979: 40). However, as Smart and 
Hodgson (ibid. ) detail, there are two further levels of responsibility 
which neatly illustrate a tiered approach to provision of security by 
the state which now confidently incorporates (as indeed in many 
instances it always has), the level of private security. 7 
The police, by virtue of the terms of the Continental Shelf Act 
(1964) : 
"have authority to operate in the sea areas within a 500 
metre radius of offshore installations. The Ch i ef 
Constables exercise their authority under the Port of 
Operation rule and respond to incidents of platforms 
registered in the ports within their areas of jurisdiction. " 
(Ibid. ) 
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The third level of responsibility rests with the armed forces who 
"have to be prepared to act in support of the civil power at offshore 
installations to contain urban guerilla action or threats, " (ibid. ) 
but who would (theoretically) be used under the direction of the civil 
power. This is a serious commitment by the state to provide back-up 
and rapid support; however the absence of a permanent immediate 
presence necessitates placing great emphasis on sophisticated in-house 
security provision along lines worked out in negotiations between the 
Offshore Operators Association and government departments and 
agencies. This Association also lays down guide-lines for stringent 
safety precautions which health and safety officials are supposed to 
oversee with the cooperation of security staff and the police (though 
with a documented poor safety record in the North Sea coordination at 
this level may leave something to be desired). 
Risk Management 
Mention of health and safety responsibilities is by no means 
incidental in this context however. The specialism of risk-management 
which is offered to commercial customers on a consultancy basis but 
which also has a primary place in any description of comprehensive in- 
house security coverage, embraces, as one independent consultant 
observes, 
"such a wide spectrum that one needs to start with some terms 
of reference. In this context, it ranges from the Health 
and Safety at Work Act, through the fire regulations, to 
measures against fraud, theft and terrorism. " 
(Hasler, 1978: 45) 
As an in-house security services manager makes clear, none of this is 
n ew. Risk management "i s simply a means of bringing together 
functions which have hitherto been conducted quite separately and., at 
the same time, enables the whole subject of the management of risk to 
be treated in a more sophisticated and orderly manner" (Bridges, 
1978: 46) Indeed, the in-vogue status of risk-management as a concept 
needs little further consideration except to emphasise that its 
significance is in "bringing together" previously disparate functions 
(although it is arguable how really separate they have been in the 
past). In terms of the development of private security, what should 
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be noted is the empha si s on 
_programmed 
planning; an idea well 
developed since the 1960s in the USA (cf. Momboisse, 1968). 
Essentially, programmed planning (which can integrate highly 
sophisticated psychol ogical approaches to critical , vul nerabl C- and 
hazardous situations) boils down to 'a place for everyone and everyone 
in their place'. It is first and foremost directed at the total 
security of premises and plant. For example, in Momboisse's classic 
text Industrial Security for Strikes, Riots and Disasters (1968) the 
two principal criteria for risk evaluation determining the degree of 
protection necessary are discussed in terms of the political geography 
of "the facility". 'Criticality', for example is defined thus: 
"The portion of the facility which is considered to be of 
high criticality is one whose partial or complete loss would 
have an immediate and serious impact on the ability of the 
facility to provide continuity of production or service for 
a considerable period of time. " 
(Momboisse, 1968: 8) 
'Vulnerability' is "the susceptibility of a facility to espionage, 
thefts, sl ow downs or work stoppage for any cause" (ibid. , p. 9). But 
programmed planning is not parochial; it can also extend to the 
coordination of information and development of provision for mutual 
aid between companies and outside services. 
Risk management and planning is not new. In many ways its in-vogue 
status, especially with insurers, is misleading in this respect. It 
is however, clearly the line of development which corporate (and even 
small-scale) enterprise will follow with regard to the organisation of 
in-house security in the future. 
3. Defence., Deterrence and Detection: Alarms., Detection Devices, 
Locks and Safes 
Al th ough th is secti on is pri nc i pal ly c oncern ed wi th th es ec uri ty 
h ardwa re i ndu stri es , it shoul 
d be apparent, and borne in mi nd , that 
there is a key role played in the fortunes of the private security 
industry overall and especially the alarm and lock industries by the 
insurance sector. This is self-evident but no less significant for 
being so. After all, the major growth (in value terms) of private 
security has been in the commercial not the private (household) 
sector. Such growth i s evidently not unrelated to where the influence 
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and pressure of insurers is strongest (because of risk criteria and 
high premiums for plant and stock etc. ) The fear of crimes such as 
burglary is very high among the general public, yet without concerted 
encouragement from insurers this fear has not resulted in particularly 
significant investment in devices such as intruder alarms. As the 
Sunday Times reported on 22nd October, 1978, one-quarter of all 
households carried no burglary insurance at all; one-half of those 
that did were heavily under-insured and of the 27,000 (estimated) 
alarms installed in 1977 only one-third were installed in private 
houses. 8 The point is that, there are evidently grounds for 
scepticism about the rising tide of crime generally being the sole, or 
even principal, push to the growth of private security. Hence the 
complex picture must also take serious account of other 
institutionalised economic forces. 
The concerns of the insurance sector in relation to private security 
revolve more around the deterrence of crime than catching criminals. 
As the MATSA (1983) report notes, this can produce an odd conflict 
because insurance companies: 
prefer, and often stipulate, noisy visible alarms (; by) the 
time the police or guard have responded there is of course 
little chance of catching the intruder. This conflict of 
policy between insurance companies and security al arm makers 
on the one hand, and the police or Home Office on the other, 
is a running sore for the industry. " 
(pp. 8-9) 
Nonetheless, insurance companies and their own priorities remain 
extremely powerful within these relationships. Reports of business 
consultancies make no mistake about emphasizing that a customers 
interest in security is generally the result of their insurance 
companies' advice about the unacceptability of the risk without some 
security cover. This has been the standard pattern. But recently 
some insurers have begun to actually offer discounts on premiums for 
customers intalling alarm systems. In some cases, insurers have 
linked directly with security hardware manufacturers, for example 
Economic Insurance and Hoover which markets a DIY alarm system. At 
the level of inter-industry liaison, limited formal links exist, with 
the British Insurance Association being represented on the National 
Inspection Board of the National Supervisory Council for Intruder 
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Al arms. This latter body maintains a Roll of Approved Installers who 
are to adhere to British Standard 4737 covering the installation and 
maintenance of alarm systems. 
Wh i1ean umb er of c ommentators have argued that N SCIA h as been f ai rly 
ineffective it should still be stressed that even for smal 1 companies 
it can be quite important to be a member of the organisation because 
insurance companies are then more likely to accept it as an installer. 
Members of the NSCIA can also be members of the Alarm Systems section 
of the British Security Industry Association which aims to develop 
policy promoting high standards for screening and training of 
employees. A second sub-section of the BSIA that should be noted is 
the Alarm Manufacturers Section concerned with development of 
guidelines for standards and performance of equipment and alarm 
systems. However, the membership of both these groups is quite small; 
at June 1983 the former had thirty-six members and the latter only 
fifteen. 
Despite significant growth, profits in the alarm business have not 
always been easy to come by. In value terms the commercial sector of 
customers has been the most important, though this is probably now 
close to saturation, but the volume potential of the private, 
household market may still offer a great deal of scope. Despite all 
this, and it has to be acknowledged,, largely to do with the absence of 
standardised accountancy practices within the industry, there has 
recently been some controversy over profits in the alarm business. 
'Security Profits Cause Alarm' ran the 'Exclusive' lead story in the 
Sunday Times Business News on 31st July, 1983. 
The alarm business is not, of course., new. Electronic alarms were 
first used commercially in the UK in 1916 and, familiarly, were 
introduced as a result of pressure from insurers on furriers in 
London's East End, emphasizing the deterrent value of alarms. But 
even then, the USA and Scandinavia had a longer history and more 
sophisticated use of alarms. The next technological staging post in 
the use of alarms in the UK did not come until 1936 with the use of 
Post Office telephone lines to connect alarm systems to a central 
alarm monitoring point, pioneered in London by the Rely-a-Bell 
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company. This system was shortly extended throughout major UK 
population centres but despite its considerable greater efficiency it 
proved quite expensive. In 1938, a new system appeared based on the 
automatic dialling system of the telephone network, enabling a silent 
message to be sent over the 999 emergency lines and first used by the 
Burgot Alarm Company (Dring, 1972: 19). By 1971 one authoritative 
estimate of the number of alarms in use was set at around 110,000 of 
which 76,000 were directly connected to the police (Dring, 1972). 
However, it was still evidently unclear even in 1972, as it is now 
after years of growth, how many alarm firms were in business. In 1960 
there were eleven known firms, by 1970 the Trade Directory listed 
ninety-eight, but it was accepted then, as now, that many more were 
unlisted. It was hoped that coherence, standardisation and 
accountability could be brought to the alarm industry by the 
establishment in 1971 of the National Supervisory Council for Intruder 
Alarms., supported by the Home Office, the police, insurance companies 
and the security industry. 
From the latter two involved parties representatives of the British 
Insurance Association and the British Security Industry Association 
alternate to take the Chair of the Council. With laudable aims and a 
staff of seven experienced electronic technicians acting as regional 
inspectors to follow up complaints and check on applicants for 
membership, the NSCIA generated some optimism among supporters and 
neutral observers. The real effectiveness of its "supervisory" role 
was, however, based on the willingness and voluntary cooperativeness 
of the firms in the market-place to allow themselves to be supervised. 
This was, unsurprisingly, frequently not forthcoming. Further, as one 
media observer of the crime control scene noted; 
"in 1979, eight years after its formation, it was apparent 
that the general public was not aware of the Council's 
existence nor of the help it could offer either to those 
with alarms installed by Approved Installers or to those 
thinking of having one installed. " 
(Burden, 1980: 113) 
Without formal license-based regulation the watchdog will remain 
toothless and its bark ignored. The case for control is more serious 
when NSCIA, aware of its own limitations, nonetheless suggests that 
11 at least 750,000 alarm systems are needed in Britain. " Bu rden, 
1980: 114) 
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Probably the most frequently cited problem with alarm systems and the 
industry which provides them is the extremely high rate of false 
al arms. It is quite often felt that one result of this situation is 
the development of an attitude among the police that "the boy cries 
wolf too often" (cf. Matthews, 1972: 29). But there is anyway a 
general problem of speeding up the response time of the police as 
usually it is first a key-holding security company which receives the 
alarm and then has to notify the police to check the cause of the 
alarm. This fairly typical procedure occurs where the alarm is 
discovered by a patrolling guard on site or where the alarm is fed 
direct to a security company's central control. If the alarm is not 
wired to a centralised check-board with a security firm then in the 
past it was either wired direct to the police (a practice no longer 
allowed by most forces and strongly discouraged by others) or else it 
simply rings in isolation until acted upon by somebody. 
Not surprisingly, many in the security industry have argued that this 
is a serious probl em area in which there is a need for much closer 
cooperation with the police on an operational basis. One suggestion, 
for example, has been to build private security alarm and guard 
control centres close to, or even next door to, police stations. 
Other members of the industry have, it should be noted, been very wary 
of such suggestions in terms of their concern for the industry's 
public image and this caution has been expressed to me in interviews 
with both very senior and very junior employees in security companies. 
Nonetheless, employment of new communications technology is being 
seriously exploited by the major companies in efforts to provide a 
more sophisticated and efficient service. 
The relationship between the alarm companies and the police is clearly 
one that is often, classically fraught with difficulties,, and is 
founded, and occasionally flounders, upon tensions. The official 
police 'line' has some praise for the efforts made in the past twenty 
or so years to achieve a mutual operational accommodation although the 
Metropolitan Commissioner has recently called for more to be done. 
But a different, unofficial , subcultural response can 
tend to view 
private security in general, and private alarm companies in 
particular,, as close to parasitic. Other researchers in this area 
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al so feel that they have detected this sentiment. One of the major 
contributors to the literature on private security in Canada similarly 
notes that alarm companies are seen by the police as being among that 
section of the public which 'use' the police "exploiting their 
relationship as allies" (Shearing, 1981: 290). 
Moving here from the general to the relevantly particular, Shearing 
observes that the police: 
"complained that the public were often not as helpless as 
they seemed. The public, they believed, sought to use the 
police to accomplish their own self-serving ends. The 
police became particularly incensed when persons misused 
their power and status for these reasons. In the police 
eyes, one of the worst groups of offenders were private 
alarm companies who 'had the nerve' to ask the police to 
respond to their alarms for them. " 
(291) 
Whilst it is in the alarm company business in particular, (at least in 
the UK - and I believe in Canada).,, that efforts have been made to 
simplify and better synchronise police and security responses to 
alarms, a significant degree of resentment seems to remain. The 
feeling may principally be one of professional disdain for imagined 
(or real) negligence or incompetence on the part of alarm companies. 
As one West Yorkshire beat constable told me: "Of course they can do 
something about it! " 
Whatever the persistent shortcomings, the development of security 
technology, and indeed of the private security sector as a whole, is 
strongly related to a competitive cycle not simply between customers 
demanding better security from their suppliers but more importantly 
between security systems and those who attempt to neutralise them. 
Obviously, security technology has, in one sense, simply kept pace 
with technological developments generally. As the US 1976 Private 
Security Task Force commented: 
with the application of advanced technology to the security 
industr , even one of the oldest security 
devices, the lock, Y 
was subject to revolutionary changes: combination locks, 
combination time locks, del ayed action time 1 ocks, 
combination locks with surveillance and electronic controls, 
and eventual ly access control 1 ed systems that uti 1i sed the 
technology of television and mini-computers. " 
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But within this history of technological advance, professional 
competition lies at the heart. Whether the professionals are 
designers of security systems or of organised crimes. O'Tool e 
(1978: 186) draws this point out quite nicely: 
"Locks, safes, vaults and burglar alarms are among the most 
traditional paraphernalia of the Private Sector. Locks date 
back to Ancient Greece. They were thoroughly commonplace in 
the mid-19th century when American locksmith Alfred Hobbs 
challenged his English colleagues with the boast that he 
could pick the best of their products, but no English 
locksmith could defeat a Hobbs-built lock. He made good on 
both claims. Such contests of ingenuity advanced the art of 
locksmithing, even as competition between electronic 
eavesdroppers and countermeasures technicians elaborated 
audio-surveillance techniques a hundred years later. Edwin 
Holmes, who invented the first electric burglar alarm in 
1853 put it this way: 'The whole history of bank burglary 
and vault building is competitive; and in the same manner 
that a new system is devised to protect armour plate,, so the 
burglar finds or devises a new method of attack. '" 
As McIntosh (1971) has succinctly argued, changes in the organisation 
of thieving have generated a cycle in which the manufacturers of 
protective devices of all kinds have had to respond with their own, 
increasingly sophisticated changes. McIntosh cites the example of 
burglary as a fairly routinised craft form of crime up to the 
industrialising and urbanising 19th century. Quite naturally the 
great new buildings housing the new industrial wealth tended to be 
increasingly better protected. Thieves successfully rising to such a 
'challenge' were met, in due course, by further improvements in 
protection techniques and "an innovative cycle was under way. " 
(McIntosh, 1971: 117) McIntosh presents the history of the safe since 
the 19th century, as a good example of this process: 
"Since Elizabethan days, strong-box locks with other locks 
had been vulnerable to the Black Art of skeleton keys and 
pick-locks. But this was defeated when the warded lock was 
replaced by the lever or tumbler locks. In turn techniques 
were developed for forcing locks off and for defending 
against this; for drilling holes in locks by various means 
and for defending against these; for dynamiting locks and 
defending against this., and so on. The technology of the 
I Peter man' (safebreaker) has by now moved through 
gelignite, oxy-acetylene or oxy-arc cutting equipment and 
even to the use of the thermic lance to cut through concrete 
to get at a safe, which puts some safebreakers at the 
forefront of technological advance. So rapidly is the 
technology changing in this sphere that leading safemakers 
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are contemplating hiring safes rather than selling them on the grounds that, unl ike most industrial or commercial 
equipment, an outmoded safe loses all not just some of its 
usefulness. " 
(McIntosh., 1971: 118) 
According to one professional 'heist' , or 'hold-up' man, the improved 
security of bank safes, particularly the introduction of the time 
lock , and the tendency for ordinary safes just to carry non-negotiabl e 
cheques and securities has prompted a move away from burglary and 
safe-breaking to hold-ups (McIntosh, 1971: 123). This kind of view is 
shared by other experienced commentators on crime and crime 
prevention. As Worsley (1983: 13) recollects of his visiting lectures 
at the Stafford Crime Prevention Centre, the "most important 'law'" he 
devised to provoke his audience was that "security equipment and 
services do not prevent crime. They divert it to other targets and 
change its pattern, even producing violence, but in the national 
context they prevent nothing. " 
But all of this is to consider the technology and effectiveness of 
crime- prevention related security devices and systems. The areas of 
security hardware cannot be left without some brief description of 
security technology less clearly designed for employment in the 
commendable, if ill-starred, pursuit of crime prevention. 
4. Security Technology, and Issues of Surveillance and Privacy 
This section explicitly moves away from a focus on so-called crime 
prevention to briefly note examples of security technology designed 
with matters such as industrial espionage and personal information 
storage and retrieval in mind. I start by quoting a sceptical note 
about crime, capitalism and technology. 
In the early 1970s, the new wave of critical criminologists argued 
that: 
we may be entitled to a degree of scepticism ... as to the 
centrality of crime (even in a period of 'societal 
breakdown') in the development of new technological devices 
and machinery by capitalist powers. " 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973: 212) 
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I would contend that whilst the spirit of scepticism remains val id, in 
the late 1980s we should be wary of 'critical complacency'. 
Personal Surveillance 
"Now You Can "Clone" Your Best Employees 
cut applicant screening costs to the bone. Do it with "VAP I" 
Voice Analysis Personality Inventory 
Generations beyond lie detection and psychological 
assessment. 
Fully validated and complies with EEOC and FEPC 
requi rements. 
Rave reviews from users and labor leaders. Slashes 
recruiting 
and training costs, turnover and theft. 
Call collect, 609-452-8960 
(Advertisement run in New York state newspapers, 1980) 
The common version of the 1 ie-detector or polygraph monitors 
physiological signs of 'stress' such as heart-rate and, retaining the 
psychology of the culprit sweating while being grilled, the electrical 
conductivity of the skin (which 'measures' a person's sweating). 
Perhaps the Voice Analysis Personality Inventory (a "generation beyond 
lie detection and psychological assessment") was inevitable as a 
development. Not because of any leap-frogging with the technological 
sophistication of organised crime, but because - even in the USA, the 
Disneyland of personality assessment tests and devices - scepticism 
about lie-detectors and their effectiveness has been growing. As the 
Sunday Times (5th December, 1982) reported: 
"Lie detectors are being seriously considered as a way of 
improving Britain's leaking security vetting system. Bu t 9, 
according to a leading authority in America - where lie 
detectors have been widely used for years - they are almost 
useless. 'It is an insidious myth in the United States that 
lie detectors produce highly accurate results ... In fact 
the best scientific evidence is that the polygraph produces 
a wrong answer about one time in three 
(Dr. David Lykken, University of Minnesota) 
The VAPI advertisement which promises to help employers to "clone" 
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their best employees (interestingly referring to a more sophisticated 
form of biological technology in its sales promotion) actually refers 
to a form of voice stress analysis. According to the Sunday Times 
report, 
"the original voice-stress analyser was invented and marketed by a former CIA man. Because it can be used without the 
subjects knowledge, even over the telephone, it is widely 
used for job-vetting in America. Voice-stress analysers are based on the idea that a natural, almost imperceptible, body 
tremor, with a frequency of about 10 cycles a second, is 
reduced by stress and that there are resultant detectable 
changes in speech. " 
Apparently, four serious studies have been madi 
analyser, including an important one in Israel 
according to Lykken., "were even worse than with 
were no better than chance. " (Ibid. ) Which must 
about the "rave reviews" for VAPI from "users 
(especially the labor leaders! ). 
e of the voice stress 
. "The results, " 
the polygraph. They 
lead one to wonder 
and labor leaders" 
Perhaps capital is not developing amazingly effective technology, 
although this area, as with others in the private security sector, 
attracts large research and development investment. There may however 
be an equally serious danger in the fact that it is prepared to buy 
and use - on a large 'scale - technology which is effective only to 
varying, and eminently disputable, degrees. The widespread embrace of 
use and acceptance of that fact, brings us ever closer to the reality 
of being a totally surveilled society. As Hougan (1979) comments of 
developments in the USA: 
"Saber Laboratories President, Leo Jones is correct when he 
declares that 'Society today is on a surveillance binge', 
citing the fact that for every bugging device in the hands 
of government, there are three hundred in the private 
sector. Indeed, surveillance has become such a routine of 
western life that we pay it hardly any attention. In the 
banks, supermarkets, department stores and airports, we're 
watched - sometimes by kindly eyes, always by hidden ones - 
and have become accustomed to it. " 
XX) 
Voice analysers and the comments of Hougan and Jones may seem to 
reflect a picture of American commercial zeal and excess, but for 
Britain it is less a matter of 'it can't happen here' and rather more 
one of 'following the American pattern, one, ten or twenty years 
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later For example,, in 1975 a New Scientist report (Hanlon, 
1975), on "electronic warfare" in Britain argued that, 
clearly the increasing squeeze on corporate profits and rising political dissent has led to an escalation of electronic spying on corporate and political opponents, 
which in the best military tradition has led to an 
electronic counter-measures capability. Beating the buggers 
depends upon how much you are willing to pay. " 
( p. 67) 
Apart from the quite naughty pun for New Scientist, this report again 
indicates the peculiar vampiric thrust for immortality of the 
development of technology in the private security sector - feeding off 
its own life-blood; it is highly commercially competitive, insatiable 
in its efforts to prove itself outdated and in need of rejuvenation 
and further innovation. For, of course, once simple eavesdropping has 
become regarded as old-fashioned or impracticable, then the horizons 
of technological eavesdropping open wide - and almost to infinity. 
Personal or technical surveillance devices are, as Campbell (1978: 600) 
has succinctly put it, "generally used to attack personal or 
commercial security; sometimes they are used by those who claim to 
promote security by such surreptitious means. " There is not the space 
(or the necessity) to describe the variants of 'bugging' devices here, 
but it should be illustrative to describe the single example of the 
'infinity' transmitter. 
Th is., it has to be acknowl edged, is one of those sensational exampl es 
which most commentators will use for effect. So it is hardly original 
to draw attention to it; though it should be noted that there seems to 
be some slight dispute about the extent of its capacity. But for the 
simple point of indicating the established potential of electronic 
surveillance devices I defer to the authority of K. G. Wright, one of 
the major and most prolific commentators on private security in 
Britain. As Wright puts it, 
"The most dangerous of all listening devices ...... is 
the notori ou s'infini ty tran smi tte r' . The bug itself is 
much smaller than a matchbox and can be connected to the 
telephone wiring quickly and easily by a skilled operator. 
Normal use of the telephone is not affected until the 
eavesdropper wishes to bring the transmitter into action. 
When this time comes, he need only dial the number of the 
telephone he has bugged, and transmit a special tone down 
the line to activate the microphone. He can do this from 
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anywhere in the world providing he has direct dialling 
access to the number he is calling. Thereaf ter, the 
microphone will pick up everything that is said within its hearing: the eavesdropper can listen over the open line. 
Once activated, the bugged telephone will give the 'engaged' 
signal to callers, but there will be no other indication of 
anything unusual. If it is possible to connect a microphone 
in the target room to a different telephone in a 
neighbouring office, the microphone can be activated in the 
target room by ringing the number of the telephone in the 
other office. " 
"In Britain an incoming call is not finally connected until 
the handset has been lifted from its cradle at the receiving 
end of the call. Thus in this country it is necessary to 
make sure than an incoming call has been answered before 
transmitting the signal that will activate the infinity 
device. " 
(Wright, 1972: 223) 
In the private security sector the sensational should certainly be 
treated with scepticism but never simply dismissed: because just as 
aspects of the security world are mythologised in various media images 
so can the worl d of myth be sought in real i ty. As one of the major 
suppliers of spy and anti-spy equipment of the 1970s, Lee Tracey, 
commented on this tendency to the New Scientist, (21st June, 
19 73: 738) : 
"I was doing special engineering for films such as James 
Bond, and at the same time selling military equipment in the 
Middle East. There is a funny parallel between motion 
pictures and selling goods. On one side you create the 
fantasies of some writer, on the other you meet people 
around the world who want the articles created by those 
fantasies ... I decided to see what could be done 
in 
reality. " 
While still rather more prevalent in spy fiction than the real world, 
electronic surveillance, to intrude upon or to protect privacy, and 
the absence of any effective legal controls,, are nonetheless serious 
real ities. As a recent advertisement ran: 
"BUGGED? It's quite possible - in fact., quite 1i kely - that 
you are. The reasons for electronic eavesdropping are 
numerous. The methods, simple. And the consequences to 
you ... devastating. 
" 
The apparent irony of this advertisement, appearing in that guardian 
of civil liberties,, The New Statesman (15th February, 1980) presumably 
reflects a shrewd commercial targetting of the market of investigative 
journalists, paranoid sociologists and their like 
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Treatment of the technology of security and security systems 
necessarily entails exploring the diversity of that market from the 
boring to the sensational and the mundane to the sinister. The point 
to be made is that the significance of the private security sector 
today, and its antecedents in the past, cannot be really appreciated 
unless the tremendous contribution to patterns of pol icing, crime and 
indeed everyday life, which is made by the technology of security is 
emphasized. 
"Contribution" may be a word to use advisedly and with caution here,, 
but if that is so, it is only because there is much to cautiously 
consider about the positive and negative consequences of developments 
that "contribute" to the security of people and their property whilst 
at the same time bringing closer the reality of a surveilled, 
security-conscious society. Deep ambivalence is perhaps the most 
appropriate response to such a contradictory history and modern 
development. Issues of public safeguards and accountability will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 and a broader analysis of the services of the 
private security sector offered in Chapter 5. 
5. Private Eyes: Private Spies? 9 
While many of the various forms of private security operation can be 
seen to work at a fairly visible level and changes to our physical 
environment designed to provide better security also tend to be 
evident, at least to some degree, there is a further, important 
dimension of the private security sector which has tended to adopt a 
very low profile. Its existence and activities are no secret: its 
practitioners easily found in the Yellow Pages of virtually any town. 
But it is generally in the nature of the work done by Private 
Investigators that a low-key 'softly, softly' approach is demanded. 
Sometimes this is for relatively honourable reasons, like the good 
name of the client or subject of investigation., at other times it 
simply facilitates covert and dubious or dishonest practice. 
In this section I shall describe the range of activities of this 
final , key dimension of the private security sector and continue 
to 
raise issues of concern which will be more fully taken up in the 
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following chapter which addresses the case for accountability and 
control of the private security sector. 
To begin with, there is considerable definitional confusion in this 
a rea. Terms like private investigator, private detective or enquiry 
agent do not really reflect any precise degree of characterisation and 
where some authors choose one term, claiming its particular 
appropriateness, this generally seems more a matter of whim and 
preference than taxonomic expertise. Enquiry agent may more commonly 
be a term used to describe the part-time amateur; private detective 
may be eschewed as a description by some respectable practitioners 
seeking to show they do not desire any confusion of their role and 
powers with those of the police; and private investigator sounds 
relatively unthreatening yet solid and professional. Nonetheless, 
here I shall generally follow Draper (1978: 27) and use the terms 
inter-changeably. 
The public image of private investigators is also somewhat confused. 
This too, of course, is strongly related to the influence of the 
media, both in fictional depictions and in the occasional, usually 
negative, news report. Not surprisingly, the profession has been 
consistently concerned about this image problem: 
"The private detective works against cheats and bullies in 
the main,, assists and often brings about the end of 
suffering and cruelties. Why does he not get due credit for 
his value to the community? The answer is simple all our 
Public Relations have been negative and damaging 
(Open Letter, The Association of British Private Detectives; 
quoted in Thompson, 1970: 141). 
Public relations efforts do not usually emphasize the saintly 
qualities of private investigators, but they do commonly emphasize the 
value of the profession to the community. According to one member of 
the Institute of Professional Investigators for example, 
"There is scarcely a field of modern day existence which does 
not at some time or another require the services of the 
Private Investigator. " 
(Undated document: private files of Bruce George,, MP) 
Unfortunately, as part of any public relations effort, such statements 
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are as likely to sound like a sinister threat of all-pervading 
intrusion as they are a confident professional claim. Certainly 
private investigators are employed by clients who range across the 
economic scale from finance houses to ordinary families. Insurance 
companies, solicitors, large and small companies worried about 
internal theft or industrial sabotage and interested parties like 
families or creditors concerned to trace a missing person who is not a 
priority for the police - may all employ private investigators. In 
recent years the compilation of personal profiles involving assessment 
of financial status and moral character has become a growth area of 
activity, especially as corporate expansion brings with it the 
commercial version of the 'need to know' principle of who should be 
told what in the company and the accompanying 'need to know' more 
about the person(s) being told. 
Private detective work is commonly thought of as the occupation of a 
mysterious class of hard-bitten ex-cops who rent sleezy offices in 
downtown Los Angeles, start the day with a shot of Jack Daniels and 
then amble off to investigate a murder, invariably carried out in the 
environs of Hollywood. There is, of course,, a substantial British 
tradition of 'private enquiry agents' from the Victorian London of the 
'worlds first consulting detective' onwards. Today, although the 
status of all of them is unclear (as the Younger Committee, 1972 
earlier found) there seem to be five professional organisations in 
Britain alone which include private investigators among their members. 
These are the Association of British Private Detectives, the 
Association of British Investigators, the Institute of Professional 
Investigators, the International Professional Security Association 
(IPSA discussed in more detail in the next chapter), and the Institute 
of Industrial Security. On a wider international scale, the Council 
of International Investigators and the World Association of Detectives 
are affiliates of similar organisations in other countries. By virtue 
of this network of professional contact one member of the Institute of 
Professional Investigators asserts that: 
"Investigators ... are able to bring their enquiries 
to a 
satisfactory conclusion far quicker than the regular police 
forces., who are so often hog-tied by red-tape or even 
pol i tics. " 
(Ibid. ) 
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The investigation business is expanding. Central to its development 
there remains (as always) a somewhat individualistic modus operandi 
which might take its actions well into the unethical and sometimes the 
illegal , yet at the same time it is apparently striving as never 
before for professional respectability - or so its occasionally vocal 
spokespersons would have us believe. The problem is that there is no 
recognised office or representative for the profession. The competing 
organisations, with more or less unknown memberships present a jumbled 
picture. In the past the two organisations that seem to have made the 
strongest claims for representative credibility also did little to 
conceal the conflict between them. The Association of British Private 
Detectives, which seems to have all but disappeared in recent years, 
was almost evangelical in its approach, publicising the integrity of 
the profession, apparently gathering evidence of malpractice and even 
threatening legal action against its perpetrators. Certainly in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s it was vocal in calling for higher 
standards and a sense of unity, pride and identity for the practice. 
The Association of British Investigators (ABI) not only seems somewhat 
more moderate in its general tone but would also seem to be able to 
claim some legitimacy by virtue of its history. The ABI was 
originally known as the Association of British Detectives (formed in 
1953), but changed its name partly, the story goes, because they did 
not wish to make claims for their members which might lead the public 
to confusing them with police detectives. It also seems very likely 
that they wished to avoid being confused with the ABPD. The 
Association of British Detectives was in turn an amalgamation of the 
Federation of British Detectives (founded in 1945) and the British 
Detectives Association (founded in 1919). 
All of these organisations represent only a minority of private 
investigators (the ABI apparently still has only a few hundred 
members) but their proliferation and lengthy history at least indicate 
some vitality in a profession that has been around a long, long time. 
Today, the ABI seems less concerned than the ABPD with the problem of 
those who may tarnish the general image of the profession and 
concentrates instead on trying to maintain a high standard among its 
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own membership,, with a code of practice, disciplinary committee and 
professional examinations. The ABI's Constitution lays down 
conditions which prospective members must fulfil, but there is no real 
mechanism of enforcement in practice, the conditions could only apply 
to the limited number of ABI members anyway, and oddly, though 
unsurprisingly, its original members were not required to meet them 
(cf. Madgwick and Smythe, 1974: 114). 
As with the guesstimates applying to the rest of the private security 
sector it seems easier to count the number of supposedly 
representative associations than it does actual private investigators 
in practice. There are simply no wholly reliable sources of 
information, government or otherwise. As matters stand there are in 
any case very few statements to collate and these offer a grossly 
inadequate basis for detailed discussion in this area or related 
policy purposes. In 1970, Thompson suggested that "if everyone 
calling himself (sic) a private detective were to be taken at his 
word, then the total number of operatives in the field might be set as 
high as fifteen thousand or so" (p. 142). Both the Association of 
British Investigators and, particularly, the Association of British 
Private Detectives have challenged this estimate. According to 
Thompson, in 1970 the ABPD estimated that: 
"there are probably no more than 2,700 full-time private 
investigators in the country, plus about 2,000 'status 
enquiry agents' and specialists in writ-serving. Of the 
2,700 or so full-time private investigators, they claim that 
only about 1,000 are truly worthy of the name - and possibly 
as few as 500, depending on how strictly one interprets the 
qualifications needed for the job. " 
(p. 142) 
The most recent ' statement' on this matter from the Home Office seems 
to be the five lines it received, admitting the lack of information, 
in the 1979 Green Paper on The Private Security Industry. The best 
that the Home Office researchers could do here was to refer back to 
the 1972 Report of the Younger Committee on Privacy,, noting that the 
committee, 
"thought 'that a reasonable estimate of the maximum number is 
of the order of 3,0000' , but said that 
it had not been able 
to obtain hard evidence (see paragraph 430 of the Report). " 
(Home Office, 1979: 5, para. 14) 
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But as Madgwick and Smythe observed in 1974, this estimate, 
"probably does not take account of the many people working on 
the fringe of the profession. One of the leading agencies 
estimates 15,000 as a conservative figure and the great 
proliferation of one-man businesses over the past few years 
inclines us to believe that this is no exaggeration. " 
( 113) 
Clearly, alliances are at work somewhere here. Thompson was writing 
of the encroachment on privacy by Big Brother (his book evoked the 
theme of 1984 - somewhat less hackneyed in 1970). The ABPD represent 
a view asserting the integrity of the profession and its ability to 
regulate itself. The Home Office has much sympathy with this view. 
Madgwick and Smythe write from a perspective of many years involvement 
with the NCCL. The Younger Committee took its evidence on this issue 
from the few representatives of the profession that would present 
evidence. So the picture remains obscure. The most recent 
independent estimate was provided by Bowden (1978), a political 
scientist with an interest in policing. Writing eight years after 
Thompson, he suggested that the highest estimate might be around 
209000 (p. 259) . On the basis of Thompson's 1970 estimate, the 
undoubted over-cautiousness of the ABPD and the Younger Committee 
evidence, I would suggest that Bowden's 1978 figure is at least close 
to being acceptable for the mid-1980s. 
One key issue which this particular numbers game revolves around, 
whether explicitly or not, is that of licensing or regulation of 
private investigators. I shall devote more attention to the arguments 
for and against licensing and regulation of the broader private 
security sector in the next chapter. However, because private 
investigators have been the subject of specific attempts to legislate 
around them, I shall briefly fill in some of this specific background. 
As with much else in this area, the position of representatives of the 
private investigators' profession appears confused. According to 
Thompson (1970: 143) both the ABI and the ABPD have opposed legislation 
in the past. Presumably, the ABI (at least) changed its position in 
the early 1970s for in its 'Report ... to the Royal Commission on 
Legal Services' (undated document; circa 1978) it stated that it had: 
"for many years advocated that there should be some control 
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of the Private Investigative profession, and strong support 
was given to the following: - 
Andrew Gardner,, MP - Private Investigators Bill 
Norman Fowler, MP - Security Industry's Licensing Bill 
Michael Fiddler, MP - The Private Detective's Control Bill 
No. 1 
The Private Detective's Control Bill 
No. 2 
Bruce George, MP - Private Security (Registration) Bill 
It seems likely that the general trend in the profession has been 
towards favouring some form of licensing, though clearly this was at 
one time anathema to some. For example, the response of the ABPD to 
the news in 1968 that a Private Members Bill proposed the requirements 
of a license to practice and surety of il. 000 was to suggest that: 
"If this was to reach the Statute Book., it would simply move 
us nearer the Police State and would eliminate our work as a 
fi el d. " 
(Thompson, 1970: 143) 
At the same time, there were others who welcomed such proposals. 
Colin Finlay, a well-known private investigator and then vice- 
president of the Council of International Investigators argued that: 
"As the law stands at present, anyone can start up a private 
detective agency. Some of the many agencies that have 
sprung up in recent years have done untold harm. The people 
who run them don't really know what they're doing and are 
just getting money under false pretences. " 
(Evening Standard, 27th May, 1968). 
The law currently stands as it did in 1968 when Mr. Finlay made his 
statement. Five years later Norman Fowler, MP was commenting in the 
House, 
"If a private detective here was convicted of the kind of 
offence for which the Watergate conspirators are now serving 
sentences in the United States there would be nothing to 
prevent him in this country recanmencing work as a Private 
Detective on the day of his release. " 
(Hansard, 4th July, 1973: 538) 
Mr. Fowler's statement topically reflected the feelings of many 
engaged in the debates and responses to the findings of the Younger 
Committee which had reported a year earlier. 
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When Younger had considered the possibility of issuing licenses to 
private investigators it f ound, of course, that it could pl ease no- 
one. The ABI liked the idea of licenses but when the committee felt 
there were grounds for over-printing on them that they carried no 
official authority and the public were under no obligation to 
cooperate, the enthusiasm of the ABI cooled. They apparently felt 
that in such a format the license might actually discourage public 
cooperation, and likened it to a dog license. At the same time the 
reservations of the Committee were being prompted by the police and 
Government who saw dangers of abuse of the document and the misleading 
of the public. According to Draper (1978: 151), 
"It was this consideration which persuaded the Government to 
oppose the recommendations of the Younger Committee relating 
to private detectives when they were finally debated a year 
later. The only concession made by the Home Secretary was 
the suggestion that a 'Disqualification Scheme' might be 
introduced by which anyone wishing to practise as a private 
detective would have to go to his local police station for a 
criminal record check which, if it proved positive, would 
disqualify him from practising. This is a scheme which 
bears some resemblance to the Continental approach and, 
although it represents the very minimum form of checking, it 
would at least be a step in the right direction. As yet, 
however, nothing has been done by the Government to 
implement this proposal. " 
The now thrice-f ailed attempts by Bruce George, MP to introduce 
Licensing across a range of private security activities have included 
provisions covering private investigators, but successful legislation 
seems almost as remote as ever. (This issue is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter). However, many of the more 
professional agencies now favour some form of legislation, although 
for much the same sort of reasons as the larger security firms. Not 
least among these is a desire to drive out of business, by stiff 
licensing procedures and heavy financial and insurance demands, all 
the smaller firms who are capable of undercutting prices by doing a 
shoddy j ob. 
Such concern about competition is made the more understandable when it 
is realised that the private investigator business is not really one 
of glamorously esoteric arts and plush office suites. Rather, in 
general,, it is dull and drab, basic and frequently boring,, and most 
importantly., routine. Obviously the large and successful practices 
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have grown by virtue of having something special about their services, 
their contacts and clients. But most of the work done by private 
investigators can as easily be done by small firms. 
Most agencies,, small and large, depend upon solicitors offices for the 
bulk of their work. Despite advertising, few agencies receive 
anything like a majority of cases or enquiries through direct client 
approaches. It is far more Ii kely that a person wi th a probl em wi 11 
approach a solicitor who may then refer them on to one of the private 
investigators that they know of and deal with. Importantly for the 
investigator, client referral through solicitors means that they can 
be fairly sure of genuine cases rather than the type that turn out to 
be imaginary. Further, contact through the solicitor can make legal 
aid available to the client if eligible (cf. Draper, 1978: 28). Most 
investigators therefore need to build up their contacts with, and the 
regular custom of, various solicitors practices. Similarly contacts 
in local Chambers of Commerce, among Rotarians and so on,, can provide 
the difference between a bread and butter practice and one which gets 
the jam of more prosperous clients who will pay for discretion, and of 
business clients who may even put the investigators office on a 
retainer basis to handle all their company's enquiry work. 
My use of the term 'practice' to descri be th ei nvest i gator' s work is 
not intended to confuse their image with that of solicitors or doctors 
and the like. Rather, despite the continued strong presence of lone 
detective operations, there is a trend towards more organised, 
multiple staff offices with all the accompanying resources of a well- 
run business. Such practices are fairly evidently modelled on those 
of solicitors, with senior and junior partnerships and younger 
apprenticeships. Such a development may serve to improve the image of 
investigators quite considerably. 
Certainly given their close working contact with solicitors it is 
unsurprising that they should emulate the model., and do so also in the 
hope of attracting further business from reputable sources. The point 
about this search for business is that it is not necessarily the sort 
of work that private investigators are commonly thought to do; it is 
legal dogs-body work, like process-serving - passing writs and 
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summonses into the hands of those required to be party to legal 
proceedings. This task can be a simpl e matter of straightforward 
delivery or involve making enquiries in order to trace an elusive 
defendant. As Draper observes, 
"For many agencies this is their 'bread and butter'. This is 
especi al ly so since the fal 1i ng of f of divorce work , and the demand for process-servers at least does not suffer too 
badly in times of economic recession because there are the 
resulting bankruptcies to maintain a steady stream of 
litigation. " 
(1978: 30) 
In the world of the private security sector, society's dark clouds 
often have silver linings. In hard times another detective agency 
service can flourish - that of acting as bailiffs. Focused 
principally at the lower end of the profession., among what may be 
called enquiry agents (and carried out in Scotland mainly by estate 
agents), such work can be relied on for its regularity (cf. Draper, 
19 78: 3 0-3 1). The business of making mundane tracing enquiries can 
also be a regular source of work for an agency. Draper succinctly 
summarises what is involved here. 
"This may involve locating a missing relative, a beneficiary 
or a child., or tracing stolen property, credit cards or 
hire-purchase goods. The private detective may be required 
to find and interview a witness to a road or industrial 
accident who has not been forthcoming with his evidence. He 
may also be employed by a party to civil litigation to find 
evidence supporting his case - evidence, for instance, as to 
the nature of the whereabouts of a defendant's assets and 
his means generally, or proof that one party has not been 




investigative work in the real world, as opposed to that of the 
media, plays only a small part in the work of private investigators. 
According to Draper (1978: 31) involvement in criminal investigation 
may account for only about 10% of the investigator's work-load. This 
may be a slightly low estimate according to one police source I talked 
to, but there again the police are not necessarily the best judges as 
relatively speaking they are likely to come into contact with more 
private investigators involved in criminal offences- related work than 
is perhaps representative of the average. Usually this work involves 
being retained by the Defence to check up on aspects of the case, 
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tracing witnesses, looking into alibis and covering the ground gone 
over by the police to get an idea of the Prosecution evidence. 
Investigators, may., of course, also be used on occasion by the police 
themselves, either officially or unofficially, sought out because of 
their good reputation and perhaps because of some particular 
expertise, 1 ines of contact., or to bring in a fresh face or 
perspective. Where the police have not conducted some investigation 
to the satisfaction of some party, then investigators may be employed 
to add to a Prosecution case. This is not common, but it does occur 
and as Draper points out, "it is likely to arise more frequently as 
the police find it more difficult to keep pace with the increasing 
numbers of serious crimes" (Ibid., p. 31). During any criminal 
offence-related investigation, and even in the course of an ordinary, 
routine kind of job, there is the strong possibility that the 
investigator will discover evidence of some criminal matter. The 
investigator will (or should) then discuss the issue with the client 
recommending that the police be brought in. It should be noted though 
that this relationship leaves a great deal of room for discretion, and 
for a variety of motives! 
Private detectives have something of a' snooper' image. This may be 
due in part to the enquiries they undertake in criminal cases,, but it 
is likely that much of the disapproval surrounding their image and 
profession - in the real world - arises from their past heavy 
involvement in matrimonial divorce cases. Indeed, despite the passing 
of the heyday of such work, the familiar modus operandi persists. In 
a taped interview with Jane Walmsley of Capital Radio (tape supplied 
to the author, 1979)., one private detective blandly stated that he 
would take on an investigation of "suspected infidelity" more or less 
at face value but did qualify his attitude when the possibility of 
blackmail was raised. In circumstances where he or his colleague felt 
that "something wasn't quite right, " then it would be fairly standard 
practice to turn round and investigate the client,, "to find out why 
there's something funny, " he assured the interviewer. The negotiation 
of loyalty to the client and maintenance of professional integrity can 
clearly give rise to strong ambiguities in the private investigation 
business. 
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As a proportion of such business however, the Divorce Reform Act 
(1969) and subsequent amendments, have diminished the importance of 
cases of adultery for private detectives. Generally there are now 
easier ways to secure a divorce by establishing "irretrievable 
breakdown" of the marriage. Additional provisions for 'postal 
divorces' by mutual consent accompanied by sworn statements have also 
removed some of the need for the employment of private detectives in 
those adversarial contests where a divorce action was defended in 
court requiring the submission of evidence. Having made these points 
however,, it should be noted that observation to prove adultery is 
still very much a part of the business of many agencies., perhaps 
taking up around 5% of their business (cf. Draper, 1978: 34). 
Typically, such a case might arise where a husband fears that divorce 
by mutual consent could lead to him having to make a substantial 
settlement on his wife - 'proof of' adultery is apparently often 
sought by husbands in the hope that the divorce settlement will 
somehow be affected and reduced. 
Adultery in such cases is proven, according to one private detective, 
by the 'eternal triangle' - opportunity, inclination and association. 
For example: 
"Take an instance of a man and woman who go into an empty 
house together at night, at say 10.30 p. m. At midnight the 
lights go out ... we would be standing outside 
watching ... and would keep observation perhaps all 
night ... and you would see them come out the following 
morni ng. That means they've had the opportunity , you've 
proved the assocation and to spend all night together they 
certainly must have the inclination. " 
Such an account might form the basis of a courtroom statement, 
especially the emphasis on maintaining surveillance all night. But of 
course, like any occupation,, private detectives have their 'tricks of 
the trade' which are employed to 'ease' their work. One security 
consultant, with some experience of investigation work told me of one 
classic. Staying at an observation post all night, for example, in 
the case of an adultery investigation, may be both unattractive and 
thought unnecessary. So. to check that those under surveillance have 
not moved during the period of absence or sleep, age-old techniques of 
I marking' are used. These are anything from simply pushing a 
matchstick in a door which should be still there on return if the door 
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has not been opened and marking the position of car tyres with chalk 
on the road, to placing pressure pads which are linked to a paper-tape 
time recording mechanism. (Apparently, whether intentional or not, 
the name of the 1960s television private-eye Frank Marker was a small 
in-joke in the business). 
The Private Investigator as Undercover Agent 
Whil st much of the investigator's mundane and routine work now comes 
by way of ref erral sf rom Sol ici tors , there is one area where 
increasingly their services are sought by direct approach. This is in 
their employment as undercover agents and use at al 11 evel s of 
industry (cf. Lipson, 1975; Draper, 1978). The direct approach is 
justified on grounds of secrecy and security, though on the other 
hand .in the UK at 1 east,, many cl i ent compani es and i nvestigative 
agencies will seek the cooperation of trade union representatives over 
the matters being investigated rather than risk discovery and the 
possibility of industrial dispute over the protocol of consultation 
and so on. Such work is of course, highly sensitive in its nature and 
can range from the investigation of fraud and embezzlement at the top 
of the company hierarchy to sources of large-scale pilferage at the 
bottom. In some cases,, 'troublemakers' are being sought out, personal 
profiles compiled, even information on the habits and opinions of 
spouses can be the nature of an assignment. 
Though some agencies have offered these services in Britain since at 
least the late 1950s the increase in demand for them seems to have 
only slowly followed the boom in private security services generally; 
probably gaining some sense of legitimacy as a commercial option in 
the wake of broader acceptance of the place of principles of security 
in modern management. Such practices have been used extensively in 
the USA throughout this century, and earlier, and often with little 
regard for ethical investigative practice. This can mean that they 
are viewed without great sympathy even by security professionals like 
Lipson (1975). According to this author of a well-known security 
text, undercover agents are usually put on a company's pay roll as an 
ordinary employee, paid the full salary for the job they have been 
hired for and in addition receive a sum from their agency. They are 
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mostly employed in relatively unskilled positions, such as shipping 
rooms, stock rooms etc... (but presumably this does not mean that some 
are not also deployed in the higher reaches of organisations). 
"Their job is to infiltrate existing cliques and strata of 
companies ... Some of the techniques used can be said to border on entrapment, or the actions of an agent 
provocateur. Many make it known that they are interest-edin 
a fast buck", placing a bet, obtaining marijuana or 
more potent drugs,, joining the union - whatever it is that their assignment encompasses .o oll 
(Lipson, 1975: 121) 
It is unknown how far the agent provocateur approach has been adopted 
in Britain., but as the Daily Mirror reported in 1982 (23rd November) 
the idea of planting spies in the workplace is certainly becoming 
increasingly familiar. 
"More and more firms - insurance companies., stockbrokers and 
supermarkets - are planting 'moles' to check on thieving by 
staff. The move is worrying union leaders who are virtually 
powerless because the spies are necessarily known only to 
top company executives. Though they appear to be on the 
payroll, they are employed and trained by security companies 
- and paid by results calculated in arrests or a cut in the 
firm's losses. [As one] union official complained . .. 'This sort of thing must harm staff morale ... Company detectives are known and accepted as part of life. But how 
can bosses expect a happy atmosphere with the thought that 
there could be a spy on the next desk or counter. '" 
(Emphasis added) 
For the USA, Lipson suggests that investigation agencies and security 
staff follow up such undercover operations with trained interrogators 
who will question "those 'fingered' and obtain confessions and 
resti tuti on. Cases developed in this manner are seldom referred to 
the criminal justice system" (1975: 121), but are part of the private 
justice system. This observation is at odds with Draper's comment 
that the police are unlikely to object to undercover investigations 
carried out privately in companies because "in all probability, if the 
offenders are found out they will be handed over to them,, making a 
welcome improvement in police detection statistics" (Draper, 1978: 32). 
I think that Draper is probably being generous here in her estimation 
of the regard for legal process necessarily held by private companies 
or investigating agencies. There probably is higher regard for 
traditional referral to the police in the UK than in the USA, but it 
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is also true that Draper's study,, written from the point of view of a 
practitioner at the bar, is generally blind to the concept of private 
justice as embracing forms of social control which run to the side of 
the formal legal system (cf. Henry,, 1983). 
On the other hand, writing with direct experience of work in the 
security world, Lipson is explicit about the implications of such a 
private justice system for the private security personnel involved. 
"The private investigator is deeply involved in this practice 
of private justice. He often combines the function of investigator with that of prosecutor, while his business 
colleagues sit in judgement. The operation of these 
private, kangaroo 'courts', of course, means that the crimes 
they are dealing with are unreported and that justice has 
become a private affair. In this area the function of the 
private investigator represents a challenging and disturbing 
problem in criminology. " 
(Lipson., 1975: 120) 
Whil e many private detective agencies will therefore be in a position 
to attract reputable local and legal business and others will have a 
'name' as specialists in certain kinds of investigation, many others 
must seek the basis for a steady living elsewhere. One avenue of work 
is supplementing the strength of the investigation departments of 
insurance companies, usually when an enquiry is being pursued over a 
lengthy period of time and is exhibiting some complexities requiring 
extended enquiries (for example dubious fire insurance claims). 10 But 
perhaps the area which has seen the most expansive participation of 
private detectives in recent years is the boom throughout the 1970s in 
credit rating and referencing agencies. These agencies themselves 
pursue enquiries of a private investigative nature and hence, in some 
respects, the line between the two can become almost indistinguishably 
blurred. 
Credit as a routine matter of commerce is by no means new of course 
and assessment of credit worthiness has always been an associated 
pr ob I em. In the 19th century Trade Protection Associations and 
private registers of bad debtors arose to formalise some degree of 
protection and means of investigation for those giving credit. But 
the 20th century, and in particular the affluent decades of the 1950s, 
1960s and 1.970s has seen the credit investigation agencies flourish as 
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an expansive and profitable area of business in itself. The promotion 
of a consumer credit society, embraced in the 1950s and 1960s by 
sl ogans I ike 'Live Now, Pay Later' . inevitably means a boom in work 
for credit-reference agencies, first in vetting customers and then in 
reclaiming goods and payments when 'living on the never, never' proved 
too much for household budgets to handle. 
Briefly, the credit reference business falls into two areas. The 1 ess 
intrusive (relatively speaking) , credit rating of commercial 
businesses. This tends to be simply a matter of compiling a detailed 
report from the variety of available sources about the standing of the 
company financially, as a trader and customer and so on. There are, 
for example, registers of businesses with established credit ratings,, 
such as the 'White Book' published by Dun and Bradstreet of London 
(cf. Draper, 1978: 35). Such profiling-type investigations rarely 
involve any intrusion into the personal lives of members of the 
company. Generally of more concern are those investigations pursued 
by agencies supplying credit references on individuals. Well 
established organisations exist providing such services, usually 
regarded as reputable and of high standard, for example, the United 
Association for the Protection of Trade and British Debt Services. 
But there is little serious regulation in this area and as Draper 
observes, "one mistake on the part of the credit- reference agency can 
bring untold misery to an individual who gets blacklisted as a result 
of it. " 
Within the credit industry then, the small private detective agency 
can really be small-fry indeed. However,, as Draper notes, they have 
their significance here for two reasons. First, they provide and are 
used as an "alternative source of credit reporting for traders and 
finance houses" (ibid. 36). On a localised level private detectives 
prove useful for gathering information in those less serious cases 
which perhaps do not merit the time,, trouble and cost of resorting to 
specialised agencies employing computer time and correspondingly 
trained and expensive staff and investigators. This division is 
emphasised further in the second important role of private detectives 
in the credit field. This is their function as a source and conduit 
of local information about private individuals and traders passed on 
to larger credit organisations. 
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These private detectives are probably diminishing in use and in 
reality were, in any case, less professional investigators than casual 
amateurs, usually employed when the larger agency had no local office 
or representative, and generally called correspondents. Their 'stock 
in trade' was simply their knowledge of the locality and willingness 
to approach potentially unreliable sources of reference - neighbours, 
acquaintances and shopkeepers, etc. Part of their bad name followed 
from the sort of information they therefore tend to gather and their 
inclusion of it in written reports. Such additional bits of gossip 
can be ostensibly valued as 'background'. in reality as titillation. 
Some of the most dubious practices have however seen a degree of 
tightening up in the wake of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974, 
particularly with regard to verifying accuracy of information. Thi s 
follows the opening of access to personal credit reference files 
provided for by the Act. The industry has also had to tighten up in a 
broader sense. The "personal credit boom, which reached a peak in 
1973, has seen a reversal as there has been a reduction in the demand 
for hire-purchase and other instalment credit business" (Draper, 
1978: 37). This has certainly reduced the available work for the old 
corresponding investigators and also put many of the smaller agencies 
out of business, whilst the larger ones have widened the services they 
provide in the commercial field. A number of credit and private 
detective agencies have however simply shifted sideways into the area 
of debt-collecting and 'counselling'; and it should be noted that the 
clients who use them are not necessarily scrooge-type businesses - 
I private eyes' can even be hired on the rates by councils concerned 
over levels of bad debts (Evening Standard, 27th October, 1978). 
Despite the protection offered by the Administration of Justice Act., 
1970, to debtors subject to harassment, some agencies employ 
distinctly unsavoury techniques in trying to extract repayment. While 
here, as in other areas of private detective work, these may be the 
minority, some attention should now be paid to examples of dishonest 
and corrupt practice. 
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Private Detectives, Professional Abuse and Civil Liberties 
There may be many private detectives who fit the seedy, down-at-heel 
image, but the majority make a reasonably comfortable living from 
their trade. There are, of course, an additional few for whom the 
business can be very lucrative. As Draper (1978: 30) observes: 
"Any who are prepared to resort to unlawful methods, or 
indul ge in dishonest activities such as industrial 
espionage, will find that some people are ready to pay a lot 
of money for their services. " 
In general . the profits to be made depend upon the character of the 
agency and of its cases. They can thus vary widely, and it is not of 
course a necessity to engage in unscrupulous practices in order to 
build up a highly profitable turnover. However., the private detective 
business can be insecure, competitive and highly opportunistic - 
indeed successful and honest detective work can make relative virtues 
of these factors. But the scope f or unethical , corrupt or i 11 egal 
practice is nonetheless evidently large, especially given lack of any 
serious official regulation. And it is not as if there has been no 
evidence of the need for such regulation. 
Following an Editorial in The Guardian (11th May, 1970), the Central 
Office at Scotland Yard was encouraged to take a token sweep through 
the private investigator business. The editorial followed an 
interview by one of the Guardian's reporters with a private detective 
who had boasted that he could easily obtain details of Inland Revenue 
status, criminal records, bank account details, debts and so on. 
Under various charges of 'Demanding money with menaces' , 
'Conspiracy 
to pervert the course of justice' , perjury and under the 
Wireless 
Telegraphy Act, nearly twenty private detectives were subsequently 
taken to court. The comments of Thomas Beet, while perhaps a little 
extreme, may nonetheless remain an apposite caution, despite first 
being written in 1906: 
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"I am convi nced that f ul ly 90% of the private detective 
establishments, masquerading in whatever form, are rotten to 
the core and simply exist and thrive upon a foundation of dishonesty, deceit, conspiracy and treachery ... Thugs and thieves and criminals don the badge and outward 
semblance of the honest private detective in order that they 
may prey upon society. " 
(Beet, 1906) 
Certainly the infamous upholding in November, 1974,, of the appeal by 
the Withers brothers, a private detective partnership based in 
Brighton, casts neither private investigators nor the capacity of the 
law to protect the public, in a good light. The Withers brothers had 
dishonestly obtained information of a confidential nature concerning 
private individuals by misrepresenting themselves to councils and 
government departments. This led to a charge and conviction for 
'Conspiracy to affect a public mischief'. However, at an appeal 
before the House of Lords, the Law Lords, Lord Dilhorne, Lord Diplock, 
Lord Simon and Lord Kilbranden ruled that there was no offence at law 
of conspiracy here. This has left what could prove to be a serious 
gap in the law. 
Not surprisingly, even before the law was found to be so seriously 
inadequate as a regulator of abuses by private detectives, the issues 
were a strong source of concern to civil liberties bodies. As the 
NCCL put it in their evidence to the Younger committee: 
"It is the NCCL 's view that all forms of intrusion into 
people's private lives are inherently undesirable. Some of 
them may be necessary, and in an industrial society we have 
to concede more than we would readily wish. But we find it 
wholly deplorable that there should be no control over who 
can carry out these tasks and under what conditions. " 
(Reprinted in Jones, 1974: 135) 
Such concern is justifiable. Unlike the situation in many other 
countries, barriers to entry into the commercial business of being a 
private detective are non-existent. The aspirant needs little more 
than the basics - one of the many popular guidebooks or short 
correspondence courses, a telephone, maybe a car and a fair degree of 
audacity. But this point should not be allowed to diminish the 
seriousness of some of the tasks private detectives become involved 
in. As Draper (1978: 40 remarks, 
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"possibly the most recent development in the role of the 
private detective in industry is the importation from 
America of the idea of pre-employment checks, a procedure 
which is beginning to take place on a considerable scale. " 
Another importation, lie detectors, are being assiduously promoted by 
some agencies, and although their reception in Britain has generally 
been cool, the very development of widely available services using 
them raises questions and concerns. Not least among these is the 
clash between employment checks, lie detectors and so on, and the 
principles of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974. Some of this 
thorny issue is discussed in the following chapter on licensing and 
regulation of private security personnel with regard to whether they 
themselves should be exempted from the Act. Private detectives 
however have usually been concerned about the way in which provisions 
of the Act affect their work. Many simply say that in any conflict 
between the Act which would restrain them from telling their client 
about, say a prospective employee's past conviction for fraud, and 
their feeling of duty to that client., then the person who pays would 
win and the client would be told. Existing legislation to protect and 
safeguard the rights and privacy of individuals is inadequate anyway. 
When it is seriously considered in relation to how it can be abused by 
agencies in the private security sector, then it is disturbingly so. 
Conclusion: Blurring the Lines of Definition 
Quite rightly, Hilary Draper has argued that "the line of definition 
between detective agencies and security companies is becoming somewhat 
blurred, making it more difficult to deal with their respective 
problems in isolation from each other" (1978: 47). While Draper does 
not discuss the broader division of private security services across 
the spectrum that can be identified, nonetheless, at this core, there 
is some sense in which the wheel is turning full circle and some 
investigating agencies are offering security consultancy and guard 
services while security organisations offer investigatory services. 
The blurring of boundaries here and elsewhere in the private security 
sector (and across the private/public divide),, is not a sign of 
confusion or imminent commercial collapse. The private sc-curity 
sector is expanding and will continue to do so, in varying ways, to 
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varying degrees, for the forseeable future. As it does so, the need 
to ensure that itis stri ctl y regul ated grows even more. It is to 
this issue that I turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3- Notes 
The rol es of MATSA and the BSIA, and other trade union and 
profesional association bodies are discussed more fully in 
Chapter 4. 
(2) More description of two middle range companies - one London wide 
and beyond and the other more 'localised' to the centre and south 
of London - is given in the description of the ethnographic 
phases of this research in the preceding Chapter 2. 
I have discussed aspects of these issues, particularly the shifts 
and the boredom in Chapter 2. 
(4) Not surprisingly, given the international character of private 
security, similar problems are strongly evident in the USA and 
Canada. In 1971 Kakalik and Wildhorn observed in their Rand 
Report on private security in the USA, that: 
"Turnover in private security work, especially guarding, 
is much higher than in public law enforcement. Lateral 
entry is rare in the public police; recruits generally 
enter when young and a substantial fraction remain 
until retirement. Precise, overall figures for 
turnover in the public police, however, are not 
ava i1 abl e. 
"In contract security work, especially in guard work, 
turnover is high, ranging f rom aI ow of about 20% per 
year for high-quality, more highly paid guards at 
government installations, to a high of 200 percent and 
more per year for the low-quality, low paid, hourly 
guard. For example, one large firm claims an overall 
rate of 75 percent in some areas and as high as 200 
percent in others. The highest turnover rates are 
experienced during the first several months of 
employment" 
(1971/2, Vol. 11: 74) (cf. Shearing et al. 1980: 96-97). 
For Canada, the major study undertaken by the Toronto Centre of 
Criminology, confirms the same general picture. Shearing et al, 
(1980: 97-98) were able to draw upon extensive survey data in 
their assessment of the high turnover characteristic of private 
security in Canada and found the same contributary factors as I 
have mentioned in the main text. Thus, 
"the American literature tends to identify poor salary 
as the principal cause of the high turnover within the 
security industry. Our respondents concurred that poor 
salary was a major cause of high turnover in Canada. 
Just over half of our respondents mentioned that low 
wages contributed to high turn over. Related to this 
was the response that the benefits offered employees 
were not attractive enough. This was mentioned as a 
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factor by just over a sixth of our respondents. 
Further, agency executives commented that the absence 
of salary increases and chances for promotion 
contributed to the turnover problem. A number of the 
agency executives (16%) also pointed to the nature of 
security work itself as a source of high turnover. 
About 10% mentioned the existence of shift work as a 
factor. Several pointed to the often boring nature of 
the work. In addition, several indicated that because 
many contracts were short-term., it was sometimes 
necessary to let employees go at the expiry of specific 
contracts. Another 10 percent of the agency executives 
indicated that one of the reasons for high turnover was 
poor job performance, which resulted in a continual 
process of termination and hiring in some agencies. 
"Another set of reasons offered for high turnover 
focused on the security agents themselves. Over ten 
percent of agency respondents indicated that security 
work was regarded by many as a stop-gap while employees 
looked for another job. " 
(Shearing et al., 1980: 97-98). 
(5) Interview with senior Securicor management, 1979. 
(6) The mythology and stereotyping of the 'special' abilities and 
f unction s of private security/publ ic pol ic e/f i gures of 
authority/guardians of order (etc. ) representatives, are part of 
a grander unifying, hegemonic consensus (or ideology/cosmology) 
in society, which mediates contradictions held by individuals 
with individual experiences and beliefs but who must nonetheless 
subscribe to the idea of society as made possible by virtue of 
understandable meaning and order conducive to some degree of 
unification. Pauline Morris and Kevin Heal (1981) have discussed 
the idea of myth in relation to the police role, referring to the 
work of Levi-Strauss (1966). 
"The importance of myths in society is referred to by 
Levi-Strauss (1966) who discussed the way people fit 
together ... 'the remains of events 0*0 odds and 
ends, to lead to a completed picture' and he refers to 
the untiring ordering and re-ordering of events and 
experiences in a constant search for meaning. Myths 
themselves are never true or untrue, real or unreal; 
they are a body of beliefs mediating and interpreting 
reality and they perform an important unifying 
function" 
(p. 5). 
(7) In April , 1984 the Conservative government 
intending to privatise 
the Ordnance factories was considering arrangements which would 
al so i nvol ve privati sing the security of the pl ants, and was 
tentatively inviting tenders from reputable private security 
companies. The proposals were eventually dropped, but if they 
had been implemented these commercial services would, of course., 
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have had the backing of the police and, in the last resort, the 
a rmy. (Background information from sources in Westminster and Trade Union contacts. The deliberations of the House of Commons Defense Committee were reported in the National Press in April 
1984). 
(8) Of course, the figure for private households installing alarms 
may have been somewhat higher really as small firms, even smaller I cowboys' or do-it-yourself may have been employed, blurring any 
estimates. Commercial customers following the 'advice' of their insurers are more likely to use at least relatively respectable 
alarm companies whose installations would be more likely to 
figure in sources for compilation of estimates (e. g. the figures 
compiled by the National Supervisory Council for Intruder 
Alarms). Sales figures are generally unhelpful of course because 
they do not indicate the use to which the alarms will be put. 
(9) Although I do not have the space here to thoroughly detail their 
range and activities, there are significant sections of the 
private security sector whose concerns and dealings are less with 
people in the flesh and rather more with people as data-subjects. 
This occurs at levels from the routine of credit referencing to 
the high-tech levels of international commercial intelligence 
gathering and industrial espionage. While credit reference 
agencies use their own and hired private investigators, they can 
generally be excluded from this survey of the private security 
sector (except that measures designed to ensure probity of 
commercial agencies and civil liberties of citizens should affect 
them). Information about international computerisation of 
personal information and its use is, by its nature, difficult to 
come by, but in any case properly belongs to a different study. 
There is an intermediary arena for the collation and private 
transmission of personal information, that of privately 
subscribed agencies like the Economic League. However,, these are 
more in the nature of private information agencies than private 
security or detective operators and hence deserve separate 
consideration elsewhere (cf. South., 1983). 
Nonetheless, the acquisition and collation of personal 
information is central to or at least a significant part of the 
work of many components of the private security sector. 
(10) Insurance companies in the UK usually have efficient 
investigation departments of their own but are quite willing to 
resort to outside help from private investigators or police fraud 
squads. However_, developments in the USA should always be noted. 
There the establishment of in-house fraud investigation units is 
becoming common. As Guarino-Ghezzi (1983) observes "because 
fraud cases are rarely brought to court, these units operate as a 
kind of private police" (p. 321). In a personal communication, 
Guarino-Ghezzi confirms that there seem to be striking 
similarities between the way that these private fraud 
investigators operate and the way that the DHSS Specialist Claims 
Control teams operate in the UK (cf. Scraton and South, 1983). 
It would be interesting and informative to explore further those 
constants and similarities which exist between public and private 
agencies of investigation adhering more closely to 'principles' 
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of private justice than the civil and criminal law. I hope to be 
able to return to this subject in future work. 
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CHAPTER 4 
'Public Safeguards for Private Security' 
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Public Safeguards for Private Security 
The private security sector is already a major area of commercial and 
industrial growth - and it continues to expand and make substantial 
prof its. Its activities touch,, directly and indirectly upon many 
aspects of ordinary and extra-ordinary, everyday life. It has now 
been widely recognised in Britain and abroad,, as a service sector 
industry of some special significance and there have been several 
attempts to introduce some form of official over-view of the industry 
in Britain. All such attempts have, however failed. 
In this chapter I shall bring together, for the first time on such a 
broad scale, the range of issues and arguments surrounding the case 
for or against licensing and regulation of private security (cf. inter 
alia: Draper, 1978; Outer Circle Policy Unit, 1978; Stenning and 
Shearing, 1980, (a); George, 1984). However, it should be stressed if 
it is not already apparent that I am not presenting an attempt at 
neutrality in the debate. I am in favour of strict regulation of the 
industry and would support an effective model of licensing as a step 
towards ensuring public accountability and control of the security 
world. In conducting this research over a period of several years I 
have become convinced that licensing alone is not an adequate 
'solution' to the security problem - i. e., its control. However., it 
does seem the only viable first step. 
This chapter is therefore concerned, in a reformist sense, only with 
those issues relevant to providing for the licensing and 
accountability of the private security sector. However, a broader 
approach to providing a genuine sense of 'social security' must go 
beyond the common focus on policing and crime-prevention and also 
consider how this can integrate with a broader social service 
providing crime prevention, insurance, victim support and other 
services. I shall make some suggestions about this more ambitious 
second step in the concluding chapter, 6. 
At this point of introduction to the policy issues I would emphasize 
that the conclusions to the observational field-work discussed in 
Chapter 2 should not be forgotten. There I emphasized the strength of 
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th e occu pa ti on al cu 1 ture a nd i ts va I ue s and the nature of the 
conservative world-view permeating private security from board-room to 
guard-room. These create powerful barriers to change within private 
security itself and a strong boundary set against intervention from 
without. The case presented below is not one that can be criticized 
for ill-informed optimism. Rather and to the contrary., while it may 
be criticized by some for its moderation and caution, these qualities 
are at least borne out of a reasonably well-informed realism. 
In the following I shall draw upon a wide-range of sources, from 
academics, media, government and private security itself, as well as 
on field-work interviews with a variety of interested parties, 
including MPs, private security managers and workers, police and ex- 
police and others. I shall consider first some of the causes for 
concern., then the current state of self-regulation in the industry 
(confined at present in a narrow sense), arguing throughout for strict 
regulation and accountability to be built upon a system of effective 
1i censi ng. 
1. Causes for Concern 
Inefficiency? Who Really Pays for Private Security? 
Many concerned with the future of private security, whether working 
within it or outside it, express a desire to see standards raised, to 
improve pay and conditions, offer training to workers and so on. 
However,, the 'realities' of the highly competitive market seem to 
militate against such improvements. This means, as is widely 
recognised, that services offered to and paid for by customers are 
usually (invariably? ) not of the quality they might be. In some 
instances, those concerned with civil liberties might initially feel 
that this is no bad thing, but as NCCL and others agree, it is far 
better to have responsible and trained personnel working in this 
sensitive area than some of the staff who have been employed and who 
would be of far greater concern. And, of course, private security is 
not simply going to 'go away', so such accommodations must be made and 
thought about. 
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So inf act,, the need to cut costs to stay competitive actually 
restri cts f reedom of choi ce in the market - the choi ces are 1i mi ted in 
terms of the level of qual ity of service. Moreover, as Williams 
(Williams et al., 1984: 35) points out, 
many of the costs of the private security industry are being 
passed on to the public and taxpayer. The industry affects 
the police, the insurers, the client, local authorities, 
National Health Service, employees families and the general 
public. Everybody pays a price. " 
Low pay, poor conditions and high turnover make for 'cut rate 
efficiency' (cf. MacLennan in Williams et al., ch. 2). 1 have covered 
some of these issues earlier (in the preceding chapter) and without 
re-iterating them and other social and economic costs related to the 
current organisation of private security (e. g., costs to employees and 
their families; to industrial relations; those resulting from claims 
on police time; inefficiency in being able to deal with fire and 
serious theft and crime etc. ), I can here only emphasize that low pay 
and all these related issues have in fact proved expensive not 
primarily to private security but to society. 
A system of licensing could be the basis for setting minimum standards 
of pay, conditions, training and so on. Indeed given the support for 
this proposal among groups like the Low Pay Unit and the principal 
trade unions in security, there would be strong impetus to ensure that 
licensing worked for the private security labour force just as much as 
it did for the respectability of the companies licensed and for 
society. 
Such developments will of course be closely followed by the trade 
unions, not least because in this field they stand particularly 
uncomfortably between their efforts not to upset the rather 
conservative managements and their efforts to increase their 
membership and obtain good agreements for them. They might also be 
wary about how negotiations for better conditions could be blocked. 
The following exchange at a workshop in Canada (Jeffries, 1974: 48-9) 
is suggestive. A representative of the Canadian Guards Association 
"expressed his conviction that better working conditions in the 
industry would result in a higher quality work force. " A reply to 
this point argued the employers line "that higher pay should be 
191 
dependent upon better training. " Al though he agreed wi th the 
(Canadian Guards) Association's objectives, he said that "improved 
qualifications must precede increased salaries. " 
A system of licensing must ensure that companies are responsible for 
providing or sponsoring at least basic (and opportunities for more 
advanced) training. What needs to be avoided,, of course, isa 
situation where companies,, having for years relied upon and encouraged 
a low qualified (etc. ) workforce, prepared to accept low wages and 
poor conditions, then turn around and say that low pay and poor 
conditions were the fault of poorly qualified staff who did not merit 
better. 
Training provision for security professions has been extremely patchy 
and undeveloped in Britain, especially in relation to other countries. 
Yet it is an area that must be integrated into any strategy to improve 
the industry in its service delivery and inform its workers about 
their own rights and duties and also the legal and ethical constraints 
upon them. It is also the only area where some legislation exists 
specifically directed at the private security firms albeit only in 
relation to handling guard dogs. 
Whereas in the USA, training for security occupations has been a 
growth area in higher education (at least at Community College level) 
there has been little movement into this market in the UK. Letchworth 
College of Technology innovatively ran security courses for eight 
years in the 1970s but for some reason these have ceased., despite a 
good reputation for their senior courses which dealt with a wide range 
of subjects. Motherwell Technical College started a pilot scheme in 
this area and other colleges such as Trent Polytechnic, have 
considered following, but training in the college sector remains 
vi rtual ly non-exi stent. Thi s only real ly leaves the courses, 
conferences and seminars run by the security industry itsel f. These 
may be offered under the auspices of representative organisations, 
like the International Professional Security Association, or by 
individual companies, the larger of which (such as Securicor, Group 4) 
have their own training schools. Such limited availability means even 
reasonable standards of training, let alone high standards are spread 
thinly. 
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Regulation could in future set minimum standards and periods of 
training. At present the only area of training which has attracted 
legislative interest is that concerned with handling guard dogs. 
Securicor runs its own dog training schools, supervised by an ex- 
Metropolitan police dog trainer and providing basic and refresher 
courses. The 'dogs issue' has long been an emotive one in the 
security business with some fearing it gives the industry a bad name. 
Hence, Group 4 has phased out its dog-using operation, but because 
Securicor, the other major voice in the British Security Industry 
Association, continues to use dogs, there can be no united disapproval 
of the practice. 
Nonetheless, concern in the industry did lead to the establishment in 
1974 of the British Institute of Professional Dog Trainers to 
represent dog trainers and handlers. In such a case puns about 
further 'toothless watchdogs' are probably too obvious, but even with 
stipulations of examinations for handlers and tests for dogs on 
obedience, scent-work, criminal work (chasing and catching) and so on, 
as pre-requisites for membership, the Institute has no special powers 
to improve standards. It did however join in exerting pressure for 
legislation in this area and the 1975 Guard Dogs Act 
, 
provided some 
legal basis for standards, following a number of serious cases of 
children and adults being mauled by guard dogs. Under the Act, from 
1st February, 1976 guard dogs had to be either under the direct 
control of their handler or else secured so that they were not free to 
roam the premises. Warnings were also required to be clearly posted 
at all entrances. The Act was also supposed to eventually provide for 
local authority licensing and hence inspection of guard dog 
kennels. but these provisions have never been brought into force, 
apparently on grounds of expense. The BSIA endorses those rules and 
regulations which therefore do apply., and can point out that member 
companies who use dogs, like Securicor, have in fact improved 
standards quite voluntarily. So who needs statutory intervention? 
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Lack of Public Control over the Range of Activities in the Private 
Security Sector 
Most of the points dealt with above apply principally to the case for 
licensing and regulation of the main body of private security 
organisations and their activities - what is usually referred to as 
the private security industry. But either within the boundaries of 
this main dimension of private security or at least their fringes 
within the broader private security spectrum, there are various other 
'services' and activities which must be noted and brought into the 
case for regulation. This includes dubious practices of otherwise 
ordinary security companies as well as some of the services of 
specialist agencies and free-lancing 'heavies'. 
In 1978 1 contributed to a Report from the Outer Circle Policy Unit 
(1978), which pointed out that,, 
"where the security industry defines its role as the 
protection of profits (and therefore the process of 
production as well as property) then it extends into areas 
which are politically sensitive, such as strikes and 
picketing, and its activities are likely to be in conflict 
with the rights of employees. For instance, the Handbook of 
Security includes go-slows, strikes and picketing in a list 
of the "most important crimes which a commercial manager of 
today must protect agai_ý`st_. _T_Tr 
(OCPU, 1978: 8. quoting Hamilton and Norman., 1975,1.1.02) 
Unhappily the Handbook ... does not simply reflect 
its author's 
opinions, but practices and attitudes which have wide currency and 
high demand. The security and detective agency of the notorious Barry 
Quartermain was always a good indicator of the approach of the rogue- 
end of the market in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1969, Quartermain 
explained to a Times reporter that industrial 'counter' espionage 
essentially meant "investigating agitators and finding the real motive 
behind a strike" (Times, 28th June., 1969). In the 1960s particularly, 
but into the 1970s and 1980s as well, specialist agencies opened up 
providing services like "pre-planning for action in riots and other 
disorders ... and penetration 
tests and how to apply them" 
(INCOMTEC, n. d. ). Given the lengthy history of private security's 
involvement in 'emergency planning' for strikes,, riots and disasters 
in the USA (cf. Momboisse, 1968 and the discussion of ' risk 
management' in Chapter 3) it was not surprising that many such 
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agencies boasted ex-US marines., police and secret service personnel on 
their staffs. But such services are home-grown as wel I, as the 
Guardian reported in 1972 (13th July) , when a firm set up by ex-RAF 
security officers identified the shop stewards involved in the 1972 
London docks strike. 
Perhaps such fringe operations would be marginally less disturbing if 
the people involved in them did not seem to have such evident cross- 
over connections with the worlds of state law-enforcement and 
security. It may also be that such connections make less-laughable 
article titles like 'Nuclear Attack - There's a Job for Private 
Security' (Evans, 1980). This article is not, actually, suggesting 
that private security guards could become a nuclear deterrent,, perhaps 
delivering nuclear pay-loads in armoured cash-carrying vans. Rather 
the author, Peter Evans, the Home Affairs correspondent of the Times 
(writing in Security Gazette) suggests that in the event of nuclear 
attack private security could be a valuable disciplined force to aid 
in civil defence organisation, especially in and on behalf of 
industry. It may well be that in the event of nuclear attack people 
will be glad of any organised help they can get. However,, such 
suggestions from responsible commentators really ought to suggest that 
before any serious thinking about future roles for private security 
gets that far ahead, an immediate priority ought to be the adequacy of 
standards that could be brought about through regulation. 
These points cannot be dismissed as if they had relevance only to some 
exceptional or possible reality. Private security already - and 
indeed for a long time - has been of serious relevance to those grand 
issues which exercise minds normally dismissive of the agitation of 
the 'civil liberties cranks'. The most recent example is the case of 
the plans of the present Government for the privatisation of the 
ordnance factories and, initially with them., the arrangements for 
security at the plants. The withdrawal of the Ministry of Defence 
police and their replacement with a private security firm slowly 
became a proposal which alarmed the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee. "While nobody is going to steal a Challenger tank, " they 
argued, "the ROS' range of arms, explosives and ammunition offers 
immense attractions to terrorist or extremist organisations" 
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(Standard, 26th July, 1984) . According to the Standard., "the 
committee took 'some very scathing evidence' about the private 
security industry and doubted the government's wisdom in including 
Ministry of Defence pol ice in spending cuts if they were to continue 
effectively guarding weapons factories" ( ibid. , pp. 1-2). Now it 
shoul d not be taken that ef f ective I icensi ng and regul ati on shoul d 
ever be assumed to be a mechani sm for ' improvi ng' pri vate securi ty so 
that it could take over such roles. The important point here is that 
privatisation of an important military police function was confidently 
and happily proposed by the present government who had informally but 
nonetheless actively considered tenders from various companies. 
No doubt in this case the bona-fides of the company expected to get 
the contract had been well checked and my sources, as they say in 
Fleet Street, assure me that it was a wholly owned British company. 
But this very assurance is an index of another 'grand' consideration 
about control over private security, one which has already attracted 
some attention in Canada. In a report on Contract Security in 
Ontario, prepared for the Office of the Solicitor General of Canada, 
Shearing et al., (1980), observe that private security raises very 
important questions about the administration of justice in terms of 
whether it is being defined and maintained fairly and equally or 
whether, in certain circumstances,, the conflict of interests between 
corporations and government, and the resources that they control, 
means that justice can be skewed in the interests of the corporately- 
blessed few. Important however, as they go on to argue., 
"This issue of private versus public interest takes on a new 
complexion ... when the multi-national corporation as a 
provider or consumer of security services is introduced into 
the picture. With this development, the issue is no longer 
simply one of the public versus private interest, but of the 
possible conflicts between different national interests and 
the interests of the multi-national corporations that 
straddle continents and nations (Friedenberg, 1975). " 
(Shearing et al., 1980: 72) 
As yet, the case for the regulation of private security in Britain has 
not taken on board the issue of private security operations being 
allied to the 'sovereign states' of international corporations, rather 
than being accountabl e to home-grown authorities. But it seems 
unlikely that the matter will not have future importance. What is 
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currently understood is that certain elements of the private security 
sector in Britain inhabit very murky waters with regard to identifying 
what they do - let alone to whom they feel accountable. 
Who Pays - Wins 
Ina Parl i amentary Questi on ( wri tten :1 st August . 1978 ) to th e 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Bruce George, 
MP, asked for a listing of those private security companies hired by 
the department in the 1 ast f ive years, detail s of their 
responsibilities., the expenditure on them and the criteria for 
choosing companies for hire. The details of the Written Reply are now 
outdated, though along with questions to and replies from other 
government departments, it did confirm widespread use of private 
security companies by virtually all departments. This remains the 
case, perhaps with some expansion of the heavy use of private security 
by government departments in Northern Ireland (cf. George 1984). What 
was of special interest about the brief reply from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office was its even briefer note on the employment of 
private security agencies abroad: 
"Abroad, guards have been obtained through one private firm 
(KMS Limited) to protect Ambassadors at a very few 
particularly exposed posts 
It is perhaps no surprise that KMS should be favoured by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. Many of their requirements in different 
parts of the world will probably call for highly trained security 
staff with a working familiarity with arms and with terrorism, 
insurgency, counter- insurgency and so on. According to Duncan 
Campbell's Special Report in Time Out of 21st July, 1978., KMS more 
than fit the bill (Campbell, 1978). The only element of surprise 
should perhaps be around the fact that, as with the rest of the 
private security sector there is no degree of control - other than 
contractual - over the 'top', specialised end of the private security 
market. 
Campbell described KMS as an "undercover mercenary recruiting 
organisation" with strong links with past and present members of the 
Special Air Service (SAS) engaged in "a private army service, 
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supplying bodyguards, troops and invasion parties to despotic rulers 
and other wealthy interests" (p. 7). Oddly,, Campbell's story notes 
that just earlier that same month of July the Foreign Office had 
repl ied to a Daily Mail Report - 'A Worldwide Exclusive' on 'The 
Bodyguards' - which claimed that private "hired armed bodyguards" were 
employed on a secret Foreign Office contract to protect British 
Ambassadors and other diplomatic staff abroad. The Foreign Office 
dismissed the story as largely untrue. This prompt response the very 
next day apparently suggested that: 
"No armed bodyguards are ever hired from private companies to 
protect Diplomatic Service staff - they are employed directly by either the British or the host governments. 
There were no such 'secret' contracts - only a 'normally budgeted' arrangement for a specialist British ccmpany to 
send visiting teams to a small handful of embassies to train 
locally-based staff in security practices. " 
(Campbell,, 1978: 11) 
To the Foreign Office's credit in answering a written Parliamentary 
question it does indeed make no secret of its contract with a 
specialist company - KMS - however,, its reply of August has KMS 
protecting Ambassadors, as opposed to training local staff. But what 
KMS real ly di d- or does -f or the Forei gn Of f ice is not the point 
here. The point is that KMS operates, recruits and trains in Britain, 
keeping its finances in Jersey and its contacts in London. 
Given the nature of the activities of KMS and agencies like them, it 
is doubtful that any system of licensing and regulation could control 
them without very strong powers and the ability to enforce them. For 
quite apart from the immorality of mercenary work abroad,, there is 
little to prevent such agencies offering their various services in the 
UK. And indeed some agencies do specialise in offering 'elite' 
bodyguard and protection services in the UK. Regulation and a system 
of accountability must therefore take very seriously the range of 
activities in the private security sector, as the following two 
sections also illustrate. 
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Bodyguards and Minders 
The spate of kidnappings in the late 1970s led to a boom in the 
bodyguard business. A NOW magazine report of 1979 claimed that: 
"Many potential 'targets' have their own full-time team of 
guards ... If a visiting millionaire wants to hire 
protection in London from a private company it costs him 110 
an hour f or each guard. ' For just two guards on duty 
through the working day he will have to pay a minimum of 1160 and that is a competitive price by general European 
standards, ' reports a former Special Branch officer who has 
retired into the protection business. " 
(Now,, 1979: 20) 
Certainly at the prestige end of the market the services of a company 
may get increasingly expensive but such agencies frequently boast of 
havi ng personnel who in the past have been senior pol ice or 
intelligence officers. One such company is Saladin Security, which 
includes among its directors Commander Rollo Watts, ex-Head of the 
Special Branch. According to the Now report, Watts describes Saladin 
as "an elite organisation which can't be matched. " 
"He lectures his recruits, many of them ex-SAS and Royal 
Marine Commandos, who keep fit by running up the seven 
flights of stairs leading to his Chelsea office, pointing 
out that we live in an age of violence, that violence breeds 
fear and that people need advice and guidance about 
protecting themselves. Where the need arises, there is a 
commercial response. " 
(Now, 1979: 23) 
Saladin's operations are also instructive in terms of private 
security's ambiguous relationship with firearms and the authority its 
personnel assume. Watts naturally emphasizes that what he calls 
'protection officers', must remember that their activities are limited 
by the 1 aw. However, as the Now report points out, 
"this comes hard to some of his recruits, many of whom have 
served in Ulster, where the army can stop suspects and 
search them and their cars. Although they may now be doing 
similar jobs they no longer have those extra-legal powers. " 
(p. 23) 
The use of firearms is legally proscribed but according to several 
informants is certainly informally condoned at this end of the market. 
As far as can be ascertained, no bodyguard agency in Britain has 
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personnel licensed to carry guns whilst operating in this country. 
Police guards for foreign statesmen may be armed, and by arrangement 
with the Home Office personal guards may also be authorised. S ome 
private f igures who may be at risk may be granted firearms 
certificates to carry a gun for their own protection. However, many 
agencies operate abroad with armed personnel who move around the 
company internationally. Even the 'ordinary' guarding companies (such 
as Securicor) arm their staff abroad., and many senior personnel are 
trained in arms use. Like many of the specialist agencies, Now 
reports that: 
"Saladin often send teams abroad to places where it is 
essential for them to be armed. A two-man team carries a 
mixture of weapons. One will have a 9mm. Browning pistol 
with a thirteen round magazine loaded and a twenty round 
magazine in his pocket. This is a weapon most of them will 
have used in the army and they feel comfortable with it. 
The other man will carry a Luger . 357 Magnum with a 2.75" barrel. The idea of this mix of weapons is that the man 
with the blockbusting Magnum can get off his six heavy 
bullets quickly and while he reloads his colleague can use 
his Browning with its greater ammunition supply to hold off 
the attacker. " 
(p. 23) 
Training is carried out in this country at the range run by gunsmiths, 
Holland and Holland. Agencies like Saladin are also prepared to act 
as initial consultants on a security 'problem' and carry through their 
service to the provision of guards, technology and a 'security plan' 
to minimise risk. 
Other specialist agencies, such as Zeus Security Consultants Limited, 
run principally by Peter Hamilton., act as advising "middle-men between 
potential targets and the companies who offer to protect them" (p. 
25). The Cititel offshoot of Consolidated Safeguards also offers 
advice on building security, vetting and industrial counter- espionage, 
calling in other specialist consultants in any areas where additional 
expertise is required. 
The activities of these agencies at the specialist, 'elite' end of the 
market are all but invisible. The task of an adequate licensing and 
regulation authority would be to bring them under public scrutiny - 
and control. 
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Down-Market - Strong-Arm Security 
There is not the space here to cover a wide range of examples of down- 
market dubious practices. However, some mention should be made of the 
kinds of activities which can and do routinely involve violence. 
Some security firms happily undertake work involving the eviction of 
squatters. Over the years numerous cases of this type of work have 
gained private security some notoriety in the media, although it is 
usually made clear that it tends to be the 'cowboy' type of agency 
that takes on such work. Less concern seems to have been demonstrated 
by the courts and the police however, even though many if not most of 
such evictions probably contravene Section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 
which makes it an offence "to use or threaten violence to secure entry 
into premises where another is present opposing your entry. " Somehow 
squatters seem exempt from the protection of the law, whilst private 
security, here as elsewhere, benefits from some purposefully turned 
'blind eyes'. 
The attitudes underpinning this kind of security work are neatly 
indicated by the office manager of Omega Security Services of North 
London, reported in Time Out in 1979., (16th-22nd February). 
"This is just one of the little services we do for clients - 
it's just a job ... We don't go in for crossing t's and dotti ng Vs so 1 ong as we know where to send the bil I... 
We're filling a vacuum in the security market. We're doing 
the sort of things Securicor wouldn't do - they're too 
establishment minded after all. " 
Evidently intrigued by the work of Omega Security, Time Out followed 
up their February report with a further one in March. This report 
highlighted how people with a perhaps dubious past can succeed in the 
security business without really trying. There is. after all , no test 
of integrity that needs to be passed. In Omega's case the head of the 
security guards was known as Barry Evans, an alias for Roger Gleaves, 
the former self-styled Bishop of Medway, "who was jailed for four 
years in 1975 after a television documentary 'Johnny Go Home' , claimed 
he corrupted young boys in hostels run by him. " Gleaves subsequently 
served less than half his sentence and has been attempting to prove 
his innocence. 
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The point with regard to the running of a security firm is not whether 
or not Gleaves was innocent of what he was accused and convictEd of. 
It is that there is no control over or means of officially checking on 
the bona-fides of those who run private security firms. Perhaps the 
use of an alias may not in itself necessarily arouse concern - though 
many clients and the general public might have been alarmed if the 
Kray brothers had gone 'legitimate'. changed their names and set up in 
the security business. What should be of serious concern is that this 
issue is simply a small part of the consequences of who can run a 
security firm and what they can offer as services. 
Omega, for example. sent out standard solicitations for business 
offering to remove 'anti-social parasites' (i. e. squatters) from 
property: 
"Instead of wasting weeks or months in getting trespassers 
evicted, why not call us in to act on your behalf. We act 
strictly within the requirements of the Law (although we pay 
no attention to the 'rights' that are claimed but have no 
foundation in law) ... we find that once our Repossession Officer and his staff, accompanied by the owner of the 
premises or his legal representative arrive at the 
house ... then the peopl e soon decide it would be more 
advantageous to them to reside elsewhere. " 
(Time Out, 16-22 March, 1979) 
What is being sold here is not security but 'repossession' of property 
by use of threat and physical force. Perhaps such services are 
carried out within the (vague) letter of the law. But the approach 
and attitude of this a nd similar security firms is surely disturbing - 
and the conclusion must be that the (vague) letter of the law in this, 
and other areas where security services are offered, demands some 
amendment. 
Of course, threat and physical force are resources in the world of 
security - not in the respectable, "establishment minded" world of 
Securicor, Group 4 and their 1i ke - but at the up-market end of the 
military-trained bodyguard and, also., at the downmarket end of the 
I gym-trained' bouncer. The case of the death of Henry Bowles in 
November, 1978 brought some attention to the frequent circumstances in 
which bouncers employed in pubs and clubs use considerably more than 
what might be regarded in law as 'reasonable force' to evict people 
from premises. 
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After a firework was let off in a Kings Cross pub, Bowles was pointed 
out to the bouncers as the person responsible. He was physically 
removed and thrown out, despite protestations. As Time Out reported, 
outside he was then "kicked and punched unconscious. He died in 
hospital on 4th November, a fortnight later, without regaining 
consciousness. " (Time Out, 8-14th December, 1978). The subsequent 
court case at the Old Bailey found one of the pub's 18 a night 
bouncers guilty of manslaughter and another guilty of common assault. 
The case did little to bring the casual employment of private strong- 
arm security under the scrutiny of the law., law-makers or public. It 
did establish that bouncers are entitled to use reasonable force in 
removing people from a place, though as the judge said in summing up, 
"once the customer has been ejected, the license to use reasonable 
force ceases because the object allowed for by the law has been 
attained. " 
Subsequently, Bowles' brother, Matthew, started a campaign - CURB - to 
draw attention to a variety of cases where bouncers had been 
responsible for carrying out serious assaults, some of which (in 
Scotland., Liverpool , St. Helens and London in 1978 alone) led to 
deaths. CURB sought to introduce some form of licensing or 
registration for bouncers as part of, or alongside proposals from 
Bruce George., MP (and others) for regulation of a broad range of 
security-related occupations. However, even without association with 
this broader campaign, Matthew Bowles had two particularly sound 
points to make. First he had I ost a brother as a result of wholly 
unnecessary violence; secondly, as he pointed out to the BBC's Tonight 
programme (12th March, 1979), if his wife who worked as a child-minder 
had to be registered he felt there was undoubtedly a case to be made 
for some similar scrutiny of those who could be employed as bouncers. 
It is unlikely that even the Home Office would be re-assured by the 
statements of the bouncers interviewed in the Tonight programme - 
"We never made it as boxers or wrestlers, but we are trained 
men, " said one interviewed 'working out' in a South London 
club. 
Or,, in response to the leading question: 
Question: 'Do you see yourself as a public service? ' 
Answer: 'I bloody well do! ' 
But,, nonetheless, bouncers like bodyguards, specialist agencies, shady 
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agencies and the respectable establishment-minded companies, did not 
become, and are not now, a source of concern to the Home Office. 
Despite the range of activities across the breadth of the private 
security sector and the serious issues these raise, lack of control, 
accountability or even scrutiny is not a popular item on the agenda at 
the Home Office. 1 
'Insider Crimes and Fraudulent Practices2 
"All we are saying here is that the constraints of the rule 
of law, while accepted by the security industry, do not have 
the same inexorable and sometimes ironic centrality to its 
activity as in the case of the pol ice. Hence, there is at 
least a greater potential for those constraints to be set 
aside in the course of activities based on entrepreneurial 
enterprise .e *11 
(Carson and Young, 1976: 48) 
The conventionally recognised significance of private security sees 
its activities as related to the protection of property and the 
prevention of crime. However,, such significance can be double-edged, 
f or cl early - to any but the nai ve or wi 1f ul ly bl i nkered -s uc h ta sk s 
can gi ve ri se to as eri es of ci rcums tances and contradi cti ons 
conducive to their possible corruption. In this section I can only 
give some selected examples of the consequences of petty and 
substantial corruption of trust and ethics in the private security 
business (but see South, 1983), It is admittedly unlikely that 
licensing and regulations alone would eradicate all these problems. 
But, on the other hand, a wholly unregulated private security sector 
is certainly inviting abuse. 
As Draper (1978) argues, one of the principal reasons why there should 
be concern about private security is that 'their work by its very 
nature provides for access to industrial premises, cash and high-value 
goods, and confidential information' (Draper, 1978: 11). Draper's 
argument is well-illustrated by the experience of the ill-starred 
Purolator Security Company, which lost out in two major thefts, on 
both sides of the Atlantic, within two years of each other and both 
the result of 'inside information'. In October, 1974 its Chicago 
vault and highly sophisticated alarm systems were breached -a former 
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guard was part of the break-in team. Less than two years later 
Purolator was hit by an even more audacious insider-job, this time at 
London's Heathrow Airport. In June 1976 two men presented themselves 
as Purolator Couriers at airport vaults where $3.5 million in various 
currencies were awaiting collection by representatives of the agency. 
Having produced the necessary papers and authorisation., the couriers 
left with the currency in an armoured van. The comfortable ease of 
such secure routine was rudely disturbed when., two days later., two 
more Purolator guards arrived to transport the money. This time they 
were the real guards. Neither the company nor the police were slow to 
realise that such 'secure routine' is in general 'secure' but to an 
insider, it is also 'routine' - and therein lies its vulnerability. 
As the most desirable insiders imaginable in the perpetration of a 
neat crime, 'the protectors' themselves are prime targets for 
corruption. Intriguingly, this seems a source of concern across a 
fair range of opinion. A recent article in Police Review considered 
the nature of 'confrontation and co-operation' between the police and 
private security (Kerr, 1979) and observed that, while the 
"apparently inadequate set of safeguards had proved pretty 
effective so far ... there are (firms) who have no declared allegiance to any code of ethics or practice. In 
1974, Sir Douglas Osmond., then Chief Constable of Hampshire, 
speaking at a fire and security conference said: 'Some three 
years ago, in one police region alone, no less than 69 
persons with criminal records were identified as working as 
patrol guards. '" 
In 1982, the Daily Mirror (10th August, 1982: 6) reiterated its concern 
shared at various times by the press of all political shades3 - that 
*e. crooks are setting up their own security companies to help 
them pull off robberies from the inside - and possibly to make 
industrial espionage easier. ' The same report expressed the concern 
of Derek Hunter, regional officer of the then General and Municipal 
Workers Union, who stated that 'we know of men who walk out of an 
employment exchange in the morning and are on duty in security guard 
uniform in the evening. ' It seems reasonable to assume here that GMWU 
is not objecting to people finding a job within a day but rather to 
the impossibility of checking references or providing adequate 
training or briefing within a day. Both the GMWU and 'the Independent 
Low Pay Unit are pressing the Government to introduce licensing for 
the security industry'. (Daily Mirror, 10th August, 1982: 6) 
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The concern of the Low Pay Unit is, and has been for some years, the 
low levels of pay in private security; presumably in the context of 
the Mirror report this concern reflects the suspicion that low pay for 
a job giving access to other people's property leads to temptation. 
Even the supposed 'rotten apples' who provoke this unifying moral 
horror seem to agree with such a proposition: "One guard asked to be 
taken off a cash run because he had a convi cti on and had been jail ed 
for robbing a security vehicle, " added Mr. Hunter (ibid. ). 
Some of these points are also recognized by various representatives of 
the private security sector. However, such recognition is usually to 
be found in the arguments that they have continued to put forward in 
campaigning for exemption from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act, 1975, concerning the law against disclosure of certain 
past criminal offences. While maintaining agreement with the fair and 
laudable principles of the Act, aspects of the argument for exemption 
maintain that it is unfair and a misjudgement to allow ex-offenders to 
be employed in the private security sector: unfair to customers and 
unfair to ex-offenders faced with the temptation. 
At a potentially more costly level of the 'insider problem' the 
easing of industrial espionage mentioned in the Mirror report the 
private security sector is less concerned with such charitable 
understanding and more with the weakness of available legal recourse. 
The British Corruption Act, 1906, provides one of the very few legal 
bases for attempting to secure prosecution against in-house industrial 
espionage. Insider industrial espionage perpetrated by an employee is 
usually untouchable as trespass and if information is copied rather 
than being stolen in the form of tangible documentation, then there is 
no crime of theft (cf. Draper, 1978: 112). However, 'if the company 
can show that the source of the leak was a bribed employee ... the 
British Corruption Act 1906 provides for a maximum penaly of 1500 fine 
and/or imprisonment for two years. ' Trespass or breach of contract 
remain the principal grounds for legal prosecution in cases of 
industrial spying, though prosecutions have been brought employing the 
breadth of conspiracy law, successfully as 'conspiracy to obtain 
confidential information by corrupt and other unlawful means', and 
unsuccessfully as 'conspiracy to defraud' (Draper, 1978: 112). 
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It is undeniably the case that forms of criminal infiltration and 
corruption are well-evidenced in various areas of the private security 
sector, and fairly liberally sprinkled throughout even its more 
creditable and reputable representatives. As it is principally from 
these 'reputable representatives' that the shocked and morally 
offended demand for official blessing of self-regulation comes, it is 
not surprising that their elitist vantage point leads them to attempt 
to preserve a case for the integrity of the 'profession' of security. 
The result is reliance on the old 'rotten apple theory'. This is the 
explanation invariably trotted out in most conventional discussions of 
police corruption, and is indeed best summed up in the report of the 
Knapp Commission (1972) on police corruption in New York: 
"According to this theory, which bordered on official 
department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must 
promptly be denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise 
clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his otherwise 
individual corruption may be symptomatic of an underlying 
disease. " 
Given the peculiar and anomalous sense in which private 
security/investigator work can be one of the 'fiddle-prone' 
occupations par excellence (especially given the almost universal 
levels of low pay and low standards of qualification, training and 
incentive), then the confinement of criminal activity to the single 
individual who realises that they are 'on to a good way of making a 
bit (or lot) extra' seems a doubtful proposition. The general 
acceptance of the rotten apple theory, however, functions in a not 
dissimilar way for the private security sector as for the police, as 
an attempt to preserve the public image of the private security sector 
as a whole (and, by association, the integrity of our 'guardians' in 
general). 
Competition, Cutting Corners and Sharp Practice 
The private security sector is heavily competitive. However, there is 
not the space here to consider the consequences of this across the 
full range of its activities; instead I can only offer examples of 
deception and cost-cutting within the largest and most visible area of 
private security, that of provision of guarding services (cf. Chapter 
2). 
207 
Few business concerns are interested in personally involving their own 
management in the supervision of safety of their premises and property 
outside of normal working hours and are content to leave such matters 
to the police and private security. Hence, opportunities for 
(literal) short-service are numerous and are fully exploited by some 
companies. Some customers will pay for all-night guards, who leave 
the premises as soon as they are deserted and return shortly before 
work commences the following day. Visiting patrol services often have 
such long lists of calls that they are physically impossible to 
fulfil. On one occasion, one of the directors of a firm in my own 
research interviews had a case of a guard from a competing company 
offering a job to one of his staff, saying 'you come on at six, you go 
home at eight, and you get paid for four hours' ; the contract to the 
company was actually for eight hours' guarding. Obviously, such 
arrangements increase profits for the company, keep wages low, and 
enable cut-rate charges to be offered to the firms employing the 
company, obviously an asset in under-cutting private security agencies 
who genuinely try to fulfil the terms and obligations of their 
contracts. 
The prevalence of cost-cutting practices is substantially dependent 
on, and partially the reason for, the employment in private security 
of an abnormally high proportion of part-time and casual staff. 
Moonlighting from another job or taking on this kind of part-time work 
while formally unemployed are common in private security and employers 
knowingly exploit this. Unrecorded work and unrecorded payment are 
familiar in certain areas of the private security business, and 
obviously, for the firms themselves, employing on this basis produces 
considerable savings of outlay on insurance and pension contributions 
etc. ,a 11 owi ng a1 owe r tax- f ree rate of pay and 
1 ower charges in the 
under-cutting of competition. 
In this section I have only had the space to cover some of the areas 
of petty and serious malpractice and so on. However, if there is any 
validity in applying the 'tip of the iceberg' metaphor to private 
security then the little that is known about 'insider crime' and 
fraudulent practice throughout the private security sector can be seen 
to offer substantial further evidence of the need for some form of 
regulation and scruting. 
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Some Civil Liberties Issues: Intruding on Privacy; Powers of Detention; Fr-ivate Networks 
Of the advanced western societies Britain has consistently been the 
most grossly negligent in promoting the legal protection of 
individuals with regard to the personal information that can be 
gathered about them and the use made of such information. This state 
of affairs has been of strong concern to a wide variety of parties for 
many years but government action under any administration has been 
virtually non-existent. 
In an interview with Jane Walmsley of Capital Radio (20th May, 1979 - 
tape supplied to author), Patricia Hewitt, then General Secretary of 
NCCL remarked on the absence or inadequacies of laws governing such 
information gathering and cited in particular agencies like credit 
reference companies, one of which she gave as an example illustrating 
how information is collected on a large scale by the illegal 
impersonation of police officers and DHSS and tax officials. 
The lack of effective controls over the ways in which information can 
be gathered was made notoriously clear in the Malone telephone tapping 
case of 1978. Here the judge was moved to comment that not only were 
there no effective controls over police telephone tapping (because 
with a warrant from the Home Secretary the police can tap telephones 
perfectly legally), but there are also no effective sanctions against 
the private individual resorting to telephone tapping. In this regard 
Britain does not yet meet the requirements of the European Human 
Rights Convention on the right of the individual to privacy. Recent 
government proposals may remedy this, but the reasons for any such 
move seem a compl ex tale of Westminster, Whitehall and Euro-politics 
rather than any simple recognition of human rights. Fol 1 owi ng 
pressures from Alliance and Labour peers to add amendments to the 1985 
Telecommunications Bill covering this issue, the Government announced 
a limited 
_Interception 
of Communications Bill in the Queen's Speech of 
6th November, 1984 (Guardian). Specific rules may be formulated but 
the gesture is cosmetic. Certainly the electronic surveillance 
activities of private agencies seem to fall outside the offence of 
interception (Hilliard, 1985). 
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In the meantime the f ami 1i ar overlap of the publ ic and the private 
spheres finds this a particularly fruitful area for commercial 
compromise. As the Sunday Times (10th February, 1980) reported on its 
front page: 
"Army officers in Ulster, frustrated by official restrictions 
placed on telephone tapping, have been buying their own 
personal tapping equipment so they can carry on their 
activities unhindered by the law. A Sunday Times 
investigation shows that the officers are among a rapidly 
expanding number of clients using private security firms to 
tap telephones. Other targets for private tapping have 
included: 
- political activists in a key constituency; 
- employees suspected by their employers of theft. " 
Numerous examples of such practices could be cited - as they have been 
many times before. But there is still no political wedge to drive 
home in pushing for 1 egislation on this issue - and it is a political 
wedge that is needed. As the High Court judge, Sir Robert Megarry 
noted in 1979, there is nothing in law that prevents telephone-tapping 
and the subject "cries out" for legislation, "this is a matter for 
Parl iament and not the courts to put right. " Parliamentary 
legislation to regulate the activities of the private security sector 
might provide an appropriate political wedge to open up this issue to 
proper Parliamentary scrutiny and action. Current Home office 
proposals in this area are by no means specific (in the Interception. 
of Communications Bill for example), about the activities of private 
agencies and individuals (cf. Hilliard, 1985). 
Private security also services the publ ic social control agencies in 
other direct and only slightly less legally dubious relationships. 
These too deserve serious examination. 
In 1983 an Observer (27th March, 1983: 3) story., 'Anger at Securicor 
Guard on Migrants' , noted that 
"the use of Securicor ... to guard 
and escort immigrants is being examined by the Commission for Racial 
Equality .. ."A number of MPs and civil rights and 
immigrant 
welfare organisations have expressed concern over the f250,000 per 
annum contract that Securicor holds from the Home Office to guard 
suspected illegal immigrants and escort them as they are moved about 
for detention and questioning. 
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The legal position occupied by Securicor here certainly needs to be 
clarified. In the Observer story., "Larry Grant, a lawyer and member 
of the National Council for Civil Liberties, pointed out that 
Securicor's legal position was curious. 'They have only thE power of 
an ordinary citizen making an arrest. '" Physical force can only be 
used for self-protection according to the relevant Home Office rules 
covering Securicor's work on this contract. This makes it difficult 
to understand how Securicor can detain those who are unwilling to 
submit to detention. This is not a problem of powers available at 
most other ports of transit in Britain. Securicor only operates at 
Heathrow, Gatwick and Harmondsworth, whilst at other ports, official 
policing bodies have generally been responsible for performing such 
duties. It is odd then that the Home Office justifies the use of 
Securicor on the grounds that they "considered that the use of police 
to control people who were not criminals would be too oppressive and 
because it was felt that immigration officers, who are civil servants, 
could not be asked to perform such tasks. " (observer, 27th March, p. 
3) 
The real point of the story however is that it is not new. It shortly 
blew over as it has donemany times in the past. In 1970 (28th 
August), Police Review, carried a report attempting to clarify where 
the Home Secretary (then Reginald Maudling) derived his authority for 
employing Securicor at Heathrow and other airports. A Home Office 
representative was, at that time, apparently only able to quote 
Section 13 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, as authority: 
"Any person required or authorised to be detained under this 
Act may be detained in such places as the Secretary of State 
may direct. " 
However, as Police Review commented, 
11wh ether Parl i ament ever i ntended to permit 'private gaol s' 
is unlikely because nowhere in the Act does it confer powers 
of detention on anyone other than an immigration officer or 
a constable. " 
However, in the Summer of 1973 the Protection of Aircraft Act was 
introduced to comply with the provisions of the international Montreal 
Convention on hijacking and aircraft safety (Bunyan., 1971: 244). The 
Act was passed, with minimal consultation with interested parties by 
both Houses without a division. As in other cases concerning the 
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anomalous nature of private security the unconsulted opposition to 
certain provisions of the Act were a strange alliance. NCCL and 
several Labour MPs spoke out and so too did Reg Gale,, chairman of the 
Police Federation, objecting to the powers extended by the Act to 
private security to search and detain airline passengers, and 
ultimately, some feared, to bear arms. Under the Act the Secretary of 
State can require airport management to provide sufficient and 
adequate personnel for searches of site., aircraft and persons. Such 
personnel need not be police officers and under a (deliberately? ) 
general description in the Directive private security can clearly be 
used. The Act now provides a firmer legal basis for the state's 
commercial compromise in the employment of private security staff in 
roles fulfilling public security and public immigration service 
functions. As the Daily Telegraph (October, 1977) noted, the work 
that Securicor undertakes 'for' the Immigration Service comes out of 
the budget allocated to that public service. 
Thus the issues raised in 1983 about this private immigration service 
have long been around and have not gone away. But they have once 
again been generally forgotten. Legislation should clarify the legal 
position of private security generally and as a privatised department 
of the Immigration Service! 
Private Security and the Police: Links and Networks 
The cross-over of roles and blurring of boundaries is also acutely 
evident when we consider the nature of the networks that exist, 
transcending the public and private services. 4 
The euphemism of the 'ol d-boys network' is a common and cosy 
metaphorical way of side-stepping issues that can often touch upon the 
corrupt abuse of personal position and privilege. Of direct concern 
here is the passage of information between private and official 
channels of information: the unchecked 'co-operation' between private 
and public sector - from local private security agencies feeding 
I observations' and 'hearsay' to the police at local collator level, 
through checks run through police criminal records as favours to ex- 
policemen now in the private security sector, to other outcomes of the 
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familiar pattern of cross-over employment from the police and military 
to private security. All of this constitutes a significant system of 
violation of the security of personal and official information. The 
existence of the old-boys network also confirms the like-minded world- 
view shared by police, military and private security personnel. 
As noted above this can contribute to the former seeking the 
assistance of the latter in the circumvention of certain rules (for 
example over telephone tapping). The up-market end of the private 
security sector, dealing in commercial intelligence and industrial 
espionage, also utilises the advantages of cross-over employment and 
old contacts and in many cases has some considerable disregard for 
either the ethics of the profession or the laws of the land, or both 
(although in some cases, such as computer privacy or telephone 
tappi ng, ef fective 1 aws do not Yet exi st) . 
The link between private security and the police at local collator 
level is of obvious mutual and reciprocal advantage where the police 
can help out with the vetting of prospective employees, and anyone 
else of interest, in return for the security companies' own local 
information gathering. Obviously, such arrangements largely depend 
upon the willingness of the police to co-operate and indeed they 
rarely co-operate with very small, inefficient or particularly dubious 
agencies. Despite the fact that a small firm need not necessarily be 
justifiably regarded as dubious, nevertheless it could be denied this 
sort of co-operation, which simply means that in many cases (for there 
are many small firms) the claimed vetting procedures for hiring staff 
are either ineffective or non-existent. In the 'big league'. however, 
as long ago as March 1971,, J. Philip Sorenson, managing director of 
Group 4. acknowl edged to The Times that 'there is no doubt that there 
is an old-boy network which helps us to discover whether a man has a 
criminal record. ' 
As Stenning and Shearing (1980, (a)) observe with regard to the Home 
Office Discussion Paper on Private Security (1979): 
213 
"No one who has any familiarity with the world of private 
security could take seriously the Paper's claim that what is 
involved in this regard is really no more than an 'occasional transgression' (para. 67), of confidentiality 
rules by the police,, and on this issue the credibility of 
the Paper's authors is sorely strained. The fact that 
widespread practices of this kind are hard to prove - and 
security officials, being the kind of people they are, go to 
great I engths to ensure that they wi 11 be hard to prove - is 
no justification for ignoring their existence and the 
important implications for public policy to which they give 
ri s e" 
265). 
Public policy and clear legislation must address the implications of 
this system of frequent transgression of confidentiality and abuse of 
pri vi I ege. 
2. The Current State of Self-Requlation in the Private Securi 
ector 
The British Security Industry Association 
The BSIA was formed in 1967 by eight of the major firms in private 
security. The idea was to create some sort of pressure group to 
generate an image of responsibility and integrity for the industry and 
to bring to bear on the government and, in particular, the Home 
Office, some pressure to recognise the industry as a force to be 
treated seriously in the field of crime prevention. 5 
The Association makes much of the fact that it represents between 75- 
90% (even BSIA estimates have varied) of the trade of the main areas 
of private security, by annual turnover. It is however difficult to 
obtain any certain figures to support such a claim and certainly by 
the estimate of the Di rector General ,J ohn Wheel er, af ter a survey 
that he conducted in 1978., there were then at least three hundred 
small to medium-sized firms outside the BSIA. 
The aims and activities of the association as laid out in their 
introductory brochure are of course highly laudable: 
"The Association was formed to give the maximum possible 
assistance to the public, the police and the government in 
the prevention of crime and to promote and encourage high 
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standards of ethics, service and equipment throughout the 
security industry. Other aims include the promotion of more 
public awareness of the importance and value of good 
security and the provision of a negotiating body to meet 
government, insurance and police representatives and indeed 
any other bodies interested in crime prevention. " 
Until very recently, with the appointment of one Inspector General in 
1982, the BSIA has been a one man and his secretary operation, 
although a great deal of effort is put into suggesting that it is 
quite a complex and high-powered organisation. Their brochure 
suggests that the Director General of the Association is the focal 
point of communication with the Association of Chief Police Officers, 
the British Insurance Association, the Association of Burglary 
Insurance Surveyors, the Post Office, Government departments, 
Parliament, the EEC and various other bodies. What is certainly the 
case and of interest, is that the Director General does represent the 
industry on the Home Office Standing Committee on Crime Prevention and 
the sub-committee dealing with mobile property. Representatives serve 
on other committees and working parties concerned with technical 
aspects of security and crime prevention. There is then, indeed, a 
considerable degree of liaison between the Home Office, the civil 
policing network and the security industry but this neither warrants 
the BSIA's sel f- importance, nor many of the claims it makes for its 
effectiveness. 
According to the rul es laid down, the criteria for joining the BSIA 
are quite stringent. The application form for membership, an 
undertaking which prospective members must sign, indeed reads most 
impressively. However, there are sections in the form relating to 
methods and periods of screening of employees and to training which 
are essentially hollow as the Association has no effective means of 
checking the veracity of what is entered on the form. The BSIA 
nonetheless remains confident of its ability to regulate its members 
and hence a large section of the industry. It therefore looks upon 
its 'rival', the International Professional Security Association with 
its membership of individuals working in private security, as very 
much a poor relation - if any kin at all. Wheeler and the BSIA have 
on the other hand been quite enthusiastic about the degree of dialogue 
between their Association and Whitehall, especially on matters of 
training, licensing and safety, costing and efficiency standards. 
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At the same time, the BSIA has generally been quite uncomfortable 
about admissions by some senior figures in the security world that the 
extent of use of channels of dialogue includes gaining access to 
privileged information, particularly in vetting prospective employees. 
The BSIA grudgingly acknowledge that such practices may indeed be 'a 
fact of life', but as John Wheeler added in my interview with him: 
"we wi sh it coul d be otherwi se and 1 ook forward to a time 
when proper ... procedures will make some of the Criminal Records Office data available to us, in some form. " 
Such 'hopes'., typically unclear about the mechanisms or guarantees of 
accountability to be involved,, are only understandable when placed in 
the context of the BSIA's concern for its self-survival and its claim 
that with stronger backing from the Home Office it could be an 
effective self-regulation body. 
The BSIA certainly agrees that there are undoubtedly abuses within the 
security business and that some form of control and accountability is 
desi rabl e. Criminal infiltration and unwelcome elements, especially 
in the more marginal, speciality sectors - providing for example 
politically sensitive services like personnel and surveillance can, 
from the point of view of the BSIA., bring the steady and stable image 
of security into disrepute and jeopardy. Indeed the security 
constituency that the BSIA represents strives very hard to stabilise 
its potentially rocky boat. This is especially so in its 
accommodation of trade unionism. 
Unionisation has sl owly, but in recent years more surely, begun to 
take a hold within the major security companies. As described 
earlier,, MATSA in particular has organised in several of the larger 
companies and ASTMS have also moved into the managerial grades of some 
companies. Both operate closed-shops and have been willing to 
accommodate themselves to the structure of the companies and their 
I need' for vetted personnel. They nonetheless remain vocal in their 
support for measures which could lead to improved conditions for their 
members and hence would favour licensing and regulation where this 
could serve as a means to improve levels of pay, benefits, status and 
so on. 
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Perhaps, unsurprisingly, John Wheeler and the BSIA have found it 
difficult to completely conceal their anti-union sentiments and 
suggested to me that the trade-unions have been "opportunistic in 
tapping what is a resource of independently-minded people, " in other 
words, somehow taking advantage of them. It is not difficult for the 
BSIA to suggest that it already demands high standards or that it 
encourages a minimum wage on which to build. But at present there is 
little incentive to meet high standards and the minimum wages that 
have been prevalent throughout the industry have been indeed that - 
the minimum. 
Obviously,, the key issue for the BSIA with regard to their status as 
legitimately - and powerfully - representative of private security 
companies is whether they can deliver an effective system of self- 
regulation or whether some form of public licensing and regulation 
takes over. In general, but with some inconsistency over time, the 
BSIA has been highly sceptical of various proposals for licensing 
measures. In my interview with Mr. Wheeler (and recurring in 
subsequent BSIA statements and press releases) the familiar problem of 
how to re-negotiate the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act has been emphasized.,, and indeed Mr. Wheeler suggested that such a 
"great amount of consideration" and negotiation would have to be 
"given over to this problem" that it almost wasn't worth starting on 
the process. Although in more recent years the BSIA's position seems 
to have been moving to a position more receptive to some ideas about 
licensing - (after all under favourable arrangements the large 
companies could benefit strongly) it seems unlikely that there have 
been any fundamental changes in its early guiding inclinations. 
Probably one of the most substantial criticisms which Mr. Wheeler and 
the BSIA have been able to level against the pro-licensing proposals 
has been that there would 'surely be problems with the extended 
bureaucracy which would be required, for the regulatory board would be 
unlikely to have sufficient staff to justify in practice setting high 
standards for the granting of licenses which it would then be unable 
to inspect and police' (quoted not verbatim: taken from notes of 
interview, 20th April, 1978). Mr. Wheeler, not wholly unreasonably, 
contended that the inevitable outcome of this practical dilemma would 
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be that the standards and requirements set by the board would tend to 
be 1 ow enough f or iu st about al 1fi rms to f ul f il them and gai n thei r 
I icense. This seems a slightly extreme caricature insofar as there 
would at least be legislatively embodied minimum standards and 
requirements to fulfil so some positive contribution would still 
emerge, even from such a bleak scenario. The criticism really 
highlights the BSIA's reservations about any form of statutory 
intervention, for the market leaders would remain in their positions 
of dominance and respectability but with added government bestowed 
'status' - at least within this 'weak' licensing vision. The fear 
then is probably of enforceable minimum standards being the 'thin end 
of the wedge'. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the 
criticism - as addressed to such an under-resourced regulatory board - 
is not without foundation. For example, in the USA,, Scott and 
McPherson's (1971) study of licensing in Minnesota found that: 
"The licensing agent (the State Crime Bureau and Director of 
Public Safety) feels that present statutes, court 
interpretations and shortage of manpower for enforcement 
(one part-time crime bureau staff person, has total 
responsibility for private police licensing and regulation) 
restricts its discretion in granting or denying a license 
and in regulating activity once a license is granted. 
Indeed the operative Attorney General opinion requires that 
every applicant fulfilling the minimum requirements must be 
granted a license. " 
(p. 274) 
It remains unclear whether any licensing and regulation arrangements 
in the UK would benefit most from local accountability and knowledge 
or perhaps from some of the strengths to be obtained from centralised 
coordination and inspection. However, the possibility of a process of 
the bureaucratic reduction of licensing requirements to the lowest 
common denominator of standards occurring is not a remote one. 
It can be argued inf act th at a1i cen si ng programme woul d requ i re a 
flexibility of standards. Fi xed 1 egi sl ati on woul d obvi ously 1 imit 
such flexibility as was necessitated by the very momentum of private 
security's expansion. The standards and operational potential, as 
well as the activities of companies and arenas of activity within the 




Of course they are not always necessarily changing quite as the BSIA 
would hope. John Wheeler and the BSIA agree that the pre-war liberal 
interpretation of where police could or should patrol changed after 
the Second World War and led to an increasing division of policing 
labour, and clearly they feel that they could play a fuller part in 
these changed circumstances. For example, it came as a disappointment 
to some in the industry when a Home Office working party recommended 
that security employees should not be allowed the status of Special 
Constables. The failure to be granted such responsible recognition 
and special status by Whitehall and the Home Office still causes some 
irritation. 
In an article in Security Gazette in 1977 (October, p. 325) , John 
Wheel er concl uded that: 
11 essentially the central problem of insuring public 
confidence in the security industry is the question of 
vetting. If that could be dealt with separately from the 
more complex matter of licensing and standards we might 
achieve a rapid advance to the benefit of all. " 
What Mr. Wheeler and the BSIA hoped for at this stage,, and perhaps do 
again today,, is a resuscitation of the mood of optimism which followed 
the formation of the BSIA, when it was hoped that the respectability 
of private security woul d be assured by what came to be seen as a 
'dialogue' between its respectable representatives and Whitehall. 
Such a dialogue it was hoped would mean respectability, retention of 
self-control and rejection of licensing. 
In the event the persisting dialogue has been remarkably low-key; the 
BSIA has Home Office recognition if no particularly explicit blessing, 
it still has its limited self-control over its own members and there 
is still no real prospect of a licensing authority being set up. On 
the other hand, the BSIA has not really gained anything and its 
critics can still make many valid and telling points against it. In 
the mid 1980s the BSIA seems a little unclear about its role; 
unsurprisingly., not for the first time. 
In 1982 a report in the Home Office publication Crime Prevention News 
announced - 'Security Industry Acts'. Within the same week 
both the 
BSIA and the IPSA had announced " that they were taking steps to 
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improve the standards of the security industry" (p. 3) . The BSIA 
announced a more rigorous pre-employment screening system and the 
appointment of an Inspector-General to "ensure that published 
standards were maintained. " IPSA introduced a detailed set of 
standards for its members in an Ethical Code of Conduct, which it 
hoped would offer a yardstick for the industry. The report concluded 
that "Both moves were warmly welcomed by the Government, which has 
encouraged self-regulation within the industry. " 
It is too early to say what impact these measures may have made but it 
is not inappropriate to ask whether they could, genuinely, make any 
substantial impact. Despite the assurances of the BSIA that it is, 
and can improve as, an effective watchdog and disciplinary body, it 
must still lack the legal teeth which an indpendent adjudicating 
inspectorate might have in order to enforce its decisions. Neither 
the BSIA nor its new Inspectorate are independent bodies and they 
could not therefore usefully be vested with such powers. Similar 
points are acknowledged even by members of the BSIA's inner circle. 
As Peter Smith, Managing Director of the Securicor group and chair of 
the BSIA policy committee has said; for 
"a professional body ... to try an issue which may I ead to 
expulsion of a member, the courts have always held that the 
professional body., since it is acting in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, must conform in all respects 'to the rules of 
natural justice' ... It follows that., were they to try an issue potentially involving a later claim for damages, the 
Association's 'disciplinary committee' would have to be 
prepared to bring to the sifting of evidence, and to the 
deciding of issues of fact and law, all the skills, 
procedural and otherwise, which a competent judicial body 
would be expected to have, and to make available the 
necessary time required. Plainly this will generally be 
impractical ." 
(Smith, 1975: 382-3) 
The real impracticality however resides in the nature of the existing 
ineffectuality and partiality of self-regulation. 
It should not be thought however that Smith advocates an alternative 
system. Rather he has eloquently argued the case against the need for 
increased regulation and monitoring. For example, a common concern 
raised by critics is that bogus security companies are frequently able 
to defraud customers buying their services in good faith. Smith 
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argues that this presupposes a naivety on the part of business 
managers which is simply wrong. Successful businesses check thE 
suppliers of their services through their bankers, the Company's 
registry and, especially in the case of security services, they will 
usually require evidence of insurance cover. This sounds rather more 
like an account of how Smith wishes employing companies would act, for 
it remains the case that there have been, still are and will doubtless 
continue to be, security firms which defraud their clients, albeit to 
varying degrees and with varying degrees of impunity. 
Most of the pro-licensing lobby also points to 'criminal infiltration' 
of other, otherwise respectable companies and argues that regulation 
with access to criminal records would allow for a thorough screening 
out of would-be 'infiltrators'. Smith 's response is 
characteristically concerned with a sense of "moral fibre" which the 
absence of a criminal record will still tell the security company 
nothing about: the likelihood of succumbing to temptation., 
"Likely sobriety., reliability as a time-keeper, amenability 
to discipline or general maturity and stability as an 
individual. " 
(Smith, 1979: 29) 
It is as likely, argue Smith and the BSIA, that an individual 's record 
of previous employment for the past twenty years or back to school 
leaving will provide an indication of character and 'suitability' for 
s ecu ri ty empl oyment. But the real stumbling bl. ock for even this 
reference only system is again the provisions of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act, 1974. 
The central principle of the Act,, as relevant here, allows for 
convictions for offences which have resulted in sentences of up to two 
and a half years for imprisonment to be 'ignored' if the offender 
successfully stays out of further trouble for a specified period of 
time after the original conviction, determined according to a sliding 
scal e. Such a 'spent' conviction can then be ignored by applicants 
and past-employers for the purposes of giving references. This i s, to 
the security companies, an absurd situation. Smith points out for 
example,, that in relation to a probation order, the rehabilitation 
period can be just one year from the date of conviction or the date of 
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the expiry of the probation order,, whichever is the later. "So it 
would appear, " observes Smith: 
"that an individual convicted of theft and put on probation for twelve months can apply for security employment the day 
after his probation order expires and can entirely conceal 
the fact of his conviction from a prospective employer. " 
(Smith, 1979: 30) 
Whilst in the main the pro-licensing lobby - including the National 
Council for Civil Liberties - would support the exemption of private 
security from the working of the Act if this was accompanied by 
statutory registration and regulation, the representatives of private 
security principally call for exemption from the Act as another aid to 
putting their own house in order without considering how they could 
ensure that such a provision could be used effectively, fairly and 
with due regard for civil liberties and personal privacy throughout 
the private security sector. A number of other industries and 
professions are exempted from the Act., and at first sight it does seem 
eminently reasonable to therefore argue that private security is as 
deserving of exemption as probably the majority of the others. 
However, successive Home Secretaries have rejected or ignored calls 
for private security to be similarly treated as a special case. I 
shall return to the role and position of the Home Office later in this 
chapter (and in Chapter 5). 
At thi s poi nt I continue to cons i der the i ssues of I icens in9 and 
regulation from the point of view of organisations representing 
private security and turn briefly to IPSA - The International 
Professional Security Association. 
(ii) The International Professional Security Association 
Whereas the BSIA represents security organisations who favour self- 
controlled, self-regulation., IPSA represents individual security 
professionals and has generally taken a policy stance favouring some 
form of government licensing. 
Formed in 1958 the Association aims to "establish, promote and 
encourage the science and professional practice of industrial and 
commercial security. " Its membership is open to all employers of, or 
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employees engaged in, private securit work on a full-time basis. It y 
has a wide membership which can incl ude private investigators and 
others working in the private security world - even internationally 
with its status of overseas associates. By the late 1970s it was 
claiming a membership of around 5,000. Uniquely it has consistently 
addressed the issue of the need for training in private security in a 
positive way by offering courses and conferences aimed at basic, 
intermediate and advanced levels. These courses have been recognised 
in the past by various government appointed training boards -a factor 
of importance in encouraging the take up of basic training 
opportunities particularly because it meant that the costs could be 
reimbursed to the sponsoring company. Enthusiasm for the provision of 
basic training however should not go untempered by reservations about 
the course content of advanced and managerial training. 
In 1968 1 PSA establ i shed the Institute of Industrial Security. 
Membership of the Institute requires membership of IPSA for one year 
and then the achievement of a certain standard in an examination. 
This covers questions on crime prevention, fire prevention, alarm 
systems, powers of arrest and search, theft, trespass, evidence and 
procedure, reporting and industrial relations (cf. Draper, 1978: 128). 
The Institute also offers correspondence courses which are widely 
taken up whilst IPSA itself publishes one of the major security 
journals Security and Protection. IPSA's outreach activities have 
also included the arrangement of seminars for management in industry 
and commerce. It is at this level of 'training' and discussion that 
cause for caution about the promotion of 'advanced standards' in the 
private sector should arise. For example, in October 1975, IPSA held 
a conference in Brussels in association with the Management Centre for 
Europe, inviting an interesting series of speakers. These included: 
John Wilson of IPSA, Sir Martin Furnival-Jones (an MI5 man of twenty- 
five years experience), Brigadier S. E. Dufton, MBE and Lt. Col. S. G. 
Styles, GC (bomb disposal experts) of S and D Security Limited, Donn 
P. Parker of the (conservatively-orientated) Stanford Research 
Institute and Harry Welton of the (very conservatively orientated) 
Economic League (cf. Garner, 1978: 113). Topics apparently included 
computer fraud, anti-kidnapping strategies, industrial espionage and 
so on. 
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Movi ng back to the perhaps more parochial issue of licensing and 
regulating such activities in the UK, the following section draws upon 
brief interviews with seven members of IPSA (with varying degrees of 
involvement in the Association) and a substantial number of 
conversations with other members at privte security meetings, 
conferences and exhibitions. Of course, nothing that any of the 
people that I talked to can be held to represent, then (1979-1983) or 
now, the official position or opinion of IPSA. 
Whatever the policy level support for licensing of private security 
within IPSA, it is perhaps inevitable that there should be a number of 
dissenting voices among the individual members. I certainly 
encountered quite a high degree of hostility to the broad range of 
factors which would be covered by legislation such as contemplated in 
the Parliamentary Bills introduced by Bruce George, MP and others. 
The dilemma is that individuals may see a basic form of licensing as 
both a publ ic and a private good - cl eani ng up the i ndustry and al so 
bestowing status and credibility upon those licensed. However, any 
further encroachment into the world of private security may lay claim 
to the public good but is more immediately viewed as a private 
nuisance. In other words hostility to any substantial body of 
legislation emanates from those who can see no pecuniary advantage in 
it. 
A reasonable subject to discuss with regard to the effects of any such 
legislation seemed to be the issue of vetting of personnel, and the 
use - and abuse - of the 'old boys network' . Most people seemed 
cynical about the role of the old boys network - it has always 
operated and it always will. 
Security Officer: "If the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act was 
repealed then all our troubles would be over 
"Why? " (I asked naively). 
"Cos. we'd know then wouldn't we? " 
"But you'd still need the machinery to check on people, " I replied. 
The response of the Security Officer to this was to turn away in 
amused disbelief. Security and personnel managers regard it as 
obvi ou s that wi th a wi nk and a wh isper in the right ear there al ready 
exists the basis for informal checking of applicants' references and 
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backgrounds. From this point of view licensing and any exemption of 
private security from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act would simply facilitate degrees of access to privileged 
information. Without careful safeguards such a situation could be 
even more dangerously open to abuse. 
For IPSA with its diversity of individual members there has always 
been a particular awareness of the anomalous position of 'In House' 
security staff who are employed not by security organisations but by 
other commercial and industrial enterprises yet who undertake several 
duties of a similar nature to those employed in security firms. 
Exploring this I talked to two ex-CID officers, one of whom now works 
for ChemPro (the fictional name for a major chemical processing 
company) and one who works for Plastic Credit (a major credit card 
company). 
ChemPro Officer: "You can't exclude in-house security from the Bill 
or whatever, 'cos I'm both you see ... I'm in-house security but I 
go round checking outside" (i. e. outside the company he works for). 
Author: "What, checking on your employees outside? " 
Chempro Officer: 11 *. No .. (laughs) .. on our customers! I 
check their inventories and their stock - and reclaim for us what they 
say they haven't got! Like today, say, I did ten inventories --- 
(pause) 
,I should think I recovered S-6,000 worth of stuff. 
Not bad 
for one man, eh? " 
Despite some arguments advanced that in-house security should be 
excluded from licensing and regulation, it is clear that in-house 
security staff and private security firms' staff have no clear cut 
boundaries of operation. They cannot therefore be rendered distinct 
for the purposes of licensing and regulation. As the Chem Pro 
security officer was at pains to point out, he is by no means unique. 
Inevitably, a large number of 'in-house' security staff actually spend 
their working hours away from their in-house base visiting the 
premises of customers, sometimes asking for a straightforward 
inventory check but usually, and interestingly, just saying that 
"They're 'checking on what's selling. III 
The securi ty of fi cer f rom PI asti c Credi thi ghl i ghted the propen si ty of 
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the ex-pol ice officer to carry over some of the rol e and authority of 
his former job to his new profession: 
"Last week, " he said " I was just sitting around talking to an 
old mate who works for a car hire firm - and this guy comes in to return a car - mark you - to return it, with what turned out to be a stolen credit card - after a routine check that was. Now in that situation somebody has to do 
something - somebody has to make a decision ... So I arrested him (pause) ... Of course, I could only perform 
a citizens arrest. That's the problem. And if he'd been 
innocent ... if, like - the usual trick is to give some 
young yobbo a fiver and say 'take this car back for me' and 
I'd arrested him and then this young yobbo had stood up in 
courtandsai d I'm innocent - then ... (pause) 
... that's my problem see. " 
This security officer would not be drawn further on the issue of 
desirable powers for private security, and to give him his due, I 
certainly do not think that he was advocating that security personnel 
should enjoy the powers of any branch of the police - as an ex- 
policeman he had the benefit of two perspectives. But he did seem to 
imply that it might be desirable to have a system whereby security 
staff could perform arrests with perhaps a little more power and 
authority than the ordinary citizen, and where their 'professional 
position' - placing them in situations potentially more likely to lead 
them to seek to detain or arrest members of the publ ic- woul d be 
viewed more favourably by the courts and the general judicial system. 
However reasonable such a hope may seem to some, to others it suggests 
but the thin edge of a bigger blue wedge. A form of licensing and 
regulation designed to serve the public interest before that of 
private security would have to sympathise with the latter sentiment. 
One of the most frequent negative comments about licensing and 
regulation from these IPSA members (and others) relates to the claim 
that legislation coul d raise standards by removing the unfair 
competition of the price- undercutting 'cowboys'. In conversation with 
four security officers both a sceptical view and several counter- 
arguments were put forward: 
"It's a market anyway - we will always have to contend with 
undercutti ng. " 
Advocates of the sceptical view tend to dismiss the 'undercutting by 
cowboys' issue on, first, the above grounds, and second, that: 
"Customers are commercial businessmen too .. . 
11 
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(interruption - "not always! ") and they know they're 
getting what they pay for. " 
There are however several well-known arguments against this position: 
"Well 
--- 'cowboys' undercut by more than the respectable 
companies can afford to compete at . ." 
So, undercutting in a market composed solely of 'respectable' 
companies would still provide higher levels of standards - and 
therefore, the argument hopefully goes - of pay and conditions for 
workers, of safeguards for the public and of service for the customer. 
Others have little faith in the business acumen of commercial 
customers as a positive influence on standards in the security market 
pl ace: 
"Commercial business clients may be simply required to hire 
security because of insurance requirements - and they give 
scant regard to 'quality of service' simply because price 
and profits are the prime consideration. " 
Indeed., even the genuinely quality-conscious business will not 
necessarily know what it is getting if it has to rely solely on 
publicity brochures and a high price. Enforceable standards backed by 
accountable authority is the only viable solution to the exploitation 
of this particular - and particularly lucrative market. 
Hii) Other Associations - Locksmiths and Alarms; Private 
Investigators 
The Master Locksmiths Association represents around two hundred 
members and a number of af fiIi ate members who are manufacturers and 
wholesalers. Changes in the lock making industry throughout the post 
war period have severely reduced the specialist craft section of the 
trade and most locks today are mass-produced and then fitted by anyone 
advertising themselves as locksmiths. The Master Locksmiths 
Association remains the respectable membership body for the trade and 
seeks to maintain its credibility and independence, even drawing up 
rules relating to the representation that large companies can claim in 
order to ensure that no particular parties gain positions of 
dominance. 
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Although Codes of Practice supported by the Office of Fair Trading and 
the police cover the interests of the Association% it generally feels 
that these can be ineffective and certainly slow mechanisms for 
redressing any malpractice. As with other branches of the private 
security sector, locksmiths are concerned about the uncontrollable 
growth of a potentially, if not actually, disreputable source of 
competition. In this case it is the growth of shoe heel bars which 
also offer key cutting services. These have undergone massive 
expansion in the past fifteen years yet give only minimal training and 
require no authorising instructions to enable them to cut security 
keys. There are a number of true and apocryphal stories in the 
business about security keys for safes that have been cut at heel bars 
and have subsequently jammed in the safe lock. Certainly a perverse 
contribution to crime prevention. Other common tricks and sources of 
complaint and concern include the retention of spare keys by "cowboy 
outfits" who offer to fit household locks, incidentally failing to 
give advice about window locks and who, whilst fitting the locks, can 
be safely 'casing' the premises. The Association is therefore in 
favour of at least some form of licensing and regulation. 
The National Supervisory Council for Intruder Alarms has over one 
hundred members, the figure fluctuating with the growth of the 
industry and the offsetting of increases following amalgamations of 
companies. The NSCIA is associated with the BSIA, the latter acting 
as a broad trades association for the private security industry as a 
whole (or at least its members) with the NSCIA seeing its brief as 
overseeing adherence to British Standards for alarm systems. Being an 
installer of alarms is the sole criterion for eligibility for 
membership., although acceptance follows some degree of scrutiny of the 
bona fides of the applicant company. Acceptance to the Council's Roll 
allows companies to display the seal of approval of the NSCIA and 
carries some recognition from the insurance companies and the police - 
and supposedly also, the general public, although this seems far less 
certain (see Chapter 3). Although the certainty of some of the 
NSCIA's claims are disputable, it does seem that obtaining insurance 
coverage without their approval could be a more difficult process. 
The governing body of NSCIA includes seventeen members comprised of 
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f our representati ves of the i ndustry i ts e1f, f ou rf rom insu ra nc ea nd 
five from other relevant but independent institutes!, such as the 
Institute of Electrical Engineers or Architects. There are al so 
representatives from small installers who are not BSIA members, and 
the full-time Director General. The Chair alternates every two years 
between representatives of the alarm business and the insurance 
companies. Manufacturers are not allowed as members. Confident of 
its success and credibility, the NSCIA is generallly unenthusiastic 
about licensing and regulation though it has obviously considered the 
issue (see below). But in any case,, the NSCIA is probably best 
considered in terms of its affinity with the BSIA. In terms of wider 
policy relating to private security as a whole, where this would 
affect the NSCIA then it would probably follow the BSIA's lead. 
The Intruder Alarm Installers Association is a small, independent 
rival of the NSCIA and has attracted criticism from the BSIA/NSCIA 
Directorate. It is comprised of small independent installers 
nationally, claiming to work to similar high standards to the NSCIA, 
such as installing to British Standard and operating an internal 
system of inspection and discipline. Its attitude to licensing seems 
equivocal but however much sympathy it might elicit as the underdog in 
a competition with the larger companies and the BSIA/NSCIA it is clear 
that it has no real powers of discipline over its membership other 
than expulsion from what is in any case a small organisation. It 
lacks the credibility and contacts of the NSCIA and certainly cannot 
be taken to contribute anything to the arguments against licensing. 
On the other hand the very fact of its existence demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness and non-representative nature of the NSCIA. Only a 
system of licensing and regulation could clarify the muddied waters of 
the alarm industry. 
The Association of British Investigators has tended to adopt a liberal 
public relations approach in presenting its identity., has decried the 
non-professional standards of some private investigators and has seen 
the benefit of such a strategy in indicators of acceptance like use of 
its membership list by the Law Society. An impressive sounding code 
of ethics and conduct urges its members "to at all times conduct our 
investigations within the bounds of legality, morality and 
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professional ethics .9. (and) to guard against inadvertent 
disclosures of private information, " and so on. Needless to say, 
there is no mechanism for more effectively encouraging adherence to 
these highflown principles. Indeed, an apparently well-known story 
from the early 1970s concerning a member of the ABI General Council, 
who in 1971 was fined t500 for entering premises through a window and 
frightening an unsuspecting woman, raises questions about why he was 
then made President of the General Council? Further questions might 
also surround other aids to the promotion of a professional image. 
For example., the Younger Committee (1972) heard evidence concerning 
private investigators which feared the possibility of 
misrepresentation if officially approved identity cards could be 
issued perhaps bearing a photograph and possibly being mistaken for 
possessing some police authority. As Draper, (1978: 163) points out 
however, 
"this problem is already with us. Members of the Association 
(of British Investigators) ... are given identity cards to 
prove the membership of the holder and,, although they are 
not very similar to police warrant cards, to the uninitiated 
they might be mistaken as such. " 
Such half-way house attempts to create respectability are not really 
very satisfactory on any criteria. 
To some extent this is recognized by the Association which has gone on 
record in favour of some form of licensing system. In an undated 
report (cira 1978) the ABI notes that its 
efforts were acknowledged by the ... Younger ... Committee on Privacy ... in July 1972: "We also note the desire of the Association of British 
Investigators - apparently the only large organisation of 
private detectives in this country to have a licensing 
system. " 
The BIA's document, submitted to the Royal Commission on Legal 
Services, concluded its two pages with the following claim and 
request: 
"With the exception of those investigators who are members of 
the Association of British Investigators, they are not bound 
by any code of conduct or ethics and it is therefore the 
wish of this Association that in the public interest, the 
Royal Commission on Legal Services support the various moves 
being made to control or license the private 
investigator 
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Of course, no control was, or is, imminently forthcoming. Private 
i nvestigators , detecti ves and so on , remai n unregul ated inan 
occupation which clearly (as discussed) relates to a wide range of 
sensitive issues. 
The Role of the Home Office - Inertia and its Implications for Self- Regu lation or Formalisati_on of _ a BSIA inspectorate 
Since the earliest soundings about the possibility of licensing 
private security in the 1960s the Home Office has remained unmoved by 
arguments in favour of active consideration of the merits of the case. 
Rather, regardless of political party in power, it has generally 
rejected the need to address the issue, and when occasionally moved to 
a token information-gathering gesture has opted for the minimal 
response possible. Even the 1979 Green Paper was a case of brief 
momentum gathered in a way designed to subsequently clog the wheels 
for years to come. With the publication of the report, leaving an 
open-ended but wholly uncoordinated period for consideration, response 
and consultation, the wheels ground to a halt again and static inertia 
was restored. To all intents and purposes - apart from some 
recognition of significance inherent in the preparation of a Green 
Paper - the status quo was resumed and the support of the Home Office, 
and the new Conservative and previous governments., for self-regulation 
was reaffirmed. 
The Home Office has over time, aruged that an established range of 
legislation already controls and regulates the status and power of 
private security personnel (and hence their organisations) just as it 
does all other ordinary citizens. To provide some brief examples: 
Uniforms,, it is generally agreed, give private security a sense of 
corporate identity. For good or ill they help the private security 
personnel to stand out and furthermore - and more importantly - they 
give "him (sic) some authority in his task" (Randall, 1976: 140). It 
is of course also widely agreed that the wearing of uniforms 
deliberately designed to resemble those of the police in order to gain 
further authority, respect and perhaps lay claim to police powers is 
not the done thing. The fact that it happens - albeit with varying 
degrees of subtlety - can be neatly forgotten. 
For the Home Office 
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the matter is rendered unproblematic because Section 52 of the Police 
Act, 1964 makes it an of f ence f or ' any person who is not a pol i ce 
officer to wear an article of police uniform or any article having the 
appearance of such an article where it gives him an appearance so 
nearly resembling that of a member of a police force as to be 
calculated to deceive' (Turner vs. Shearer, 1973; Bunyan, 1977: 253). 
Arms, and their use,, 
. present an odd case in the mid-1980s because 
although the public is more familiar today than ever with the idea of 
the police being potentially armed in certain circumstances (and the 
experience of the Northern Ireland conflict highlights that), it is 
often now forgotten that for periods in the 1950s and early 1960s a 
number of private security companies were issuing firearms to their 
payroll guard services. Undoubtedly other 'private security' 
services, then and now, had and have access to arms. But the 
important point in providing a backcloth of what is possible is that 
in a society which prides itself on its control of firearms, for quite 
a few years private security organisations were able to issue selected 
members of their staff with firearms in a legitimate fashion under the 
benign, half-closed eye of the Home Office. The Home Office 
subsequently discouraged requests for, or licensing of permits for 
firearms for private security organisations. But the rol e of the 
police is of major significance here as well. They have, of course,, 
consistently criticised the issue to and use of firearms by private 
security. Wide-ranging criticism eventually led the BSIA to adopt a 
policy position which it evidently feels is sufficiently reassuring to 
reiterate at every appropriate point. To others it might be felt to 
contain an ominous secondary implication: "While the British policeman 
(sic) remains unarmedg the British security guard will remain unarmed" 
(cf. Bunyan, 1977: 236). 
Not surprisingly, ex-police officers now working in private security, 
fear a serious spiralling of use of firearms if private security 
companies are ever able to issue and use them on any scale. The most 
obvious example that might be given here is that bank and payroll 
raiders would be even more likely than they are now to carry and use 
arms if they knew or thought that the security guards were armed. 
With regard to the adequacy of current control however, the Home 
232 
Office (and others) feel that existing restrictions of firearms are 
sufficiently tight (although this assumption is currently being 
strongly questioned). Furthermore, this position emphasises that 
private security companies (by which they tend to mean the respectable 
companies), need to maintain good relations with the Home Office and 
the police and this acts as a most severe informal as well as formal 
source of proscription against use of firearms. 
Truncheons, have also been issued to and used by private security 
guards in the past. The Home Office again argues that existing 
legislation is and has proved to be sufficient to control and curtail 
such practices. According to the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, 
Section One, the courts shall be the arbiters of whether a person has 
'lawful authority or reasonable excuse' to carry an offensive weapon, 
such as a truncheon. But generally it is held that "Any person who 
without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof lies 
on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon, shall 
be guilty of an offence. " Security guards have been prosecuted on the 
basis of this understanding and in 1973 a Court of Appeal ruled that 
"the carrying of a weapon should not be treated as a matter of routine 
or as part of the uniform. " Three guards working for White Star 
Security were convicted following this ruling having been prosecuted 
for carrying truncheons which were held to constitute offensive 
weapons (cf. Bunyan, 1977: 236). 
However . wh iIe truncheons no 
1 onger seem to be a part of any standard 
issue by security companies, it is the fact that there were few, if 
any, qualms about issuing - and potentially using truncheons, firearms 
and MACE canisters that was and remains disturbing. Private security 
guards are not the 'general publ i c' , wh o af ter al 
1 do not as a rul e 
guard payrolls, night clubs and so on; rather they are a very specific 
case. Even if the preferable option of specific legislation 
pertaining to the powers, authority and uniform and accoutrements of 
private security is viewed as too complex, potentially cumbersome and 
anyway unnecessary., by the Home Office there is no excuse 
for not 
maintaining a publicly accessible, specific watching-brief overseeing 
the activities of and developments in the private security sector. 
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The standard response of the Home Office to such a case is that 
private security companies and personnel have no 'special privileges'. 
However, as legal commentators have often retorted, Common Law and the 
provisions of six Acts of Parliament provide for an individuals right 
to protect his/her property. This power can be made the 
responsibility of another party, such as a private security 
organisation, whose employees enjoy and can use the citizen's power of 
arrest and the right to use sufficient force as is necessary to 
prevent a crime being committed (cf. Sunday Telegraph Magazine, 8th 
December, 1973; Garner, 1978: 126). Under the Criminal Law Act, 1967: 
"Any person may arrest with reasonable cause any person 
suspected to be in the act of committing an arrestable 
of f enc e" (2. (2)). " "A person may use such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime 
or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of 
offenders or suspected offenders. " 
(ibid., Section 3) 
Itis not a question of ' special privi I eges' - the point is that 
private security are a special case! They do not act 1i ke ordi nary 
citizens, indeed their raison d'etre is that they should not. I shal 1 
have more to say about the special status of private security, both de 
facto and de jure, in Chapter 5. Here I conclude this section noting 
how it seems to have suited both the Home Office and the BSIA to 
attempt to maintain a very low profile despite the importance of the 
relevant issues. 
The Home Office Green Paper on The Private Security Industry issued in 
February, 1979 acknowledged that: 
"There is no modern society in which a government can provide 
total protection against crime 
(p. 10, para. 30) 
("It is inconceivable that the police should be expected to 
meet all demands for protective services as part of their 
public Futies and to do so at the expense of taxpayer and 
ratepayer"). 
(p. 11, para. 31) 
Four months earlier., Sir Robert Mark had generated an apparent wave of 
shock through the media when he had said the same thing: the Daily 
Telegraph headline announcing 'Police Force Can No Longer Cope with 
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Thefts' (cf. Davis, 1980: 21). Hardly a murmur greeted the Home Office 
echo of Sir Robert's statement yet this represented a statement of 
official state policy-thinking whereas Sir Robert was well-known as an 
outspoken individualist when it came to views on contemporary 
po1icing. This point is perhaps the very reason why Sir Robert's 
comment did make the news, but it does not explain why a report 
purporting to be a contribution to further debate and needed thinking 
on this subject somehow effectively dampened any such debate. 
Perhaps part of the answer to this is that, 1 ike many bureaucratic 
documents designed to cover but stifle a subject and its debate, the 
Green Paper was simply very bland. Furthermore, the private security 
sector - or at least its 'establishment' end - has ultimately been 
quite effective in blurring what measures it itself supports: some 
form of self-regulation merges with promises of consumer protection 
and 'independent' inspectorates which merge with vague expressions of 
willingness to 'support' licensing. 
However, proposals for self-regulation of abuses within the private 
security sector merely reflect an inclination and mechanism for the 
minimisation of the conflicts and revelations inherent in the real 
enforcement of regulation (cf. South, 1983). The operation of this 
pseudo 'ombudsman' or cons umer-protecti on agency type of 'informal 
institution' is well described by Abel (1982: 287) as based upon: 
11scapegoating the exceptional enterprise that is totally 
irresponsible, thereby diverting attention from routine 
business practices and ensuring that regulation and 
publicity will have only a very limited general deterrent 
effect. " 
At the same time, it is clear, and no surprise of course, that where 
significant voices are raised in the private security sector in favour 
of some limited form of licensing (as opposed, it should be noted, to 
stiff regulation and limitation) it is because they are generally 
those of the figureheads and public relations departments of the 
larger companies who might well be very happy to take up any slices of 
the market left by any legislation which pushed smaller companies 
unable to 'make the grade' out of business. This cynical truism 
is 
well understood throughout the industry. 
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Carson's work on the history of factory I egi slat ion ( 1970; 1979 ), 
i 11 u strates a simi I ar si tuati on where I arge companies have over time 
been apparently happy to cooperate with the Factory Inspectorate. 
Quite simply, such companies can afford to come up to scratch whereas 
smaller companies often cannot. Ironically, the Factory Inspectorate 
in this respect can strengthen the monopolistic power of the larger 
companies as small competition is pushed out of business by the 
stringency of conditions that it cannot meet. The potential for abuse 
of regulations - and for hiding such abuse - increases as the dominant 
companies grow in size, respectability and power. 
The prospect of a similar development within a self-regulating or 
legislatively minimal ly-control led private security sector is an issue 
to be seriously concerned about. 
Towards Effective Licensing, Regulation and Accountability 
Other Models and Jurisdictions 
With regard to the provision of 
security it is surely the case that 
of its European neighbours, with 
with developments in countries with 
Israel and those with closely 
Australia and New Zealand. 
public safeguards concerning private 
Britain is out of step with many 
provisions in the United States and 
dissimilar legal systems, such as 
similar systems such as Canada, 
0fc ou rse, n ot a 11 of these nati ons have comprehens iv e, omn i bu s 
legislation covering every aspect of the private security sector,, as I 
have outlined its range of activities. Nonetheless, some exertion 
(and importantly symbolic effort) of control over some areas of 
private security activity has been made. At the same time lessons 
have been learned. 
Before offering a short review of the principal criticisms and 
reservations about existing models of licensing and regulation I will 
first outline the major provisions of relevant international 
legislation. In doing so I shall follow the format of Hilary Draper's 
excellent and still authoritative discussion of this area 
(cf. Draper,, 
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1978; ch. 8)6,, initially outlining legislation relating to private 
investigators and then going on to consider control measures relevant 
to other forms of private security. 
It is generally assumed that licensing and regulation are most 
strongly developed and well-defined in the USA where thirty-five of 
the fifty federal states currently operate some sort of relevant 
system. However, as Draper also observes (pp. 136-7)9 it is the 
legislation adopted by New Zealand which probably offers a more 
adequate example of attempts to control both private investigators and 
security. Furthermore, developed in a similar society and legal 
system, it is a model which it has often been suggested might be 
followed in the UK. This system requires anyone working in the 
detection field to be approved as a 'responsible employee' and to have 
obtained a certificate to this effect from the regulatory body. The 
employee may then work for any licensed private investigator agency. 
As Draper explains: 
"the form of control laid out in this statute is similar to 
that adopted in many American states. No person is allowed 
to be a private investigator unless he is the holder of a 
private investigator's license and such a license will not 
usually be granted unless the applicant is twenty years of 
age or over and has had at least twelve months' experience 
in the fi el d for which he is applyi ng to be 1 icensed. It is 
a bar to the granting of a1 icense to have been convicted, 
within the ten years preceding the application of a crime 
involving dishonesty, or to have had a license or 
certificate of approval cancelled within the preceding five 
years ... In the case of both the license and the 
certificate of approval, a copy of the application is sent 
to the police who may, within a certain time, file a notice 
of objection to the license being granted. If there are 
objections from the police (or in the case of a license) 
from any other persons, then there will be a hearing of the 
application for the license or certificate of approval. " 
(1978: 136-7) 
There is not the space here to go into the positive features or the 
shortcomings of this system, though the requirement of a period of 
basic experience is usually praised (although without monitoring of 
this aspect this could be a double-edged feature) and once again, 
characteristic of the field internationally, there is little emphasis 
on training development and the gaining of qualifications. 
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Far less attention has been paid to the activities - and control - of 
private detectives in Europe, and when compared to the situation in 
the USA where they are more common and active in wider fields, this is 
relatively unsurprising. The Scandinavian countries regulate their 
private security industry which has been a long established feature of 
their provision for property protection and crime prevention. 
However, neither there, nor in France, Belgium., Holland or the UK, is 
specific licensing legislation directed at private investigators. 
Germany's Central Association of Investigating and Detective Agencies 
operates a self-regulating Code of Ethics and private security 
organisations must be licensed by the Lýnder (Home Office, 1979: 29); 
Spain requires investigators to pass a proficiency test, but as Draper 
points out (P. 137) the most elaborate system for licensing private 
investigators in Europe seems to be that which operates in Italy. 
This system forbids the carrying out of a whole range of investigative 
services without the granting of a license issued by a Prefect. The 
Prefect must be satisfied that the applicant is of Italian 
citizenship, can be appropriately bonded and has not been convicted of 
a criminal offence. As possibly indicative of future developments 
here (for historically it is not implausible) and elsewhere, I shall 
just note the "two interesting features" of this legislation which 
Draper (p. 138) draws attention to. These are: 
"firstly that an agency must keep a list of its current 
activities at all times and show this to the police if 
requested to do so; and secondly, that Surveillance and 
Private Investigation Officers are required on request to 
give their services to the police authority and to comply 
with all requests addressed to them by police officers or 
bail i ff s. Private detectives in Italy are thus technically 
auxiliary policemen. " 
Legislation directly controlling the activities of private 
investigators in Europe is then, generally undeveloped except in 
Italy, and in the UK in any specific sense it is non-existent. In an 
earlier section I have noted how the issue of protection of privacy 
relates to the need for the licensing, regulation and control of the 
private security sector. Here, as in other fundamental matters of 
constitutional human and civil rights, Britain lags behind many other 
European and other western-style democracies. For present purposes 
I 
do not have the space to go further into this disparity, but again 
Draper (pp. 138-142) offers a very useful review. 
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When we turn to look at international examples of licensing and 
control covering private security companies then a now well-familiar 
picture emerges. Concomitant with their massive expansion and 
increasing significance as part of the division of policing labour, 
private security organisations are now the subject of some form of 
regulatory legislation in most European nations as well as the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
In Italy the same system of licensing which operates for private 
investigators also covers private security employees. Further it is 
sufficiently well-developed to not only lay down standards but also 
make extra provisions for different types of guards, including those 
who are 'sworn' and carry firearms. Where less elaborate systems 
exist elsewhere in Europe they nonetheless represent statutory 
requirements to be fulfilled by prospective employees seeking to be 
placed in positions of trust and which require responsible levels of 
sensitivity and discretion. At its most basic the favoured method for 
some form of vetting is generally the requirement that the applicant 
can show he/she has no previous criminal convictions. Providing 
evidence of this is either the responsibility of the applicant seeking 
employment or else, as with the New Zealand system, the prospective 
employer may be expected to take on responsibility for complying with 
c erti fic ati on requ i rements. While the latter system is held to have 
some advantages of bureaucratic certainty and efficiency it can also 
be criticised as involving too much invasion of privacy. 
Draper (1978: 143) argues this point, following Phil ip-Sorenson,, 
Chairman of Group 4. who believes that making it the responsibility of 
the employee to provide his/her own certificate by applying at a local 
police station is the most acceptable method of vetting. According to 
Philip-Sorenson "If the applicant does not return to the security 
company to which he has applied, then no one is any the wiser. He may 
have failed to get a certificate or he may, on the other hand,, have 
found another job" (ibid. ). This is true,, but at the same time, 
suggesting that this involves 'less of an invasion of privacy' by the 
security company is a dubious indication of concern for civil 
liberties, especially as once employed by major security companies 
like Group 4, the employee will be expected to undergo further and 
future vetting and checking procedures. 
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This is however the basis of the systems of licensing operating in 
most countries with regulatory legislation. As I have mentioned 
previously, its implementation in the UK would need to take account of 
the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. As a system it 
is far from adequate, but it does constitute at least a minimum step 
in the direction of control of private security and toward some degree 
of monitoring and accountability. 
Slightly more developed systems operate in a few states in the USA and 
in Canada but the most advanced at present seems to be that in Sweden. 
Here the licensing system, 
requires that every ... employee should undergo a minimum of 214 hours of a training programme that must be approved by the government. In addition, there is a stipulation 
demanding refresher courses every year and forty hours extra 
training for any specialist duty such as handling guard 
dogs. " 
(Draper, 1978: 144) 
Addi ti onal ly , the amount of overtime that can be worked is also 
1 imited. For an industry which is of ten rel i ant upon , and expl oi ts 
overtime working., this is a significant and positive provision. Thus 
in reviewing other models of regulation in other jurisdictions there 
are both lessons to be learned from mistakes and half-hearted 
responses, but there are also exemplary practices in existence which 
are proven to be workable and which can be followed. 
This expanded legislation and licensing system now operating in Sweden 
is however still relatively new. To gain a different perspective on 
what is workable it is useful to turn to the experience of licensing 
in the United States and Canada. 
In their major Rand Corporation study conducted and published in the 
early 1970s for the US Department of Justice, Kakalik and Wildhorn 
presented a clear picture of the inadequacy of then existing 
1i cens i ng. Following a survey which looked at procedures in thirty- 
one states, three counties and forty-six cities, they made the 
following observations: 
"First, the regulatory agencies' effectiveness is limited 
because they typically do not have extensive data on the 
security industry's problems. With the exception of 
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reviewing license applicationss the typical regulatory agency has very limited and, in some cases , no contact with the industry. Second., the agencies' effectiveness is limited because they very rarely invoke the post-licensing 
powers they possess to correct problems in the industry. Suspensions, revocations and fines are rare .-- the agencies have such limited resources and such ineffective 
channels for learning of problems that many specific 
problems do not come to their attention. Hence, control s 
are very rarely exercised. Third, there are wide variations in the toughness with which regulations are enforced among 
regul atory agencies. Finally, nearly every regulatory 
agency responding to our survey recommended that some aspect 
of the regulation of the industry be made stronger than it 
presently is in their jurisdiction. " 
(Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1972,, Vol. 1: 56-7). 
Despite my earlier comments about the extent of licensing regulation 
abroad in relation to the British situation, cases of long established 
regulatory systems like the USA are instructive. Although it is 
sometimes assumed or inferred that the USA, in particular, has wholly 
embraced licensing,, it remains the case that serious commitment to 
regulation and control of the private security sector has not really 
been embraced with great enthusiasm anywhere. Ten years on from the 
Kakalik and Wildhorn Rand Report., a municipal judge writing in The 
Police Chief (Schepps, 1982: 26-7) was seriously concerned about the 
inadequacy of the regulatory system. Thus Schepps writes: 
"Since only 62% of the states have regulatory agencies for 
security services, one-third of the nation must rely solely 
on local regulation. Widespread local regulation 
discourages uniformity and standardisation necessary for 
maximum effectiveness and control of security services. " 
(P. 27) 
More broadly and fundamentally, 
"While citizens have, in theory, some ability to alter police 
behaviour (through the courts .1 ocal government, pol 
i ti cal 
clubs, etc. ) their control over private police behaviour is 
almost non-existent. Thus, if the citizenry is to have any 
success in halting the threats to individual liberties and 
privacy, it must create new mechanisms of control over 
private agencies. " 
(ibid. ) 
Progress, however, appears to be slow, even with the existing 
framework of State legislation to build upon. In a recent story 
in 
the New York Times, (4th June, 1984) 'Growing Security-Guard Industry 
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under Scrutiny' . the New York Secretary of State., Gail S. Schaffer 
echoed familiar past criticisms: "It is an industry that lends itself 
to abuses. " According to the Times story: 
"The New York State Investigation Commission in its report said attempts to license guards and increase controls had been blocked by 'the vigorous lobbying efforts of the security guard industry. " 
Obviously, I cannot go into all the diverse provisions of different 
examples of existing systems of licensing, though there are many 
interesting issues here - for example - the extent to which licensing 
restricts and limits powers and activities versus the extent to which 
it enhances existing prerogatives and confers new ones. There is also 
an accompanying debate, so far little developed in the UK, which is 
less about whether private security should be licensed and regulated 
and more about whether private security arrangements and provision 
should be required by law. As Hamilton (1974). points out,, such a 
system has been introduced in Israel where, 
"amendments passed by the Knesset to the Licensing of 
Businesses Law, 1968 give power to the Minister of the 
Interior to designate businesses requiring a license in 
order to ensure the 'prevention of danger to the public 
peace and protection against robbery and housebreaking'. 
The Minister of Police is then empowered to make regulations 
for the prevention of 'danger to the public peace --- (etc. )... including protection at the time of the 
transportation of money, diamonds, securities and other 
valuables, where licensed and certain other businesses are 
concerned. These regulations are enforced by the police but 
usually amicably and appeal mechanisms are built in. " 
(p. 95) 
It is highly unlikely that this sort of model will develop in the UK 
or indeed in many of the other jurisdictions mentioned. However, it 
is 1 ikely that the requirements for security in certain businesses and 
homes imposed by the insurance industry will become increasingly 
stringent. 
In general though .f ormal control , regul ati on and 
1 icensi ng of the 
private security sector has exhibited three key features in its 
concerns. To paraphrase the excellent discussion of these issues 
offered by Shearing and Stenning (1981: 230-1 and passim),, until very 
recently most regulatory schemes have tended to share several 
characteristic features. First, their focus on the contract security 
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side - upon contract guards and investigation activities. Second, 
they have reflected concerns about 'competition' between private 
security and the public police. This has been the case historically 
and remains evident today. Where licensing systems exist, some 
evidence for this is afforded by the frequency with which it is the 
public police who are designated as the licensing and regulatory 
authority. At the same time, in many jurisdictions, it is a high 
priority concern to forbid, or at least control 'moonlighting' by 
sworn police offers in the private security sector in off-duty hours. 
Third,, the breadth and lack of precision of regulations, (rarely 
accompanied by a breadth of actual powers and resources to back them 
up) has given rise to a high degree of discretion in the 
impl ementati on of regul atory authority. Necessary baselines for 
effective assessment for certification are notoriously loose. 
Criteria such as character and competency have been consistently 
recommended or required yard-sticks, yet the bases on which they 
should be judged are equally consistently unclear. While this 
discretionary type of system has probably often worked to the 
advantage of private security companies it has generally been even 
more inadequate in lacking provision for fair appeals. 
Th e po i nt of thi s tour through ' other j ur i sdi ct i on s and model s of 
licensing' has been to indicate that the UK is virtually alone in 
having no formal, legislatively empowered system of control over even 
the most visible and largest-scale operators in the private security 
sector - let alone those small-scale 'cowboy' and up-market specialist 
agencies that should elicit more concern. In c onclusion however, it 
is only honest to admit that examination of the various existing 
schemes gives little scope for optimism about their real efficacy. As 
Shearing and Stenning (ibid. ) conclude: 
"Despite the apparently expansive scope of these regulatory 
schemes, research into the adequacy and effectiveness of 
such schemes has not produced encouraging results. " 
Ih ave al ready ref erred to the fi ndi ngs of the Kakal ik and Wi 1 dhorn 
(1971) Rand Report. Their conclusions have been broadly confirmed in 
the wide-ranging studies conducted over ten years by researchers at 
the Toronto Centre of Criminology (cf. particularly Stenning and 
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Cornish, 1975, ch. 6). This research into the regulation of private 
security in Canada concluded that: 
"Regulatory agencies were typically understaffed and under- budgeted., with the result that they could rarelY perform more than the most minimum of licensing functions. Administration of such regulatory functions as inspections, competency tests, the hearing and disposition of public complaints, and setting of standards for advertising, 
uniforms, and equipment was typically minimal or non- existent. " 
(Shearing and Stenning, 1981: 233) 
In going on to consider some of the pros and cons of proposals for 
licensing and regulation of private security in the UK, it should be 
borne in mind throughout that one of the most central issues is 
whether to provide the absolutely necessary resources to make any 
licensing scheme work if this gains supports and is intended to work. 
The metaphor of the 'toothless watchdog' is a particularly appropriate 
one to use in discussion of the private security business. Wi thout 
the appropriate resources to do its job then any regulatory authority 
ever appointed might well appropriate the image for its crested 
letterhead. 
Bringing it all Back Home: the 'Pros' and 'Cons' and General Issues 
and Principles of the Case for Licensing and Regulation of Private 
Security in the UK 
Unl i ke the f ormal system of overvi ew of the pol ice (whatever its 
inadequacies) there is in the UK no prescribed means for ensuring the 
accountability of the private security sector. There is no 
constitutional calling to account, nor even a universal regulatory 
code governing the relationship between private security and public 
services - from which private security benefits in gross disproportion 
to its input into the relationship. 
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In 1978 1 contributed to an unpublished Report on private security 
prepared by the Outer Circle Policy Unit and presented to the Home 
Office during the period that it was preparing its 1979 Green Paper - The Private Security InLIdUst rry: A Discussion Document. One of the key 
issues which the OCPU report addressed and which the Green Paper 
minimised was that of accountability. Private security interests 
themselves,, not surprisingly, consistently trivialise this issue. As 
the OCPU report observed, 
"the claim by the Managing Director of Securicor that as a 
public company it is 'at all time most effectively 
answerable to the press' (Times, 10th June, 1978) simply demonstrates a failure to grasp the constitutional issues 
i nvol ved in the concept of accountability. Occasional 
scrutiny by the press does not at all resemble the 
conventional idea of accountability or that which (has been) 
cal 1 ed the 'explanatory and cooperative mode' of 
accountability which is written into the Police Act 1964. " 
(Ocpu: lo) 
Formally the occupation and social role of the police is based upon 
the mandate of the state to appoint an agency to ensure the 
enforcement of its laws. In contrast, prima facie, private security 
has only a commercial raison d'etre. I shall explore this specific 
point further in Chapter 5, but it is reasonable to state that there 
is certainly no 'mandate' here which is primarily intended to be 
coincidental with the general public interest. Rather it is private 
interest that prevails. As the OCPU report pointed out, "indeed since 
the initial abolition of compounding an offence, even the most 
exiguous protection for the public is lacking" (ibid.: 11). 
Of course the question also arises of protecting the civil liberties 
of ordinary employees in private security work. At one level, there 
is an unusual coincidence of opinion on this issue between civil 
liberties groups, private security employers and representatives of 
employees such as the trade union MATSA and the independent 
association., IPSA. All these groups,, albeit with different ends in 
view, would support some system of licensing which exempted private 
security employees from the provisions of the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act,, 
_(1974). 
The most relevant part of this Act is Section 4. This lays down that: 
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"a person who has become a rehabi 1 itated person f or the purposes of this Act in respect of a conviction shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of, or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction. " 
(Section 4.1) 
"Where a question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances is put to him or to any other person otherwise than in proceedings before a judicial authority - (a) the question shall be treated as not relating to spent 
convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent 
convictions and the answer thereto may be framed 
accordi ngly. " 
(Sub-section 2) (cf. discussion in Draper, 1978: 42) 
The provisions of the Act do not extend to sentences of over thirty 
months and the length of 'rehabilitation' can be up to ten years. But 
what seems to keep this hurdle at the forefront of proposals about how 
to introduce licensing and regulations is not only that it ýakes it 
difficult to make a credible start on vetting prospective employees 
but also the fear that it is not necessarily 'major criminals' who may 
have received substantial prison sentences who will find employment in 
private security attractive,, but rather petty,, small-time, small crime 
offenders who may have a string of two year sentences behind them. 
The 'clean slate' intentions of the Act are highly laudable but there 
have always been a number of occupations exempted from the Act. It is 
on the basis of pragmatic recognition of this that bodies like the 
National Council for Civil Liberties which has favoured a system of 
licensing for private detectives for someyears (recomending this as 
part of their evidence to the Younger Committee), have more recently 
extended their support to the licensing and regulation of private 
security generally, including - with provisos - the exemption from the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. In a letter of March, 1978 to Bruce 
George, MP supporting his proposed Private Members Bill to regulate 
private security, the then General Secretary of NCCL, Patricia Hewitt 
briefly stated NCCL's position: 
"We do not believe that licensing would either confer an 
unwanted appearance of official approval on Private 
Detectives, nor would such a system involve an invasion of 
privacy. As you know, it is our view that only the 
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licensing body should have access to criminal records in 
order to find out whether an applicant should be licensed or not. We w ould, of course, be against any syst em where an 
employer could have access to criminal records in order to 
check the credentials of an applicant for a job as a detective or security agent. " 
I bel ieve that the NCCL 's position is the most proper one f or a 
regulatory system with credibility., integrity and sensitivity to 
f ol 1 ow. It would however require far more resources than either kind 
of system allowing the employee or employer to apply for some form of 
certification from the criminal records system. Such large resources 
are unlikely to be forthcoming in the forseeable future. It remains 
to be seen how much of a real dilemma any possibility of licensing and 
regulation which could not concede this proviso for fiscal reasons, 
might be. 
There are, of course, other parties with an expressed interest in 
seeing the control, if not the complete doing away with,, of private 
security. Not insignificant here is the opinion of many rank and file 
police officers. While attitudes to the private security sector seem 
to mellow, if not take on a glow, further up the promotion scale, the 
attitude of many junior police officers and of the Police Federation 
has frequently ranged from the suspicious to the hostile. 
In familiar terms and with similar arguments, various representative 
voices of rank and file officers have demanded controls over private 
security through the past three decades and remain vocal over the 
issue in the 1980s. Perhaps the rank and file themselves have grown 
slightly apathetic about the issue or else come to accept, and to some 
degree welcome, the ancillary service functions of the contract 
private security industry. But on the platform of Police Federation 
conferences, and in the pages of Police and Police Review, the issue 
remains a live one. 
Typical was the Editorial column of Police Review for 17th June, 1983 
headlined 'Ban Bogus Police' and revivifying a whole series of 
arguments which turn upon the contention that private security is 
usurping the function of, and taking over, roles which should 
be the 
responsibility of the police. The scene is set in terms of public 
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confidence in the police -a concern which it is difficult to 
reasonably argue against. 
"There is no law in this country to stop a private ccmpany 
setting up its own police force. There should be - if for no other reason than to maintain public esteem for genuine 
police forces. There are other reasons besides, but it is 
manifestly against the public interest to permit anything that might erode public confidence in the police. " 
Without the burden of having to acknowledge reasons for the growth of 
private security - including aspects of the law relating to access to 
private property and to police powers and responsibilities - there 
follows familiar invocation of section 52 of the Police Act 1964 
concerning the wearing of police-style uniforms and of the Public 
Order Act, 1936 regarding 'associations of persons' who may be 
organised, trained or equipped to 'usurp the functions of the police'. 
It is not that these points do not have val i di ty - either in 1 aw or 
argument, as I have indicated earlier; rather they are simply tired 
and by themselves., put forward from a relatively narrow interest group 
position, will receive little attention and less action. Nonetheless 
as part of a broader range of arguments and sources of pressure for 
licensing, regulation and control then the significance of this 
particular lobby is profound. 
Where we could expect to find strong and clear opposition to any forms 
of licensing and regulation is among the free-marketeers and 
established figures at the helms of self-regulation organisations. I 
have already discussed the ambivalencies of the position of the BSIA 
and some of its key figures. But even in the arguments of those who 
seem most certain about the benefits of non-regulation or the adequacy 
of self-regulation, there are evident failings or concessions. 
In several papers which have contained arguments against licensing 
private security - and indeed supported further privatisation of 
certain 'policing' functions, the economist, R. L. Carter (1974; 1976) 
has viewed the private security organisations as providing a good and 
efficient service at competitive prices - the key to the fallacy of 
this argument is the belief that efficiency and good service can 
follow from uncontrolled competition. 
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Carter correctly points out that licensing would increase the cost of 
private security, as would proposals to create qualification barriers 
to entry into the business or the kind of proposal made by Seldon 
(1977) and others, to employ the police for certain security services, 
for they have higher standards, better pay rates and better conditions 
of work (Carter, 1976: 35-7). Carter sees the current situation as 
beneficial for both security organisations and their customers. 
"So long as entry to the market remains easy with low capital barriers there should be no fears of the restrictive 
practices characteristic of oligopoly situations. Competition between firms should keep both prices and 
profits low. Moreover customers can always exercise the 
ultimate sanction of employing their own security staff if dissatisfied with the prices charged or service provided. Therefore under existing conditions there need be no fear of 
the exploitation of firms by a cartel of security companies, 
nor can they afford to operate inefficiently. " 
(Carter, 1976: 3, ) 
However, with regard to these conditions promoting efficiency, 
surprisingly for an economist., Carter misses the point that in the 
most competitive areas of private security they are likely to lead to 
the opposite. Precisely because "competition between firms ... 
keeps both prices and profits low" (though the latter is 
questionable), price-undercutting of rivals is necessary for survival 
and low pay and inadequate training are inevitable consequences, in 
turn tending to attract workers to the occupation who are, by the 
professed standards of the private security companies, unsuitable. In 
short, the competitive marketing of the mass, non-specialised private 
security services actually means that firms (to paraphrase Carter) 
I cannot afford to operate efficiently' What the arguments of writers 
like Carter expose is not the efficacy of the free-market, but rather 
the need for intervention in it in the form of minimum wages and 
standards legislation. 
Of the sel f-regulation bodies, the National Supervisory Council for 
Intruder Alarms has - relatively speaking - perhaps been the most 
successful. However, in musing upon the possibility of it attaining 
broader powers through legislation, its former Director, Admiral D. 
Callaghan, was quite prepared to acknowledge its ineffectiveness in 
dealing with serious cases of abuse of standards and practice. As 
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Callaghan put it in a paper to the Edinburgh Conference on 'Major 
Property Crime': 
... we are very much open to criticism for our impotence in the face of outrageous advantage being taken of a customer powerless to obtain redress without resorting to the Courts. " 
Once this admission is made the next step can only be recognition of 
the need for some form of legislatively backed powers of control: 
*. it-could hardly be questioned whether a legislated iupervisory 
body would have the necessary powers, either 
under its own control or by virtue of its official access to the various consumer-protection departments of the Government, and we must therefore conclude that an independent body (e. g. the NSCIA) is at a disadvantage in 
this respect compared with a legislated body when acting as 
a consumer protector. " 
(Callaghan, 1976: 147) 
Clearly the self-regulation bodies would prefer that they were the 
recipients of legislative authority. But at least recognition of the 
advantages of legislated powers of control over private security 
starts the debate at a more appropriate point than the non- 
intervention 'leave it to the market' stance. To quote the title of 
Callaghan's paper, it recognizes that fundamentally the issue is that 
of the 'Accountability of Security in Practice'. 
The Green Paper 
Feb -at e ?_ 
1979 -A Document for Discussion or the Grevina of a 
In 1979, the then Labour Government published a Green Paper - The 
Private Security Industry -A Discussion Paper. The Introduction 
stated that: 
(1) The Government are publis-hing this discussion paper because they 
recognise that there is public concern about the recent growth of 
the private security industry in this country ... 
(2) Arguments in favour of control are often based on the principle 
that the preservation of law and order is essentially a matter 
for the police and that if certain functions in this area are 
assumed by private organisations then at least these 
organisations should operate under strict government 
control ... 
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The present paper is designed to contribute to this debate by 
providing background information about the private security 
industry and discussing some of the issues raised by the question 
of control (P. 1). 
Such a debate however has hardly flourished in the UK. It has instead 
kept relatively safely within its existing parochial boundaries. If 
the Discussion Paper was a sincere initiative then it should have had 
sincere support and sponsorship subsequently and genuinely encouraged 
debate involvinq all interpqtpd nArtielc Tnn nf+nn 4rr11,,, r --C 
legislative policy and criminological significance are debated by 
those whom the Home Office feels 'know best' but who in reality may in 
fact be those who know 1 east about the day to day real i ti es of ýf or 
exampl e, pol ici ng, pri sons , drug-use or -in thi s case - the private 
security sector. 
Indeed, one of the major problems of the adequacy of the Paper - as 
with much of the 'debate' about Drivate securitv - i,, that it har, nn 
conception of the significance of the breadth of the activities which 
private security organisations, agents and related bodies deal in. 
The parameters of its discussion are safely set out in a restricted 
view of "the private security industry. " This very low-key approach 
did not surprise, but nonetheless disappointed, interested observers 
and especially those (including the present author) who had been 
involved in the compilation of information and evidence for submission 
to the Home Office with the precise intention of attempting to widen 
the working definition of private security that Home Office 
researchers had been briefed with. 
It is certainly something of an indication of the damping as opposed 
to enlivening effect that the Discussion Paper had on debate that the 
most cogent response came from observers in Canada. In a paper 
entitled 'Private Security and Private Justice' published in the 
British Journal of Law and Society (1980 (a)) Stenning and Shearing 
provide a critique of the discussion document in the kind of detail 
which cannot be offered here. It is important however to take up some 
of the key points that they raise, both in agreement and disagreement. 
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Stenning and Shearing (1980 (a)) promptly identify the nature of the 
Discussion Paper as a "tentative governmental response to some quite 
specific pressures for the introduction of some form of regulatory 
legislation" (p. 262). Echoing the feelings of UK observers they go 
on to observe that, 
"in such circumstances, there is often as much, if not more, 
comment to be made on what the Paper did not talk about (and 
why it did not talk about it), as on what the Paper did talk 
about. " 
262) 
This is certainly true - and in regard to one of the key issues that 
Stenning and Shearing raise, there is a certain irony in some 
omissions. 
As I have mentioned, earlier official sources, Ministerial statements 
and Home Office reassurances have at various times rejected the need 
for specific legislation pertaining to private security on the grounds 
that the existing body of laws are quite adequate to curtail abuses 
and illegalities. Up to a certain point, principally concerning one's 
definition of adequate, this argument is fairly sound. Yet the 
Discussion Paper makes relatively little of it. Indeed, in the view 
of Stenning and Shearing, 
"in emphasizing that the law makes no distinction between 
ordinary citizens and private security persons., the 
Discussion Paper seems to ignore the importance of the 
general law as a vehicle for more effective control over the 
private security industry. In this way the Paper prepares 
the way for its exclusive focus on various forms of 
regulation in discussing the alternative forms of control 
available. " 
(p. 262) 
As Stenning and Shearing suspect, the Paper was not designed to be an 
exercise genuinely considering the entire possible range of issues 
arising from the growth., activities and need - or not - for control of 
the private security sector. Its posture is defensive and purely 
responsive. It was not, whatever its claims to the contrary, intended 
to be part of or to stimulate debate. It was intended to reply to 
certain pressures and proposals and, in reasonable tones and terms, 
defuse them. 
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What must be grasped is that genuinely adequate regulation, control 
and accountability of the private security sector will not follow from 
the pursuit of 'either/or' options. Standing, general laws should 
always, in any case, be employed to protect civil liberties, curb the 
abuse of power and privilege and prosecute in cases of criminal 
violation. As Stenning and Shearing go on to recognize: 
"If private security personnel are in reality no different from ordinary citizens, a law which treats them alike seems 
most appropriate. But if in reality they are not, and the law still treats them as if they are, it becomes 
i nappropri ate ... We strongly suspect that in reality the 
personnel of modern private security organi sati ons are 
growing increasiný-ly less like "ordinary" citizens. " 
(p. 263) (my emphasis) 
This latter point is pivotal to the argument for the necessity of 
specific regulatory legislation pertaining to the range of activities 
within the private security sector. 
The very development of the private security sector has been founded 
upon the need of various interested parties to create agencies and 
mechanisms of protection., detection, policing and social control which 
are quit e different to the public police controlled by specific laws 
or the g eneral public controlled by general laws. Chapter 2 has 
already explored how ordinary employees working in the largest and 
most visi ble part of the private security sector, take on attitudes 
and are immersed in an occupational culture which encourage their 
sense of, and their actual differentiation from, 'ordinary citizens'. 
Chapter 5 will go on to explore some of the background ideological 
elements which help to sustain the private security sector's ability 
to work effectively at its various levels within the new division of 
pol icing labour as part of an acknowledged commercial compromise on 
the part of the State. 
To some extent, this 'new' division of policing labour merely replays 
that 'new' division which took place in the 19th century when the 
'new' public police began to displace some of the long established 
local . private arrangements 
for security, protection and the 
maintenance of order. The tremendous significance of this development 
must not be under- estimated. Nor should the medium and long-term 
social repercussions, adjustments in the criminal justice system and 
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other effects. But there is a need - and there is scope - for 
constructive legislative response now in order to provide public 
safeguards for private security. 
Conclusion: Beyond the 'Blind Eye' of History and the Home Office 
Limited licensing and regulation can in the long-term view only be an 
inadequate stop-gap measure. It woul d nonetheless be a step in the 
right direction, even if only as a concession of recognition of the 
present and future significance of the private security sector. The 
current 'blind eye' of history and the Home Office is grist to the 
mill of suspicion and the musings of conspiracy theory. And their 
attraction is not confined to civil libertarians and the like. As the 
Editorial Comment of Security and Protection magazine put it in 
responding to the Home Office Green Paper, the document as a whole is 
"pretty uninspiring, " it "ignores in the main the extensive arguments 
for and against regulation/registration, " it "suggests the need for 
public debate but provides nothing for the 'public' to debate, " and 
generally, "seems **. an extended argument as to why the Home 
Office should not involve itself, " (March 1979). 
There is af amil i ar danger in much social science research, and in 
criminology in particular, that examination of an area which usefully 
finds hidden complexities and ramifications, tends to then conclude 
that more research is needed before useful and informed action can be 
taken (cf. for example on this particular subject, Shearing et al., 
1980: 252, para. 2). The only positive feature of Britain's current 
absolute lack of legislated regulation in this area is that it can 
develop a system of controls which takes on board the lessons, 
practice, experience and research available from elsewhere. More 
research information gathering and debate are essentials. But on the 
basis of what is already known of the relative failures of existing 
systems abroad and the identified areas of concern in the UK, we 
should be able to work towards a legislatively empowered regulatory 
system which truly regulates. 
7 
Essentially such a system should set minimum standards; be backed by 
legal powers to regulate and enforce these; create a forum of 
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accountability, for the hearing of complaints and the initiating of 
appropriate action. In developing its role the system should examine 
and build upon the experiences of other jurisdictions. It must have 
adequate resources to maintain a credible and effective Inspectorate 
with an efficient administrative back-up. These should be paid for 
out of licensing fees, imposed fines and central government funding. 
Legislatively empowe-t, cJregulation and procedures for ensuring 
accountability are necessary because it must be recognised that 
private security are not simply private citizens. Their expected role 
and function makes them a special case requiring special public 
safeguards. 
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Chapter 4- Notes 
The analysis offered in Chapter 5 explores some of the reasons 
why this has been consistently so, regardless of the political 
party in power. 
(2) This section draws upon South (1983). 
(3) The research reported in this thesis is not centrally concerned 
with media images of the private security sector, however in its 
early phases the cuttings libraries and back issues of leading 
daily and Sunday papers were searched and documentary and 
magazine reports collected or abstracted. 
(4) The following draws on South, 1983: 49. 
(5) The following section draws on an extended interview with John 
Wheeler, Director General of the BSIA., 20th April, 1978; 
subsequently issued BSIA reports; and access to some of the files 
of Bruce George., MP relating to his campaign to introduce 
licensing for private security. 
(6) Draper's starting point here follows from her particular 
interests as a lawyer; (and hence the detailed exposition found 
in Chapter 8 of her book) . From an interest in legislative 
control alone then initial consideration of private investigators 
and issues of intrusion of privacy is quite necessary and 
logical, for this is where most legal interest has been directed. 
Having outlined the broader dimensions of the private security 
sector earlier then this same starting point can suffice here 
al so. It must however raise one or two questions. One obvious 
and key question that Draper asks is why quite a lot of 
legislation has been focused on private investigators. She 
suggests that for the UK at least, anxiety over security 
companies "is of a more sporadic nature, manifesting itself at 
intervals whenever a particularly worrying story hits the 
headlines .. ". whilst on the other hand, 
"the activities of 
private detectives have come more regularly under review in 
Parliament and elsewhere, usually in the context of the 
controversial question of the invasion of privacy" (Draper, 
19 78: 14 6). What seems a more interesting and fundamental 
question is why, in the UK - and even in those countries which 
have developed some legislative control - activities engaged in 
by private security sector agencies do not generate more concern, 
and on a more consistent basis. Certainly the influence of the 
media in its selection of stories has something to do with it. 
Clearly also there is a more obvious link in the public eye, and 
to a large extent in practice, between the private investigator 
and issues like the invasion of privacy. However, there are 
other dimensions of the private security phenomenon which must be 
explored in order to be able to raise the appropriate questions 
and then attempt to answer them. Chapter 2 offers exploration of 
the occupational dimension of work in private security and the 
following Chapter 5 offers an attempt at a broader analysis of 
how and who the private sector works for. In offering the latter 
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analysis I seek to go beyond Draper's legalistic concerns (and 
additionally the economistic analyses of others, like Spitzer and 
Scull (1978), and offer an account of the political-economic 
significance of the contemporary private security sector which 
also helps to explain its relative and apparent 'insignificance' 
in the eyes of both the public and the State. 
(7) Arriving at a model for the regulation and accountability of 
private security is clearly no easy task. It faces many of the 
great difficulties which arise out of debates concerning the 
accountability of the public police. This point could lead onto 
a whole separate study of the nature of accountability, but 
clearly developments around both issues ought to be informed by 
common and dissimilar aspects of the two debates. For it is 
undoubtedly the case that progress and set-backs with regard to 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I seek to develop an analysis 
is; how and for whom it functions and how it 
capital and the state. Having elaborated 
diversity of the private security sector such 
usefully start by attempting to clarify 
security. 
of what private security 
does so in relation to 
on the development and 
an analysis might most 
the concept of private 
This is crucial for if we speak of private security as fundamentally 
distinct and divorced from the public policing of society then,, by 
virtue of re-enforcing the private/public dichotomy, we are in danger 
of misconceiving the nature of private security and obscuring its 
relation to., and position within the state (cf. Weiss, 1984: 3). 
Thus the purpose and pursuit of clarification at this point is to go 
beyond what private security does (as described in chapters 2 and 3), 
and to locate it in relation to other agencies of social control 
concerned with deviance, crime and the protection of life and 
property. In other words, where it fits within society's division of 
policing labour. 
There are numerous criminological studies of 'policing', by which we 
tend to mean studies of state empowered, organised and paid police 
forces. There are, however, relatively few studies of private 
security 'policing' and its functions and activities. One of the 
purposes of this chapter therefore, is to locate private security 
policing within the broad context of its relationship to the state, 
defining its place in the continuum of social control thereby 
literally relating it to other systems of policing and social 
control. 1 I shall also discuss (or re-iterate) some of the structural 
factors which have been conducive to the post-war growth of private 
security in Britain. Like private security itself, however, many of 
these factors are not nationally specific but are part of broader and 
international post-war developments. Thus there is a strong,, albeit 
implicit, comparative basis to this chapter. Probably most 
importantly with regard to Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, where the same private security phenomena have developed in 
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relatively comparable ways, the issue of private security control of 
policing and security raises similar and equally disturbing issues for 
those concerned with civil liberties, (cf. Chapter 4). 
The Private Security Sector and the Social Control Continuum 
I start here by positioning the private security sector within the 
spectrum of 'formal ' to 'informal ' institutions of rule-enforcement, 
investigation, adjudication and discipline. Such a 'locating' 
exercise is important not only in terms of this particular chapter but 
also because of the narrow-alley 'beat' which police research in 
general, has tended to unimaginativelY 'pound'. Examples and the 
resulting deficiencies of such a tendency have been emphasized in an 
erudite discussion of studies of policing by Maureen Cain (1979). 
Here Cain observes that in such studies, 
"nobody questioned what 'the police' meant. Thus private 
police forces, citizen protection groups and other 
government policing bodies were ignored. " 
(Cain, 1979: 145) 
The narrowness of focus has extended throughout the posing of problems 
with policing and in the nature of the questions asked. For example, 
"the posing of the problem as 'do policemen break the rules? ' 
and 'are policemen prejudiced? ' enabled the police to 
develop their 'rotten apple' theory as a defence. " 
(Knapp Commission, 1972). (Cain, ibid. ) 
It is interestl ng, and di sturbing to fi nd that wh i1 st the bel i ef has 
been widened., so now academics may consider a wider range of civil 
liberties issues related to different forms of policing organisation, 
the problems and questions are posed in a remarkably similar fashion 
and, not surprisingly, receive similarly styled defences and 
responses. As Cain (1979: 145) concludes of earlier studies: 
"in sum both the problem of policing and its solution were 
conceived in a non-social way. Relationships and structures 
were not conceived as problematic in themselves. " 
It is certain problematic aspects of these relationships and 
structures in the case of the private security sector which have been 
considered in this thesis and which are addressed at a more 
theoretical level in this chapter. 
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Private security seems at first sight distinctly different from civil 
provision of policing services in its general relationship to the 
state - its organisation, control, 'mandate' and central object to 
make profit. In fact, I would argue that it is useful to employ a 
model of a continuum of policing organisation in society - in which 
both the public and private contributors exchange expertise, key 
personnel and, importantly, accommodate each others shifting 
parameters of operation and priorities in action. 
In one of the final reports of a ten-year study of private security in 
Canada, Shearing, Farnell and Stenning (1980: 14) have similarly 
suggested the utility of conceiving of policing as a continuum of 
activity. Thus, at one end: 
"it is the coincidence of special powers and public 
accountability that defines the public police, while (at the 
other end), private security is defined by the absence of 
special powers and accountability to private persons and 
organisations. In between these two poles lie a number of 
security forces which are neither strictly public nor 
private ... This ambiguous status applies to all 'private 
security' persons who have been granted special constable 
(or 'deputy') status as well as to those employed by Crown 
(government, state) corporations and other organisations 
whose character as either private or public institutions is 
uncertain (e. g. railway police, parks police, harbour and 
airport authority police). " 
These ambiguous and anomalous policing statuses are found not only in 
the UK and Canada, but also in the USA, Australia, New Zealand, most 
European nations,, the USSR and Soviet block and also in curious forms 
in 'community' orientated courts and policing in various other 
socialist societies. 
The rational isation2 of social control in the past thirty years and 
the unfolding decade, occurring from pole to pole across this 
continuum, must be explored in terms of the articulation between the 
state and capital of a newly re-asserted compromise and symbiosis in 
the field of social control. Re-asserted because the employment of 
commercially organised 'private police' forces by ruling groups has a 
long history (cf. Chapter 1; Bowden, 1978; Draper, 1978; Little and 
Sheffield, 1983; South forthcoming; Weiss, 1978,1981,1985). Private 
policing arrangements pre-date public policing by centuries and were 
never wholly superceded by the latter (South, forthcoming). In the 
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post-war period a variety of private security services have expanded 
throughout western industrial societies. Most evident are the visible 
and now wholly commonplace unformed guards, armoured vans, patrol cars 
and alarms etc. (cf. Chapter 2). But the historically familiar 
figures of private spies and mercenaries also flourish in clandestine 
fashion within the private security sector, whilst the sophistication 
of visible and invisible surveillance is new, sinister and also much 
in demand. Theoretical assessment of the contemporary significance of 
private security therefore presents, first of all, an important 
definitional problem. 
A number of commentators . principal ly representatives of the 
'industry' maintain that the term 'private police' is inappropriate 
because this promotes confusion with the public/civil police and the 
business of 'private security' is, very straightforwardly, the 
'security' of property and persons. Clearly, such a source of 
confusion is unhel pf ul ; on the other hand , the assurance and 
maintenance of 'security' is a very broad enterprise and the concept 
of 'security' itself far from unproblematic. I argue here that 
'private security' is a more appropriate term because the provision of 
services it represents is wide but not specific to policing. Other 
commentators seem to prefer to refer to 'private policing' partly 
because in the USA 'private police' have often had the status and 
legitimacy of legal deputisation from the civil police, but also, more 
dubiously, one suspects because of the polemical attraction of 
referring to 'private police' Ware, 1975; Spitzer and Scull, 1977 
(b)). 
Shearing et al. ( 1980: 16) attempt to clear this definitional ground. 
Moving from the inadequacy of simply listing what is comprised within 
a broad category of security services, these authors suggest that: 
"If we are to move to a definition of 'security', we must 
make explicit the common theme which makes all (such) 
services ... security services. This theme is 
protection, and in particular, the protection of 
information., persons and property. Thus, security, may be 
defined as those activities which serve to protect these 
valued goods. " 
This focus alone however is insufficient to dispel ambiguity in 
termi nol ogy - and i ndeed potenti al ly c ompounds c on f us i on ,f or 
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'protection' is also a part of public policing duties. As these 
authors observe: 
"the argument for the use of the term 1private police' as 
opposed to 'private security' has tended to emphasize the 
similarity of functions of public and private security. The 
conclusion drawn is that if one group performing policing 
functions is to be call ed 'pol ice' , then so shoul d the 
others. " 
(1980: 16) 
The critical point is that public and private policing may share 
aspects of function but crucially differ with regard to control and 
legal status. More precisely the term 'police' has, they argue,, ccme 
to be associated with members of a "government constabulary" (Parks, 
1970): 
"that is, persons with a special legal status employed by 
governments to preserve the peace ... To talk of 'private 
police' rather than 'private security' , given the 
connotations we associate with the term 'police' thus tends 
to be misleading. " 
(1980: 16) 
This significant and powerful connotative 'sense' of what policing 
'is', or more precisely 'who the police are'.. derives in large part 
from the historical origins of the term 'police' , and the 
"connotations of government control and governmental authority that 
derive from them" (1980: 17). It is worth observing here that this 
point should raise the question of the relationship between private 
security,, government and state, but this opportunity is missed. 
Shearing et al. (1980: 17) therefore opt for use of the term 'private 
security' as more accurate than the term 'private police', but retain 
the broader concept of 'policing' as appropriate to the description of 
the activities of private security. 
In this thesis I have accepted the point concerning inappropriate 
confusion with the public pol ice as wel I as suggesting that in many 
ways 'private security' is a broader enterprise, with a wider range of 
functions than the public police. I have therefore adopted the term 
private security or, more adequately I have argued, 'private security 
sector' , precisely because 
it encompasses not only provision of 
I policing' services but also more than conventional commonsense ideas 
of policing. Thus the private security sector embraces the opening of 
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a market based on the idea that ordinary office cleaners cannot be 
trusted anymore so clients need the services of 'security-vetted' 
cleaners, through the multiple role of 'crime prevention' , 
'rule 
observance' and fire-prevention advice, the checking of rules relating 
to health and safety at work., to services of surveillance, on-site 
plant observation, personnel profile compilation, and industrial 
espionage consultation and counter-attack (Chapters 2,3 and 4). Many 
of these services coincide (and often compete) with the formal 
policing responsibilities and operations of the state, but their 
immediate accountability is not to the representative legislature but 
to individuals in the commercial market place (cf. Chapter 4). 
The Anomalous Position of Private Security and Commercial Justice 
The private security sector undoubtedly represents the structural 
organisation of private security policing services outside the formal 
parameters of state provision of policing. Is it therefore part of 
what has been identified as a system of informal private justice 
(Abel 
, 1982; Henry, 1983) ? The answer is that it does not seem to f it 
here either and hence, the extent to which it can be considered an 
'informal' system of justice, of investigation, adjudication or rule- 
enforcement, must be clearly distinguished from those institutions 
more properly and accurately seen as representing forms of informal 
justice. Abel (1982) provides a comprehensive overview of the 
relevant parameters of this alternative and developing sphere. 
According to Abel (1982: 2): 
informal justice is said to be unofficial (dissociated 
from state power), non-coercive (dependent upon rhetoric 
rather than force), non-bureaucratic, decentralised, 
relatively undifferentiated, and non-professional; its 
substantive and procedural rules are imprecise, unwritten, 
democratic, flexible, ad-hoc, and particularistic. No 
concrete informal legal institution will embody all these 
qualities, but each will exhibit some. " 
Private security may seem to exhibit some of these qualities, and 
different aspects of private security may apparently display different 
qualities. The subject is open to tentative and suggestive analysis 
in terms of the general characteristics of informal justice, sharing 
features of the mutual interpenetration of ideologies, forms and 
practices of justice which exists between the informal, private and 
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formal spheres of justice and 'legal ' regulation (cf. Henry,, 1983). 
Nonetheless., the private security sector and its distinctive private 
justice can be clearly distinguished from 'informal ' justice by its 
necessary inclination towards formalisation. 
The centrality of the profit-motive means that the formalisation of 
commercial organisation is paramount, along with attendant 
professional isation, hierarchical and office bureaucracy, and 
differentiation within the market-place in order to stress the 
'uniqueness' of services; the adoption of (if not necessarily 
adherence to) a body of rules which are in line with formal law, are 
precise,, written, not open to discussion., and (ideally) inflexible, 
routine in use and general in coverage. Furthermore, the private 
security sector also works for and within the wider ambit of the 
state's organisation of social control and certain elements within it 
have no aversion at all to the use of coercive force. The distinction 
between the formal (state/civil /criminal) justice system and informal 
justice is of serious importance in the case of the private security 
sector precisely because it lies clearly and logically within the 
parameters of neither. Rather it lies between them, penetrated and 
penetrating, metaphorically a hybrid, born out of tensions and 
conflicts over definitions of justice between the state, capital and 
various forms of populism (left and right). 
Itis not. however., neutral or neuter. While the modern private 
security sector has anteced ents, in historical forms of private justice 
and private pol ice today' s private security i s, in range and form, 
unequivocally born of the age of modern capital and it represents 
capi tal 's own pol i ci ng of , and in, its own i nterests. It is a 
conservatively oriented, privately employed and directed, form of 
private commercial justice (cf. South, 1983). 
Some General Conditions for the Growth of Private Security 
The very scope for the existence of the private security sector has 
been related to the state's management of the conditions of the 
economy, capital's use of resources and the ways in which it benefits 
from state workers production of 'luxuries' (e. g. 'protection' 
(Gough, 1975). As Ian Gough (1975: 85) has argued: 
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the balance struck between direct state provision of a 
servi ce . state fi nance of pri vate provi si on or un trammel 1 ed 
private operation will depend upon the balance of class 
forces and the political structure of each individual 
state. " 
Thus the policing of complex., constitutionally democratic societies 
turns heavily on the legitimacy of the means employed by the state to 
regulate social order, oversee the observance of its laws and be seen 
to be making efforts to fulfil public expectations of creating a 'safe 
society' . 
Borrowing from the classic Weberian formulation of legitimacy and 
authority., Etzioni (1968) has focused upon two "bases of power": 
"On the one hand, power is based on the actual or potential 
use of instruments of coercion by the holder of power. On 
the other hand, power is based on, and is used, in "accord 
with the subjects values and under conditions that he views 
as proper" (Etzioni, 1968: 360). It is this latter form of 
power, which has its bases in the subject's values, that we 
refer to as authority or legitimate power. " 
(Turkel, 1980: 22) 
A key aspect of the legitimacy of private security is therefore found 
in the resonance of its avowed aims to protect property, prevent crime 
and so on, with 'right and proper' social values. Such aims are 
1 audabl e and 'a good thing' ergo private security is a' good' - or at 
least - acceptable thing. It can therefore claim some de facto, if 
not de jure, authority so necessary to its private policing modus 
operandi. As Parsons observed, authority - as required here - is 
"essentially the institutional code within which the use of power as a 
medium is organised and legitimised" (Parsons, 1966: 249; cf. Turkel, 
1980: 22-25). Therefore, the state's forbearance and tacit approval of 
private initiatives is also necessary to accord widespread legitimacy 
to them. Over time such tacit approval takes on its 
-de 
facto 
character; the initiative of private enterprise is even welcomed by 
governments conscious of fiscal constraint. 
Legitimacy accrues as private security is linked to the legitimate 
protection of private property, including "mass private property" to 
which the public has access (e. g. shopping centres or malls, cf. 
Shearing and Stenning, 1983). As in the USA, Canada and elsewhere it 
can acquire (or has long enjoyed) the legitimacy of licensing by the 
state. 
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However, measured against the ultimate sovereignty and power of the 
state, it never achieves such legitimacy as truly de-jure. It may 
claim right and lawful title for its activities but it does so within 
thestate'sf ramework of 1 egal ity. The increasi ng 
internationalisation of private security confuses this issue, but 
nonetheless, all states seek to oversee the exercise of power within 
their borders. Thus private security has a crucial relationship., not 
simply with capital, as its principal employers and owners but also 
with the state. For the state is not 'giving way' to private security 
but is continuing to act through it. To understand this, we must 
first be mindful of the artificial construction of the private/public 
dichotomy, as if the former were outside and the latter inside 'the 
state'. In an analysis paraphrasing Gramsci, Louis Althusser 
(1971: 144) argues that: 
"the distinction between the public and the private is a 
distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the 
(subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 
'authority'. " 
The state itself is identifiable with neither the public nor the 
private (Weiss; 1984: 13), "on the contrary, " Althusser argues, "it is 
the precondition for any distinction between private and public. " On 
the basis of this understanding, I argue that the state is not as some 
argue receding; it is not giving way to 'creeping capitalism', to the 
encroachment of informal institutions or to dimunition of its power 
through 'reformist' engineering (of the left or the right). 
As I shall indicate, state moves to rationalise, cut costs,, pull-back 
and so on, have their undeniable place,, impact and importance. But in 
considering the growth and significance of private security, as in 
other matters, our analysis is crude and short-sighted unless it also 
appreciates the dialectical nature of change, the interpenetration of 
state and civil society, of the formal and the informal and of the 
public and the private. 
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The Expansion of Private Security as a 'Sign of the Times' 
Within the post-war period, and particularly the recent decades of 
economic inflation and stagnation., private security has enjoyed a 
11 recession resistant" boom (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971) and has meshed 
well with a number of state moves to rationalise the cost of policing 
throughout western societies. In an analysis of the growth of the 
demand for private security in the USA, Mare (1975) suggests three 
factors have been of major importance. First, the decade of the 1960s 
in the USA was a period of social upheaval and violence. The 
coincidence of political and cultural turbulence marked the period as 
one of significance for those concerned with social control and 
economic reproduction. In this context an executive of the Burns 
security agency offered the following explanation of why the private 
security business was booming: 
"Look at what's happening today. The headlines are enough to 
tell you. There are all kinds of civil strife and turmoil, 
bombings and disruptions. Isn't that enough of an indicator 
of why businesses want protection? " 
(Washington Post, 1970) 
The Burns executive offers a 'context' - which apparently satisfies a 
number of commentators on private security: what is not answered is 
why such 'protection' should legitimately come from the private 
sector. It should of course be noted of 'explanations' from such 
sources that for all that private security is in the business of 
privacy, and invariably fights shy of media interest for fear of 'bad 
press', it is, on the other hand, by no means averse to publicising 
'bad news' for the rest of society. Such is the bread and butter not 
only of the media but of private security as well. 
A second, but related, growth phenomenon in the USA was 'street 
crime'. 'Muggings', 'hold-ups' and increases in rape offences all 
gave rise to increasing public and policing concern and consternation. 
Though again, why private security should be seen as the legitimate or 
obvious solution to such problems is unanswered. A more plausible 
connection might be with the growth of vigilantism, community patrols 
and the like. 3 Thirdly, the late 1950s and 1960s saw the 're- 
discovery' of 'commercial crime'. Robbery., violence, burglary and 
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vandalism are consistently 'alarming' crime problems, but suddenlY, 
massive hidden losses to business were miraculously discovered by 
security consultants as arising from employee theft, industrial 
sabotage and shoplifting. 
For the UK it is most evidently in the latter context of growing 
concern about crime problems, offences against property and the 
person, the decline of old standards and values, and, relatedly, a 
dramatic (re-) discovery of 'crime at work', that the development of 
the private security sector appears to have emulated expansion in the 
USA. Concern over rising crime and moral decay is not new and 
recurrently brings with it calls for moral re-armament and tougher 
action against the predators (cf. Pearson, 1983). Private initiatives 
have always played their part in such responses (cf. Little and 
Sheffield, 1983; South, forthcoming; Weiss, 1985). The post-war boom 
and proliferation of private security services finds a historically 
logical and expected place among these 'signs of the times, although, 
as I shall indicate, there are deeper factors and a broader context to 
also take account of. 
But in one very real sense., the development of private security has 
been the development of policing work and, more grandly, the private 
property environment which increasingly embraces areas of mass publ ic 
access but privately-owned space (e. g. shopping precincts). 
Well developed in the USA, the private policing of the workforce and 
the work-pl ace breeds a phil osophy which sees the surveillance and 
control of employees by a quasi-pol icing set of arrangements as a 
commercially logical extension of, and adjunct to, the traditional and 
formal organisation of supervision and discipline at work. 4 For 
example, an annual report for the Burns agency in the USA offered 
undercover agents to investigate certain kinds of "managerial 
problems" which it listed as "inventory losses, pilferage., theft, 
fraud, falsification of records, forgery, poor employee morale, wilful 
neglect of machinery, waste of time and materials, theft of tools, 
unreported absenteeism, supervisory incompetence, inadequate 
surveillance" and what are referred to as "delicate investigatory 
matters" (Burns, 1972). A pot-pourri of work-related 'problems' which 
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have coherence and connection only in a sinister marriage of F. W. 
Taylor's prescription for efficient production and Jeremy Bentham's 
scheme for the 'panoptic' surveillance of society. 
In the UK and the rest of Europe., private security organisations offer 
similar if generally less eye-catching lists of services. Massive 
profits are made in the provision of such services, but then, the 
argument runs, in the I ong-term . security saves money. Within the 
commercial ideology, investment, in 'loss prevention' is the key 
rationale underpinning the appeal of security to efficient management. 
As one senior British politician put it, "There is good evidence that 
security measures are a good investment which earn a rate of return at 
least comparable to that on other investments. 115 But the 'rationale' 
is more than simply concern over profit margins. 
"It is natural to feel most concern and to canmit most of our 
efforts to what seem to be the most serious offences: major 
robberies, frauds and arsons. But let us not forget the 
lesser crimes. In isolation these may seem trivial, but 
when, as now, they accumulate in great numbers, they are 
seri ou s. Petty pilfering is not as dramatic as bank 
robbery, but on a large scale it can be even more harmful to 
the fabric of our society. " 
(Ibid. ) 
This concern with the "fabric of our society" is., I shall point out, 
something which the private security sector is particularly concerned 
about, a factor belying its avowed apolitical commercial neutrality. 
There is no neutrality here. There are questions to raise. As an 
early writer on the subject asked, are private pol ice "a I egal 
anomaly, a constitutional contradiction? " (Shalloo,, 1933: vii; cf. 
Weiss, 1984: 2). 1 have raised some issues related to this question in 
preceding chapters. In the following sections I shall explore further 
the position of private security as embraced by and embracing anomaly 
and contradiction. 
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The Post-War Rise of the Private Security Sector in the UK 
"The best way of achieving power for the Trade Unions 000 is to ensure that they have access to relevant management 
and government information, nearly all of which is processed 
and stored in computer centres. The picture is not an 
entirely gloomy one. At least one can say that the advent 
of the violent protester, the urban guerilla, the militant 
school child, the frenetic female, the campus incendiary, 
the highwayman trade unionist and all the other overturners 
of the world, has created a bonanza for the security man and 
the industry which supports him. They must be, and indeed 
are trying to be, worthy of their calling. " 
(Hamilton, 1972: 111-112) 
This quote, from one of the major security theorists in Britain, has 
an interesting historical resonance. Radzinowicz (1948: 28) quotes 
Smollet, the 18th century novelist, as describing the England of the 
1730s as "infested with robbers, assassins and incendiaries, the 
natural consequence of degeneracy, corruption and the want of 
police .. ." Hamilton's view of contemporary conditions almost 
suggests that the presence of a public police force has made little 
discernible difference. The point is that the same rhetoric which 
stimulated private initiatives pre-dating the establishment of a 
public police in the 18th and 19th centuries, is curiously little 
changed in the 20th century. 
The private security sector developed rapidly in the UK, USA and 
Canada throughout the 1950s and 1960s and it is worth briefly re- 
examining some of the conditions which helped to stimulate this 
growth. On one level, there is little that is remotely odd about the 
expansion of private security. In the history of policing in Britain 
and the USA (and, indeed elsewhere) private initiatives and policing 
arrangements pre-dated public policing6 and the likes of the privately 
paid night-watch, factory police and the systematic organisation of 
informers and information gathering for private purposes, never really 
disappeared. In this sense the new organisation of private security 
has merely involved the more intensified selling of these services as 
a more economically rational form of security, offering immediacy, 
personal service, control, standby support, 'risk-free' undercover and 
detection work, consultancy, and provision of technical equipment and 
expertise (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). 
271 
A significant structural factor arises out of changes in the infra- 
structural organisation of production in the post-war period. The 
movement to larger units of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' production 
systems on single sites, alongside the growth of "mass private 
property" (Shearing and Stenning, 1983), (such as shopping complexes, 
condominiums, private residential estates etc. ), has meant a greater 
demand for internal security on private property than ever before. A 
role expanded for the policing function to fill which the police 
themselves were unable to move into, partially because of the 
relatively small base of legal powers on which they can routinely 
claim access to private premises. Above and beyond this, other 
obvious pressures on their resources came to be prioritised, 
generating considerable formal, and informal, reluctance to embrace a 
further demand for their services. 
The pressurising 'other problems' faced by the police were part of the 
developing post-war awareness of social problems and political 
tensions, of both an internal and external nature. In this climate, 
the private security sector has sold itself well, identifying threats 
to corporate security and profit. It is undeniable that modern 
industrial development has made business and industry more 
'vulnerable' to theft and sabotage (if only in terms of scale) and, 
hence, more security conscious. Massive 'discovered' increases in 
pilferage and forms of fraud - minor and major - have been identified 
and, in times of economic crisis, when the Keynesian orthodoxy has 
broken down and recession and slump squeeze high profits (Gough, 
1975), then such high 'shrinkage' become unacceptable. Attacks on 
payrolls ill-protected by pressurised police resources, heralded a 
boom in armoured car services. Further, the fostering of the idea in 
society that technical advancement and administrative rationalisation 
are 'neutral ' matters and without far-reaching consequences, helped 
this reorientation of policing power. 
For Spitzer and Scull (1977, b) , two key orientations 
in the 
development of the modern corporation have been particularly 
significant in contributing to the accompanying growth of private 
security. First, a process of concentration "making more efficient 
use of labour power through 'scientific management' .. " and 
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secondly, "extending control over many factors of production, 
distribution and consumption external to earlier forms of business 
enterprise" (p. 25). As Christopher Lasch (1979: Chapter 7) observes, 
American managerialism in the 1950s (a commodity soon imported to the 
UK) embraced a cultural turning point in the socialisation of 
industrial authority and these sentiments have been strongly 
internalised in the theory and practice of industrial security. One 
hi gh 1yinf1u enti a1b ook of th e end of the decade., 'Th e Human Si de of 
Enterprise' by Douglas McGregor (1960), responded to conservative 
alarm about the apparent abdication of authority in society generally 
and managerial relations in particular, by arguing that this apparent 
trend, in fact, "represented instead a transition to a more effective, 
scientific, therapeutic form of control" (Lasch, 1979: 314). According 
to Lasch: 
"reactionary businessmen predictably denounced the new 
softness imported into business by industrial relations 
experts, demanding a crack-down on unions, a reversal of the 
New Deal, and a return to the good old days of industrial 
autocracy, McGregor had no patience with this outmoded 
outl ook . It rested, in his view,, on a misunderstanding of 
authority and a simplification of the alternative modes of 
exercising power. 'Abdication is not an appropriate 
antithesis to authoritarianism ... Only if we can I 
free 
ourselves from the notion that we are limited to a single 
dimension - that of more or less authority - will we escape 
from our present dilemma. " 
(Lasch,, 1979: 315, quoting McGregor, 1960: 31) 
By the 1960s and early 1970s management had learned the lesson (it 
seemed) that there was a negotiable and judicious optimum level of 
authority which needed to be exercised - and no more. For security 
consultants, always in any case constrained by cost considerations 
attached to recommendations for improving security, such a message 
made commercial as well as sound theoretical sense. Thus., Wright 
(1972: 19) compares government security and commercial security in 
these terms: 
e*. in government security the end 
(preserving secrets of 
national importance) justifies the means (the creation of an 
expensive security defence). In commercial security, 
however, the end is subject to a means test: for if the 
losses are not likely to be serious, it is not worth 
spending a lot of money to prevent them. Government 
security, therefore, aims atmaximum security levels, while 
commercial security aims at an optimum level of security in 
each individual business. " 
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So changes in the organisation of production., in technology and in the 
hard and soft edges of the management of industrial relations, 
alongside increasing consumerism and the moral panics surrounding real 
and imagined growing crime rates, have all contributed to the 
legitimate and largely unchallenged expansion of private security. In 
Britain the recommendations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police 
pressured the existing 158 forces to re-structure and re-appraise 
their priorities. They subsequently discontinued a range of escort 
and social-function services, and increased the cost of their services 
when available for hire. The 1964 Police Act was a gift to private 
security's growth. 
More generally, several social themes, or perhaps more descriptively 
I paranoias' , occurred around the late 1950s and early 1960s, further 
boosting conditions of growth. The Welfare State and its provisions 
were humane outcomes of post-war social reconstruction,, but there was 
a clear limit to be set to the acceptability of state intervention and 
control. The ideology of the period of the 1950s, stirred by the 
suppression of the 1956 Hungary Revolt, conscious of involvement in 
Korea and enmeshed in the politics of the Cold War, was distinctly 
anti-totalitarian, in particular, anti-Soviet. Individualism (within 
the consensus) and private choice (within the parameters of accepted 
'rationality' and morality) were key-notes. In the UK and other 
European countries, the nascent 'national security' consciousness was 
also stimulated by the beginnings of the so-called 'brain-drain' to 
overseas competitors, principally,, and ironically, its war-time 
allies, the USA, Canada and Australia. This particular corporate 
headache went hand-in-hand,, and often symbolically merged in the 
imagery of cut-throat competition, with the seemingly new practice of 
industrial espionage. The spectres of defection and betrayal haunting 
capital's consciousness were given more substance by the spy-scandals 
of the 1950s and the 1960s. Fear of 'Reds' and 'homosexuals' 
occupying key positions in the state took little effort to translate 
to the boardroom. National security was clearly a priority for 
capital; private choice to make provision for private security was 
wholly consonant with the prevailing ideology and disturbing trends. 
'Security begins at home' might have been the watchword. 
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The further growth of private security since the 1960s has al so 
occurred in a period when, as Cohen (1979) has observed, the 'public' 
and the 'private' show general tendencies of merger. In policing in 
particular, the police are re-presented as 'ordinary citizens', 
subject to the same laws and facing the same problems of I ife as 
everybody else. In turn, as 'crime prevention' has become more and 
more a matter of being "your business", and people are exhorted to 
report suspicious events and set a good example to others, especially 
to Youth, so are the citizenry moving toward 'social policing'. The 
b reak d own of tradi ti onal rol es and expectati ons wh i ch th e pol i ce 
themselves are able and willing to f ul f il has contributed 
signifi cantl y to the acceptab i1i ty of pri vate secur i ty (c f. Home 
Office, 1979). 
It should not be assumed however, that this is a trend towards mutual 
appreciation, nor that public services do not fear the consequences of 
erosion of their own resources both for themselves and those they 
serve. A recent report in the New York Times drew attention to these 
issues, which have clear correspondence in the UK. 'Private Guard 
Forces are Feared as Drain on Money for the Police' 
"The rapid growth in private security forces may lead to 
reduced financial support for public police services that 
would be particularly harmful to poorer communities, a panel 
of experts has warned. 'Security firms and personnel are 
now commonplace, ' said 13 law-enforcement specialists in a 
report on "The Future of Policing". "The messages in this 
are disturbing: those with resources to protect their pads 
do not trust the public police, and those without such 
resources can expect still less from the public police 
tomorrow. " 
"The more those who can afford private security services put 
their money there, the less they will support municipal 
public services" the report said. "Those who will lose most 
when this comes about are those already losing the most: the 
people in the poorest, most ripped-off neighbourhoods. " 
(New York Times, 5th February, 1983) 
But importantly., beyond the filling of a day-to-day policing vacuum, 
the private security sector reflects a strong concern for the 
stability of the consensus. Its concerns embrace not only the 
security of private property but the security of a morality and 
ideology also. Thus, Hamilton (1968: 123) defines "the purpose of 
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security in its widest sense" as being "to protect a way of life". 
Similarly, but more specifically identifying the aggrieved worker as 
merely the pawn in a larger game, another security commentator, Slee- 
Smith (1970: 121) makes the classic analysis that such workers will be: 
manipulated by sinister outside forces to twist and distort 
facts so as to cause industrial unrest and to wreck all 
attempts by legitimate trade union officials to negotiate 
with management. " 
Such 'political corruption' is inextricably entwined with 'moral 
corruption' . As Slee-Smith (1970: 115) puts it: 
"Many factors can contribute to a lowering of moral 
standards; political associations, emotional background, 
mental instability., drink, sex-perversions, drugs etc. 
There can be no doubt that political associations play a 
significant part in influencing the course of actions to be 
taken by the employee intent on 'hitting back' at his 
empl oyers. " 
(emphasis added) 
But it is not only the recognisably polemical spokespersons of private 
security who publicly avow a commitment not only to the protection of 
life and property but also to the moral and constitutional fibre of 
s oc i ety. The usually 'moderate' managi ng-di rector of Group 4, Philip- 
Sorenson also expounded a more generalised concern in his 1972 address 
to the Cropwood Conference on Private Security: 
"Our service is more than a protection against crime in all 
its forms. At a time when the frontiers of decency and 
morality are being breached on every side, the manned 
security services of the industry are a bulwark against 
declining standards of behaviour and they offer to the 
industrial and commercial society of this century a 
reassurance and a quality of protection which no prudent 
management can afford to ignore. " 
(Philip-Sorenson, 1972: 46) 
Thus., the theoreticians and practitioners of the private security 
world repeatedly and explicitly link their programme of the defence of 
a threatened economic base with offences against morality, all within 
an aggressive attack on the political 'subversives' - Private security 
may make its money in the commercial market-place but the concern of 
the security mentality, from control room to board room,, is (almost) 
equally the protection of the values of stable conservatism. 
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It would be highly misleading however to characterise private, 
commercial security as heavy-handed, or their utilisation by the 
sophisticated corporate managements of the 1960s and 1970s as anything 
like old-style company police in the USA circa the turn of the 
century. Whilst in the sensitive atmosphere of the 1950s social 
change and the 1960sturbulence, it is easy to discern the unease and 
insecurity about economic and political instability which contributed 
strongly to the resurgence of demand for commercial security, the mood 
of corporate 'liberalism' focused the corporate utilisation of private 
security on its discretionary advantages. It should gowithout saying 
that such a mood and the manipulation of private security's 
discretionary advantages represent precisely that "transition to a 
more effective, scientific, therapeutic form of control" which Lasch 
notes in discussing McGregor's Human Side of Enterprise. While 
discretionary justice is of course nothing new in the workplace - the 
owner's right to hire and fire on personal preference and whim has 
only relatively recently been challenged by legislation - the 
emergence of a third party, a business itself, in business precisely 
as a mechanism of alternative, commercial, private, discretionary 
justice, was both a logical extension of the capitalist division of 
labour and enterprise and a welcome service. As Shearing et al 
(1980: 164) note, this is well understood in the promotional strategies 
of the private security sector. Thus: 
"Contract security companies tend, in their advertising 
literature, to avoid the language of criminal justice. 
While they sometimes argue for the necessity of private 
security by pointing to the 'rising crime rate'. in 
describing their services they seldom talk about crime or 
crime prevention, but rather of 'loss prevention'. This 
language acts to define private security as a service that 
operates within a framework that is designed primarily to 
meet corporate needs and objectives and is not confined by 
the objectives and concerns that define criminal justice. " 
Sh eari ng et al . are reporting a study carried out 
in Canada but, al ong 
with the international isation of private security itself, its 
language, imagery and modus operandi speak to a corporate sector that 
itself thinks internationally and which, even at more parochial 
levels, inherits a legacy of workplace discretionary justice with 
which private security can resonate as simply a modern expression. 
In one of the few serious, critical appraisals of the private security 
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phenomenon - an essay on the privatisation of social control - Spitzer 
and Scull (1977, b) suggest that "private police": 
"can deal with many transgressions extra-legally, minimising 
the risks and costs of public processing while maximising 
the probability of restitution. " 
"Private policing" also responds to its "consumer demand" more 
efficiently and with more flexibility than public enforcement in terms 
of organisational "adjustment". It seems probable that this is the 
case, though Spitzer and Scull do not indicate whether such 
"adjustment" entails lay-offs of staff or calculated advantage taken 
of the 'casual ' nature of 1 abour turnover characteristic of private 
security such that staff can be lost with relative alacrity and 
amenability (cf. Chapter 2). Presumably 'organisational adjustment' 
would rely on both features rather more than the police can. Private 
security also undoubtedly, borrows the "halo and symbols of authority" 
of the police (Chapter 2) and benefits from exchanges of information 
and the 'cross-employment' of retired police officers (Chapters 3 and 
4). Such points of comparison are extremely valuable; however at this 
level it remains important to consider the distinctiveness of private 
security from the police in modern society. 
In its day-to-day operation private security presents itself as 
primarily involved in straight-forward loss-prevention and as engaged 
in detection and surveillance work in a 'service' capacity to suit 
commercial interests. The question can now usefully become, how does 
private security relate to the other major employer of such security 
and policing services in society, i. e. the state? 
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The Commercial Compromise of the State 
The recent UK Home Office Discussion Paper (1979) on the 'Private 
Security Industry' is quite clear in first emphasizing that it is the 
mandate and responsibility of the public police force to maintain law 
and order but that under present conditions the police cannot meet the 
total and growing demand for protection which has come from society. 
The "private security industry" should therefore be viewed as a 
realistic and reasonable 'private adjunct' to public police: "to plug 
the gaps' left by an unfortunate incomplete police presence" as one 
commentator from the police service puts it. As the same writer 
astutely continues: 
"The irresistable conclusion to this argument is that with an 
increase in public police resources, the needs and 
justification for private security would simply disappear, 
but in real ity we are aware that such an expansion of the 
role of the police has been foregone, mainly for reasons of 
economy. " 
(Slater, 1982: 19) 
Shearing and Stenning (1981) are critical of this "plugging of gaps", 
"filling of vacuums", type of explanation for the growth of private 
security (cf. South,, 1979). "This argument", they suggest: 
"typically identifies the "economic crisis of the state" as 
the principal , if not the only, reason for the re-emergence 
of private security in the latter half of the 20th 
century ... The difficulty with this vacuum theory of the development of private security, as Carson and Young (1976) 
have pointed out, is not so much that it is wrong but that 
it is too narrow and limited. Certainly the fiscal 
restraints that have affected public police budgets are real 
enough and this most assuredly has had some influence on the 
growth of private security. However, a limited focus on 
this., and other "proximate causes" (Carson and Young, 1976) 
of modern private security, in the absence of a historically 
grounded analysis of the structural changes at work, results 
in both an inadequate explanation of the development of 
private security and a distorted picture of the historical 
nature of the relationship between private and public 
security forces. " 
(pp. 226-227) 
Crucially here, Shearing and Stenning cast doubt on the "fiscal 
crisis" explanation of the growth of private security most strongly 
developed by Spitzer and Scul 1 (1977, b) , 
(although perhaps in the end 
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they minimise it too much). They also see the need for a full 
historical picture of the "relationship between private and public 
security forces. " But if history implies, as it should, a social, 
economic and political contextual i sation, then noting the forces of 
paternalism and capitalism is inadequate without also referring to the 
political relations with the state within which private security is 
employed by capital. I shall say more on this point after further 
consideration of the fiscal crisis argument. 
Commercial interests in the post-war period have obviously had a keen 
awareness of the "fiscal crisis" affecting the public service sector. 
In this context, Spitzer and Scull (1977, b: 27) note that 
"productivity in labour-intensive organisations rises considerably 
slower than in their capital -intensive counterparts. " Thus, it is 
argued, greater levels of expenditure are required to maintain the 
same levels of service of public policing, in real terms. When this 
particular accountancy problem is coupled with the growth in militancy 
and effectiveness of organisations representing the interests of 
police officers (unions and federations, cf. Reiner, 1978), seeking 
better pay and working hours for their members, then it becomes more 
understandable why public policing is hard-pressed "to provide the 
kind of sophisticated and expensive services that modern corporations 
require" (p. 25). 
Throughout the 20th century corporate enterprise has attempted to 
'rationalise' (Kolko, 1963) and, as opposed to the 19th century aim of 
simply reducing the cost of labour supply, modern corporations have 
sought efficiency through 'scientific management' and the extension of 
control beyond the concerns of early commerce and manufacture, to 
embrace factors in the processes of production, distribution and 
consumption. It is in terms of these developments then, that Spitzer 
and Scull (1977, b: 27) argue that "privatisation of policing must be 
understood in relation to the organisation of society on a market 
basis. " Thus, these authors basically argue that the growth of 
private security can be explained by an analysis of "the fiscal crisis 
of the state" as occurring at the same time as the extension of 
corporate hegemony. 
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Itis suggesti ve to note, however, that such a pos i ti on is pec ul ia rl y 
reminiscent of a neo-Galbraithian analysis of 'The Affluent Society' . 
Galbraith's (1969) dialectic is one of private affluence co-existing 
with, indeed thriving upon, public squalor. The theory according to 
Galbraith, and strangely paralleled by Spitzer and Scull , is that at a 
time of high inflation and general economic crisis the state exerts 
economic 'brakes' on expansion and publ ic expenditure. The public 
sector is naturally most directly affected because this is where state 
control is most immediate. In this analysis there is no reason why 
the police would not be treated as any other state agency, suffering a 
reduced budget and cuts in resources with which to expand. Overall, 
this clearly has not happened. Furthermore, the increasing division 
of policing labour to which the private security sector is 
contributing new levels of unskilled and 'special ised-service- 
policing' has also allowed for certain branches of the public police 
to actually enjoy increased budgets and increasingly specialised 
functions. 
Private Security, Public Policing 
Comments on the 'Privatisation' Thesis 
and the 'Fiscal Crisis': Some 
Spitzer and Scul 1 's thesi s of the "privati sation of social control" 
(1977 (a) (b)) as directly related to state responses to the fiscal 
crisis has drawn a few questioning comments. In particular, Stanley 
Cohen (1979) has noted the developing trend toward the merging of the 
public and the private in social control, but is sceptical about the 
extent to which this has resulted in a genuinely significant degree of 
privatisation of functions across the social control spectrum. It 
seems correct to suggest that there has been the beginning of a trend 
away from the 'concentration' of the apparatuses of social control 
intervention at the level of the state., which began in the mid-19th 
century, toward what is in a sense a 'dispersal' of some of these 
activities back into the commercial and community arenas (Cohen, 
1979). But for Cohen, one must still have reservations about this 
development. 
The general conclusions which can be drawn from this in an analysis of 
social control under advanced capitalism remain limited. The ideology 
of the 'community treatment' movement which Cohen summarises, 
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interestingly reflects in a partial - though politically at odds sense 
- some of the private security sector's legitimating justification for 
greater commercial intervention into the former preserve of the state. 
As Cohen (1979: 26) puts the community treatment case, "the 
ideology .-. implies this: on the one hand, the repressive, 
interventionist reach of the state should be blunted, on the other, 
the 'community' should become more involved in the day-to-day business 
of prevention and control. " The private security ideology would argue 
that on the one hand the interventionist reach of the state - (they 
would be unlikely to concur with the opinion that it was repressive) - 
in fact is stretched as far as it can go and that whilst it actually 
needs to reach further, it is bound by legal and financial 
considerations to stretch in some directions rather than others., so 
that, on the other hand, it is therefore necessary that commerce and 
community (in the form of residents associations etc. ) should become 
more involved in the day-to-day business of prevention and control., 
for example, by hiring private security patrols. 
Interestingly (and perhaps ironically), public policing has swiftly 
become a part of this movement in its guise of 'community policing'. 
In the UK, the USA and elsewhere, community policing initiatives have 
encouraged "Neighbourhood Watch" schemes involving local residints to 
act as the eyes, ears and alerters of the police. 
Thus, whilst 'creeping capitalism' may indeed be a force for the 
'privatisation' of certain former public service sector functions, the 
extent to which this is really going on and the extent to which it is 
significantly eroding the power of the state in the accepted 
public/private sector equation are questions deserving close 
attention. 
It may be instructive to consider here another anomalous case within 
this equation; the so-called 'civil ianisation' of police staffing'. 
While civilian police staff remain clearly within the state sector, 
this anomalous case is relevant here because, according to some 
observers, not only does it contribute to breaking down the 
police/public distinction (and the attendant 'negative' consequences 
of that opposition) but significantly., it is also a response to the 
concern of the state over the cost-effectiveness of policing per se. 
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In the UK the civilian component of the police force has been rising 
over the past few decades; the 1970s in particular saw a substantial 
rise in the number of civilian staff employed, from a 1971 figure of 
16,417 to 21,173 in 1980 (State Research, 1981: 166). Such a process 
of 'civil ianisation' (Ray, 1977: 69) is even more advanced and apparent 
in the USA. According to Ray, this 
"policy of transferring jobs held by uniformed sworn 
personnel to non-uniformed civilian workers ... is one of the ways in which the labour process of policing is being 
reduced to increasingly distinct tasks subject to closer and 
more centralised managerial control. Many clerical, traffic 
control and station house jobs are now held by civilians, 
and others, such as finger-printing, may soon join the 
list ... This sector of the police institution now 
accounts for 12% to 20% of the labour force in municipal 
policing and it is increasing. " 
Ray argues that this process of 'civil ianisati on' "is actively 
promoted by the police policy makers of monopoly capital because it 
makes it possible to expand the coercive potential of the police 
apparatus without a commensurate increase in the size of the wage 
bill" (my emphasis), such civilian personnel generally being lower 
paid. It is difficult to see, however, how stabilising the size of 
the sworn force and increasing clerical and traffic control positions 
of a civilian nature actually "expands the coercive potential of the 
police apparatus" in any way other than to, say, possibly free more 
duty time of the sworn personnel and ensure a 'smoother' 
administrative and bureaucratic back-up. This may well have some net 
effect in this direction and it may emanate from the budgetary 
constraints of the state, but Why 'police policy representing the 
interests of monopoly capital' should seek to cut the size of the 
police wage bill at the same time as 'monopoly capital ' is increasing 
corporate expenditure on private security is a different question. 
Nor does this analysis contribute to explaining real increases in 
budgeting for specialised sections of the police in the UK, the USA 
and Canada where, as Taylor (1979: 44) points out, there has been: 
"an increase in expenditure on policing, within an otherwise 
stable, or reducing, public expenditure on health, education 
and social welfare (and control). " 
Taylor is quite rightly sceptical of the effects of state budgetary 
constraints on its overall social control expenditure, but this does 
not mean that, at the same time, the state is not also likely to 
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support and foster a space for commercial intervention to provide an 
ancillary service sector. This supplements what remains after all, an 
extremely expensive commitment for the state. While Spitzer and 
Scull, and others, emphasize this point most strongly, they fail to 
identify the bifurcating trends in state expenditure which Taylor 
details. 
It is indeed tempting to explain such developments, along with the 
resort to supplementary commercial services by the state and capital, 
in terms of the recent 'fiscal crisis' of the state. Yet 
'civil ianisation' is really an unsurprising development as a logical 
reaction to the increasing administrative., technical and policing 
division of labour. Moreover, to return to the principal concern 
here, as I have already observed, forms of private security policing 
continued to exist through boom and slump even after they were first 
overshadowed by the formal organisation of the 'New Police'. 
Furthermore, such arrangements have had several flourishing phases, 
and their provision has been slowly on the increase since the turn of 
the century in the USA and more modestly throughout the post-war 
period in Britain and elsewhere. The crises of the 1960s and 1970s 
explain much regarding the 'boom' growth of private security, but 
there is a broader canvas of social trends and under-currents to 
consider, as Spitzer and Scull recognise in considering the orthodox 
differentiation between public and private 'policing' on criteria of 
'who pays'. Distinctions based on the nature of econcmic support from 
private rather than public expenditure "are less and less defensible, " 
they argue: 
"as changes in the economic structure of capitalist societies 
have blurred the boundaries between the public and the 
private sector (and as) private organisations (i. e. 
corporations), expand their ability to 'tax' the public, 
either directly through state subsidies or indirectly 
through administered prices. " 
(Spitzer and Scull, 1977, b: 18) 
For Spitzer and Scul 1 the reality of the changing functions of the 
state appears to become the object of inquiry, but this real ity is not 
conceived in any broad sense. Instead it is restricted to the extent 
to which the state has to change to adapt to new demands or 
recognitions of failure. It is true that the way in which the 
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organisation of policing labour has been changed can, to some extent., 
be well understood by this analysis. However, there is much 
'unfinished' about this approach. Understanding the connection 
between the commercial security sector and the arrangements that the 
state makes for policing requires a stronger emphasis on the political 
relations and mediations involved. 
Certainly,, differences in the financing of policing arrangements in 
society do not sufficiently distinguish between the civil police and 
the private sector of policing as, respectively, one, part of the 
state and two, divorced from the state. As I have suggested in 
introducing this chapter, private security policing occurs within the 
state and within its legal framework (even where it exceeds the limits 
of legality it refers to that legal framework). It thus operates 
indirectly in relation to the state, and also directly in its frequent 
employment by the state (at national and local levels). It is quite 
logically located therefore within the 'unity' of state relations. As 
Nowell-Smith (1980: 9) puts it,, 
"The boundaries of the state are constantly shifting and vary 
with the standpoint from which it is viewed. There are 
various forms of state relation, and of relations which have 
a state aspect to them ... The ' power' of the state is therefore very much a question of the extent to which the 
aspect of centralised juridico-political ordering dominates 
over others that might be in play at any given time. " 
Private security or policing (in whatever manifestation) has a 
political relation to the state. Robert Weiss (1978), in a highly 
suggestive analysis of the history of 'Private Policing in the USA' , 
also seeks to clarify this relationship. For him., the key point is 
that the state has and does permit capital to use 'extra- governmental 
violence' (or more moderately, one might add, extra-governmental 
surveillance or the institution of a private justice system of 
detection, prosecution, adjudication and punishment). For Weiss,, the 
use (or even possibility of use) of 'extra- governmental violence' (in, 
for example, cases ranging from industrial disputes through evictions, 
to debt-collection or the patrol of public functions, cf. Chapters 2 
and 3) means that private security 'policing' becomes, in Weber's 
terms,, part of the state's "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory" (Weber, 1972: 78; Weiss, 1981: 13). 
Weiss argues that: 
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"if police power can issue only from the governing authority 
i. e. the state, then we must conclude that private police 
possessed state power and functioned as part of the state. 
This power was not under the control or direction of the 
government but under the direct control of private 
interests. " 
( ibid. ) 
Weiss is, of course, offering an analysis of a case-study within a 
specific period of the history of a specific state (the USA, 1850- 
1940). However, the assumption of 'police' powers of a more 
apparently moderate form: the fulfilling of functions of surveillance, 
discipline, punishment (within the senses developed by Foucault, 1977) 
draws out!, in the contemporary state, a similar presumption to the 
'formal' power of the state. 
So what else is happening here? Shearing and Stenning have described 
the growth of private security in relation to policing functions in 
society as "a quiet revolution" (Stenning and Shearing, 1980 (b)). I 
would rather refer to it as a profound development in the securing of 
soc i ety. It is a commercial compromise between the sovereignty of the 
state which constitutionally represents the status-quo and those 
sections of society whose commercial interests are most benefited by 
the maintenance of that status quo. In accommodating the development 
of the private security sector, with whatever mixed degrees of caution 
or enthusiasm, the state is not simply 'saving money'. It is not 
reducing its commitment to more social control intervention - 
economically or politically. As the state accedes to a new (or at 
least renewed) dimension of capital's assertion of its relative 
autonomy., capital, in turn, seeks the means to safeguard its 
interests, (literally) on its own account. 
On two mundane but contributory levels the private security sector has 
grown in response to this need. Fi rst, it has built upon the 
importance of ensuring the security of the conditions under which 
profit maximisation can be pursued. The principles of physical 
security are brought to bear to protect property., plant, stock and 
information against theft., threat,, intrusion and loss. Secondly (and 
perhaps more importantly), private security policing affords capital 
both the symbolism and mechanism of discipline (cf. Foucault, 1977), 
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primarily through control and surveillance of labour and, 
increasingly, wider populations with legitimate access to 'public' 
private property and selected populations about whom interested 
parties wish to 'know more' (e. g. credit applicants; competing 
companies etc. ) . 
Its 'supervisory' function is not that of the manager but that of 
I symbol i sed authority' bearing the role of guardianship of both 
workers as employees (as labour value and property) and of the 
interests and property of capital. As 'ordinary workers' private 
security are 'good blokes/nice women'; if not the fulfilment of the 
role of 'philosopher, guide and friend', then at least someone that 
you can sometimes find to be 'OK' , helpful and so on. On the other 
hand, they are also an authorised,, intrusive presence with a wage to 
earn and a responsibility, allegiance and hierarchy of managerial 
direction which are external. Even unionisation in private security 
defers to this state of affairs and this is not an industry in which 
an 'oppositional' working-class consciousness is well-developed. 
Irresolvably, a primary and explicit function of private security 
personnel is that of 'watcher', of observer and of reporter. The 
specific mandate of private security has at its very core, the 
practice of surveillance over some to ensure the protection, property, 
privacy and security of others. 
The Perpetuity of Private Security: Three Key Propositions_ 
Contrary to the implications of the fiscal crisis argument it now 
seems highly improbable that even the most substantial increases in 
state expenditure on the police would result in any significant 
reduction in private expenditure on private security. Quite apart 
from capital's response, it is unlikely that the state or, more 
specifically even the police themselves, would welcome any such 
reduction. This contention is based on three general propositions, 
which reflect the core of my argument in this chapter. First,, as I 
have pointed out, forms of privatised security or policing have always 
been around, flourishing to varying degrees, even as the provision of 
public policing has increased dramatically in size, scope and 
sophistication. Latterly,, their growth has actually been stimulated 
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by changes in the operational priorities of the public police who have 
increased their selective concentration on certain, 
, 
specific duties. 
Second, the increasing complexity of social and economic life 
'demands' a correspondingly complex division of policing labour and 
expertise (though the form which this must necessarily take could of 
course be debated, cf. Taylor, 1982; Lea and Young, 1984). Thirdly, 
of course, and very simply, the provision of law and order maintenance 
by the state must 'universalise' itself beyond the immediate interests 
of individual components of capital and be directed to securing those 
conditions best suited to facilitating the reproduction of capital and 
its position vis-a-vis class relations as a whole. For individual 
components of capital, the market offers arrangements for more direct 
contractual relationships with the private security sector. 
The relationship between the state and private security is, at its 
simplest, one in which a 'buffer' function is performed. The private 
security sector works directly on behalf of capital , on the visible 
level (i. e. at least in its visible activities) seeming less formally 
threatening to the 'industrial balance' and social consensus than 
common resort to the civil police or courts. The moral philosophy of 
any 'social contract' or ethos of commercial freedom and enterprise is 
naturally unsurprised by the idea of industry and business keeping its 
own house in order. Further, commercial crime, theft, embezzlement 
and fraud, industrial espionage, the new difficulties of protecting 
large-scale plant or the expanding range of 'private-public' spaces 
(such as shopping precincts) etc. . have all presented problems 
generated out of a changing set of economic relations - from the 
opposition of capital and labour, the nature of competition between 
corporate interests and from changes in the commercial use of 
property. At the same time, police priorities have led them to patrol 
those crimes more 'evidently' threatening the social consensus - from 
street crime and burglaries to organised crime, and drug distribution. 
More significantly, and increasingly, the publ ic pol ice (across 
international boundaries) have overtly sought to control and restrict 
political challenge, regulating demonstrations and compiling political 
dossiers. Throughout the 1980s they are likely to continue to 
prioritise the policing of unrest and maintenance of social order in 
the inner cities and of protest around nuclear and ecological issues, 
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etc - Such priorities are priorities of the state. Capital, not 
unnaturally, has its own more parochial concerns, and private 
security, with a heritage dating back to the privately subscribed 
parish night-watch, responds to those concerns. Such a sense of 
'parochialism' does not of course limit the proliferation of the 
private security sector's provisions for the international isation of 
capital and, thereby, the international isation of private security 
itself. 
The Legitimation of Private Security 
In the London of 1833, a Parliamentary Committee discussion of the new 
public police had warned of any form of policing involving "the 
employment of spies ... as a practice most al ien to the 
constitution. " One hundred and fifty years after these constitutional 
fears were expressed, not only is such a practice institutional ised in 
public policing (Scraton,, 1982)., but such services are also offered on 
the market on a private, commercial, profit-making basis (cf. Chapters 
2ý3 and 4) . In the UK , private security operates without any 
specific legislative control and even where licensing systems do 
operate (e. g. in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, parts of 
Europe), control , in practice, is 
1 imited (cf. Chapter 4). Today, 
such developments seem peculiarly unproblematic for elected guardians 
of the 'constitution' . Even in terms of the laws of the market-place, 
it is no great source of comfort or reassurance to find an experienced 
commentator like Lipson (Director of Security at American Express, and 
former US secret-service agent) observing that: 
"The paradox of the private security industry is that on the 
one hand it prescribes methods for the protection of 
individuals and property from harm and theft while on the 
other hand it uses for this purpose personnel that the 
industry itself proscribes as high risks when evaluating or 
surveying business operations. " 
(Lipson, 1975: 168) 
Thus, not only is private security structurally anomalous but in its 
practice it also reflects a number of contradictions. The legitimacy 
of the private security sector might therefore be potentially 
problematic. However, when it is viewed, and occasionally presented 
by its own representatives, by police commentators and in government 
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reports, as a commercial compromise between an impoverished state and 
growing private sector demand for protection within a mixed economy, 
then this problem of legitimacy is signif icantly reduced. Drawing 
together some of the points raised earlier in this chapter, the deeper 
roots of this legitimation can briefly be examined further for the 
case of the UK (though the trends are similar for the USA and Canada). 
The commercial success of private security in the late 1950s and the 
1960s was born within a political and cultural atmosphere of hybrid 
social democracy and progressive conservatism. 8 Central ideological 
themes of the period included the celebration of consumerism, a faith 
in the prospects for economic security, the ideal of the middle-class 
family and promise of a better future through harnessing the 'white 
heat of technology'. Issues of a law and order nature which seemed to 
pose threats to such promise in this period were most clearly seen as 
being related to rebellious youth, racial tension, the affrontery of 
lorganised' crime and tremors of political subversion and the 
militancy of labour. In Britain, the criminal statistics for the 
period 1955-1965 showed the greatest increase in crime generally since 
1915, with an annual average increase of about 10% (McLintock and 
Avison, 1968: 18-19). Such conditions were 'naturally' conducive to 
the legitimation of private security. 
At a broader level than the new consumerism of this period, the 
general inviolability of private property rights holds sway. On the 
basis of this fact alone, the legitimation of the property- protect ion 
functions of private security is as deeply ingrained in the 
I collective consciousness' of society as every other 'taken for 
granted' value. In all capitalist societies private security has 
hence had the advantage of developing as an unsurprising commercial, 
mediatory, expedient to protect and maintain the existing pattern of 
property distribution. Legitimacy then, is accorded, at least 
partially, because private security appears to fulfil only this low- 
key and restricted policing function - however numerous the operators, 
the number of people employed, or the variety of services offered. It 
is less obviously intrusive or repressive intervention (as police 
action is quite commonly seen), and is hence, to most, relatively 
unremarkabl e. Assurances of probity and self-regulation 
from private 
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security itself (cf. Chapter 4) and from its sympathisers, general ly 
pass the ultimate ' media-disinterest' test - because they are not an 
'issue' they are not pursued as something worthy of the agenda of 
' issues' 
I have referred to legitimation accruing to private security by virtue 
of their performing a 'mediatory' function. A simple but suggestive 
parallel may be drawn between this and some of the conditions which 
promoted the growth of the civil policing force in the England of the 
19th century. In the 18th and 19th centuries the contours of its 
society were re-organised as the system of paternalistic local order 
and traditional institutions of control were weakened. 9 The Enclosure 
movement, unpopular corn prices and laws, the rise of the factory 
system and attendant general social dislocation heightened class 
antipathy and unrest. In such a cl imate it became apparent that in 
the absence of organised alternatives., continued reliance on the Army 
as the first-resort force for the enforcement of order, was dangerous 
and damaging. As Silver (1967: 12) comments, employment of the 
military in cases of civil disturbance could only produce "an 
alternation between no intervention and the most drastic procedures - 
the latter representing a declaration of internal war with lingering 
consequences of hate and resentment. " Mather (1959) points out that 
direct forms of personalised social control tend to exacerbate class 
antagonism, and this may be especially true where it is the direct 
agency of the state intruding into workaday life. In the acutely 
sensitive realm of policing, clearly the 'mediatory' role of private 
security may be perceived as a less drastic intrusion. 
Conclusion: the Contradiction of the Commercial Compromise 
Ultimately, the commercial compromise entered into between state and 
capital in facilitating and developing the organisation of private 
security, cites its foundation of legitimacy as being the 'right' of 
the individual (including the corporate 'individual') to make 
whatsoever (legal) arrangements the individual party feels necessary 
to secure and protect personal life and property. The acceptabil ity 
of recourse to such private arrangements is premised on the principle 
of 'free choice' within a supposed 'free market'. with equality under 
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ci vi 1 governance and f ormal 1 aw. However, the 'free' nature of the 
market as in any sense approximati ng equal i ty of access and 
opportunity has been well demonstrated as mythical. As Adam Smith 
recognised a long time ago, the system has a certain degree of bias. 
"Civil Government,, so far as it is instituted for the 
security of property, is in reality instituted for the 
defence of the rich against the poor, of those who have some 
property against those who have none at all. " 
(Adam Smith., The Wealth of Nations, 1776) 
Freedom within the market is subject to the developing relations of 
capitalism, which since the 19th century has demanded changes in its 
mode of discipline (cf. Fine et al., 1979) including the need to make 
arrangements for the marshalling and surveillance of 'free' labour and 
for the protection and security of that profit and property born out 
of that labour's production of surplus value. 
But private security is not simply a phenomenon of 'creeping 
capitalism', privatisation or the 'rolling back of the state'. To the 
contrary, in the interpenetration of the formal and the informal (cf. 
Henry, 1983) and the shifting parameters of appearance of the public 
and the private, private security functions and develops within the 
unity of state relations and relations to the state. Accounts of 
private security from historical , economic or social administration 
perspectives are valuable contributions but a more adequate political 
economy analysis can only begin from relating private security to 
capital, the market and their various dialectical relations with and 
within the state. 
Beyond 'Policing by Consent'? 
Increasingly capital (nationally and internationally) and with 
legitimacy accorded by states' (nationally and internationally), 
resorts to arrangments beyond those made for 'policing by consent' and 
tempered by effective safeguards for civil liberties. Such a 
development has disturbing implications for the wider, traditional 
relations which are expected to exist between institutions of policing 
and society. 
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In the following,, concluding chapter, I shall briefly discuss some of 
these implications., reiterate some points already made and - with 
cautionary intent - add a few more, suggesting a new and realistic 
direction that policy could take in this area in moving away from the 
focus on private security towards an integrated scheme for social 
security. 
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Chapter 5- Notes 
This chapter is a substantially revised version of a working 
paper 'Private Security., Private Policing and Social Control, , 1982., Department of Sociology,, Middlesex Polytechnic, London " which was itself a revision of South (1978 (b)) and another paper 
entitled 'Policing the Crisis - Privately' (delivered at several 
meetings in 1979). 1 should like to thank in particular Stan Cohen for his extensive comments on this material; also Gerry Mars, Jock Young and for early directions, Paul Wiles. The 
original papers were first drafted together in 1980 whilst I was 
a visiting lecturer in the Sociology Department., Hofstra 
University, New York. I would also like to thank the Department, 
Hy Enzer, Will Petry and Jeff Rosenfeld for making my visit such 
a pleasure. Finally, I am indebted to Steve Spitzer and Andrew Scull for encouraging me to develop the critique and position 
presented here and for publishing a shorter version, despite its 
criticism of their own work (cf. South., 1984). 
(2) For interesting discussions of the idea of 'rational isation' 
related to social control see Cohen, J., (1972); and Spitzer, S., 
and Scul 1, A. , 
(1977 (a) and (b) ). 
(3) Thanks to Stan Cohen for his comments of this point. 
(4) There is in fact a background of management philosophy which 
berates management practice for putting employees in 'positions 
of temptation'. This dates from at least 1922 in major 
management j ournal s e. g. ,Ha rts h orn e, J., ( 192 2; F ac to ry Management (1954); Friedlander, M., (1965); Gregory, A.,, (1962). 
I have summarised some of this literature elsewhere, South, N., 
(1982). 
(5) Merlyn Rees., former Labour Home Secretary, in his address to the 
International Professional Security Association in 1978. 
(6) Briefly on the nightwatch and voluntary associations pre-dating 
the police see Tobias, J., (1979); South, N., (forthcoming); such 
phenomena are quite clearly still with us; for the USA see Weiss, 
R. 9( 1978,1981 , 1985) ; on early i nf ormers see Thompson, E. P. , (1963). Modern private investigation, industrial espionage etc. 
remains reliant on informers, as increasingly does police 
investigation, witness the phenomenon of the 'Supergrass'. The 
author is currently working on a more detailed treatment of this 
relatively unbroken history. 
(7) In the UK, other than registration as a private company there is 
no specialised form of registration as a business involved in the 
private security field. There is no system of licensing (cf. 
Chapter 4) and the details of operation and accounts lodged for 
companies can be minimal (and hence deceptive). There is thus no 
way to estimate with any precise accuracy the number of security 
firms operating in the UK (cf. Chapter 3). According to one 
estimate, by the late 1970s, there were over 700 agencies with 
resources of approximately 200-250,000 uniformed staff and over 
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10,000 armoured vehicles operating in Britain (Bunyan, 1977: 230). 
The figure outnumbers the civil police force establishment. Even 
the more conservative estimates produced periodically by more 
sympathetic observers offer a picture of a very sizeable, active 
work-force in private security and, significantly, police 
observers now estimate that private security sector operatives 
outnumber or closely rival the figure for the police 
establishment. It should be remembered though that, as with all 
1 ef t- versus- righ t-wi ng debates relying on statistics,, 
manipulation is not a talent restricted to one or the other. In 
particular, in some estimates of private security versus police 
the figure for the former represents an estimate of all 
employees, including for example, administrative staff. Figures 
taken for the police establishment however are usually the 
official ones for sworn-officers excluding civilian staff. Th ere 
is no doubt that the number of private security personnel rival s 
and may exceed the police officer establishment, but there is a 
danger in unclear presentations of statistics indicating this. 
For the USA., Spitzer and Scull (1977, b) note the variance of 
estimates of size and number of officers (partially dependent on 
who is included - guards, investigators, store detectives etc. ) 
as between 350,000 and 800,000 (derived from Kakalik and 
Wildhorn., 1971: 6). It is also worth noting, however,, that as a 
recent journalistic study of 'private spies' has indicated, the 
private security sector harbours a highly specialised and 
secretive dimension of ex-government security and intelligence 
agents which may make this a literally dangerous under-estimate, 
not numerically, but because it is based upon examination of the 
more visible operations of the private security sector (cf. 
Hougan, 1979). 
(8) See Hall., 
trends of 
popular and 
S., (1979) for 
this period in 
policy thinking 
a discussion of some of the political 
Britain and their relationship to 
on law, order and morality. 
(9) For a fuller discussion of property law, paternalism 
control in relation to the working class and forms 
crime in the 18th and 19th centuries, see Scraton, P., 
N. 9 1981 
(pp. 26-36), (cf. also Scraton, P.,, and 







'Conclusion: Limits, Possibilities and Cautious Proposals' 
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The post-war expansion of the private security sector has 
revolutionary implications for the nature of modern social control and 
the policing of society. For the foreseeable future, such a 
significant resurgence of private arrangements for ensuring security, 
has fundamentally changed society's division of policing labour. 
In this thesis I have described examples of private security at work 
(Chapter 2) , detailed the recent development and practice of the 
broader private security sector, and presented the case for regulation 
and accountability (Chapters 3 and 4). 1 believe that I have brought 
together a wider range of sources of material and original research on 
this subject in the UK than has previously been publicly available. 
But private security's continuing development and significance will 
ensure that future work in this neglected area will be essential. As 
Chapter 5 has indicated, such further work must make sense of a 
complex diversity of social., economic and political trends and 
devel opments. For this particular project, the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5 represents one form of conclusion. 
In this final chapter I do not intend to summarise what has already 
been said, rather I shall draw out some points about policy and what 
might be done. I shall not re-iterate the arguments for regulation 
and accountability as broadly presented in Chapter 4. To make their 
case they are best left to stand together as presented, perhaps to be 
added to or - in particular circumstances - be used selectively. But 
there are some obvious points about the limitations of what might be 
done that should be noted whilst some possibilities should be raised 
for inclusion on the policy agenda. Of course, limits and 
possibilities should also always inform each other and if on the one 
hand we should take seriously the 'limits of the possible' then on the 
other, in the case of this particular subject, we must also consider 
the desirability of the possible. With this in mind, my concluding 
comments must be cautionary, although, at the same time, they harbour 
some ambition to move beyond a concern with private security per se 
and towards considering how crime- prevention, insurance and victim- 
support services could be more universally provided to contribute to a 
greater ensuring of social 'security'. 
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From the late 1970s and through the 1980s there has been a growing 
acceptance by police and public of the respectable and visible 
operations of the private security sector. Police disapproval of the 
less reputable understandably persists and public opprobrium is 
occasionally aroused when media revelations point to particular 
abuses, shortcomings or practices that challenge the comfortable 
notion that 'things like that can't happen here'. Meanwh i1e the 
private security sector expands rapidly, benignly encouraged by the 
state and increasingly indispensible both to its more parochial and 
multi-national., public and private employers. The contribution of 
private security to crime prevention is welcomed as a public good and 
its role in systems of management, surveillance, protection and 
control is embraced as a contributor to private profit. 
Safeguards to protect the individual against abuses, intrusion into 
their private lives and so on, do exist. For example, the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974., legislation concerning data 
protection, credit references and the like, the new telephone tapping 
regulations, civil and criminal law regarding powers of 'stop and 
search', interrogation and detention and a variety of other provisions 
in law (and custom) should all counter the extension of private 
security activities beyond their supposedly right and proper limits. 
In practice., such piecemeal safeguards are themselves the real subject 
of I imitation. It is the necessity of establishing an effective 
system of accountability and regulation to safeguard civil liberties 
and curtail certain specialist (and not so specialist) activities that 
is my primary concern. But ina highly diverse area, with a 
bewildering array of positions, views and personalities, there are 
many other issues that deserve or seek attention. Some are of urgent 
importance, some chimerical , some deviously 
diversionary and some a 
foolish waste of time. Draper (1978) for example, cogently juxtaposes 
two of the 'important' issues thus: 
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"The biggest danger of the present situation is not, in my 
view, the possibility of persons with criminal records infiltrating the industry, although this is, not 
surprisingly, the aspect which receives the most publicity, 
and is indeed very worrying. No. the real threat lies in 
the incidence of poor-quality services and inadequate 
training and instruction in what now constitutes a second- 
string police force in this country. " 
(pp. 167-8) 
It is cl early probl emati c to be inasi tuati on where the choice is 
between uncontrolled inadequacy and controlled efficiency - especially 
if part of the 'problem' is the threat to civil liberties posed by 
very efficient private security services. However, Draper is talking 
here principally of the mass, non-specialised services which, as she 
points out., are playing (and will increasingly play) a significant 
role in the provision of services which affect the public as private 
citizens, employees, taxpayers., consumers and so on. They must 
therefore make the grade of acceptable public service standards - and, 
correspondingly, be made accessible to an effective mechanism of 
public scrutiny. At the same time, precisely because certain parts of 
the private security sector are already highly competent and efficient 
in the specialist services that they offer, but are not subject to 
public scrutiny, the case for regulation and accountability is strong 
here also. 
Obviously,, serious doubts can (and in a constructive frame of mind, 
should) be entertained about the role of private security as a 'public 
service' and about the adequacy of systems of public scrutiny, 
regulation and accountability. Such doubts hinge on realistic 
perceptions of the situation but can also embrace what, at present, 
seem rather optimistic prescriptions for really effective change. For 
example., Flavel (1973),, in what is otherwise a most astute and 
realistic paper, can ultimately offer little that can be done now. 
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"If organised private security is seen as an exercise in 
selective policing., biased in favour of wealth and power, then for example developing a superficial system of public 
accountability, or improving Police-security relations will 
make no difference. Radical change would seem to be 
necessary in the ownership and control of property, in the 
meanings attached to the term security, and in the aims and 
motivations of security organisations, before the systematic 
application of property security could be seen as a broadly 
based social service .o oil 
15) 
One can but agree, but such "radical change" is unl i kely to happen 
next week and in the meantime the power and impact of private security 
as a "biased" and "selective" system of "policing" increases. 
In similar vein, the important work of Shearing and Stenning 
ultimately eschews practical policy in favour of a somewhat utopian 
recommendation that the nature of changing forms of property be 
reconceived. As Weiss (1984) notes, 
"in the face of the threat to individual liberties that 
private security poses, Shearing and Stenning suggest as a 
remedy not the attempt to regulate the private security 
industry, but to declare "mass private property" as "new 
property", hence subject to the "elaborate protections of 
publ ical ly- owned public space. " Just how such a revolution 
is to be achieved is left to the reader's imagination, but 
even if such a transformation were to occur, it would be a 
dubious achievement. " 
18) 
Even with a re- conceptual i sati on of property and legal and other forms 
of 'protection' surrounding it, such a proposal offers little in the 
way of tangible action for dealing with the private security sector 
and its growth, power and activities. Unless within this vision it 
has simply disappeared from society, whi ch seems an unlikely 
consequence, such a proposal produces no effective system of 
accountability or guarantee of civil liberties. Changes in the nature 
of property form and distribution would undo ubtedly have profound 
implications for private security - as for the entire social, economic 
and political structure of society. But in the absence of likelihood 
of such change we have to bear in mind the immediacy of influences 
that private security currently has on aspects of social 
inequality, 
policy matters and everyday visions of the way that society 
is ordered 
and policed. As Flavel puts it, 
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a secondary system of policing which provides unequal 
protection to different groups in society is in itself 
socially divisive but it also has a direct influence on the 
operational priorities of the public police and perhaps 
affects people's attitudes to policing in general. " 
(1972 : 15) 
Realism and practicality dictate that while we might look to change in 
the future there are matters to recognise as priorities for more 
immediate intervention. The private security sector is not going to 
'go away'. It is expanding rapidly and massively. As it does so it 
seeks to make itself and its services more indispensibl e, 
proselytising about its contribution to crime prevention, public 
safety and security in what it can point to as an ever-more dangerous 
and unstable world. As Table 6.1 illustrates, rising crime as a 
precipitant factor in the growth of pressure on a 'hard-pressed' 
police force and concomitant 'need' for private security, does indeed 
seem demonstrabl e. 
Table 6.1: Crime Figures - England and Wales 
Year Violence Against Robbery Burglary 
the Person 
1971 47,000 7,500 451,500 
1972 52,400 8,900 438,700 
1973 61,300 7,300 393,200 
1974 63,800 8,700 483,800 
1975 71,000 11,300 521,900 
1976 77,700 11,600 515,500 
1977 82,200 13,700 604,100 
1978 87,100 13,100 656,700 
1979 95., 000 12,500 549,100 
1980 97,200 15,000 622,600 
1981 100,200 20,300 723,200 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1982 
(Table 4.1, p. 76) 
This statistical context (whatever the problems with such data),, 
has 
important implications for both public policing and private security. 
In his Annual Report of H. M. Chief Inspector of Constabulary for 1977, 
Sir James Haughton, referred to the original crime- preventi on 
objective of the Metropolitan force when first established and noted a 
re-awakening of interest in preventive aspects of policing among 
some 
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forces in England and Wales. Haughton's Report was confident that 
prevention would receive "increasing attention throughout the police 
service, " yet in the same year Sir Robert Mark was drawing public 
attention to the difficulties that the police were facing in being 
able to provide anything more than 'fire brigade' policing. In an 
interview with the magazine Security Gazette in July, 1977 Sir Robert 
commented on the role to be played in crime prevention by private 
security and on the 'limited educative role of specialised crime 
prevention activities' . One implication of this piece-meal , half- 
hearted state of affairs, according to the Editorial in the same issue 
of Security Gazette was that, 
"the results of applying preventive measures to particular 
types of risk is to divert crime to other targets and to 
encourage the development of new forms of criminal 
activity. " 
(Security Gazette, July, 1977, p. 215) 
This is, of course, a widely held view and to tackle 'the problem' 
there have been various suggestions concerning wider cooperation and 
coordination between the police and other agencies operating with 
crime- prevention, or related functions. The recent inter-departmental 
document (Home Office (et al. ) Circular 8/9/84; etc. ), is only the 
latest in a stream of proposals from various sources urging the need 
for cooperation and coordination. In its 1977 Editorial, Security 
Gazette suggested that crime- prevention should become less a separate 
police departmental function and more one of the 'everyday duties of 
the police' in "active cooperation" with other contributing agencies 
which: 
"would undoubtedly include a reliable, competent and fully 
accountable security industry, which through licensing or 
other means would be acceptable to the police as a partner. " 
(Security Gazette, ibid. ) 
Subsequently, James Anderton, Chief Constable of the Manchester force, 
suggested the establishment of a 'Central Crime Prevention Agency'. 
This would coordinate and disseminate information to the affiliated 
network of agencies. In Anderton's view there is no reason why the 
police service should not assist in this manner those security 
companies which wish to improve the range and standard of their 
services. If Sir Robert Mark's pessimistic portrayal of the ability 
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of the police service to stretch to protect property from burglary and 
similar crimes, has only half the validity that it seems to have hadý 
then these proposals, from both sides of the policing fence - private 
and public - may well still be important pointers to real trends in 
the development of the private security sector. Indeed, the comments 
of Sir Kenneth Newman, the current Commissioner, quoted in Chapter I 
suggest that there is some growing momentum in this direction. 
Besides the trends in 'inter-agency' proposals, other initiatives and 
possibilities are encouraged, sharing at least one principal 
consideration - that of reducing cost. The USA is often over-played 
as an indicator of 'the shape of things to come' in the UK, but in the 
current economic climate there is no shortage of reliable parallels, 
and approaches to dealing with crime problems may seek to emulate some 
US d evel opments . In the most recent major USA study of private 
security (cf. Cunningham and Taylor, 1984), 384 law enforcement 
administrators were surveyed and "indicated a willingness to discuss 
(some) transfer of responsibilities to private security. " (Ibid., p. 
4) 
"They cited a number of police tasks 'potentially more cost- 
effectively performed by private security' - among them 
public building security, parking enforcement and court 
security 
The off-loading of crime-related prevention and detection services 
from the public to the service sector is limited and cautious even in 
the USA scenario - although privately run prisons are a new growth 
phenomenon, (Weiss, personal communications, 1984,, 1985; New York 
Times, 25th February, 1985). However, even in the UK, the increased 
availability of private security services has commended itself 
strongly to advocates of the general privatisation of public services 
as a means to reduce direct taxation. 
Whil st such advocates tend to be uncl ear about the extent of publ ic 
expenditure cuts which are workable and about the remaining adequacy 
of public provision of services for the less well off., there is one 
element of the argument which should be highlighted here. Seldon 
(1977), for example, presents the argument that 'You pays your taxes,, 
but You gets no choice' (p. 106). In relation to crime prevention 
services he argues, quite reasonably, that: 
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generally police patrols seem in principle to be a typical 
public good from which all in the patrol area benefit, frcm 
which they cannot be excluded, and for which they cannot be 
charged. But patrols benefit homes or buildings not 
according to their size (roughly reflected in their rates) but according to the value of the property (and life) 
protected. These values are reflected more accurately by 
insurance cover. " 
(p. 108) 
According to Sel don's proposition then, "police charges could 
therefore be made to reflect the varying value of patrol services to 
individuals or firms in the area according to the lives or property at 
ri sk ." However, such proposa Is to pr i vati se p ubl ics erv i ce s, 
especially in key areas of state responsibility such as health and 
criminal justice (cf. Adam Smith Institute, 1984) inevitably reproduce 
- and compound - existing and familiar inequalities and 
contradictions. But such proposals do not come only from 'neutral' 
economic commentators. Proposals similar to Seldon's - to charge for 
policing services, whether with public and private police in 
commercial competition or having integrated them - have also come from 
and been discussed by senior representatives of the police force. 
Phil ip Knights, Chief Constable of the West Midlands force., for 
example, in a paper (1979) to a joint conference of the Association of 
Chiefs of Police., Associati on of Metropolitan Authorities and 
Association of County Councils, noted that, 
"the police committee of the AMA in 1976, when considering 
the role and development of local authority police forces 
and private security felt that it would be desirable for all 
types of policing to come under one large umbrella, and 
interest was expressed in establishing a multi-tier police 
force comprising, for example, police officers as we 
generally understand the term, existing 'private' police 
forces, private security forces and traffic wardens, 
together with, perhaps, persons to patrol high-rise flats, 
covered shopping centres and the like. It was felt that the 
total cost of running the full, proposed organisation would 
be the same as now and charges could still be made to firms 
and individuals for the services of the 'security' section 
of the force. " 
( 
Knights suggests that: 
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such a move would no doubt have its supporters, but it does 
of course raise the whole politically sensitive question of 'municipal trading' and whether it is right that in the 
matter of police protection the more affluent citizen should 
be able to purchase a better service from his local Police 
Authority than that which the authority might be able to 
make available to the less affluent. " 
(p. 7) 
Here Knights echoes (knowingly or not) a comment made by the United 
Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control , quoted in a 
circular to the 5th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
(Stead, 1975: 381). The Committee observed that: 
"the development of private law enforcement very often 
introduced an inequality of protection, since the richer 
groups in the society could afford additional security 
services while the poorer sections were left to manage with 
whatever services the state could provide. In a modern, 
complicated society, private services might be required, but 
they should be carefully supervised by the official police 
and standards should be established by Governments for their 
recruitment and performance. Too much private security, 
f avouring some groups against others, could foster 
insecurity on a large scale. " 
Possible Polic 
Benefits 
'Self-policing' and 'community protection' seem to be the sort of 
slogans emerging out of long-overdue debates about how to provide 
accountable systems of crime prevention for local communities, 
particularly the traditionally disadvantaged. The future development 
of these debates must be considered elsewhere, but they resonate with 
policy orientated observations which have been around slightly longer. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a wave of research - most evidently 
in the USA - has been directed at the 'link between crime and the 
built environment' (cf. Murray et al., 1980). Such studies 
occasionally offered familiar conclusions ('not enough is yet known 
about this area ... etc. 
'), but nonetheless suggested eminently 
reasonable and desirable minor policy goals, such as installation of 
better locks as cheap and cost-effective, and the reduction in the 
number of families per floor or per building. In the 
UK, the 
Department of the Environment saw the need for rehabilitation of 
housing estates, including resources for elementary security 
fixtures, 
Considerations,, the State, Private Security and Public 
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as embodied in its Priority Estates Programme. But as Kirsch (1983: 2) 
points out, 
resident caretakers, adequate Direct Labour Organisations to 
cope with speedy repairs, and more council officers based directly on estates and in neighbourhoods are precisely those services which have been hit by the Tory government 
squeeze on rates andd the rate support grant. As for safer designs of new estates, with public housebuilding ground to 
a halt by Tory policy there is a grim irony in this 
suggestion. " 
The point is not that I have 'the answer' but that community action 
and concern that has found a new voice cannot and should not get into 
the dangerous position of talking to itself. It must engage with 
1 ocal government and national levels of policy planning and 
implementation. Correspondingly, the state must - and we must work 
towards ensuring that it does - listen to the small voice from below. 
The issue of private security, and more broadly issues around crime 
prevention and privatisation of various public services, must be 
viewed!, and hence promote realistic responses, within a social, 
economic and political context which contains powerful cross-currents. 
If on this basis the following suggestions seem ambitious it is only 
because there is nothing wrong in having grand goals as long as we 
have the sense to accommodate and work on small-scale incremental 
gains. 
Just broadening the policy focus in one direction would suggest that 
perhaps the insurance industry can provide us with some idea for 
alternative systems of offering forms of financial and social security 
as well as security from crime. This is not to deny the need that 
communities may feel and genuinely experience for increased provision 
of physical security. However, in providing for the 'protection' of 
life, limb and property it is reasonably common and reasonably 
advisable not only to seek a good lock but also a reasonable insurance 
policy of some sort. Yet more desirable would be a universally 
accessible scheme which provided for both physical security and 
insurance. 
According to Pease, (1979: 32): 
"the position of the insurance company is clearly critical 
(in the field of crime prevention), since it is the only 
agency in a position to offer the householder who wishes to 
306 
be insured, financial incentives for crime prevention 
measures, in the form of reduced premiums. " 
Pease goes on to project some imaginary - and imagi native -' futures ' 
for the contribution of insurance to crime prevention. I would like 
to briefly take up one of these futures - one in which the provision 
of a particular kind of insurance is a nationalised enterprise. As 
Pease outlines this particular model: 
"in this future the insurance companies are nationalised. 
Many insurance surveyors join the police as specialised 
crime prevention officers and the crime prevention units 
take over the responsibility of surveying properties for 
theft insurance purposes. Theft insurance on properties 
becomes compulsory along the lines of third party motoring 
insurance and crime prevention officers have annual right of 
access to all properties for the purpose of survey. 
Actuarial rate of the calculation of premiums is available 
but social factors are incorporated into the calculation of 
premiums. In this way, insurance is no longer a fully 
commercial enterprise. For example, those living in inner 
cities are subject to high rates of crime but only low 
premiums are exacted, although premiums do vary with 
precautions taken by the individual property holder. 
Certain classes of citizen,, for example, old age pensioners, 
are allowed free crime prevention devices to bring them to 
the lowest premium rates. Lack of competition between 
companies means that high-risk individuals cannot use their 
insurance brokers in such a way as to allow them to minimise 
the required levels of crime prevention measure. " 
In my conception of this 'future', the insurance industry is 
n ati onal i sed as a whol ly or maj ori ty owned state-di rected enterpri se. 
I say 'directed' because for the purposes of any transition for such a 
complex system of financial institutions, from being a literally 
capital intensive and orientated body to a re-organisation as a system 
of ' social ' security and insurance, then retention of some existing 
expertise and administrative processes would clearly be needed. 
A 
system, not unequatable to a fairer structuration of taxation could 
bring a categorised range of property forms under the provisions of 
legislation requiring subscription to a system of National Property 
Insurance, with subsidy or free subscription in cases of 
the 
unemployed, low-incomed, elderly and so on. A similar arrangement 
could provide for life and health insurance taking 
the kind of 
benefits expected from private schemes into the arena of provision 
given by state schemes. In what would presumably still 
be a mixed 
economy financing of the schemes could come not only 
from the state 
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sector but al so f rom the kind of investment that private insurance 
engages in currently. 
As a medium-term development this is not a far-fetched proposition. 
As Bottoms (1983) observes, schemes set up to provide criminal 
injuries compensation in various Western countries, have 
"run into substantial criticism, especially on the ground 
that if the state is to make grants to the victims of 
misfortune, there is no reason to single out the crime 
victim; rather, it is argued., the movement should be (as in 
New Zealand it has been) towards a more general scheme of 
state insurance and compensation for personal 
injuries 
171) 
Such a shift could be profitably accommodated - in a socially 
profitable and useful way - within a system of Nationalised Insurance. 
Private security, private insurance plans and selective and 
discretionary criminal injuries compensation could provide the basis 
for a nationalised and universally applicable system of provision of 
their whole range of services. 
The cautionary point here lies in the suggestion that Smart (1983: 80) 
finds in Foucault's later work that society has seen, 
"a relative decrease in the significance of techniques of 
discipline, and a concomitant increase in the importance of 
mechanisms of insurance and security; (this) represents the 
insertion of a "principle of cohesion" in the very fabric of 
society, the constitution of a particular kind of 
solidarity. " 
The argument for optimism 1 ies in agreeing that social cohesion has 
i ts desi rabi 1i ty - that what has to be changed and developed is the 
accountability of the institutions which 'shape' that cohesion. 
Another and different "kind of solidarity" can be worked towards, 
constructing and constructed by a different 'social fabric' . 
Significant, realistic and just social change can take place through 
some reorganisation of existing social and economic institutions. 
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Conclusion: Beyond 1984 
Apparently, George Orwell arrived at his choice of year for the 
depiction of the totally surveilled and security-conscious society by 
simply reversing the last two numerals of the year in which he was 
wri ti ng. Hence, the significance of 1984 as a motif for totalitarian 
society was less strict prophesy than simple ironic gesture in the 
hands of a prescient writer. 
I make no claims to be a prescient writer, for here I have only 
reported what has already happened and what might be proposed by way 
of response. Indeed, although there has not been the space to present 
the relevant material, this thesis has been partly premissed upon the 
idea that some significant sense of contemporary trends in social 
control can be made by looking back. Hence, writing in the wake of 
1984 1 look back and, as an 'ironic gesture' (which does not diminish 
the significance of what is said) note a quotation from Phillip 
Selznick writing in 1948,1: 
"Do we need or want agencies of control so efficient ... that every actual offence has an equal chance of being known 
and processed? ... I am concerned that we do not respond too eagerly and too well to the apparent need for effective 
mechanisms of social control. In the administration of 
justice,, if anywhere., we need to guard human values and 
forestall the creation of mindless machines for handling 
cases according to set routines. Here vigilance consists in 
careful study of actual operations so that we may know what 
will be lost or gained .* *11 
(p. 84) 
As I hope to have demonstrated, in the modern spectrum of 
'formal /commercial /private/informal ' dimensions of social control and 
justice, the actual operations of the private security sector have a 
significance demanding very serious vigilance. 
A cal I for the accountability of such agencies is obviously a call for 
the establishment of machinery to administer such a procedure in a 
democratic fashion. A goal might be accountability guaranteed by 
public right of inspection, for example of training, 
information 
collection, operational activities and so on. It would however 
be to 
simply reproduce the '1984' nightmare to follow Bentham's solution 
to 
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the old question of 'who guards the guards ' by pursuing the ideal of 
"omnipresent inspection, of everyone, by everyone. " (Ignatieff, 
1978: 78) 
Beyond 1984 it is precisely this 'future' that democratic 
accountability can and must guard against. 
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Chapter 6- Notes 
This quotation is edited insofar as Selznick refc-rs to 
"impartial" agencies of control - which, as I have tried to show, 
is precisely not the point of private security. 
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